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MEMOIR 

OF THE 


DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 









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a /• :' * 




//.A 


MEMOIR 

ai ^ 

DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 



BY 


CHARLES MAC EARLANE, 

AUTHOR OF “ HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,” 
“ OUR INDIAN EMPIRE,” ETC. 


WITH 


A CONCLUDING CHAPTER, 


0 


“Virtuti3 Fortuna Comes 



Jr 


LONDON: 

GEO. ROUTLEDGE & CO., EARRINGDON STREET. 


1852 






% > 


/ r 


London: 

Printed by Stewart and MUrbAt, 
Old Bailey, 





TO THE 


MAEQUIS OF ANGLESEY, 

THE 

MAEQUIS OF LONDONDEERY, 

THE 

VISCOUNT HAEDINGE, 

AND THE 

OTHER SURVIVORS OF THE BRAVE MEN 
WHO FOUGHT UNDER THE DUKE 
IN THE PENINSULA OR IN THE NETHERLANDS, 

THIS SMALL VOLUME 
IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, 

I i 

BY 


THE AUTHOR, 



PREFACE. 


We cannot afford, now-a-days, to lose great men, for the 
great men of this age are not yet ripe. And yet the power¬ 
ful hand of death tears asunder the bands which bind 
them to us; and though it causes us pain to lose the mighty 
spirits to which we have been so long accustomed to appeal 
in doubtful matters, yet there is a beneficent purpose in 
their removal. The full effects of the strivings of great 
men can scarcely be appreciated until after their death— 
the consequences on the outer world are not complete. In 
the case of the Duke of Wellington, however—whose earthly 
career has closed within these last twenty-four hours—the 
rule would almost appear to be diverged from: his great¬ 
ness seems to have already acted on the world; and so indeed 
it has. 

But the consequences of his decease will place him more 
fully before the world: a more perfect appreciation will 
follow the final touch which leaves the picture of his life 
complete, and the contemplation of that picture will fan the 
flame of patriotism of many a bosom in all the nations of the 



vm 


PREFACE. 


earth; and while his honoured name stands forth the 
greatest of modern generals, other hearts will be warmed 
by the glow of his English feeling into greatness. Great 
men thus make men great. One poet makes more poets; 
one statesman engenders many statesmen ; one general 
brings forth many generals. Thus, if we have one great 
man, he is always of use to us; and though his bodily 
presence is not, we have the consequence of his existence 
ever at hand. 

The Duke of Wellington, then, was not only a benefactor 
to his country and to Europe in quelling the formidable 
insurrection raised by the meanest of heroes—Napoleon 
Bonaparte; but his acts and despatches will remain a 
memorial for the study of the young soldier for ever; and 
when the next relapse into barbarism and mythology shall 
come, the name of Wellington will shine amid the darkness 
as a far more honourable name than that of Charlemagne, 
or even of the much-lauded Greeks. 

One of the reasons of the great Duke’s brilliant success 
and lasting fame is to be found in the fact of his never 
falling into the errors of his predecessors, and indeed, “ no 
man ever yet obtained the lasting renown of a consummate 
general, who committed the same mistakes as had been 
committed in the same position by those before him, who 
suffered great reverses by great improvidences, who never 
rose up again after one discomfiture, or who led forth army 
upon army fruitlessly.” * 

So apt and so excellent are the remarks of the Times 
upon this painful event, that I shall submit a portion of 
them to the reader:— 

“ If aught can lessen this day the grief of England upon 
the death of her greatest son, it is the recollection that the 
life which has just closed leaves no duty incomplete, and no 
honour unbestowed. The Duke of Wellington had ex¬ 
hausted nature and exhausted glory. His career was one 


* Landor, Yforks, vol. ii. p. 4*53. 


PREFACE. 


IX 


Unclouded longest day, filled from dawn to nightfall with 
renowned actions, animated by unfailing energy in the 
public service, guided by unswerving principles of conduct 
and of statesmanship. ... In him, at least, posterity will 
trace a character superior to the highest and most abundant 
gifts of fortune. If the word ‘ heroism’ can be not unfairly 
applied to him, it is because he remained greater than his 
own prosperity, and rose above the temptations by which 
other men of equal genius, but less self-government, have 
fallen below their destinies. His life has nothing to gain 
from the language of panegyric, which would compare his 
military exploits or his civil statesmanship with the prowess 
of an Alexander or a Caesar, or with the astonishing career 
of him who saw his empire overthrown by the British 
general at Waterloo. They were the offspring of passion 
and of genius, flung from the volcanic depths of revolutions 
and of civil war to sweep with meteoric splendour across the 
earth, and to collapse in darkness before half the work of 
life was done. Their violence, their ambition, their romantic 
existence, their reverses, and their crimes, will for ever 
fascinate the interest of mankind, and constitute the secret 
of their fame, if not of their greatness. To such attractions 
the life and character of the Duke of Wellington present no 
analogy. If he rose to scarce inferior renown, it was by 
none of the passions or the arts which they indulged or 
employed. Unvanquished in the field, his sword was never 
drawn for territorial conquest, but for the independence of 
Europe and the salvation of his country. Kaised by the 
universal gratitude of Europe and of this nation to the 
highest point of rank and power which a subject of the 
British monarchy could attain, he wore those dignities and 
he used that influence within the strictest limits of a sub¬ 
ject’s duty. Ho law was ever twisted to his will; no right 
was ever sacrificed by one hair’s breadth for his aggrandize¬ 
ment. There lived not a man either among his countrymen 
or his antagonists who could say that this great Duke had 


X 


PREFACE. 


wronged him; for his entire existence was devoted to the 
cause of legal authority and regulated power. You seek in 
it in vain for those strokes of audacious enterprise which in 
other great captains, his rivals in fame, have sometimes won 
the prize of crowns or turned the fate of nations. But his 
whole career shines with the steady light of day. It has 
nothing to conceal, it has nothing to interpret by the flexible 
organs of history. Everything in it is manly, compact, and 
clear; shaped to one rule of public duty, animated by one 
passion—the love of England, and the service of the 
Crown.” 

In the above remarks the illustrious subject of the follow¬ 
ing memoir is somewhat tritely contrasted to Alexander and 
Caesar, and it seems to me somewhat inappropriately; yet 
nothing more terse or more expressive can be imagined than 
the forcible observations oil the great Duke’s character :— 
“ Other commanders,” says the same writer in another por¬ 
tion of his remarks, “ have attained the highest pitcli of 
glory when they disposed of the colossal resources of em¬ 
pires, and headed armies already flushed with the conquest 
of the world. The Duke of Wellington found no such en¬ 
couragement in any part of his career. At no time were 
the means at his disposal adequate to the ready and certain 
execution of his designs. His steady progress in the Pen¬ 
insular campaigns went on against the current of fortune, 
till that current was itself turned by perseverance and re¬ 
solution. He had a clear and complete perception of the 
dangers he encountered, but he saw and grasped the latent 
power which baffled those dangers, and surmounted resis¬ 
tances apparently invincible. That is precisely the highest 
degree of courage, for it is courage conscious, enlightened, 
and determined. 

“ Clearness of discernment, correctness of judgment, and 
rectitude in action were, without doubt, the principal ele¬ 
ments of the Duke’s brilliant achievements in war, and of 
his vast authority in the councils of his country, as well as 


PREFACE. 


xi 

in the conferences of Europe. They gave to his determina¬ 
tions an originality and vigour akin to that of genius, and 
sometimes imparted to his language in debate a pith and 
significance at which more brilliant orators failed to arrive. 
His mind, equally careless of obstacles and of effect, travelled 
by the shortest road to its end ; and he retained, even in his 
latest years, all the precision with which he was wont to 
handle the subjects which came before him, or had at any 
time engrossed his attention. This was the secret of that 
untaught manliness and simplicity of style that pervades the 
vast collection of his despatches, written as they were amidst 
the varied cares and emotions of war; and of that lucid and 
appropriate mode of exposition which never failed to leave a 
clear impression on the minds of those whom he addressed. 
Other men have enjoyed, even in this age, more vivid 
faculties of invention and contrivance, a more extended 
range of foresight, a more subtle comprehension of the 
changing laws of society and the world. But the value of 
these finer perceptions, and of the policy founded upon them, 
has never been more assured than when it was tried and 
admitted by the wisdom and patriotism of that venerable 
mind. His superiority over other men consisted rather in 
the perfection of those qualities which he pre-eminently 
possessed than in the variety or extent of his other 
faculties.” 

Decidedly his greatest peculiarity was a disdain, nay, al¬ 
most contempt, for the poetry of life. He seems to have 
considered that he had a task to perform, and without think¬ 
ing more about it, he completed it in an efficient and 
satisfactory manner. Yet there was no want of urbanity in 
his disposition; his manner was kind and cordial towards 
everyone, and he never failed to interest himself in behalf of 
any social movement. “ Every social duty, every solemnity, 
every ceremony, every merry-making, found him ready to 
take his part in it. He had a smile for the youngest child, 
a compliment for the prettiest face, an answer to the readiest 




Xll 


PREFACE. 


tongue, and a lively interest in every incident of life, which 
it seemed beyond the power of age to chill. When time had 
somewhat relaxed the sterner mould of his manhood, its 
effects were chiefly indicated by an unabated taste for the 
amusements of fashionable society, incongruous at times with 
the dignity of extreme old age, and the recollections of so 
virile a career. But it seemed a part of the Duke’s charac¬ 
ter, that everything that presented itself was equally wel¬ 
come, for he had become a part of everything, and it was 
foreign to his nature to stand aloof from any occurrence to 
which his presence could contribute. He seems never to 
have felt the flagging spirit or the reluctant step of indo¬ 
lence or ennui , or to have recoiled from anything that re¬ 
mained to be done ; and this complete performance of every 
duty, however small, as long as life remained, was the same 
quality which had carried him in triumph through his cam¬ 
paigns, and raised him to be one of the chief Ministers of 
England and an arbiter of the fate of Europe.”* 

While his opponent Napoleon was raised by chance to 
the high position he occupied in Europe, it is strikingly 
apparent that the contrary was the case in our great 
English soldier. No step was taken, no post obtained, 
without the most intense application; and thus he never 
fell, while the other lived to see himself forgotten. 

“ In the whole of Europe there was one single great man 
opposed to him, wanting all the means of subsistence for an 
army, and thwarted in all his endeavours by those for whose 
liberation he fought. His bugles on the Pyrenees dissolved 
the trance of Europe. He showed the world that military 
glory may be intensely bright without the assumption of 
sovranty, and that history is best occupied with it when 
she merely transcribes his orders and despatches. English¬ 
men will always prefer the true and modest to the false and 
meretricious, and every experienced eye will estimate a 
Vatican fresco more highly than a staircase transparency. 

* Times, September 15, 1832. 


PREFACE. 


• • • 
XIII 

Rudeness, falsehood, malignity, and revenge, have belonged 
in common to many great conquerors, but never to one 
great man.” * Yet these were inherent in Napoleon, though 
the} 7, were far from the glorious liberator of Europe, who 
has quitted this earthly scene for ever. But, indeed, 

“ Death has do conquest o’er this conqueror, 

For now he lives in fame, thought not in life.” f 

The author of this volume had thought fit to conclude 
the memoir with the final military event of his career— 
the Battle of Waterloo ; and, indeed, since that time little 
of consequence has occurred which yet comes within the 
province of the historian. But now, when everything 
relating to the great Duke is of interest, it has been con¬ 
sidered interesting to add a final chapter containing the 
events from 1815 to the present time. 

He died, as he lived, an active man; and, as the Times 
writer well concludes,—“ He never rested on his former 
achievements or his length of days, but marched onwards to 
the end, still heading the youthful generations which had 
sprung into life around him, and scarcely less intent on 
their pursuits than they are themselves. It was a finely 
balanced mind to have worn so bravely and so well. When 
men in after times shall look back to the annals of England 
for examples of energy and public virtue among those who 
have raised this country to her station on the earth, no 
name will remain more conspicuous or more unsullied than 
that of Arthur Weleesley, the great Duke of Wel- 
eington. The actions of his life were extraordinary, but his 
character was equal to his actions. He was the very type 
and model of an Englishman; and, though men are prone 
to invest the worthies of former ages with a dignity and 
merit they commonly withhold from their contemporaries, 
we can select none from the long array of our captains and 
our nobles who, taken for all in all, can claim a rivalry with 

* Landor, Works, vol. ii. p. 459. 
f Shakspeare, King Richard III., Act iii. Scene 1. 


XU 


PREFACE. 


him who is gone from amongst us, an inheritor of imperish¬ 
able fame.” Well we may believe that the life of the 
Duke of Wellington stands alone in history ! 

“ Oh ! let gratitude rise from the humblest of those 
Who have known and respected what still is so dear; 

And the spirit that now has arrived at its close, 

With regard be remember’d—and named with a tear.” * 

September 15, 1852. 


* From an unpublished poem by Charles Phillips, in the writer’s pos¬ 
session. 


CONTENTS, 


BOOK I. 

Birth—Youth—Education—First entrance into the Army—Cam¬ 
paign in Holland—Services in India—Administration of 
Mysore—Battles of Assaye, Argaum, &c.—Affection of the 
Natives — Betum to England—Bombardment of Copen¬ 
hagen, &c.—Civil Appointment in Ireland—First landing 
in Portugal.Page 1 


BOOK n. 

Advance upon Lisbon—Battle of Roliga—Battle of Vimeiro— 
Convention of Cintra—French evacuate Portugal—Sir 
Arthur Wellesley again on Civil Service in Ireland—Takes 
the Chief Command of the Army in Portugal—Drives 
Marshal Soult out of the country—Advance into Spain— 
Battle of Talavera—Skilful Retreat—Advance of Massena 
—Battle of Busaco—Lines of Torres Vedras — Horrible 
Retreat of Massena—Battle of Fuentes de Onoro—Battle of 
Albuera—Skill and bravery of Colonel Hardinge—First 
siege of Badajoz.. 37 





CONTENTS. 


BOOK III. 

Siege and Capture of Ciudad Rodrigo—Capture of Badajoz-— 
Battle of Salamanca—Entrance into Madrid—Siege of 
Burgos—Retreat to Portugal—A sharp lesson to Officers 
—Battle of Vittoria—Advance to the Pyrenees—Battles of 
the Pyrenees—Reduction of St. Sebastian, Pamplona, <fcc. 
Entrance into France—Fighting on the Adour, Nivelle, and 
Five—Further Advance into France—Battle of Orthes— 
Battle of Toulouse—Siege of Bayonne—Peace—The Duke 
at Paris, and at Madrid—Ho nours and rewards . Page 125 


BOOK IV. 

Embassy to Paris—The Duke at the Congress of Vienna— 
Escape of Buonaparte from Elba.—Immense warlike pre¬ 
parations—Battles of Quatre Bras, Eigny, and Waterloo— 
Capitulation of Paris—The English Army in the French 
Capital—Marshal Blucher—Bridge of Jena—Trial and 
Execution of Marshal Ney—Justification of the Duke— 
Character and Eulogium . . .. 211 




Concluding Chapter 


. 251 




MEMOIR 


OF THE 

DUKE OE WELLINGTON. 


BOOK I. 

Our Great Captain was born on the 1st of May 1769, 
a year remarkable for the births of extraordinary men, as, 
besides Wellington, Napoleon Buonaparte, Marshal Soult, 
and Mehemet Ali (the late Pasha of Egypt), were bom 
in 1769. 

Arthur Wellesley was the third surviving son of Garret, 
second Lord Mornington (who was created, in 1760, Yiscount 
Wellesley and Earl of Mornington), by Anne, eldest daughter 
of Arthur Hill-Trevor, Yiscount Dungannon. It is curious 
that any doubts or mistakes should have arisen about the 
actual birthplace of our hero ; but I have seen it variously 
stated,—that he was born in Dungan Castle, in the county 
of Meath ;—that he was bom at his father’s residence, near 
Mornington ;—that he was born in the city of Dublin. 
It is, however, easier to settle the locality, than to decide 
up m the birthplace of Homer. He was certainly born either 
at Dungan or in the Irish capital. The family derived 
their origin from the Cowleys, or Collies, in Rutlandshire, of 
whom two brothers settled in Ireland during the reign of 
Henry VIII. Sir Henry Collie, a son of one of these 
brothers, was noted in the time of Queen Elizabeth as a 
“ sound and fast friend,” “ valiant, fortunate, and a good 
servant,” and for the good order in which he kept his 
county. It is evident he must have been a good man Qf 
business. 

The Earl of Mornington, our hero’s father, was a man of 
most polished manners, and of an amiable and hospitable 
disposition. He showed no fondness for the military pro- 

u 



2 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


fession, took little part in the politics of his times, and 
devoted himself to the study and practice of music, in which 
his tate is said to have been exquidte. I remember hearing, 
in my boyhood, an old Scotch lady speak quite rapturously 
of the Earl’s performance. His taste lor music, with the 
elegance of his manners, and gentleness of his disposition, 
gained him the affection of his young sovereign, George III., 
who loved music always, and almost passionately. It does 
not appear, however, that the fortune of the Lari benefited 
by royal favour. It is always difficult for a court or 
government to do much for a man who shuns the warlike 
professions, and keeps aloof from the turmoils of politics, 
liis lordship composed a good many glees, songs, and 
ballads, most of which were exceedingly popular in their 
day. Some of his church music was also admired, and 
obtained for him, from the Irish University, a doctor’s 
degree. One of his Chants is still echoed in our venerable 

u t , 

cathedrals, and is admired by all lovers of sacred music. 
Five of his glees have retained their great popularity :— 
1. “Hail, hallowed Fane”; 2. “Come, fairest Nymph”; 
3. “Here in cool Grot”; 4. “When for this World’s 
repose”; 5. “Go, happy Shade.” The second of these has 
a fugue of surpassing grace and beauty. The third is still 
included in every collection of glees. A much respected 
friend, well acquainted with this class of music, assures me 
that, on the whole, he prefers Lord Mornington’s composi¬ 
tions to those of Sir Henry Bishop; and that his lordship’s 
knowledge of counter-point, and of music as a science, was 
as profound as his taste was pure. He had begun the study 
of music as a child, his father having been a musician before 
him.* His lordship died, in the prime of life, at his house 
in Kensington, on the 22nd of May 1781, leaving behind 
him an encumbered property, and a large and young family. 
For his rank and station in life, Arthur Wellesley must 
have had some early experience of the res august a do mi ,— 
an experience very likely to prove beneficial to a clear head 
and decided heart like his. The Wellington correspondence 
contains several striking letters addressed to thoughtless, 
extravagant officers, and inculcating lessons of economy and 
good order in accounts. 

The illustrious warrior and statesman is no exception to 
the general rule,—that clever and remarkable men have al¬ 
ways had clever mothers. The widowed Lady Morning'on is 

* See Dailies Barrington, ‘ Miscellanies,’ p. 317, and G. Hogarth, 
‘Musical History,’ 


GAZETTED TO AN ENSIGNCY. 


3 


a.d. 1787.] 

alwavs mentioned not only as a most excellent mother, but 
as a lady of great intellect and acuteness, and of a decision 
of character rarely to be looked for in her sex. No doubt, 
the easy disposition of her husband, and the difficulties in 
which she fomnd herself involved, gave exercise and strength 
to these qualities. The entire management of the family 
property was left to her care, and upon her exertions, 
prudence, and economy, mainly depended the welfare of 
five sons and three daughters. The munificent and mag¬ 
nificent Richard Wellesley, her eldest son, who succeeded to 
the title of Karl of Mornington, and who was afterwards 
Marquess of Wellesley, did not distinguish himself, by order 
in accounts, or by the strictest practice of prudential virtue ; 
but it is ever to be recorded to his honour, that (in most 
cases without any legal necessity) he took upon himself the 
payment of his father’s debts, and discharged them all. 

Arthur was sent, like his eldest brother, Richard, to 
Eton. The traditions of him in the school are, that he 
was a spirited, active boy, yet rather shy and meditative. 
The late facetious Bobus Smith, when Arthur had con¬ 
quered wherever he had fought, used to say, “I was the 
Duke of Wellington’s first victory.” “How?” “Why, 
one day at Eton, Arthur Wellesley and I had a fight, and 
he beat me soundly.” Lord Mornington, who had always 
a strong literary turn, and who distinguished himself in 
early youth by his classical acquirements, was removed from 
Eton to Oxford. Arthur’s tastes were different, and, as he 
intended to be a soldier, he was sent from Eton to the 
Military Academy of Angers, in Franee. England did not 
po-sess, at that time, any military school whatever. Marlow 
College, which preceded the present school at Sandhurst, 
was not formed until after the breaking out of the war with 
France in 1792. In Arthur Wellesley’s time, the Academy 
of Angers, in which many eminent French officers had been 
trained, was under the direction of the celebrated engineer, 
Pignerol, who has left his name to one of the most remarkable 
of the fortresses in the Alps. At this period, Napoleon 
Buonaparte was a student in the Military College of 
Brienne. 

On the 7th of March 1787, a short time before attaining 
his eighteenth year, Arthur Wellesley was gazetted to an 
ensigney in the 73rd regiment, and on the 25th of the 
month of December, in the same year, he was promoted to 
a lieutenancy in the 76th. In order to obtain a perfect 
knowledge of both those arms, he now left the infantry, and 


4 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


served for some time in the cavalry, with the 12th and 18th 
Light Dragoons. His rise in the service was of course 
rapid. By April 1793 he had obtained a majority in the 
33rd regiment, and in September of the same year, he was 
advanced, by purchase, to the lieutenant-colonelcy oi that 
corps, long his favourite regiment. ' i 

Prior to this elevation in the army, he had entered the 
Irish parliament, as member for Trim. According to Sir 
Jonas Barrington, a lively writer, but no very reliable 
authority for facts, he was at this time ruddy faced, and 
juvenile in appearance, popular among the young men ol 
his age and station, but unpolished in his address, and 
evincing no promise of the celebrity that he alter wards 
reached. 

Another writer of early recollections of the Duke, gives a 
somewhat different account. This gentleman first visited 
the gallery of the Irish House of Commons in 1793, being 
accompanied by a friend who knew the persons of all the 
members. He says,—“ A young man, dressed in a scarlet 
uniform, with very large epaulettes, caught my eye, and 
I inquired who he was. ‘ That/ replied my friend, ‘ is 
Captain Wellesley, a brother of Lord Mornington’s, and 
one of the aides-de-camp of the Lord-Lieutenant.’ ‘ I 
suppose he never speaks/ I added. c You are wrong; he 
does speak sometimes, and when he does, believe me, it 
is always to the purpose?’” The subject which occupied 
the attention of the house that night was one of deep 
importance in politics. A farther concession to the claims 
of the Roman Catholics had been recommended in a speech 
from the throne, and an animated debate resulted. Captain 
Wellesley spoke on the occasion, and his remarks were 
terse and pertinent, his delivery fluent, and his manner 
unembarrassed.” * 

Our great soldier’s first active service commenced in May 
1794, when he sailed for Flanders with the 33rd, and 
landed at Ostend to join the British army, under the Duke 
of York, then contending with the French republican 
armies in the Netherlands, with great bravery, but small 
military skill or science. The revolutionary party in the 
country declared everywhere for the French, our Austrian 
allies were slow and unfortunate, the Dutch troops, also 
infected by sans-cullottism, showed neither patriotism nor 

* See W. H. Maxwell, ‘Life of the Duke of Wellington,’ vol. i. p. 10. 
Mr. Maxwell says, lie was indebted for this information to a gentleman 
who afterwards held a high official situation in Ireland. 


1795.] WITH TIIE ARMY UNDER THE DUKE OF YORK. 5 

valour, and a rapid advance of the French, in great force 
under General Pichegru, obliged the British, aiter several 
obstinate engagements, to retire into Holland, and take 
up a position on the right bank of the Waal. In January 
1795, the retreat was continued, through Guelderland and 
Overyssei, to the river Erns, and hence to Bremen, where 
our army was re-embarked for England in the spring. 
During this retreat, through a frozen and cheerless country, 
in the heart of a winter of extraordinary severity, Lieu¬ 
tenant-Colonel Wellesley commanded a brigade in the 
rear-guard,—the post of danger,—and his zeal, intelligence, 
and intrepidity, attracted the notice of General Sir James 
Craig, and other officers in high rank. The sufferings of 
our troops, particularly among the many sick and wounded, 
were as cruel as any that ever fell to the lot of a retreating, 
ill-provided army. Many were frozen to death, many 
dropped and perished through want of food, especially 
during the day and night marches of the 16th and 17th of 
January, when they had to cross the bleak, sandy, treeless, 
houseless districts that intervened between Utrecht and 
the towns of Deventer and Zutphen, in the midst of an 
incessant hurricane of wind, snow, and sleet. 

The whole campaign was rich in that sort of instruction 
which an observing man can always derive from witnessing 
mistakes and blunders. The Duke of York’s army took 
the field like geese on a common ; they had no ideas of cas- 
trametation, and very erroneous ones about the taking-up 
of positions, stationing posts and outposts, and conducting 
marches. They were also slow in their formations; once 
formed they stood like rocks, or, if ordered to the attack, 
they went to it like bull-dogs; but if they were once 
broken or disordered, it w r as no easy matter to form them 
again. They were overloaded with head-gear and heavy 
accoutrements, and their uniforms were made so tight and 
•stiff, that one might have fancied that they had been 
devised on pjirpose to check all quick motion, and to injure 
health, if not to give the men attacks of apoplexy. Our 
army had then no efficient staff of scientific or properly 
educated officers. Nearly everywhere there was a want 
of knowledge and method as to the means of carrying out 
orders. The medical staff was in a deplorable state, and 
the commissariat department was still worse. From the 
time of the Duke of Marlborough, we had never had a 
good commissariat, and half of our military failures, and 
a very large portion of the excess in expense of all our 


6 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


expeditions down to 1809, were attributable to this one 
great want. 

Our hero had at this time,little rest; he returned to 
England in the spring (1795), was busily engaged all the 
summer in getting his much-reduced regiment into an eilec- 
tive state, and in the autumn he embarked with the 33rd 
for the West Indies. But, after being tossed at sea for more 
than live weeks, and sustaining serious damages, the fleet — 
commanded by Admiral Christian—was obi ged to return to 
England. The 33rd regiment was landed and sent to Poole, 
where, in April 1796, it was embarked, not for the West, 
but for the East Indies. Colonel Wellesley (he was pro¬ 
moted to the rank of full colonel in the month of M y of 
this year) was detained at home by a serious illness, but he 
joined his regiment at the Cape of Good Hope, and proceeded 
with it to Calcutta. He arrived at our Indian capital early 
in February 1797, and was placed with the 33rd on the 
Bengal establishment. 

A venerable and a much-revered friend, who was in Cal¬ 
cutta at this time, and who afterwards filled a high post in 
the civil service, tells me that his recollections of Colonel 
Wellesley are these:—that he was a handsome and most 
soldierlike man, with an eye that looked you through and 
through ; that he was cheerful, free of speech, and expan¬ 
sive among his particular friends, but rather reserved in 
general society; that he would often sit in a corner of 
the splendid saloon in the government-house, silent and 
abstracted for an hour at a time, and then pace up and 
down the room with quick impatient steps. “ It was quite 
evident,” says my old friend, “ that he was impatient of 
monotony and inactivity, and was longing for something 
to do.” 

This inactivity did not last long. On the 17th of May 
1798, his elder brother, the Earl of Mornington, arrived at 
Calcutta, as Governor-General of India. His lordship’s, 
predecessor, Sir John Shore, a timid pacific governor- 
general, had allowed our enemies in the East to raise 
their heads, and to assume an attitude of insolency and 
menace, if this timid line of policy had been pursued 
much longer, our dominion in India would have been in 
jeopardy. 

One of the first objects that required Lord Mornington’s 
attention, was the equivocal attitude of Tippoo, Sultan of 
Mysore, who had repeatedly infringed his treaties with the 
English, and was now intriguing with General Buonaparte 


7 


1799.] BATTLE OP MALLAVELLY. 

and the French, with the hope and expectation of bringing 
a French army to assist him in conquering the whole of the 
south of India. 

“In the month of June a proclamation of the French 
governor of the Isle of France announced the arrival of two 
ambassadors from Tippoo, to propose an alliance, offensive 
and defensive, for the purpose of expelling the English from 
India, in consequence of which a number of Frenchmen 
volunteered to join the Sultan, and were taken to Manga¬ 
lore in a French ship of war. These movements of Tippoo 
were connected with the French expedition to Egypt. The 
Earl of Mornington wrote several conciliatory letters to 
Tippoo, to induce him to settle any pending controversy 
between him and the East India Company by means of 
negotiation, but at the same time he did not neglect to pre¬ 
pare for offensive operations, and in November an army 
was assembled at Vellore, under the command of General 
Harris, ready to enter the Mysore territory at the first 
notice. Colonel Wellesley, with his regiment, formed part 
of this force, The army was joined by a large contingent 
from the Nizam of the Deccan, an ally of the English ; and 
ns the court of Hyderabad expressed a wish that the brother 
of the Governor-General should be appointed to the com¬ 
mand of the contingent, General Harris ordered the 33rd 
regiment to be attached to the Nizam’s force, the general 
command of which was given to Colonel Wellesley. As 
Tippoo declined to enter into negotiations, and was evidently 
trying to gain time, the allied British and native army was 
ordered to advance into Mysore, which they entered early 
in March 1799. On the -27th an engagement took place, in 
which the left wing of the allies, under Colonel Wellesley, 
routed a body of Tippoo’s choice infantry.”* 

This affair was very hot while it lasted : at one time many 
of the enemy’s light cavalry penetrated the intervals in the 
English line; but the affair was finished by a bayonet 
charge of the 33rd, led on by their colonel. This is called 
the battle of Mallavelly. After it our army advanced to 
Seringapatam, the capital of Tippoo, who was covering it with 
50,000 men, while nearly 20,000 more were collected within 
the fortifications. General Harris’s force, counting Euro¬ 
peans, sepoys, and all arms, did not much exceed 20,000 men. 

* The Military Life of the Duke of "Wellington, by Andre Vieusseux, 
Esq.—A very short but admirable epitome, by a gentleman who saw some 
good service under the Duke, in Portugal. It was published, in 1811, in 
Mr. Charles Kuiglit’s ‘Store of Knowledge.’ 


8 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Colonel Wellesley was now employed to dislodge the 
enemy from some very strong posts and outworks in front 
of toe town. There was a tope or mound (called the 
Sultaun-Pettah Tope) which was intended by Tippoo tor 
rocketing, and which was well situated for doing mischief, 
but between the tope and our camp there was a greater 
elevation — the bank of a nullah or water-course—which 
commanded the tope. General Harris ordered that both 
the tope and nullah should be attacked, and appointed 
Colonel Wellesley to storm the tope, and Colonel Shaw 
to attack the nullah. Both attacks were to be made at 
the same time under cover of night. On receiving his 
order, Wellesley wrote the following letter —the first of 
the many hundreds of his letters which are now published, 
and which were written with haste in moments of danger 
and crisis. It is eminently characteristic, showing his per¬ 
spicacity, energy, and love of brevity. 

To Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in Chief. 

“ Camp, April 5,1790. 

“ My dear Sir, 

“I do not know where you mean the post to he established, 
and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the 
favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and 
show it to me. In the mean time, I will order my battalions 
to be in readiness. 

“Upon looking at the tope, as I came in just now, it 
appeared to me, that when you get possession of the bank of 
the nullah, you have the tope, as a matter of course, as the 
latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the 
best judge ; and I shall be ready. 

“ I am, dear Sir, 

“ Your most faithful servant, 

“ Arthur Wellesley. 

Lieut.-General Harris.” 

As General Harris did not see fit to alter the plan he had 
formed, both attacks were made in darkness—and both 
failed. Colonel Wellesley, with only one company of his 
regiment, got separated from the rest; isolated, assailed in 
the tope by rockets and by musketry, and the groping 
about in the dark without a knowledge of the ground, and 
without a guide, the career of our great Captain was near 
being closed most prematurely. It may be doubted whether, 


AT THE SIEGE OF SEEING At* AT AM. 


9 


1799 .] 

in all liis campaigns, he was ever exposed to more danger 
than during this unlucky night of the 5th of April 1799. On 
the 6th, the assaults were renewed by broad daylight, and 
were then attended with entire success. Lieutenant-colonel 
Barry C ose, who had accompanied Colonel Wellesley on 
this service, soon returned to General Harris’s tent, saying 
joyfully, “It has been done in high style, and without 
loss.”* 

All the outworks being carried, approaches were made, 
and heavy batteries raised against the fortress, Colonel 
Wellesley commanding in the trenches, and performing 
other arduous duties. On the 3rd of May, when the breach 
was practicable, the place was stormed by Major-General 
Baird, with a party consisting of 2,500 Europeans, and 
1,800 natives. There was desperate fighting in the breach 
and upon the ramparts, and even in the interior of the 
town; but the English flag was soon hoisted over all. It 
was a long time, however, before General Baird could ascer¬ 
tain what had become of Tippoo. At last, one of the 
Sultan’s officers assured Major Allan that he had been 
wounded during the storm, and was lying in a gateway on 
the north face of the fort. Conducted by this officer, 
Colonel Welledey (who had come up from the trenches 
some time before), Major-General Baird, Major Allan, and 
others, proceeded to the gate. The gateway, arched over¬ 
head, was long and dark, and choked up with dead bodies. 

“ The number of the dead, and the darkness of the place,” 
says Major Allan, “ made it difficult to distinguish one per¬ 
son from another; and the scene was altogether shocking. 
But, aware of the great political importance of ascertaining, 
beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the 
bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killedar and 
two other persons were desired to examine them one after 
another. This, however, appeared endless; and, as it was 
now becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accom¬ 
panied the killedar into the gateway. During the search, 
we discovered a wounded person lying under the Sultan’s 
palanquin; this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah 

* On the authority of General Harris’s private Journal, and of Colonel 
Gurwood’s ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ I omit, as altogether fabulous, two 
or three circumstances relating to Colonel Wellesley, which the late Mr. 
Theodore Hook imprudently inserted in his ‘ Life of General Sir David 
Baird.’ It appears that these circumstances were never heard of until 
years after the siege of Seringapatam. These stories are all cast in an 
old type. We have seen in French books, and have heard from French 
lips, tales about young Buonaparte skulking at the siege of Toulon, 


10 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


Khan, one of Tippoo’s confidential servants. He had at¬ 
tended his master during the whole of the day, and, on 
being made acquainted with the object of our search, pointed 
out the spot wnere the Sultan had fallen. By a faint, glim¬ 
mering light, it was difficult for the killedar to recognise 
the features; but the body being brought out, and satis¬ 
factorily proved to be that of the Sultan, was conveyed in a 
palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognised by 
the eunuchs and other servants of the family. When 
Tippoo was first brought from under the gateway his eyes 
were open, and his body was so warm that for a few 
moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whe¬ 
ther he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart, that 
doubt was removed. He had four wounds; three in the 
body, and one in the temple.”* 

Our loss, during the siege and storm, was found to be 
greater than had been anticipated. It amounted to sixty- 
seven officers, and S03 British soldiers, in killed and 
wounded; and 539 natives, in killed and wounded. Though 
joined by other troops, General Harris had never more than 
20,000 men actually occupied in the siege, and the divisions 
which carried the place did not count many more than 4,000 
men. The severity of their loss infuriated our soldiery. 
When the confusion began to subside, General Baird desired 
to be relieved, and Colonel Wellesley, being next on the 
roster, was ordered to take the command of the place. This 
is the simple explanation of facts which have been mis¬ 
represented by malice and ignorance. General Baird had 
certainly not restored order; the troops were plundering the 
houses of the town, and committing those other excesses 
which too often accompany or follow the operation of storm¬ 
ing. It is amusing, however, to observe that one of our great 
Captain’s first cares, as commandant of Seringapatam, was 
about certain wild beasts which Tippoo “the Tiger” had kept 
as pets in his palace. On the morning of the 5th of May, 
he wrote to General Harris :—“ There are some tigers here, 
which I wish Meer Allum would send for, or else I must give 
orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and 
nobody to attend to them, and they are getting violent.” A 
little later in the day, he wrote to Harris:—“I wish you 
would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. 

* Major Allan’s own account, as given by Colonel Ecatson, in ‘ Narra¬ 
tive of the Operations of the Array under Lieutenant-General Harris, anil 
of the Siege of Seringapatam 


11 


1799 .] APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN MYSORE. 

Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to 
expect to stop the plunder.” On the afternoon of the same 
day, he desp itched another note, saying,—“ Things are better 
than they were, but they are still very bad , and, until the 
provost executes three or four people, it is impossible to 
expect order, or, indeed, safety.” But on the morning of 
the 6th he was enabled to write to his commander:— 
“Plunder is stopped, the tires are all extinguished, and the 
inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now 
employed in burying the dead.” llis exertions had been 
incessant, and his humanity to the inhabitants could not 
have been surpassed. He went himself to the houses of the 
principal families, and posted guards to take care of them. 
The provost-marshal had hanged four marauders, and an 
end had been thereby put to plundering.* 

A few days after, General Harris directed a regular gar¬ 
rison for Seringapatam, and appointed Colonel Wellesley to 
the command of it; and the Governor-General afterwards 
appointed him governor of that part of the Mysore territory 
which was placed under British authority and protection. 
It is at this time that the correspondence contained in the 
‘Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington,’ lately published, 
begins. 

During several years that he held the command in 
Mysore, he was fully occupied in organizing the civil and 
military administration of the country; and in the execution 
of this task he improved his natural talents for business, 
military and civil, in all their details, and displayed that 
quickness of perception, and that sagacity and self-command, 
which have characterized him throughout the whole course 
cf his military career. From the beginning, also, he paid 
particular attention to the wants of his soldiers, to the 
regularity of the supply of provisions, to the management 
of the hospitals, and to all the particulars of the commis¬ 
sariat and quartermaster-general’s departments, which con¬ 
stitute half the business of an army, and, to use his own 
words, if neglected, “misfortune and disgrace will be the 
result.” In the mean time also, by his justice and hu¬ 
manity, ana the strict discipline that he maintained among 
the troops, he acquired the confidence of the native popula¬ 
tion of Seringapatam, who, some years after, on his return 
from the campaign of Assaye, presented to him an affecting 
address, in which “they implored the God of all castes and 
of ali nations to hear their constant prayer, that, whenever 
* ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol, i. 


12 


MEMOIR or THE DUKE. 


greater affairs might call him away from them, to bestow on 
him health, glory, and happiness.” * 

“ To this hour,” says Captain Moyle Slierer (who wrote 
about twenty-two years ago), “ the memory of all these 
services, and more particularly of those which he rendered 
to the terrified and desolate natives in the moment of our 
triumph and their distress, is cherished by the aged inhabi¬ 
tants of Seringapatarn with a grateful feeling, with which 
we are unwilling to disconnect the after-successes of Colonel 
Wellesley’s life.” f 

The Colonel had not long been military commandant of 
Seringapatarn, ere he devoted his attention to the apparently 
alien subject of finance, coinage, and exchanges, and pre¬ 
pared a paper, in which he gave proof that he had studied 
the subjects, and that he “ was not less able to project a 
measure of finance in the closet, than to guide a column in 
the field.” This aptitude for business had been remarked 
before by those who enjoyed his intimacy ; and his brother, 
the Earl of Mornington, is reported to have said,—“ I 
believe Arthur’s great strength to be rather in the civil 
than in the military line.” As a specimen of the versatility 
of his talents and of his financial abilities, and at the same 
time of his general plain idiomatic style, I give, nearly at 
full length, the following letter; merely premising, that 
some of our officers wanted to fix the value of money in a 
way as unwise and impracticable, as it would have been 
arbitrary :— 

To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 

“ Seringapatarn, Dec. 28,1799. 

“ My dear Colonel, .... 

“I have written to Campbell a long letter about the nerrick 
(rate) of exchange, in which I have endeavoured to explain 
the principles of the whole system of shroffing (banking), 
against the evils of which his regulations are to guard. 
From what I am going to mention to you, however, I am 
afraid that if the nerrick at Bangalore is permanently fixed, 

* ‘Dispatches,’ vol. iii. p. 420. Andre Vieusseux, ‘Military Life of 
the Duke, of Wellington.’ 

f Captain (afterwards Major) Slierer spoke thus of his own knowledge, 
lie had served in India, as well as under the Duke in the Peninsular war. 

I knew him well in 1830, when he was publishing his Military Memoirs 
of the Duke; and I would take even this faint opportunity of recording 
my respect for a brave, humane, accomplished, and sincerely devout officer , 
whose too great susceptibility made him the victim of the most awful 
malady that can afflict human nature. 


FINANCIAL ABILITY. 


13 


1799.] 

I must loosen my system here, and must allow the exchange 
to fluctuate. 

“ In all the conversations which you and I have had 
upon this intricate subject, we have agreed that the shrotF 
(banker) derived a profit only by fluctuations. It is, there¬ 
fore, clear that in Seringapatam there is no, or but little, 
profit; and that there would be no shroffs here, if they did 
not find one elsewhere, or that they would combine to force 
me to allow the exchange to fluctuate. I have lately made 
inquiries upon the subject, and I find that the great shroffs* 
here have houses at Bangalore, at Sera, and at the principal 
places on the Malabar coasts, and they make their profit by 
the fluctuation at those places. 

“ Seringapatam is a place of great security, where there is 
much trade, and, of course, exchange of money. In order 
to have this security, the shroffs forego the advantages 
which they would derive upon the fluctuation in the ex¬ 
change; and they have all the advantages of the fluctuation 
at places at no great distance, where the exchange is not 
fixed. But fix that exchange, and there is an end of their 
means of livelihood ; and, of course, they must either aban¬ 
don the trade entirely, or force me to allow a fluctuation in 
the place where they carry it on. 

“ I doubt whether the destruction of our fixed nerrick at 
Seringapatam will not be an inconvenience to the country, 
as well as to us: and therefore nothing ought to be done 
which can endanger it. 

“ Let me know your opinion upon this subject. There is 
no reason, however, why Campbell should not now alter the 
nerrick, so as to make it more convenient to Purneah. 

“One of the principles resulting from the position that the 
shroff’s profit is made by fluctuation is, that if the exchange, 
is fixed, it is immaterial what proportions of gold, silver, 
and copper are exchanged for one another. The Company’s 
exchange, therefore, is as convenient as any other, and as 
near the standard relative value of the three metals ; and as 
the fixation of the nerrick was readily adopted by the 
shroffs in Seringapatam, in the same manner, if the ex¬ 
change is allowed to fluctuate from month to month in any 
place, provided the shroffs can know in one month what 
value, relatively to each other, the different coins in use will 
bear in the next, it is immaterial to them what the value is. 

* Shroff', originally a Persian word, is only a modification of the well- 
known Turkish word seraff' (banker). Shroff appears to be peculiar to 
Southern India, At this time the bankers in Bengal were called seiis. 


14 


MEMOIR OF TUE DUKE. 


By means of their correspondents and connections in other 
places, they will be prepared for, and will gain by it. 

“ What I should recommend would be, that Campbell 
should tix a reasonable nerrick, and inform the shrotis tnat 
in fifteen days that shall have effect; and then fix another, 
which he must likewise communicate to them, and inform 
them that that must have effect in the following month. 
Thus he will free himself from a part of the grievance felt, 
at the same time that his operations will not affect us here, 
I shall not relieve your cavalry for some time. 

“ Believe me, &c., 

“ Arthur Wellesley.” * 

tc Lieutenant-Colonel Close.” 

Early in the year 1800, Colonel Wellesley was called from 
these peaceful operations into the field, by a daring robber- 
chief, named Doondiati Waugh. This man, of Patau or 
Mahratta origin, had served in the armies of Ilyder and 
Tippoo. He had deserted the Mysoreans during their -war 
with Lord Cornwallis in 1790, and had placed himself at 
the head of a fierce and numerous body of banditti in the 
wild country near the Toombudra river. By stratagem 
Tippoo had caught him, and he was immured in one ot the 
dungeons of Seringapatam when we took the place. On the 
very day of the assault he was imprudently released by some 
of our soldiers, toget her with other prisoners, who might claim 
a better right to the liberty. Returning to his old avo¬ 
cations of plunder and murder, he was joined by some of 
Tippoo’s disbanded cavalry, by his former associates, and 
by other desperate men. He obtained and kept possession 
of. some of the principal towns in Bednore, and soon made 
himself formidable in that fertile country and the neigh¬ 
bouring territories. With a weak enemy to contend with, 
Dhoondiah, like Ilyder, might have founded a royal dynasty. 
But Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple and Colonel Stevenson 
were sent against him with some light infantry and some 
light horse, and by the middle of August 1799, the banditti 
and their chief had been cut up, or driven out of Bednore. 
But Dhoondiah, having fled across the frontier of the Mah¬ 
ratta territory, which Lord Mornington would not at present 
allow to be violated, found friends and sympathizers among 
the Mahrattas, and soon reappeared in the field of carnage, 
stronger than before. The various operations against him 
cost Wellesley more trouble and exertion, and exposed him 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches/ vol, i. p, 50. Edition of 1837. 


WAR WITH BANDITTI. 


15 


1800.] 

to more personal danger, than any of his campaigns against 
regular armies. In February 1800, a i'eliow waited upon 
him, at Seringapatam, and informed him that he had 
come from the Mahratta country with a gang engaged by 
Dhoondiah to murder him, or carry him off when he should 
go out hunting. He desired the robber to go and join his 
gang ag un, and promised him a good reward if lie would 
enable him to surprise and capture them ; but to show how 
little he feared the gang, he went out hunting as usual on 
the morrow. One of his aides-de-camp fancied he saw some 
twenty men on horseback, lurking about the jungle ; but if 
the robbers were really there, they did nothing. By active 
movements, some small bands were soon surprised, but still 
the force of the banditti increased and swelled. “Nothing,” 
says Captain Sherer, “is more remarkable in India than the 
magic growth of a predatory force. A single adventurer, with 
no purse, no possession but horse and sword, if he has once 
rode at the head of a body of freebooters, and got a name for 
activity and fortune, is sure to be sought out and followed by 
all whose feet are ‘swift to shed blood, and to divide the 
spoil.’ The speck, scarcely visible or noticed in the far dis¬ 
tance, approaches, and, behold, a heavy cloud, black with 
the menace of destruction! Thus, Dhoondiah rode south 
again with 5,000 horse, and threatened the frontier of 
Mysore.” The robber-chief had by this*time assumed the 
royal title, and in extra or double style, for he called himself 
“ The King of the Two Worlds.” This was in the month 
of April, when Colonel Wellesley was absent on the Malabar 
coast, but a force was immediately ordered to take the 
field, and he was appointed to the command of it. At the 
end of May, when the troops were ready, he wrote to his 
brother, the Governor -general:—“Dhoondiah is certainly 
a despicable enemy, but from circumstances he is one 
against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable 
preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this 
country, and of Canara and Malabar, that that man should 
he given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you 
will have made a demand for him upon the government of 
Poona. If we do not get him, we must expect a general 
insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these 
countries. I have information that letters have been 
received by most of them, either from him or from others 
written in his name, calling upon them to take the oppor¬ 
tunity to rebel against the Company’s government ; and his 
invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance 


1G 


MEMOIR OP THE PUKE. 


favourable to their views. The destruction of this man, 
therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and 
nothing will be more easy, if the Mahrattas are really dis¬ 
posed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a 
matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether 
the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to 
this one object.”* It was clear, that if these robbers crossed 
the Toombudra river, such an injury would be indicted on 
Mysore as would require years to remedy it. Wellesley, 
therefore, declined the popularity and the profit of an ex¬ 
pedition to the island of Batavia, which the Governor- 
general proposed to him, in company with Admiral Rainier 
and the fleet, declaring that, if Dhoondiah were not pre¬ 
viously disposed of, no prospect of advantage or of credit to 
be gained should induce him to quit Mysore.f Dhoondiah 
had an asylum in the Mahratta country. Wellesley recom¬ 
mended that the English should go through with the 
business until that man was given up, even though it were 
found necessary to cross the Mahratta frontier in pursuit of 
him, which could scarcely he done without risking a quarrel 
with the Peishwa, or the court of Poona. His brother, the 
Governor-general, authorized him to enter the Mahratta 
territory, it being evident that the Peishwa was either 
unable or unwilling to put down the great depredator. 
Our troops had been already collected on the Toombudra, 
there being nothing effectual to be done towards destroying 
Dhoondiah, or dispersing his force, without crossing that 
frontier river. Towards the end of June, Wellesley 
joined the troops, crossed the river, and proceeded in person 
against the freebooters. Some of the Mahratta chiefs, in¬ 
stead of resenting the infringement pf their frontiers, now 
took the field, to co-operate with the English commander. 
But Dhoondiah and his light-footed bands moved from place 
to place with great rap dity, taking and plundering several 
towns, and distancing the British sepoys. On the 30th of 
June, the robbers defeated one of the Mahratta chiefs in a 
pitched battle. Goklah, the Mahratta chief, was killed in 
the affair; but the majority of his troops kept together, 
and seemed to be determined to continue their co-operation 
with the English. Proposals were made, not otdy at the 
Nizam’s court at Hyderabad, but also to Wellesley, to 
take off* Dhoondiah by means of a plot and assassination. 
“ Such an arrangement,” said the British commander, “ may 
suit very well at Hyderabad, but I think it unbecoming an 
* ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. i. p, 133. f Id., vol. i, p.133. 


1800.] A HOT CHASE. 17 

officer at the head of a body of troops, and I, therefore, de- 
cl lie to have anything more to do with the business than 
to hold out a general encouragement. . . . Government 

have authorized me to offer a reward for him, and I propose 
to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, 
and I find that Ins people begin to drop off from him. This 
will be, in my opinion, the fittest period. To offer a public 
reward by proclamation for a man’s life, and to make a secret 
bargain to have it taken away, are very different things : the 
one is to be done ; the other, in my opinion, cannot, by an 
officer at the head of trie troops.”* Throwing a bridge over 
the river Werdah, and constructing a redoubt lor its security, 
Wellesley stretched forward towards Hoondgul and Bud- 
naghur, being joined in his route by a good many Mahrattas, 
wbo had suffered severely from Dhoondiah’s rapacious and 
cruel banditti. Tiiat robber, however, was deemed so strong, 
and so confident, that it was reported on the lltli of July, 
that he was coming down to meet the English force. “It 
he does come,” said Wellesley, “I shall certainly dash at 
him immediately.” And on the 13th, Dhoondiah came down 
with his whole army and his guns, to within four miles of 
Wellesley’s camp, then at Savanore. He examined the camp 
for some time, from a hill, and then retired. On the morn¬ 
ing of the 14th, Wellesley threw his baggage into Savanore, 
and inarched, with five days’ provisions, as light as pos¬ 
sible, to Hoondgul. But Dhoondiah had flitted away to the 
jungles, behind Dummul. He had, however, left a garrison, 
of about 600 men, in Hoondgul, which was surrounded and 
stormed on the evening of the I4th, with but trifling loss 
to the Company’s troops. On the loth, Wellesley marched 
about seventeen miles to the eastward, to another Maliratta 
town, which had been seized by the robbers, but which was 
evacuated. On the next day, the British made another long 
inarch to another town, which Dhoondiah’s bands had been 
besieging for some weeks in the country manner. The siege 
was raised, and the besiegers fled towards the hills and 
forests. For want of sufficient cavalry, Wellesley could not 
pursue the fugitives; but Dhoondiah’s people now began to 
desert him in numbers, and the Government proclamation, 
offering a reward of 30,000 rupees for his head, was now 
issued. Moreover, another corps, under Colonel Bowser, 
was coining up in another direction, and Colonel Stevenson 
was marching against the robbers from another quarter. 
On the night of the 19th of July, Wellesley was joined by 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches.’ 


c 


18 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Groklali’s Mahratta Cavalry, about 1,000, strong; but, un¬ 
luckily, the draught and carriage bullocks fell sick, and 
his progress was delayed by losing one-half of them. The 
British commander was employed for some clays in getting 
fresh cattle and arranging them in departments for the ser¬ 
vice of the army. Several times, Dhoondiah was very near 
him, though he could not be seen. As soon as Wellesley 
was enabled to resume bis march, he pressed forward for 
Dummul. This was a strong, stone fort, well built, with a 
dry ditch. A garrison which Dhoondiah had left in it, 
seemed disposed to offer a stout resistance, but on the morn¬ 
ing of the 26th of July, Wellesley stormed the fort in three 
places, and carried it with a trifling loss, which was chiefly 
attributable to the breaking of the scaling ladders. After 
this success, he made three forced marches; and on the 
evening of the 80th of July, he surprised an encampment 
and the main division of Dhoondiah’s forces (which was 
then preparing to cross over the Malpoorba river), drove 
into the river or destroyed everybody that was in the cam]), 
took an elephant, several camels, bullocks, horses, and in¬ 
numerable families, women, children, &c. Dhoondiah was 
believed not to have been with this part of his army; but 
Bubber Jung, one of his chief men, was in the camp, put on 
his armour of mail to fight, mounted his horse, and rode him 
into the river, where he was drowned. Great numbers met 
with the same fate. In all, 5,000 men were driven into the 
river, or otherwise destroyed. On the next morning, some 
English soldiers swam across the river, which was both 
broad and rapid, seized a boat, and got possession of the six 
guns on the opposite hank. Both boat and artillery were 
given to the Mahrattas to keep them in good humour. 
After this catastrophe, Dhoondiah, with the whole of his 
remaining force, fled along the hanks of the Malpoorba to¬ 
wards the jungles of Kittoor and Soonda. lie could not 
cross the river for want of boats, and was thus ascending to 
its source. He was closely f ollowed by the corps of Bowser 
and Stevenson, which had now come up; and Wellesley and 
His Mahratta allies moved on the flank of these corps, so as 
to sweep the whole country, to the distance of fifteen miles 
from the river, and prevent Dhoondiah from doubling on 
any of his pursuers, or from fleeing between them. “ If 
he goes into the jungles,” wrote Wellesley, on the 3rd of 
August, “we shall easily come up with his rear; if he takes 
to the plain, I will cross upon him with my detachment.” 
The robbers moved so rapidly that, though Colonel Steven- 


THE CHASE CONTINUED. 


10 


1800.] 


son got close upon their tail, he could never cut it off: they 
went quite into the jungles, and beyond the sources of the 
Malpoorba, and then took to the country on the right bank 
of that river, and between it and the Gutpoorba. The 
transport of the guns and stores of a regular army, by such 
a route as Dhoondiah had taken, must have been attended 
with great difficulties. Wellesley, therefore, preferred wait¬ 
ing till boats could be constructed, by which he could cross 
the river many miles below its source. A detachment from 
Colonel Stevenson’s corps, however, still followed Dhoon¬ 
diah s track, and found the road covered with dead camels, 
dead bullocks, and people. Colonel Bowser got across the 
Malpoorba, and advanced to Shapoor, where he found sad 
evidence of the atrocities which had been committed by the 
flying robbers. Wellesiey crossed the river on the IGth, “to 
give Dhoondiah one more run between the Gutpoorba and 
the Malpoorba.” “I think,” added he, “ that I shall have a 
chance of picking up some baggage, Ac.; but it is clear that 
I shall never catch him.” Dhoondiah was now in a bad way, 
his people were starving, and leaving him, and reproaching 
him with their misfortunes. He was retorting, and telling 
them to give up their wives and daughters to the European" - , 
whom they were afraid to fight. Even the Patans, the men 
of his own fierce race and tribe, and the hardiest and most 
brutal of all the adventurers in India, were leaving him 
fast. 


At this moment, Wellesley had finished his arrangements, 
so as to be able to press upon him in a few days upon all 
points at once. Several forts were reduced along the banks 
of the Malpoorba, and the passes of the river most likely to 
be fordable were guarded by the Mahrattas. But in spite 
of every precaution, Dhoondiah and his followers returned 
suddenly to the bank, crossed the Malpoorba, which had 
fallen earlier in the season than was usual, at a ford a little 
above its juncture with the Kistna, and made off with all 
speed to throw themselves into the Deccan, and ravage that 
country of our ally and dependant. The Malirattas who 
had been placed at the ford would neither face nor follow 
the marauders, who left behind them a great quantity of 
provisions, arms, ammunition, &c. Ten thousand brin- 
jarrees were also taken by Wellesley, who must have caught 
Dhoondiah on the bank of the river, if the Mahrattas at 
the fort had done their duty. These brinjarrees ^ave a 
curious account of Dhoondiah’s system. They told the 
English commander that the robber still had about 40,000 

c 2 


20 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


of their class in his interest; that nearly all the brinjarrees 
of this part of India,‘and many on the Deccan, were devoted 
to his service. Dhoondiah employed them, and gave them 
the means of living and of making good profits in the lol- 
lowing manner:—When he appro idled a village or a town 
which was unprotected by a lort, he sent a body of horse 
and of brinjarrees, to levy a contribution, lie took to him¬ 
self all the money be could get, and gave them at a certain 
low price all the grain and all the cattle they could find; 
and they afterwards resold the grain and cattle at such 
profits as his camp would afford. With a trade so profitable 
to themselves, the brinjarrees shut their eyes to the devas¬ 
tations which Dhoondiah committed. 

Colonel Wellesley lost no time in following up the 
marauders. Crossing the Malpoorba on the 3rd Septem¬ 
ber, be entered the Nizam’s territory on the 5tli. Not a 
few of the Nizam’s own officers betrayed him and his 
English allies, doing all that they could to mislead Wel¬ 
lesley and our other commanders. Colonel Stevenson arid 
some Mahratta and Mogul cavalry now stretched across 
the country, in order to prevent a rep tition of Dhoondiah’s 
successful movement. On the 9th of September, the robber 
moved from a camp which he had occupied for some days 
towards the Kistna; but on his road he discovered Colonel 
Stevenson’s camp, which he could not hope to pass with¬ 
out fighting. He therefore returned by the way he had 
come, and encamped about nine miles in Wellesley’s front, 
not knowing that that part of the pursuing army was so 
near him. On the evening of the 10th of September, Wel¬ 
lesley moved forward, and met Dhoondiah and his army 
at a place called Conaligul. Dhoondiah was then oil his 
march to the westward, apparently with the design of passing 
between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry, and the detach¬ 
ments under Wellesley, which last he supposed to be fifteen 
miles off. Almost as soon as he was seen, lie was attacked 
by the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of 
native cavalry. Iiis entire force consisted of cavalry, appa¬ 
rently about 5,000 strong : he was strongly posted with his 
rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of 
Conaligul. His people stood for some time with apparent 
firmness ; but, such was the rapidity and determination of 
the charge made by our four regiments, that all of them soon 
gave way, and were pursued across the country for many 
miles. In order to equalize the length of their line, Welles¬ 


ley had resorted to tiie hold expedient of forming his lour 


DEFEAT AND DEATH OF DHOONDIAH. 


21 


1800.] 

regiments, and charging in one line. Many of the marauders 
and Dhoondiah himself vveie killed: all the rest were dis¬ 
persed and scattered in small parties over the face of the 
country. Part of the baggage had been left in the camp in 
the rear, from which Dhoondiah had moved only an hour 
before the battle began. All this, with elephants, camels, 
&c., was captured by the English cavalry. Among the 
baggage was found a son of Dhoondiah, a boy about four 
years old. He was conveyed to Wellesley’s tent, where every 
care was taken of him.* When Sir Arthur left India, he 
placed in the hands of Colonel Symmonds, the judge and 
collector at Seringapatam, some hundred pounds for the use 
of the boy. When Colonel Symmonds retired from service, 
the Honourable Arthur Cole, the resident at the court of 
Mysore, took charge of him, and placed him in the ra all’s 
service. Salabut Khan, as he was named, grew up a line, 
handsome, intelligent youth.j* 

Thus ended the dominion and career of the King of the 
Two Worlds. “ Had you and your regicide army been out 
of the way,” wrote Sir Thomas Munro to Wellesley, 
“ Dhoondiah would undoubtedly have become an inde¬ 
pendent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new 
dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultauns.” The various 
letters and despatches in which Colonel Wellesley describes 
these operations cannot be read without the liveliest inte¬ 
rest. Captain M. Sherer well observes,—“The pursuit and 
overthrow of this formidable freebooter are related with a 
flow of joyous good-humour, like the story of a successful 
hunt; and the phrases, the ‘king of the world’and ‘his 
majesty’ are repeated with a playfulness, which shows the 
extreme pleasure Wellesley felt at his success, and the utter 
insignificance in which he held the peril or the glory of such 
a combat. At the same time, it will be seen how much of 
thought and foresight, what clear arrangements for supply, 
what prompt decision on routes, what skill in movement, 
what unwearied perseverance, were exhibited in the effectual 
performance of this service. With Colonel Wellesley duty 
was never a trifle. It mattered not how small or great 
the object to be attained. He gave to all orders that he 
received, his fixed intelligent attention ; and to the execu¬ 
tion of them, for the time being, all his mind. Let the 
youthful officer consider well this feature in the character 

* ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. i. pp.41-219. ‘ Our Indian Empire,’ by 
C. Mac Farlane. 

f He died of cholera in 1822. 


02 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE 


we place before him. He will find it distinctive of the 
whole career of Wellesley.”* 

In the month of December of this same eventful year 
(1800) Colonel Wellesley was appointed to command a 
body of troops assembled at Trincomalee, in the island of 
Ceylon, for foreign service. The expedition was said to be 
intended either for Batavia or the Isle of France. Mean¬ 
time despatches from England arrived, directing 8,000 men 
to be sent to the Red Sea, to act against the French in 
Upper Egypt, while an expedition from England sent into 
the Mediterranean, under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, was 
attacking the French in Lower Egypt. No sooner had 
Wellesley read these despatches than he made up his mind, 
and, knowing that his force at Trincomalee was the only dis¬ 
posable force, without orders or instructions, which it was 
impossible to obtain in time, but for acting without which 
he might have been cashiered, he proceeded to act on his 
own responsibility, and removed his troops from Ceylon to 
Bombay, where they would be some thousand miles nearer 
the Red Sea and Egypt. He fully expected to have the 
command of this novel Indian expedition ; but, on arriving 
at Bombay, he found the command was given to his senior, 
Major-General Sir David Baird. This was, apparently, a 
severe disappointment. He says, however,—and his word is 
not to be doubted,—that he would have accompanied Baird 
in a subordinate capacity, but for an illness which obliged 
him to remain behind. In the event, all this proved to be 
part of his good fortune. The great merit of the novel and 
bold expedition from the Indian coast to the banks of the 
Nile was in the original conception, and that belonged 
neither to Wellesley nor to Baird. Before the expedition 
reached Egypt the French were disposed of, and, though 
admirably conducted, and abounding in interest and instruc¬ 
tion, it had no opportunity of striking a great blow. If 
Wellesley had gone with it, he would have lost the much 
more instructive and decisive campaigns against Scindiah 
and the Rajah of Berar; and the glory of the battle of 
Assaye, which first connected a prestige with his name, 
would (if, indeed, it had been fought at all) have belonged 
to another. Though he did not accompany General Baird, 
he gave him a copy of memoranda, which he had drawn up 
on the operations to be pursued on the Red Sea and in 
Egypt. This remarkable document shows what diligent 
attention he had paid to the subject—what exact informa- 

* Military Memoirs, 


THE MAHRATTA WAR. 


23 


i803.] 

tion about Egypt—the policy of the Mameluke bays—the 
real situation and prospects of the French, Sec. &c.—he had 
managed to obtain, even while acting on such a remote and 
different field as India. 

It was impossible for the Earl of Mornmgton to dis¬ 
approve of the bold movement his brother had made from 
Ceylon ; but still he thought it ought not to be set up as a 
precedent, and he required an official explanation of the 
grounds and motives which had induced the Colonel thus 
to act upon his own judgment, without waiting for orders. 
The decided, clear-headed soldier stated his motives at full 
length, in a remarkable letter, dated Bombay, 23rd March 
1801 * 

Colonel Wellesley made a second stay in Mysore of nearly 
two years. He was promoted to be Major-general in April 
1802, and in February 1803 he was appointed to com¬ 
mand a force assembled at Hurrilioor, near the Mahratta 
territory. 

The Mahrattas, who had often disturbed the tranquil¬ 
lity of our Indian empire before the year 1803, were at 
this period both very threatening and very formidable. 
Civil war, attended by unutterable horrors, raged between 
the Mahratta chiefs, llolkar and Scindiah. The Peishwa, 
the nominal head of the Mahratta confederation, was looked 
upon as an instrument in the hands of the strongest. 
Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who ruled over Maiwa and Candeish, 
had an army of regular infantry and artillery, which had 
been formed by his father, with the assistance of M. de 
Boigne, a native of Savoy, and was now under the direction 
of a French officer of the name of Perron. Scindiah exer¬ 
cised paramount influence over the Peishwa at Poona, 
llolkar, another clever, ambitious chieftain, who had long 
been at variance with Scindiah, suddenly crossed the Ner- 
budda, and marched with a large cavalry force on Poona, 
which he entered, after defeating the combined army of 
Scindiah and the Peishwa. The Peishwa escaped to the 
coast, and put himself under British protection, whilst 
llolkar placed one of his relations on the musnud of 
Poona. There could be no peace or security for any of 
the neighbouring states, so long as this state of things 
lasted. 

The Madras army, under Lieutenant - general Stuart, 

* For this admirable letter, see * Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. i. p. 301, 
Messrs. Clowes’s edition of 1837. The letter ought to be diligently studied by 
every young officer, as ought also the paper upon the Egyptian expedition, 


24 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


was ordered to advance into the Mahratta territory, for the 
purpose of reinstating the Peishwa, and Major-General 
Wellesley was appointed to command the select corps in 
advance, with which he was to march rapidly upon Poona. 
Having received information that Holkar’s people intended 
to burn Poona on his approach, he pushed on with the 
cavalry, and performing a march of sixty miles in thirty 
hours, reached that town on the 20th of April, and saved 
it from destruction. Holkar’s army retired without fight¬ 
ing, and in the following month our ally, the Peishwa, 
re-entered his capital. Scindiah, however, and the Rajah 
of Berar, another powerful Mahratta chief, were together 
in the held, and Ilolcar was expected to join them. 

The state of affairs was now more dangerous than ever, 
for the hollow peace of Amiens had been concluded, and the 
French had just recovered their Indian possessions. A great 
man, one that united political genius with military skill and 
high courage, was wanted for the crisis; and, without incurring 
the slightest risk of being charged with partiality, the Earl 
of Mornington could name his own brother. Accordingly, the 
Governor-General appointed General Wellesley to the chief 
command of all the British and allied troops serving in the 
territories of the Peishwa and the Nizam, with full power to 
direct all the political affairs of the British government in 
the said territories.* 

“ Alter some fruitless negotiations with Scindiah, General 
Wellesley marched from Poona to the north, and took by 
escalade the town of Ahmednuggur, which was garrisoned 
by Scindiah's troops. On the 24th of August he crossed 
the Godavery river, and entered Aurangabad on the 29th. 
The enemy manifested an intention to cross the river to the 
eastward and steal a march upon Hyderabad, hut were pre¬ 
vented by General Wellesley marching along the left bank 
of the river, and placing himself between them and that 
city. On the 12tli of September the British General was 
encamped twenty miles north of the Godavery. Colonel 
Stevenson, with the Nizam’s auxiliary force, was at some 
distance from him. Scindiah, who had a large mass of 
irregular cavalry, avoided a general engagement, being 
afraid of British discipline, and only thought of carrying 
on a predatory warfare, supporting his men at the expense 
of the subjects of the Nizam and other allies of the English, 
and wearing out the British troops by continual marches 

* See ‘Dispatches,’ Fort William, 26tli and 27th of June, vol. ii. pp. 
49-56, Messrs. Clowes’s edition of 1837. 


THE BATTLE OF ASSAYE. 


25 


1803.] 

and partial affrays. About the middle of September 
General Wellesley learned that Seindiah had been reinforced 
bv sixteen battalions of infantry, commanded by French 
officers, and a large train of artillery, and that the whole of 
liis force was assembled near the banks of the Kaitna 
river.”* 

On the *21st of September, General Wellesley had a con¬ 
ference with Colonel Stevenson, and a combined attack on 
the enemy was concerted. The General and the Colonel 
were to advance by two parallel routes round the hills 
between Budnapoor and Jaulna, so as to fall at the same 
time upon the Mahrattas. Wellesley arrived at Naulwah 
on the 23rd, and there learned that Seindiah and the Iiajah 
of Berar had moved off in the morning with all their cavalry, 
and that their infantry were about to follow, though, as 
yet, they were in camp, at the distance of six miles. lie 
determined to march upon this infantry, and cut it up at 
once. Colonel Stevenson, who was then about eight miles 
on Wellesley’s left, was informed of this intention, and 
directed to advance. The General moved forward with the 
19th dragoons, and three regiments of native cavalry, to 
reconnoitre, his infantry, consisting of two British and five 
native battalions, following the horse at the best of their 
speed. 

After a rapid march of about four miles, Wellesley saw, 
from an elevated plain, not only their infantry, but the 
whole force of the Mahrattas, nearly 50,000 men, encamped 
on the north side of the Kaitna river, the banks of which 
were very steep. TheMahratta right, consisting of cavalry, 
was about Bokerdon; their infantry corps, connected with 
the cavalry, and having with them ninety pieces of artillery, 
were encamped near the village of Assaye, or Assye. 

Shout Britain for the battle of Assye, 

For that was a day,- 
When we stood in our array, 

Like the lion turn’d to bay, 

And the battle-word was “ Conquer or die !”f 

Although the enemy were, so much stronger than lie had 
expected to find them, no thought of retreat was entertained. 

* Andre Vieusseux, ‘ Military Life of the Duke.’ 

t This is part of a superb Indian war -soil” - , which celebrated Wel¬ 
lesley’s conquests over the Mahrattas. See ‘ Quarterly Review,’ vol. ii. 
p. T27. I knew the whole song in my childhood, having so often 
heard it sung by fellow-clansmen, and other Highlanders who had served 
with the Duke in these his earlier and brilliant campaigns. 


20 


MEMOIR OR THE DUKE. 


Wellesley resolved to attack the infantry on its left and 
rear, and for that purpose he moved his little army to a ford 
some distance beyond the enemy’s extreme left. Leaving 
the Mysore and other irregular cavalry to watch the 
Mahratta cavalry, and crossing the river with only liis 
regular horse and infantry, he passed the ford, ascended 
the difficult steep bank, and formed his men in three lines, 
two of infantry, and the third of horse. This was effected 
under a brisk cannonade from the enemy's artillery. 
Scindiab, or the French officer who directed his movements, 
promptly made a corresponding change in his line, giving a 
new front to his infantry, which was now made to rest its right 
on the river, and its left upon the village of Assaye and the 
Juah stream, which bowed in a direction parallel with the 
Kaitna. The Mahrattas’ numerous and well-served cannon 
did terrible execution among our*advancing lines, knocking 
over men and bullocks, and completely drowning the weak 
sound of our scanty artillery. At one moment, such a gap 
was made by cannon-ball in our right, that some of the 
Mahratta cavalry attempted to charge through it; but the 
British cavalry in the third line came up, and drove back 
the Mahrattas with great slaughter. Finding his own 
artillery of little or no use (the guns could not be brought 
up for lack of bullocks), General Wellesley gave orders that 
it should be left in the rear, and that the infantry should 
charge with the bayonet. His steady resolute advance, in 
the teeth of their guns, bad already awed the Mahrattas, 
who would not now stand to meet the collision of the bright 
English steel: their infantry gave way, and abandoned their 
terrible guns. One body of them formed again, and pre¬ 
sented a hold front ; but Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell 
charged them with the British cavalry, broke and dispersed 
them, and was killed in the moment of victory. Wellesley’s 
sepoys having proceeded too far in pursuit, many of Scindiah’s 
artillerymen, who had thrown themselves down among the 
carriages of their guns as though they were dead, got to their 
feet again, and turned their pieces against the rear of the ad¬ 
vancing sepoys; and at the same time the Mahratta cavalry, 
which had been hovering round throughout the battle, were 
still near : but Maxwell’s exploit speedily led to the silencing 
of this straggling artillery lire, and to the headlong flight of 
Sdndiah’s disciplined infantry, who went off, and left ninety 
pieces of cannon, nearly all brass and of the proper calibres, 
m the hands of the conqueror. General Wellesley led 
the 78th British infantry in person against the village 


TIIE JiATTLE OF AKGAL'M. 


1803.] 


27 


of Assaye, which was not cleared without a desperate com¬ 
bat. It was near dark night when the firing ceased. The 
splendid victory cost General Wellesley twenty-two officers 
and 386 men killed, and fifty-seven officers and 1,526 men 
wounded, excluding the irregular cavalry, which remained 
on the other side of the river, and had not been engaged : 
the total number of killed and wounded amounted to nearly 
one-third of his force. The general himself had two horses 
killed under him,—one shot, and the other piked : every one 
of his staff officers had one or two horses killed, and his 
orderly's head was knocked off by a cannon-ball as he rode 
close by his side. The enemy, who fled towards the Ad- 
juntee Ghaut, through which they had passed into the 
Deccan, left 1,200 dead, and a great number badly wounded, 
on the field of battle. 

Colonel Stevenson, who had encountered some unexpected 
obstacles, did not arrive at Assaye until the day after the 
combat, when he w T as immediately despatched after the flying 
enemy.* 

While General Wellesley was defeating the Mahrattas in 
the south, General Lake gained a complete victory at Ally- 
ghur, in the plains of Hindostan, over another part of their 
force under M. Perron, which had occupied Delhi. The 
Mahratta power was now broken, and after several marches 
and countermarches, and desultory negotiations, Scindiah 
asked and obtained a truce at the beginning of November; 
but the Rajah of Berar still kept the field, and General 
Wellesley, coming up with him in the plains of Argaum, 
found Scindiah’s cavalry, together with the Bajah’s forces, 
drawn up in battle-array. The battle of Argaum was fought 
on the 29th of November 1803. The British line advanced 
in the best order ; the 74th and 78th regiments were 
attacked by a large body of Persian mercenaries in the 
service of the Rajah of Berar, which was entirely destroyed. 
Scindia’h’s cavalry charged one of the Company’s regiments, 
and was repulsed, when the whole Mahratta line retired in 
disorder, leaving thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their 
ammunition in the hands of the British. The British cavalry 
pursued the enemy for several miles, taking many elephants, 
camels, and much baggage. Colonel Stevenson soon after 
took by storm the strong fort of Gawilghur, and this ex¬ 
ploit concluded the campaign. The Rajah of Berar now 
sued for peace, and General Wellesley drew up the con¬ 
ditions of the treaty, by which the Rajah ceded to the Com- 
* ‘ Wellington Dispatches/ vol, ii. pp. 323-6. 


23 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


pany the province of Cuttack with the district of Balasore, 
and dismissed his European officers. Scindiali was glad to 
follow the example, and on the 30th of December he signed 
a treaty of peace, by which he ceded to the Company all the 
country between the Jumna and the Ganges, besides nu¬ 
merous forts. In the following February (1804), General 
Wellesley crossed the Godavery to put down the indepen¬ 
dent freebooting parties, which were carrying devastation 
through the West Deccan. Following them rapidly from 
hill to hill, he gradually dispersed them, and took their 
guns, ammunition, and baggage. The fatigue attending 
these operations was such, that General Wellesley, after a 
lapse of many years, still spoke of it as the most laborious 
service in which he had been engaged. Peace was thus 
restored t. > the peninsula of India.* 

In March 1804, General Wellesley visited Bombay, 
where he was received with all honour. The British in¬ 
habitants of the place presented an address to him, in 
which they declared, with equal brevity and truth, that he 
was a commander, “great, in the cabinet as in the field.” 
They voted him a sword of the value of 1,000/., and the 
officers of the army of the Deccan gave him a service of 
plate of the value of 2,000 guineas, with the inscription,— 
“Battle of Assaye, September 23rd, 1803.” 

But these were trifling tributes compared with the respect 
(tlie admiration falling little short of idolatry) which was 
paid to the statesman and soldier, not only by his com¬ 
panions in arms, but by all branches of the Service—by 
every man in India that knew his exploits, and approached 
his person. 

Considering the climate and the seasons, his fatigues, 
during theMuhratta war, had been prodigious; but, happily, 
his constitution was vigorous and sound, and his frame 
admirably calculated to sustain the hardest work and the 
hardest living. “ General Wellesley,” says Captain Sherer, 
“ was a little above the middle height, well limbed, and 
muscular; with little incumbrance of flesh beyond that 
which gives shape and manliness to the outline of the figure; 
with a firm tread, an erect carriage, a countenance strongly 
patrician, both in feature, profile, and expression, and an 
appearance remarkable and distinguished: few could ap¬ 
proach him on any duty, or on any subject requiring his 
serious attention, without being sensible of a something 
strange and penetrating in his clear light eye. Nothing 
* Andre Vieusseux’s ‘ Military Life of the Duke of Wellington.’ 


GENERAL WELLESLEY’S MANNERS. 


29 


1804.] 

could be more simple and straightforward than the matter 
of what he uttered; nor did he ever in his life affect any 
peculiarity o: pomp of manner, or rise to any coarse, wjtfaic 
loudness in his tone of voice. It was not so that he gave 
expression to excited feeling. 

“ It may be here with propriety observed, and it is impor¬ 
tant to the younger officers who may read this, that General 
Wellesley was a man temperate in ad his habits; using the 
table, but above its pleasures: and it is not to be f-und on 
record, that he was ever the slave of any of those frailties, 
without an occasional subjection to which lew men pass the 
fiery ordeal of a soldier’s life. lie was, however, much in 
camps; and a camp is so truly the nursery of manly virtues, 
that few officers advanced in life can look back upon days so 
unoffending, or nights of such light repose, as those passed 
in the ready field. To sum all up, he was a British noble¬ 
man serving his king and country with heart and hand; and 
while British noblemen continue to do thus, may their 
lands be broad, their mansions wide, and their names 
honoured! ” 

On. the 24th of June 1804, General Wellesley broke 
up the army in the Deccan, and in the following month 
he returned to Seringapatam, where lie received Irom the 
nati e inhabitants that grateful, and affecting address 
which has already been cited. The voice of faction could 
afterwards utter the calumnious falsehood, that Welling¬ 
ton was a merciless man—a man of iron, with no more 
feeling than one of his guns. But during the whole of 
his career in India, as afterwards in Portugal and Spain, 
though ever firm and just, he was invariably inclined to 
humanity and mercy, whenever they could be exercised 
without detriment to justice or to the safety of others. Ilis 
despatches contain innumerable proofs ol this kind disposi¬ 
tion. The following is very characteristic in its expression :—- 
The Mahratta Peishwa whom we had helped to restore, like 
most Indian princes, knew nothing of forgiveness, being 
“ callous to everything but money and revenge.” General 
Wellesley interposed to screen some Mahratta chiefs from 
his vengeance. “The war,” said he, “will he eternal, if 
nobody is ever to he forgiven; and l certainly think that 
the British Government cannot intend to make the British 
troops the instruments of the Peishwa’s revenge. * * * 

When the power of the Company is so great, little dirty 
passions must not be suffered to guide its measures.”* 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. ii. 


so 


MEMOIR OF TUG DUKE. 


Iii July 1804, our General was at Calcutta, assisting in im¬ 
portant military deliberations. The memoranda which he 
then wrote on the political and military affairs of India, are 
full of forethought, sagacity, and practical wisdom. They fill 
a considerable part of the third volume of his immortal de¬ 
spatches—a work which is by far the best monument of his 
fame. In the course of the same year, he was again in 
the Deccan and again in Mysore. In February 1805, he 
repaired for the last time to Madras, and obtained leave to 
return to England. About the same time, his appointment 
by the king to be a Knight Companion of the Order of the 
Bath was known in India, and published in the general 
orders. This honour was conferred “ in consideration of 
the eminent and brilliant services of Major-general Wel¬ 
lesley,’' and it had been determined “ that his creation and 
investiture shall not wait for his succession to a regular 
vacancy therein.”* In the following month of March, the 
thanks of both houses of parliament for his services were 
likewise published in the general orders. On the 9th of 
that month he took leave of his army, in a brief and manly 
address, dated from Fort St. George. After expressing the 
regret he felt in bidding farewell to officers and troops with 
whom he had served so long, he said,— 

“ Upon every occasion, whether in garrison or in the 
field, tffi Major-general has had reason to be satisfied with 
their conduct: he once more returns them his thanks, and 
assures them that he shall never forget their services, or cease 
to feel a lively interest in whatever may concern them. 

“ He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army 
never to lose sight of the general principles of the military 
service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to 
encourage in their respective corps the spirit and sentiments 
of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain road to 
the attainment of everything that is great in their profes¬ 
sion.” 

These were not pro forma words, hut deeply-felt sentiments. 
Whenever, in after life, this illu trious man found an officer 
or soldier who had served worthily under him in India, he 
gave some substantial proof that he had not ceased to feel the 
lively interest which he had professed. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in England in September 
1805. Again his rest was short. In November of the 
same year he was sent to Ilanover, with the command of 
a brigade iu the expedition under Lord Cathcart, which 
* Letter of Lord Camden to the Governor-General, 


CAMPAIGN IN DENMARK* 


31 


1807 .] 

was intended to make a diversion, while France was engaged, 
on the banks of the Danube, against Russia and Austria. 
The wretched policy, the mean tergiversation of the Prus¬ 
sian cabinet, and the victory obtained by Buonaparte at 
Austerlitz in the month of December, disconcerted the plans 
of i he coalition, and the English returned from Hanover to 
England in February 1806, without having had any oppor¬ 
tunity of gaining laurels. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley was now appointed to the command 
of a brigade of infantry quartered at Hastings. In the pre¬ 
ceding month of January, on the death of the Marquis 
Cornwallis, lie had been made colonel of liis own highly- 
prized 33rd regiment. In the same year he was elected 
member for the borough of Rye, and from his seat in the 
House of Commons he ably defended the Indian adminis¬ 
tration of his brother, which was furiously assailed in parlia¬ 
ment by a crazy person of the name of Pauli, who had 
begun life as a tailor in Perth, but who had subsequently 
been some years in India. 

In April 1807, Sir Arthur was appointed Chief Secretary 
for Ireland, and in that capacity sworn a member of his 
Majesty’s Privy Council. He accepted this civil appointment 
on the condition that it should not interfere with his mili¬ 
tary promotion or pursuits. The Duke of Richmond was 
Lord-Lieutenant of that part of the United Kingdom. Sir 
Arthur was received with delight by his old friends in Ire¬ 
land. I regret that I have no better authority (in print) 
than Sir Jonah Barrington, who says—“he was still in all 
material traits Arthur Wellesley, but it was Arthur Wel¬ 
lesley judiciously improved.” Common report, however, 
affirms that he had the same unassuming carriage as when 
lie was only a young aide-de-camp; that he was most atten¬ 
tive to business; that his public acts were distinguished by 
impartiality and good sense, and that he introduced several 
valuable reforms—particularly in the police of Dublin. 

But he could not long be spared for the discharge of duties 
like these. In August of the same year (1807) he was ap¬ 
pointed to a command in the expedition sent to Copen¬ 
hagen, under Lord Cathcart and Admiral Gambier, having 
for his companions and coadjutors General Lord Kosslyn, 
Major-general Robert Mac Farlane, and his able and fast 
friend Lieutenant - colonel George Murray, who acted as 
Quartermaster-general, and was qualifying himself for that 
most important post, the duties of which he afterwards per¬ 
formed so admirably in the Spanish peninsula. 


32 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


On the 29tli of August. General Wellesley’s division 
attacked the Danish troops in a strong entrenched, position 
at Kioge, carried their works, entered the town of Ivioge, and 
took a large military store, with nearly 1,200 piisoners. This 
was the only action of any importance by land. The bom¬ 
bardment of Copenhagen — which followed the affair of 
Kioge—having induced the crowned prince of Denmark to 
listen to terms, General Wellesley, with Lieutenant-colonel 
jVIurray and Sir Home Popham, captain of the fleet, was 
appointed by Lord Cathcart to draw up the articles of the 
capitulation. These articles were agreed to by the Danish 
government on the 7th of September; and the Danish fleet 
and naval stores—which must otherwise have fallen into 
the clutches of the French—were delivered to the British 
Government, to he kept until the conclusion of a general 
peace. Sir A. Wellesley returned to England with this 
very successful expedition, and for a short time resumed 
his duties as chief secretary for Ireland, in the following 
February (1808) he received, in his place in the Commons, 
the thanks of that house for his important services in Den¬ 
mark. 

By this time a military force was assembled at Cork, and 
ready to move wherever its services might be required. It 
had been originally intended to act against the Spanish 
c lonies in South America, for Spain had been forced into 
an alliance with France, and had been several years at open 
war with England But the unprincipled invasion of Spain 
and Portugal by Buonaparte, his kidnapping the Spanish 
royal family, and the insults offered by his soldiery to the 
people of the Peninsula, kindled a consuming fire in those 
countries, and gave a new destination to this English force. 
The enraged Spaniards sent to London to implore for assis¬ 
tance. Juntas, or local governments, were formed, and 
peace was proclaimed between Spain and England. It was 
then resolved to send the military force assembled at Cork 
to the coast of the Peninsula, and Sir Arthur, who had 
been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-general in April, 
was appointed in June to take the command. The force 
consisted of about 9,000 infantry, and one regiment of light 
dragoons—the 20th. A small army this to face the strong 
legions of the J r^nch, who were all flushed with victory and 
the growing confidence that they were invincible. But the 
British Government promised early reinforcements to the 
extent of 10,000 more men. 

Sir Arthur was in Dublin when (on or about the 3rd of 


DEPARTURE FOR THE PENINSULA. 


33 


1808 .] 

July)* lie received bis final instructions from Lord Castle- 
rcagh, who nobly supported him in the arduous career upon 
which he was now entering-, and who proved himself a far 
better war minister than any England had known for many 
years. With his habitual promptitude, the General prepared 
for an immediate departure, lie wrote to his friend Major- 
general Hill,—“ I rejoice extremely at the prospect I have 
of serving again with you, and I hope we shall have more to 
do than we had on the last occasion on which we were to¬ 
gether. 1 propose to leave town (Dublin) for Cork. * * 

v * * Pray, let me hear from you, and acquaint me 

with all your wants, and whether I can do anything for you 
here. You will readily believe that I have plenty to do in 
closing a civil government in such a manner as that I may 
give it up, and then in taking the command of a corps for 
service ; but I. shall not fail to attend to whatever you may 
write to me.”f Ey the 9th of July he had completed the 
embarkation of the troops, but contrary Avinds delayed the 
departure until the 12th. On the 13th, the fleet Avas clear 
of the Irish coast, and then Sir Arthur parted company 
with it, sailing in the Crocodile frigate for Corunna. 

While he is crossing the Bay of Biscay a few Avords may 
be said on the nature of the struggle in Avhich he Avas to 
engage, and of the prevailing temper of the Spaniards. The 
Peninsula had iioav become nothing less than the field on 
Avhich the great question Avas to be decided,—Avhether France, 
through Napoleon Buonaparte and his marshals and gene¬ 
rals, w r as to govern Europe, and dictate as she pleased to all 
other states—England included? The Spanish people Avere 
in many respects fitted for the struggle. And here 1 quote 
with pleasure a passage Avritten by an officer in our army, 
who knows that people Avell, and Avho had previously Avit- 
nessed the horrors of French warfare in other countries. 
“ They (the Spaniards) Avere determined even to obstinacy, 
enduring of privation, proud and reserved, prone to enthu¬ 
siasm, and, generally speaking, ignorant of Avorldly affairs. 
This last deficiency assisted them greatly in their resistance. 
If they had been better acquainted Avith the history of 
Europe ; if they had been more calculating, commercial, and 
refined, they might have shrunk from the fearful contest. 
They might have paused ere they attempted to face, with 

* Viscount Castlereagh’s letter is dated Downiug-street, June 30th. 
We had then neither railways nor steam-boats, and the letter was pro¬ 
bably three days en route. 

f ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol, iv. p. 13. 


34 


MEMOIR OF THE DUICE. 


their raw battalions, those fierce and well-appointed pha¬ 
lanxes which had fought and conquered in a hundred 
pitched battles, and at whose encounter the splendid armies 
of Austria, Russia, and Prussia hacl been dissolved as by the 
touch of a magician’s wand. If they had known the stern 
determination of Napoleon to carry his point at any cost, 
and the merciless devotedness of his officers and soldiers to 
his absolute will; if they had thought beforehand of the 
blood, the tears, and the calamities that would cover their 
peaceful valleys and sunny plains, of their towns taken by 
storm, of their villages given up to the flames, of the shrieks 
of despair of their outraged wives and daughters, hearts as 
stout as theirs might have paused ere they drew upon them¬ 
selves the awful visitation of the French. Luckily for the 
common cause of mankind, luckily in the end for Spain as a 
country, and for England too, Spanish pride and Spanish 
indifference thought not of these things; they thought only 
of the hated invader, their hereditary enemy, who had in¬ 
sidiously introduced himself into their cities and fortresses, 
who had shamefully abused their confidence : and they felt 
that he must be driven from the Spanish soil, for France 
and Spain could not commune together south of the Pyre¬ 
nees.”* Unfortunately for the Spanish people, many of 
their leaders were unworthy of taking the lead. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coruna on the 20th of 
July, and, according to Lord Castlereagh’s instructions, he 
put himself in immediate communication with the Junta of 
Gallicia. The Spanish deputies, who had gone to England 
from the Asturias and Gallicia, had requested the employment 
of an auxiliary force, to effect a diversion, by landing on 
some point of the coast of Portugal, in which kingdom the 
insurrection had not then begun. Their own native pro¬ 
vinces, the mountainous regions of the Asturias and Gallicia, 
were as yet untouched by the French; they formed, or were 
thought to form, the main strength of the Spanish patriots 
in the north; and the deputies, for their own immediate use, 
had asked only for arms and money. Some doubts were 
reasonably entertained by the British Government whether 
the Asturians and Galicians would make the best use of 
these succours, and whether Spanish armies and irregular 
tumultuary levies could drive the French out of the 
Peninsula, without the assistance of a disciplined English 
army. 

Sir Arthur, in his first conferences with the Junta of 
* Andre Yieusseux’s f Military Life of the Duke,’ 


STATE OP SPAIN. 


1808 .] 


n/r 

tjO 


Gallicia, found those Spaniards full of confidence. Although 
the battle of llio Seco had been lost, and the battle of 
Baylen not yet won, they declined the assistance of a British 
auxiliary force ; but they advised General Wellesley to land 
in Portugal, to rescue that kingdom from the French, and 
thus open a regular communication between the north and 
south of Spain. He was assured that in many places 
detachments of the French had been defeated by the Spanish 
people, and that whole armies of them would soon be anni¬ 
hilated. Some money, which lie brought with him and 
gave them, elated the members of the Junta still more. 
He could not see, either in them or in the inhabitants of the 
town, any symptom of alarm, or any doubt of their final 
success.* The Junta said that they could put any num¬ 
ber of men into the field, if they were only amply pro¬ 
vided with money and arms. His quick eye saw, at a 
glance, that a great deal more was wanting than arms and 
money, and that the disinclination to receive the assistance 
of British troops was founded, in a great degree, on Spanish 
pride, and on the objection to give the command of their 
own troops to British officers, although it was but too 
apparent that they had few or no capable Spanish officers. 
It was this objection, this pride, which led to many subse¬ 
quent reverses and disgraces in the field, and which rendered 
the Spanish armies for a long time of little or no avail. The 
Portuguese showed less pride and more docility, and thereby 
rapidly became excellent troops in the hands of British 
officers, and under the command of the great British general. 
Sir Arthur thought that Buonaparte would now carry on 
his operations by means of large armies, and would make 
every effort to gain possession of the northern provinces of 
Spain, which could be done only by the invasion and pos¬ 
session of the Asturias; and that, therefore, our Government 
ought to direct its attention more particularly to that impor¬ 
tant point, and endeavour to prevail upon the Asturians to 
receive a body of our troops. No chance or contingency 
escaped him; he thought it possible that, if Buonaparte 
found it impracticable to penetrate by land, he would make 
some sudden effort to reach the Asturias by sea; and he 
therefore recommended the reinforcing of the English 
squadron on that coast. He suggested also to the Junta 
at Coruna to fit out the Spanish ships at Ferrol for this 
service; but they declined the measure. He saw all the 
difficulties of the case in their true light, and at once told 
* ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. iv, pp. 35-41. 

p 2 


3G 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


our ministers, who were far too sanguine, and who appear 
to have believed that the Spaniards had far more resources 
than they possessed, that they must assist ail the Spanish 
provinces with money, arms, and ammunition. He referred 
to the great division of political power caused by the es¬ 
tablishment of so many Juntas; but he was not quite certain 
that each of the kingdoms of Spain should not be governed 
by its own Junta, and be was convinced that the general 
zeal and exertions of each were greater at present than they 
would be if the whole kingdom were undei the direction of 
one body.* The Junta at. Coruna recommended him not to 
land at Lisbon, or in the neighbourhood of the French 
army. His own views, and his general instructions, were 
in favour of a landing in Portugal; but he determined 
not to tix upon the spot until he obtained more accurate 
information. 

On the night of the 21st of July, he set sail from Coruna, 
to look after the transports and the fleet that were conveying 
his army. The fleet joined him the next day at sea, and he 
then saiied instantly for Oporto, where he arrived on the 
24th. By this time, Oporto and the neighbourhood wen- in 
full insurrection ; and he found that the warlike bishop had 
gathered together about 3,000 men, full of ardour, but badly 
armed and equipped. He also learned from the bishop, 
that about 5,000 Portuguese regular troops were stationed 
at Coimbra, on the Mondego river, and that there were about 
P2,0UQ peasants, who only wanted arming, clothing, and 
disciplining. Some of the more regular levies had got a 
thousand muskets from the English fleet; but others, of the 
same class, had no fire-arms except fowiingpieces. Of a 
corps of Spanish infantry, which ought to have been at 
Oporto, he couid hear nothing, except that it had been 
stopped on the frontier, and that whether it would come 
at all was doubtful. Having made arrangements with the 
Bishop of Oporto for a supply of mules and horses, General 
Wellesley sailed to the south as far as the Tagus, to get 
fresh and correcter information as to the strength and posi¬ 
tion of the French troops in and near Lisbon. 

Nothing was left to hazard, or to that second and third- 
hand information which had so often misled inferior com- 
manders.j' When he had obtained ample knowledge of 
the strength and disposition of Junot’s forces, he fixed upon 

* Despatches to Viscount Castlerengh, hi ‘ Wellington Dispatches,* vol.iv. 

t ‘Pictorial History of England,’ ‘History of the Keign of Geo. III.’ 
iy G. L. Cruik and C. Mac Farlane. Vol. iv. 


OUR ARMY IN PORTUGAL. 


1808.] 


37 


Mondego Bay ns his proper landing-place. The small town 
and fort of Figneira, on the southern bank of the Mondego, 
had been carried by the Portuguese insurgents, and were 
now occupied by 300 marines belonging to the English fleet, 
and higher up the river, at Coimbra, were posted the 5,000 
Portuguese regulars. 

On tlie 30th of July, General Wellesley anchored in the 
bay ; and on the 1st of August, the tro >ps were landed near 
the town of Figueira, according to orders and rules most 
precisely laid down by the General. On the 5th of August, 
General Spencer joined from Cadiz, with about 4,000 men, 
thus raising the entire force, under Sir Arthur’s command, 
to 13,000 foot, and 400 or 500 cavalry; but 150 of the 20th 
Light Dragoons were dismounted.* 

Having landed our hero on the scene of his glory—on 
the ground where he was first to measure swords with the 
invincible French,—I close this Book. 


BOOK II. 

The army which took the field from the shore of Mondego 
Bay, was in many respects very different from that in 
which Wellesley had served in the Netherlands. Although 
there yet remained something to do (particularly in the 
commissariat department), there had been great improve¬ 
ments since the Duke of York’s unfortunate campaigns in 
1794-5. General Jarrey, an old French officer and royal¬ 
ist emigrant, whc had served under Frederic the Great, had 
published his works on the marching of armies, castrame- 
tation, and other points ; and his good lessons had not been 
thrown away. The military academy at Marlow had been 
opened, and had sent forth accomplished pupils. Even as 
early as the year 1801, in Sir Ralph Abercrombie’s Egyptian 
expedition, the French had been forcibly struck by the 
superior style of our operations; and the science and thorough 
efficiency of most of our engineers and staff-officers had 
challenged their admiration. The main strength of every 
army, and the pride of our own—our infantry—was always 
* ‘ Wellington Dispatches/ vol. iv. pp. 50-66, 



38 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


an infantry to beat the world when properly commanded; 
and now there was small chance of that blundering igno¬ 
rance and fatuity which, since the days of the great Duke of 
Marlborough, had so often made the valour and all the high 
qualities of the British soldier ineffectual. 

The French force in Portugal, under Junot, consisted of 
about 17,000 men, 3,000 of whom were shut up in garrisons 
at Almeida, Elvas, Setubal, and other places. There, there¬ 
fore, remained about 14,000 men tor the defence of Lisbon. 
Junot’s communications with the French in Spain were cut 
off, for, since the surrender of Dupont, (at Baylen) the 
Spanish patriots were masters of Andalusia and Estre- 
madura, and in old Castile the French corps had not ad¬ 
vanced westward farther than Benavente, being observed 
and checked by the Spanish army of Gallicia. About the 
same time the French, weakened and alarmed by the sur¬ 
render of Dupont with his entire division, hastily aban¬ 
doned Madrid, and retired to the Ebro. A clear stage 
was, therefore, left for the contest in Portugal between Wel¬ 
lesley and Junot, whose respective forces, disposable for the 
held, were nearly equal. But the French had the advantage 
of a considerable body of cavalry, while the English were 
very weak in that arm. 

Our advanced guard moved from their ground upon the 
Mondego on the 9th of August, taking the route to Lisbon, 
and was followed on the 10th by the main body of the army. 
Though provisions were not overabundant, and the heat 
was somewhat oppressive, all the men were in high spirits; 
they had confidence in their great leader and in their officers; 
and the brilliant, glowing atmosphere, and the novelty 
and beauty of the scenery, enlivened the hearts of the 
dullest. “Upon this wide theatre of fierce and sanguinary 
warfare was now first heard the careless whistle and the 
cheerful laughter of the English soldier. He, stranger alike 
to the violent and vindictive feelings which animated the 
invader and the inhabitant, marched gaily forward, looking 
for a combat as for some brave pastime.”* 

On the 10th of August our advanced-guard entered the 
town of Leiria, where it found General Freire with his 
Portuguese force of 5,000 men. Freire, after allowing his 
troops to appropriate to themselves the stores which, by an 
agreement between the Junta of Oporto and Sir Arthur, 
were intended lor the English, loudly demanded that his 
corps should henceforth be furnished with provisions by Sir 
* Captain Moyle Shcrer’s ‘Military Memoirs.’ 


30 


1808.] BATTLE OF ROLICA. 

Arthur’s commissariat! This was, indeed, a preposterous 
demand to make to a foreign general, who had just landed 
his troops, and who must depend for their support mainly 
on such provisions as the country which he had come to 
deliver could afford to sell him for money.* Sir Arthur 
refused compliance, and thereupon Freire refused to advance 
with the English. With much difficulty he was afterwards 
prevailed upon to allow about 1,600 of his men to join Sir 
Arthur: with the rest Freire remained behind at Leiria. 
As the English advanced, the insurrection became general 
throughout the country, but, for want of arms, the people 
could do nothing against the French, who perpetrated 
abominable massacres at Evora, Guarda, Villavkjosa, and 
other places. 

Junot having abandoned the provinces, keeping only the 
fortresses of Elvas and Almeida, now collected his forces 
in the neighbourhood of Lisbon. He sent a division of 
about 5,000 men, under Delaborde, towards Leiria, to 
keep the English in check; and he ordered Loison, who 
had returned from a butchering expedition into Alemtejo, 
and had crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, to join Delaborde 
at Leiria. But the rapid advance of Wellesley obliged • 
Delaborde to fall back before he could be joined again by 
Loison. 

Delaborde, however, determined to make a stand alone 
in the favourable position of Rolica, hoping every moment 
to see Loison appear on his right. It was pleasant and 
picturesque ground this on which our first affair in the 
Peninsula took place. The romantic village of Rolica, 
with its vines, olive groves, and quiet gardens, stands upon 
an eminence at the head of that valley, in the midst of 
which, distant about eight miles, ri-es the insulated hill 
Obidos, crowned by an old Moorish fort. In front of 
Rolica, upon a small plain, on the table-land, Laborde drew 
up his division in order of defence. The favourable points 
upon the hills on either side, and in the valley below, were 
occupied by his outposts. Behind him, scarcely a mile to 
the rear, the steep and difficult ridge of Zambugeira offered 
a second position parallel to the first, and stronger than it. 
The valley leading from Obidos to Rolic;a is walled in on 
the left by rocks and rude heights, rising one above the 
other till they are finally lost in the lofty dark summits of 
the Sierra de Baragueda.f Up this valley, General Wel- 

* A. Vieusseux’s 4 Military Life of the Duke.’ 4 Wellington Dispatches.’ 

f Captain Moyle Sherer. 


40 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


lesley, after driving the French pickets from Obidos, 
marched on the 17th to attack Deiaborde, with 9,000 men, 
all British troops except 2-50 Portuguese cavalry and 400 
light troops of that nation. But at the same time, two 
columns of attack were moving against the French ; that 
on the left was conducted by General Ferguson along the 
lower ridges of the Sierra de Baragueda, being destined to 
turn the right of Deiaborde’s position, and interpose between 
him and the expected division of Loison : the column on 
the right, consisting of 1,000 Portuguese foot, and fifty of 
their horse, was led by Colonel Trant, and intended to 
menace the left flank of the French. From his first position 
in front of lloluja, Deiaborde was soon driven with loss. 
The brisk attack of the brigades of Hill and Nightingale, 
and the skilful disposition which had caused both his 
flanks to be menaced at the same moment, determined his 
retreat. 

Covered by his cavalry, Deiaborde moved rapidly, and in 
good order, to his second line of defence, the steep and 
difficult ridge of Zambugeira, which could be approached 
only by dark ravines, and steep rugged pathways winding 
among rocks and briars; but the ridge, so short and narrow 
that it scarcely afforded moving room to the assailers and 
the assailed, was gained by the British 9th and 29th, who 
were soon supported by other troops from our rear, and 
favoured by another threatening movement on the French 
flank. Deiaborde could hold that height no longer : though 
wounded himself, he rallied his men, and attempted to make 
another stand near a village, but he was soon driven thence, 
and leaving three of his guns upon the field, and marching 
all night, he withdrew lor Torres Yedras, where he was 
joined by Loison’s corps: he was well protected on the 
retreat by his cavalry; and Sir Arthur was too weak in that 
arm to follow him up. We lost two lieutenant-colonels, 
one of them the brave son of a brave father,* and about 
480 men in killed and wounded. The loss of the French 
was supposed to be above 600. “ But,” says a writer, who 

never confidently makes an incorrect assertion, “ it must be 
observed here, once for all, that the losses of the French 
throughout the war were never accurately known, as they 
published no returns, whilst the British official returns of 
killed, wounded, and prisoners, made by the respe tive 
officers in command of regiments after a battle, were always 

* This was Colonel L:.ke, son of Lord Lake, the hero of Laswarree, and 
of other battles in India. 


BLUNDERS OE GOVERNMENT. 


41 


1808.] 

published in the 4 Gazette.’ In fact, there were no means 
in France, under Napoleon, of knowing the truth con¬ 
cerning their armies abroad; and this is one of the many 
differences between the two services.” * 

On the 18th, General Wellesley advanced to Lourinha, 
keeping along the coast road leading to Mafra. On the 
19th, he moved on to Vimeira, where he was joined the 
next day by Generals Anstrnther and Ackland, with two 
brigades just arrived on the coast from England, and which 
raised his force to about 17,000 British, besides 1,600 
Portuguese. But at this critical moment, Sir Arthur was 
superseded m tne command ! 

In spite of the discouraging voice of the very unpatriotic 
opposition, ministers at home had become sensible of the 
propitious appearance of affairs in the Peninsula, and were 
fully determined to increase the army employed in Portugal; 
but upon these very grounds they also determined to entrust 
the chief command to some officer higher or more ancient 
in the service than Sir Arthur Wellesley. This was quite 
according to the wheel of routine, which had gone far to 
grind down all genius and spirit in the superior classes of 
the officers of our army. In India, at Copenhagen, even 
in this opening campaign in Portugal, Wellesley had given 
the highest proofs of military genius; but there were 
generals in the service much more ancient than he. It 
might have happened that this active, indefatigable man, 
whose phj'sical powers were, in their kind, as perfect as his 
intellectual qualities, should have been superseded by a 
worn-out old man, incapable of bearing the heat of the 
climate, or of sitting three hours consecutively on horse¬ 
back.]' 

As soon as it was resolved to raise this army to 30,000 
men, ministers gave the chief command to Lieutenant- 
General Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was at Gibraltar, acting 
as governor in that fortress and colony, and they appointed 
Sir Harry Burrard to be Sir Hew’s second in command, 
leaving Sir John Moore, Sir Arthur Wellesley, and Gene¬ 
rals J. Hope, Sir E. Paget, and Mackenzie Frazer to com¬ 
mand respective divisions of the army. Wellesley was thus 
reduced from first to fourth. Sir Hew Dalrymple and 
Sir John Moore were both officers of great merit, and 
generous, high-minded men; but quite so much could not 
be said of Sir Harry Burrard; and the very best of the 

* Andre Vieusseux’s ‘ Military Life of the Duke.’ 

f ‘ Pictorial History of England,’ vol. iv., Reign of George III. 


42 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


three, Sir John Moore, was immeasurably inferior to Sir 
Arthur Wellesley. Accidents, and the order in which the 
new appointed generals arrived, made a bad scheme worse. 
Sir Harry Burrard came first ; on the evening of the 
20th lie came into Maceira Bay, near Vimeira. Sir Arthur 
immediately went on board, and reported to Sir Harry 
the situation of the army, and his own intended plan of 
operation, which was to continue marching along the coast 
road as far as Mafra, thus turning the strong position 
which Delaborde and Loison had taken at Torres Yedras, 
and by this means obliging the French either to give 
battle, or retreat to Lisbon under great disadvantages. No 
plan could have been better; no reinforcements were want¬ 
ing. There was, probably, not a man or an officer in the 
array but was anxious to advance. Sir Harry Burrard, 
however, was of opinion that no further advance ought 
to be made until the arrival of the reinforcements under 
Sir John Moore. But the enemy, in the mean time, was 
bringing the question to a speedy solution. 

That very night there rose the cry that the French 
were coming. Having posted his army in excellent posi¬ 
tions, in the valley of Vimeira, and on the hills round 
the village, General Wellesley was retiring to rest, when, 
at the hour of midnight, a German officer of dragoons 
galloped into the camp, and reported that Junot was ad¬ 
vancing to the attack, at the head of 20,000 men, and 
was only one hour’s march distant. Undisturbed by this 
inflated report, Sir Arthur merely sent out patrols, and 
warned the guards and pickets to be on the alert. “ It 
may be remarked, in passing,” says Capt. M. Sherer, “ that 
no general ever received reports with such calm caution as 
Sir Arthur Wellesley. Suddenly awaked, he would hear an 
alarming account from the front with a quiet, and—to many 
a bustling intelligent officer — a provoking coolness, and 
turn again to his sleep as before. Few, if any, are the 
instances, during the war, of his putting the troops under 
arms by night, or disappointing them unnecessarily of one 
hour of repose. An hour before dawn, the British, when 
near an enemy, are always under arms.” Thus our men 
were never flurried or hurried, but kept cool, with all their 
vigour in them, for the moment of battle. Nor did Sir 
Arthur ever exhaust the strength of his people by making 
complicated movements and manoeuvres merety to show his 
own skill, a practice to which some of the French com¬ 
manders were much addicted. 


DEFEAT OF JUNOT. 


43 


1808.] 

As the sun rose on the following morning—the not in™ 
glorious 21st of August—all eyes in our camp were fixed 
in the direction of Torres Yedras, which is only nine miles 
from Vimeira, with a hilly rugged country between. But 
no enemy appeared. At about 7 o’clock, however, a cloud 
of dust rose behind the hills nearest to the British positions; 
and, at 8 o’clock, some French cavalry, were seen crowding 
the heights to the southward, and sending forward scouts 
and skirmishers. This was rapidly followed by the appa¬ 
rition of a mass of French infantry, preceded by other, 
cavalry; and then column after column followed in order 
of battle. 

Again, the scene of bloody conflict was eminently pleasant 
and picturesque. Vimeira, a pretty village, stands in a lovely 
and peaceful valley, through which flows the gentle, little 
river of Maceira; the village is screened from the sea by 
some mountain heights; and, beyond the valley, the country 
swells into bold hills. The village was the principal place 
in our lines; and in it weie lodged the park, the commis¬ 
sariat, and that noisy crowd of animals and followers which 
mark the presence of an army. 

Junot, having joined Delaborde and Loison at Torres 
Vedras, was at the head, not of 20,000, but of about 14,000 
men, of whom 1,600 were excellent cavalry. At 10 o’clock 
in the morning, he began the battle with a hot fire of 
artillery. 

The principal attacks were made upon the British centre 
and left, the French being quite sure, this time, that they 
would drive the English into the sea, which was rolling 
close in their rear. The first attack was made with great 
bravery and impetuosity, but it was as gallantly repulsed 
by our people. But lor Wellesley’s lamentable deficiency 
in cavalry, the battle would have been finished then; for 
Colonel Taylor, galloping among the confused French, with 
the very few horsemen he commanded, scattered them with 
great execution. But Margaron’s formidable squadrons of 
horse came clown upon Taylor, killed him, and cut half of 
his feeble squadron to pieces. Taking advantage of this 
check, the French threw [tart of their reserve into a pine- 
wood which flanked the line of retreat, and sent the rest of 
their reserve to reinforce the divisions that were repeating 
the attack. But, again, the assailants were repulsed at all 
points, General Solignac made a capital mistake, General 
Brennier was wounded and made prisoner; the British se¬ 
parated the French brigades from each other, and, pressing 


MEMOIR OF TIIH DUKE. 


44 

forward with the bayonet, they completely broke and scat¬ 
tered the enemy, who went off in confusion, leaving many 
prisoners and fourteen cannon behind them. The loss of the 
French, in killed and wounded, at the battle ot Vimeira, 
was estimated at about 1,800; that ot the British being 
exactly 720. Only about one-half of our force was actually 
engaged. Except the part of the reserve, which had been 
thrown into the pine-wood, the whole of Junot’s force was 
brought into action. It was only noonday when the affair, 
.which began at 10 a. m., was decided. The 4th and 8th 
British brigades had suffered veiy little; the Portuguese, 
the 5th, and the 1st British brigades had not fired a shot, 
and the latter was two miles nearer to Torres Yedras than 
was any part of the disheartened and confused French 
army. There was abundant time, and an admirable oppor¬ 
tunity, for annihilating Junot; but Sir Harry Burrard had 
landed, and had brought with him his senility and irresolu¬ 
tion. He had been present on the field during.part of the 
engagement; but he had declined assuming the command, 
or interfering, in any way, with Sir Arthur’s admirable ar¬ 
rangements, until the enemj 7 ' was repulsed. Then, however, 
when Major-General Ronald Ferguson, on our left, was 
close upon the running French, when General Hill was 
ready to spring forward upon Torres Yedras by a shorter 
road than the French could take, and when General 
Wellesley would have followed up his victory by a general 
and rapid movement forward, Sir Harry Burrard demurred, 
thinking it unwise to hazard the fortune of the day — 
thinking it advisable, on account of the superiority of 
the French in cavalry, not to move any farther, but to 
suspend offensive operations, and wait at Yimeira for the 
arrival of Sir John Moore. Accordingly, Ferguson was 
ordered to desist from pursuit; Hill was called in, and the 
French officers, to their astonishment, were allowed to rally 
their men, and make good their retreat to the admirable 
position of Torres Yedras. In a letter, addressed to the 
Duke of York, Sir Arthur Wellesley said, with a most rare 
and admirable coolness,—“ I think, if General Hill’s brigade 
and the advanced-guard liad moved forward, the enemy 
would have been cut off from Torres Yedras, and we should 
have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French 
army had remained in Portugal. But Sir Harry Burrard, 
who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it 
advisable not to move from Yimeira.” But Sir Arthur’s 
heart was warmer when, in the same letter, he came to 


CONVENTION OF LISBON. 


45 


ISOS.] 

speak to the royal duke of the merits of the men and 
officers who had fought under him at Vimeira. These were 
his memorable words, I cannot say too much in favour 
of the troops; their gallantry and their discipline were 
equally conspicuous; and, I must add, that this is the only 
action that 1 have ever been in, in which everything passed 
as it was directed , and no mistake teas made by any of the 
officers charged with its conduct .” 

> On the very day after the battle—on the 22nd of August— 
Sir Hew Dalrymple, arriving in a frigate from Gibraltar, 
landed, and superseded Sir Harry Burrard, as Sir Harry 
had superseded Sir Arthur Wellesley. Thus, owing to the 
unwise arrangements of our Government, the army, within 
twenty-four hours, had successively three commanders-in- 
chief! The time for prosecuting the victory was gone 
before Sir Hew Dalrymple could set foot on shore; and 
popular clamour and parliamentary criticism were guilty of 
great injustice towards Sir Hew, both with regard to the 
battle of Vimeira and the Convention which followed it.* 

In .the course of the 22nd (the day oi Sir Hew’s landing), 
the French general, Kellerman, appeared, with a flag of 
truce, on the part of Junot, to propose an armistice, prepa¬ 
ratory to entering upon a convention for the evacuation of 
Portugal by the French. The terms were discussed between 
General Kellerman and Sir Hew Dalrymple, who, in the 
end, directed General Wellesley to sign the armistice. Among 
the articles there was one which prejudged the terms of the 
final convention, by stipulating that the French army should 
not “ in any case” be considered as prisoners of war, and that 
all the individuals composing it should be carried to France 
with arms and baggage, and “their private property, of 
every description, from which nothing should be detained !” 
This, of course, would include the church plate and other 
public and private property that the French had taken 
either at Lisbon or in the various towms which they had 
sacked, in consequence of the insurrection, and which they 
had divided among themselves. General Wellesley did not 
“ entirely approve of the manner in which the instrument 
was worded”; but the articles, being laid before the Com¬ 
mander-in-chief, were signed by him that same evening. 
The armistice, however, was made subject to the approba¬ 
tion of the Admiral, Sir Charles Cotton; and, as one article 
of it stipulated, that the liussian fleet in the Tagus, under 

* See Sir Hew Dalrymple, ‘ Memoir of his Proceedings,’ &c., and tli 9 
* Parliamentary Papeis’ published in 1S09. 


4G 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Admiral Siniavin, should enjoy all the advantages of a 
neutral port, Sir Charles objected to this, but offered to 
enter into a separate arrangement with the Russian admiral. 
On the 25th, Sir Hew Dalrymple signified to Junot that the 
armistice would be at an end on the 28th, at noon, unless a 
convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French 
should be agreed upon before that day. In the mean time, 
the army had made a forward movement from Vimeira to 
Ramalhal, near Torres Vedras, within the boundaries stipu¬ 
lated by the armistice. Sir John Moore had also arrived 
in Maceira Bay, and his troops were about being landed. 
Junot, now perceiving the necessity of coming to terms, 
commissioned General Kellerman to confer with Colonel 
George Murray, quartermaster-general, about the final con¬ 
vention. The favourable moment for pushing upon the 
French was now quite past; and if they could not be 
brought to evacuate the country by sea, they might either 
defend themselves within Lisbon, or cross the Tagus to 
Elvas, which, being a place regularly fortified, would have 
required a long siege, during which the British army could 
not have been made available in Spain.* General Wellesley 
handed to Sir Hew Dalrymple a memorandum for Colonel 
Murray, suggesting, among other things, a separate agree¬ 
ment with the Russian admiral, and the propriety of devising 
some mode to make the French give up the church plate 
which they had seized. On the 29th, the draft of the pro¬ 
posed convention was brought to the British head-quarters 
at Torres Vedras, and, being laid before a meeting of general 
officers, several alterations were made, and the form, so 
altered, was returned to Junot, and was, at last, signed by 
him on the 30th, with the omission of several of the altera¬ 
tions, and was ratified by Sir Hew Dalrymple on the 31st. 
Sir A. Wellesley was not present at the final ratification, 
being then at Sobral with his division. This document has 
become known by the name of the “ Convention of Cintra,” 
though it was arranged at Lisbon, and finally ratified at 
Torres Vedras.f The article which gave most offence was 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. iv. p. 120. 

f “Because Sir Hew Dalrymple’s dispatches, enclosing a copy of the 
treaty, were dated from Cintra, between Torres Vedras and Lisbon, the 
convention unluckily got the name of ‘The Convention of Cintra,' a 
name which was long made to figure, ludicrously and infamously, both in 
prose aud verse; and which induced uninformed people to believe that it 
was actually negotiated and concluded in that village, and after the British 
had obtained possession of the formidable position of Torres Vedras, the 
key to the capital. This was making had worse; the formidable position 


FRENCH LEAVE PORTUGAL. 


47 


1808.] 

that by which the French, under the name of baggage, were 
allowed to carry off much of the plunder of Portugal. Some 
limits, however, were put to this abuse by a commission 
being appointed, with General Beresford as the head, to 
superintend the strict execution of the terms of the convene 
tion. Through the exertions of the commissioners, the 
spoils of the Museum and the Royal Library were restored, 
together with the money taken from the public treasury. 
With regard to the Russian fleet, it was agreed that the 
ships should be held as a pledge by Great Britain during the 
war, and that the crews should be conveyed home in British 
ships. 

The French embarked in the month of September, and 
the British troops took possession of the forts of Lisbon in 
the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal. The whole 
country being now free from the enemy, a council of 
regency was appointed, of which the active Bishop of 
Oporto was a member. The joy of the Portuguese, in 
general, w r as manifested in the most unequivocal manner. 
But in England the terms of the convention were the sub¬ 
ject of severe and loud censure, and the Government 
appointed a board of inquiry to examine into the matter. 
Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were recalled, 
in order to be examined by the board, as well as Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, who had already asked and obtained leave to 
return to England. The court sat in the month of FTovem- 
ber, and, after a long examination, reported, that the Con¬ 
vention of Cintra having been productive of great advantages 
to Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general ser¬ 
vice, the court was of opinion that no further military 
proceeding was necessary on the subject, “ because, however 
some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness 
of the convention in the relative situation of the two armies, 
it is our unanimous declaration that unquestionable zeal 
and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by 
Lieutenant-generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, 
and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and 
gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every 
occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the 
troops and reflected lustre on your Majesty’s arms.” The 
King adopted the opinion of the board, that no further 

was obtained through the negotiation ; and the convention was arranged 
at Lisbon by Colonel G. Murray and Kellerman, and was finally ratified 
at Torres vedras, about thirteen miles from Cintra, and twenty-five from 
the capital.”—‘Piet. Hist.’ Reign of George III, 


43 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


military proceedings were necessary, but, at the same time, 
expressed publicly, “ his disapprobation of those articles of 
the convention in which stipulations were made affecting 
the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese 
nations.* 

Sir Arthur Wellesley’s examination before the board of 
inquiry ought to have added greatly to his reputation as a 
wise and great soldier: yet, for a time, it appeared as if he 
was destined to be deprived of the conduct of our Peninsular 
army. In the month of December be proceeded to Ireland, 
and resumed his old civil post as Chief Secretary. Parlia¬ 
ment having reassembled in January 1809, he returned to 
London and took his seat in the Commons. On the 27th 
of January, he received, through the Speaker, the thanks of 
that House for his distinguished services in Portugal. The 
Speaker, Mr. Abbot (afterwards Lord Colchester), always per¬ 
formed these offices with grace, dignity, and warm eloquence; 
and even the prosiest and most carping members were 
electrified when, with his fine voice, he pronounced these 
words :—“ It is your praise to have inspired your troops 
with unshaken confidence and unbounded ardour; to have 
commanded, not the obedience alone, but the hearts and 
affections of your companions in arms; and, having planned 
your operations with the skill and promptitude which have 
so eminently characterized all your former exertions, you 
have again led the armies of your country to battle, with 
the same deliberate valour and triumphant success which 
have long since rendered your name illustrious in the re¬ 
motest parts of this empire. 

“ Military glory has ever been dear to this nation; and 
great military exploits, in the field or upon the ocean, have 
their sure reward in royal favour and the gratitude of Par¬ 
liament. It is, therefore, with the highest satisfaction, that, 
in this fresh instance, I now proceed to deliver to you the 
thanks of this House.” 

A few days after this, the House of Lords passed resolu¬ 
tions to the same effect., which were communicated to Sir 
Arthur by Lord Chancellor Eldon. 

Campaign of 1809.—The too confident Spaniards were 
throwing away army after army in blundering and in fight¬ 
ing pitched fatties with the French veterans. Portugal, 
in which there bad not been a Frenchman left, was again 
menaced. Our Government resolved to increase the forces 
in the Peninsula, and to aid both Spaniards and Portu- 
* Andr6 Vieusseux’s * Military Life of the Duke.’ 


49 


1809.] PLAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL. 

guese, and, in spite of numerous orators and writers who 
represented the attempt as the height of madness, they took 
measures for entering upon the war on a larger and a bolder 
scale. The Duke of York and Lord Castlereagh supported 
the claims of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the general feeling 
of the nation was that he, and he alone, was the chief-com¬ 
mander we -wanted. In a memorandum, dated 7th of March, 
Sir Arthur delivered his decided opinion that Portugal might 
he defended, whatever were the result of the contest in 
Spain ; and that, in the meantime, the measures adopted for 
the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spa¬ 
niards in their contest with the French. His notions were, 
—that the Portuguese military establishments ought, by 
means of English assistance, to be raised to 40,000 militia 
and 30,000 regulars; that the British troops ought to be 
raised to 20,000 infantry and 4,000 or 5,000 cavalrjq with 
an increased rifle corps and considerably more artillery; 
that, even if Spain should be conquered, the French would 
not be able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 
100,000 men; and that as long as the contest should con¬ 
tinue in Spain, the united British and Portuguese army, if 
it could be put into a state of activity, would be most ser¬ 
viceable to the Spaniards, and might eventually decide the 
contest. 

In this remarkable document, short as it was, nearly 
everything was foreseen and provided for. The proper 
expenditure of our subsidies, the means of reforming the 
bad management of the Portuguese finances, the means of 
reforming the Portuguese troops, and the means of victual¬ 
ing the allied armies in an impoverished and wasted country, 
were all considered with wonderful sagacity and wisdom. 
As indispensable parts of his plan, Sir Arthur laid it down 
that the Portuguese must be placed under the command of 
British officers; that the whole staff of the army, the com¬ 
missariat in particular , must be British, and that these two 
departments must be greatly increased.* “ But for the care 
taken by Sir Arthur Wellesley of the commissariat, which 
other commanders-in-chief had been accustomed wofully 
to neglect, or to leave to their inferiors—thinking barrels of 
salt pork and bags of biscuits unworthy the attention of 
well-bred gentlemen and gallant soldiers—but for the re¬ 
forms he gradually introduced into our unsystematized 
commissariat department, there would have been no such 

* For the rest of tin's invaluable memorandum of the defence of Por¬ 
tugal, sec ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. iv. 


50 


MEMOIR OP TIIE DUKE. 


glorious victories as Salamanca, Yitoria, and Toulouse; 
but the British army would have been wasted away by 
famine, and driven from the Peninsula with disgrace.”* 
Yery numerous were the talcs told, during the progress of 
the war, of the Commander-in-chief’s strict attention to these 
details, and of his sharpness to peccant officers in the com¬ 
missariat department. On one occasion that hot Welshman, 
General Picton, enraged at a want of punctuality on the 
part of a deputy-commissary-general, threatened to hang 
that officer if the provisions were not brought up on the 
morrow. The commissary, putting on his best uniform, 
repaired to the Commander-in-chief, and laid his grievous 
complaint before him. “ Did General Picton really threaten 
to hang you?” said Wellesley. “He did,” replied the 
commissary. “ Then,” said the Commander-in-chief, “ I 
would advise you to go and exert yourself and get up these 
stores, for General Picton is just the man to do what he 
threatens.” The commissary went his way, and the pro¬ 
visions were up in time. 

It was in the month of April 1809, that Sir Arthur Wel¬ 
lesley, having previously resigned both his seat in Parliament 
and his civil employment in Ireland, took his departure to 
assume the chief command in Portugal. The political and 
military atmosphere into which he was going was dark 
enough. In the preceding month of December, the French, 
under Napoleon Buonaparte in person, having retaken 
Madrid, after routing the Spaniards in the battles of Espi¬ 
nosa and Tudela, obliged the British forces under Sir John 
Moore, who had been sent from Portugal into Spain, to 
effect a disastrous retreat to Coruna, where the troops, 
after repelling Marshal Soult, and losing their own brave 
commander, had embarked for England in January. The 
French, following up their success, spread over Leon and 
Estremadura, to the borders of Portugal, and Soult, having 
overrun Gallicia, rushed into the northern Portuguese pro¬ 
vinces, and carried Oporto by storm against the badly dis¬ 
ciplined native troops. The small British force which had 
been left in Portugal, on Sir John Moore advancing into 
Spain, was concentrated by General Sir John Cradock, for 
the defence of Lisbon. It was under these circumstances, 
which would have been still more unfavourable if Austria 
had not declared war, and called Buonaparte from Spain into 
Germany, that Sir Arthur arrived at Lisbon, with some 
regiments of cavalry and other reinforcements. These, 
* * Piet. Hist.’ Reign of George III. 


ADVANCE OP MARSHAL SOULT. 


51 


1809.] 

together with the native regulars under General Beresford, 
whom the Prince Regent of Portugal had appointed to com¬ 
mand his army, enabled Wellesley to bring into the field a 
force of about 25,000 men ; and with this force he moved, at 
the end of April, to dislodge Soult from Oporto, leaving a 
division, under General Mackenzie, on the Tagus, to guard 
the eastern frontiers against the French general, Victor, 
who was stationed near Merida in Spanish Estremadura. 

Driving back all the French troops which had advanced 
south of the Douro, Sir Arthur, by the 11th of May, 
occupied the southern bank of that river opposite the town 
of Oporto. The French had destroyed the bridges, and 
removed the boats to their own side of the river, and Soult, 
in the belief that the English could not cross the river, was 
preparing to retire leisurely by the road leading to Gallicia. 
But General Wellesley despatched a brigade, under Murray, 
to pass the river about four miles above Oporto, while the 
brigade of guards was directed to cross over at the suburb of 
Villanova, and the main body, under the Commander-in- 
chief, was to attempt a passage between Murray and the 
brigade of guards, by means of any boats they might chance 
to find, just above the town. The Douro at that spot is 
very rapid, and nearly three hundred yards wide. About 
10 o’clock on the morning of the 12th of May, two good- 
sized boats being discovered, General Paget, with three com¬ 
panies of the Buff's, crossed the river, and got possession of 
an unfinished but strong building, called the Seminario, on 
the Oporto side of the river. The French in the town were 
taken by surprise ; they never expected this hazardous 
attempt from the English, at whose general caution they 
were accustomed to sneer, forgetting that, where numbers 
were so small, caution was necessary. 

Buonaparte and his marshals, with their forced conscrip¬ 
tion, their levies in the countries they had subjugated, and 
their habitual or systematic disregard of human sufferings 
and life, might hazard much, and throw away the lives of 
their thousands and tens of thousands of men; but Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, even had his indifference to slaughter 
been a3 great as theirs, was bound by imperative circum¬ 
stances to be sparing of his men. We had no conscription; 
we could raise no forced levies on the Continent; ouf native 
soldiers were voluntarily enlisted, and every man of them, in 
bounty-money, pay, and provisions, cost us three or four 
times more than any of his soldiers cost Buonaparte ; and if 
we retained foreign troops in our service it was at an equally 

e 2 


52 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


great expense. If Sir Arthur’s army had been greatly 
weakened in 1809, there would have been small chance of 
his getting another army in 1810. 

When made aware of our move across the Douro, the 
French sounded the alarm, and marched out to attack the 
Seminario; but before they could dislodge the first party 
of brave Buffs, General Hill crossed with more troops, and, 
protected by the British artillery from the southern bank, 
maintained the contest with great gallantry, until General 
Sherbrooke, with the guards, crossed lower down, and got 
into the very town of Oporto, charging the French through 
the streets, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants. 
Meantime the head of Murray’s column, which had crossed 
the highest up, at Avintas, made its appearance on the 
north bank, and came down in true martial order to join 
the brave Buffs, and Hill, and Sherbrooke. Soult ordered 
an immediate retreat, which was effected in the utmost 
confusion. The French left behind them their sick and 
wounded, many prisoners, and much artillery and ammuni¬ 
tion, retiring by Amarante, with the intention of passing 
through Tras-os-Montes into Spain. That evening, it is 
said,, our great Captain dined in Soult’s quarters on a dinner 
which was preparing for the Duke-Marshal when the fight¬ 
ing began. The French were so confident in their security, 
and then had gone off in such a hurry! 

The passage of the wide and rapid Douro, performed in 
broad daylight, with most defective means of transport, and 
in presence of 10,000 French veterans, has been considered 
as one of Wellesley’s finest achievements. He lost only 
twenty-three killed and ninety-eight wounded. Soult’s 
loss was considerable, and though he carried many away 
with him, he left in Oporto 700 wounded and sick. These 
would have been butchered by the Portuguese but for Sir 
Arthur’s considerate and active humanity. Ho sooner was 
lie in possession of the city than he issued a most necessary 
proclamation, enjoining the vindictive inhabitants to respect 
the sick, wounded, and prisoners. The proclamation is 
more honourable to him than the victory. “ I call upon 
you, 5 ’ said he, “ to be merciful. By the laws of war, 
these Frenchmen are entitled to my protection, which I am 
determined to afford them ! ” He also wrote immediately to 
Marshal Soult to request him to send some French medical 
officers to take care of his sick and wounded, as he could 
not spare his own army surgeons, and did not wish to trust 
to the practitioners of the town of Oporto. lie assured 


IlETXEAT Or SOULT. 


53 


1809.] 

Soult that his medical officers should be restored to him so 
soon as they had cured the wounded; and he proposed a 
cartel, or mutual exchange of prisoners. This is a reflection 
to smooth the pillow of our now aged, most venerable 
warrior. Whatever he could do to diminish the horrors of 
war, he did, and did it promptly. It is believed to have 
been in the nature of Soult to have responded on his part; 
hut he could not subdue or control the ferocity of his troops, 
driven frantic by their reverses and sufferings, and the 
vengeful, merciless attacks of the Portuguese peasantry. 

When Soult reached Amarante, he found that General 
Loison had been compelled to abandon the bridge there. 
This forced the Marshal to change his route, and he made 
for Salamonde. But on the evening of the 16th of May he 
was overtaken, on the road, near Salamonde, by Sir Arthur, 
who cut up his rear-guard, and took some prisoners. A 
good many of the French were killed and wounded, and 
many more of them were drowned in crossing the river 
Cabado in the dark. “ We should have had the whole of 
Soult’s rear-guard,” said Sir Arthur, “ if we had but had 
half an hour more daylight .... I shall follow him 
to-morrow .... lie has lost everything—cannon, 
ammunition, baggage, military chest—and his retreat is, in 
every respect, even in weather, a pendant for our retreat 
to Corunna.” 

Soult, like Sir John Moore, had to retire through a 
mountainous country: he left the road strewed with dead 
horses and mules, and with the bodies of French soldiers, 
who were put to death by the peasantry before the advanced- 
guard of the British could come up and save them. By 
their own conduct the French had provoked this retaliation. 
“Their soldiers,” said Sir Arthur, “have plundered and 
murdered the peasantry at their pleasure ; and I have seen 
many persons hanging in tile trees by the side of the road, 
executed for no other reason, that I could learn, excepting 
that they had not been friendly to the French invasion and 
usurpation of the government of their country; and the 
route of their column on their retreat could be traced by 
the smoke of the villages to which they set fire.”* 

With troops that carried with them, over the roughest 
roads, full equipments, and artillery and baggage, Sir 
Arthur could not hope to come ud with Soult, with an army 
that had lightened itself by losing or throwing away every¬ 
thing, and that depended for its supplies on plunder, lie 
♦Letter to Viscount Castlereagh, in 4 Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. iv. 


5 4 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


stopped his pursuit at Montealegre, a few leagues from the 
frontier of Spain, where a Spanish corps d'armee , under 
General Romano, ought to have confronted Soult’s ruined 
forces, but did not. 

Sir Arthur returned to Oporto. There he diligently ap¬ 
plied himself to the improvement of the commissariat, to the 
means of fostering a kindly feeling between the British and 
the Portuguese, of removing the crying distresses of the 
country people, and of obtaining the most accurate informa¬ 
tion as to the nature of the country and the state of the 
roads by which he intended to follow the French into 
Spain. It was while he stayed at Oporto that he learned 
that Mr. Frere—an accomplished, amiable, and excellent 
man, but absent-minded, credulous, and unfit for diplomacy 
(he had sadly misled poor Sir John Moore)—was recalled 
from the embassy in Spain, and succeeded by one of his 
own able brothers. This opportune change led, in time, to 
very important results. 

By the 26th of May the greater part of our troops had 
crossed the Mondego, and all Sir Arthur’s arrangements 
were completed for an advance into Spain, where he in¬ 
tended to co-operate with, or at least to receive some aid 
from, the Spanish General Cuesta, who was reported to be 
on the Guadiana river with 40,000 or 50,COO men. 

Except by reading, hearing the reports of some English 
officers who had served with the Spaniards, and studying 
the disastrous, but far from dishonourable, campaign of Sir 
John Moore, our great Commander, never having seen one 
in the held, could have had but little notion of the defective 
organization and discipline of a Spanish army. He got this 
knowledge in a lump when he came in contact with Cuesta. 
But, in the mean while, he had wisely resolved not to rely 
too much on those forces, and not to neglect anything to 
secure his own retreat, in case that movement should be¬ 
come a necessity. His advance was impeded by the diffi¬ 
culty of obtaining provisions and the means of transport; 
but, by the end of June, his van-guard touched the Spanish 
frontier. 

The national cause of Spain had improved since Buona¬ 
parte had left the country (in January). Hone of his generals 
had individually.the same influence, or genius, or means that 
he had at his disposal; and there was not a sufficient bond 
of union and goodwill among them all to make them act in 
concert towards one particular object at a time. Each had 
a plan of his own and a separate command over a large 


STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH. 


1809 .] 


55 


division of the country, and was, in great measure, inde¬ 
pendent of the rest; and Joseph Buonaparte, the intrusive 
king, had no control over them, and, not being himself a 
military man, he could not direct their movements. “ Each 
marshal, therefore,—and there were five or six of them in 
the Peninsula,—acted by himself, and the warfare became 
complicated and desultory. Marshal Victor commanded the 
first corps in Estremadura, near the borders of Portugal, the 
rolls of which mustered about 35,000 men ; of whom, how¬ 
ever, only 25,000 were under arms. General Sebastiani 
commanded the fourth corps in La Mancha, which mustered 
about 20,000 men under arms. A division of reserve under 
Dessolles, stationed at Madrid, together with King Joseph’s 
guards, amounted to about 15,000 men; Kellerman’s and 
Bonnet’s divisions, stationed in Old Castile and on the 
borders of Leon and Asturias, to about 10,000 more. All 
the above troops, amounting to more than 60,000 disposable 
men, were considered to be immediately under King Joseph, 
for the protection of Madrid and of central Spain, and also 
to act offensively in Andalusia and against Portugal by the 
Tagus and the Guadiana. Soult had a distinct command. 
His business was mainly to occupy the northern provinces 
of Spain, and to act through them against Portugal: he 
had in his immediate power the second corps, mustering 
about 20,000 men under arms; the fifth, or Mortier’s corps, 
reckoning 16,000 ; and Key, with the sixth corps, also about 
16,000. Soult’s force in all was about 52,000 men in the field. 
These were the two French armies with which the English, 
advancing from Portugal, were likely 7- to be brought into 
collision. Besides these, there were, in eastern Spain, the 
third and seventh corps, making together about 50,000 men, 
under Suchet and Augereau, who were pretty fully em¬ 
ployed in Arragon and Catalonia; and 35,000 more were 
scattered in the various garrisons and lines of communi¬ 
cation. The fortresses and fortified towns in the hands of 
the French were—1st, on the northern line, St. Sebastian, 
Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, Santander, Burgos, Leon, and 
Astorga; 2nd, on the central line, Jaca, Zaragoza, Guadal- 
axara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora; 3rd, Figueras, llosas, 
and Barcelona on the eastern coast. But Soult, after being 
driven out of northern Portugal, had withdrawn from Gal- 
licia; and Ke} r , following the same movement, completely 
evacuated that extensive province, including the forts of 
Coruua and Ferrol. A misunderstanding or disagreement 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


5G 

between those two commanders led to the deliverance of 
Gallicia, which was an important event in the war, for the 
French never regained that part of Spain. Marshal Soult 
reached Zamora in the beginning of July, and hovered 
about the eastern frontiers of Portugal. Fey, on his part, 
arrived at Astorga. Victor was posted between the Tagus 
and the Guadiana, his troops suffering much by the malaria 
fever; Mortier, with the fifth corps, on the road from 
Zaragoza to Valladolid, received orders from France to 
halt; and the Imperial Guards, which Napoleon had or¬ 
dered into Spain, and which had arrived at Vitoria, w r ere 
hurriedly ordered to march to the banks of the Danube. 
This was in consequence of the Austrian war, which had 
broken out. The French in Spain were reduced to a com¬ 
parative state of inactivity, and Andalusia and Valencia were 
still untouched by them.* 

The Spanish armies, though often scattered and always 
beaten by the French in the open field, had been somewhat 
re-organized. General Cuesta, commanding the army of 
Estremadura, was indeed on the Guadiana; but, instead of 
having 40,000 or 50,000 men, he had scarcely 35,000 under 
arms, and these imperfectly disciplined. This was the force 
with which General Wellesley had to co-operate in his 
advance into Spain for the purpose of attacking Victor, and 
attempting to reach Madrid. 

The British army entered Spain in the beginning of July, 
and on the 8th of that month their head-quarters were at 
Placencia. Cuesta kept them waiting, but he joined them 
at Oropesa on the 20th. By another route, the active Sir 
Robert Wilson, with the Lusitanian legion, one Portuguese 
and two Spanish battalions, moved on to Escalona, only 
eight leagues from Madrid, threatening the rear of Victor’s 
army, which was posted at Talavera la Reyna. On the 
22nd, the combined Spanish and British armies attacked 
Marshal Victor’s outposts at Talavera, and drove them in. 
The enemy would have suffered more, if that crusty, im¬ 
practicable old Spaniard, General Cuesta, had not thought 
fit to absent himself from the field. <3n the morrow—the 
23rd of July—the British columns were formed for the 
attack of the French position, as Wellesley wished to 
cripple Victor before he could be joined by Sebastian!. But 
old Cuesta was again crusty, and “ contrived to lose the 
whole of the day, owing to the whimsical perverseness of 

* Andre Vieusseux’a ‘Military Life of the Duke,’ ‘Wellington Dis¬ 
patches/ vol. iv. 


ENTERS SPAIN. 


57 


1809.] 

his disposition.”* The loss of the day could not be re¬ 
covered. At one hour after midnight, Marshal Victor 
left Talavera to retreat to S. Olalla, and thence to Torrijos, 
to form a junction with Sebastiani. Early on the 24 th, Sir 
Arthur established his head-quarters in Talavera. Before 
entering Spain, he had bargained with Cuesta and the 
governing Junta for adequate supplies of provisions and 
means of transport; but the Spaniards had scandalously 
broken their agreement. In the course of the 24 th, Sir 
Arthur wrote to Lord Castlereagh •—“ I am not able to 
follow the enemy as I could wish * * * owing to my 

having found it impossible to procure even one mule or a cart 
in Spain. * * * My troops have been in actual leant 

of provisions for the last two days." f He therefore re¬ 
solved, in justice to his brave little army, to enter into no 
new operation, but rather to halt, and even to return to Por¬ 
tugal, if he should not be supplied as he ought to be. Ilis 
letters during the whole cf this campaign teem with painful 
details on the subjects of provisions, forage, mules and carts, 
and Spanish indolence and insincerity. 

The people, the local authorities, the generals, and the 
Junta, ail seemed unanimous in their unwillingness to pro¬ 
vide for the English, although sure to be amply paid for 
their supplies. Whether it was Spanish inertness, which 
not even the love of gain can excite, or Spanish prejudice 
against foreigners in general, and especially against here¬ 
tics,—for such their British allies were called,—or fear of 
parting with supplies which they might want themselves, or 
in some instances a bias towards the French, for there was a 
French party in the Spanish towns, it is a fact that, while 
Cuesta’s army abounded with provisions and forage, Sir 
Arthur could not get enough to supply his men with half¬ 
rations. “ The French,” he observes, “ can take what they 
like, and will take it, but we cannot even buy common 
necessaries .”% “Ho troops,” he wrote to his brother, the 
Marquis, “can serve to any good purpose unless they are 
regularly fed; and it is an error to suppose that a Spaniard, 

* These are the Duke’s own expressions. See ‘Dispatches,’ vol. iv. 

p. 626 . 

In the same letter he says,—“ I find General Cuesta more and more 
impracticable every day. It is impossible to do business with him, and 
very uncertain that any operation will succeed in which he has any con¬ 
cern. * * * He has quarrelled with some of his principal officers; 
and I understand that all are dissatisfied with him.” 

f ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. iv. 

% Id. A. Vieusseux’s * Military Life.* 


58 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


or a man, or an animal of any country, can make an exertion 
without food. In fact, the Spanish troops are more clamor¬ 
ous for their food, and more exhausted if they do not receive 
it regularly, than our own troops are.”* * * § 

When Sir Arthur halted the British troops at Talavera, 
Cuesta was all of a sudden invaded by what seemed irre¬ 
pressible energy and activity; and, with singular arrogance, 
he singlely dashed forward in pursuit of the French. His 
columns passed the Alberche in rapid succession, as if they 
were to stop at nothing short of the iron barrier of the 
Pyrenees. Sir Arthur, who could scarcely help foreseeing 
how all this sudden ardour would end, recommended caution 
and circumspection to the old gentleman, and sent a part of 
the British force some ten miles in advance of Talavera. 
The two armies previously acting in concert were now 
separated, the Spaniards being in pursuit of Victor, and the 
mass of the British forces remaining perfectly quiet, “ enjoy¬ 
ing semi-starvation upon the banks of the Tagus.” f 

Cuesta went blundering through S. Olalla, and rushed on, 
like a wild bull broke loose from the amphitheatre, to 
Torrijos. But here he found the rear-guard of the French 
marshal, who had been joined by General Sebastiani; and 
the sting of the French tail—Victor’s rear at Torrijos—was 
quite enough for this disorderl} 7 -, ill-commanded Spanish 
army.i On the morning of the 27th, a half-naked rabble 
arrived at Talavera, and fell in the rear of the British, and 
Cuesta and his better battalions arrived soon after, to tell 
that they had been beaten, and that the French were close 
at their heels.§ Hobody could doubt .the first fact, but the 
second assertion was not quite correct, for Victor and Sebas¬ 
tiani deemed it prudent to wait for the arrival of Joseph 
Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan, who were coming up 
with the guards and garrison of Madrid, and thus leaving 
that capital exposed to Sir Robert WilsGn, and bis rapid 
loose Lusitanians, and to any Spanish general that might get 
near, and be quick and bold. 

It was clear, however, to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that he 
would not be allowed a long repose ; and therefore he busily 
employed himself in examining and strengthening his position 

* ‘Dispatches,’ voi. iv. This letter is dated 9th August 1809. 

f Lieutenant-colonel Leith Hay’s Narrative of the Peninsular War; 
a concise, clear, and very animated narrative, where nearly everything that 
is related was seen by the author. 

I ‘ Piet. Hist.’ lleign of Geo. III. 

§ Colonel Leith Hay’s Narrative. 


59 


1809.] CRITICAL POSITION OI' THE BRITISH ARMY. 

at Talavera, taking especial care to get good cover for the 
Spaniards, whose stomach for fighting had much declined 
since their affair at Torrijos. The fate of the British army- 
seemed to hang upon, -a thread. The French were quite 
sure it did, and that the thread would snap. Soult, the 
most skilful of them all, was rapidly advancing from Sala¬ 
manca by the Puerto de Banos, upon Placencia, in Sir 
Arthur’s rear. Cuesta had been charged by Sir Arthur 
to guard the narrow difficult mountain-pass of Puerto de 
Banos; but the “impracticable” had sent thither only 600 
men, and these were swept away from the rocks by Soult’s 
veterans like flies from a wall. Marshal Mortier from Val¬ 
ladolid was following Soult, and Marshal Key, unknown to 
Sir Arthur, was hurrying from Astorga, with the hope of fall¬ 
ing upon his left flank.* Thus there were more than 50,000 
fighting men of the enemy behind the mountains of Pla¬ 
cencia ready to act on the left flank and rear of the British, 
who had also 50,000 more in front of them. The British 
force in the field did not exceed 20,000., There were a few 
more battalions on their march from Lisbon to join the 
army, but they did not arrive till after the battle of Tala¬ 
vera. The Spanish army of Cuesta now mustered about 
31,000 men, such as they were. The Portuguese regular 
troops, under Beresford, had remained to guard the north¬ 
east frontier of Portugal, towards Almeida. It had been 
previously agreed between General Wellesley, Cuesta, and 
the Spanish Supreme Junta, or Central Government, that 
General Venegas, who was at the head of the Spanish army 
of Andalusia, consisting of about 25,000 men, should march 
through La Mancha upon Madrid, whilst Wellesley and 
Cuesta were advancing by the valley of the Tagus. Venegas 
did advance through La Mancha, but it seems that he 
received counter orders from the Supreme Junta, which 
had the effect of slackening his march ; he, however, made 
his appearance at last towards Aranjuez and Toledo, and it 
■was his approach on that side which induced King Joseph 
to engage Wellesley and Cuesta, in order to save his 
capital. If he had kept the Allies in check for a few days 
longer, Soult’s arrival at Placencia would have obliged the 
English to retire precipitately. But King Joseph fearing 
that Venegas from the south, and Sir Robert Wilson, who, 
with the Lusitanian legion, was hovering in the neighbour¬ 
hood on the north, would enter Madrid and seize the stores, 

* ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. iv. Colonel Leith Hay’s Narrative. 
General Lao’s Histoire do la Guerre de la Peninsule. 


GO 


MEMOIR or TIIE DUKE. 


tlie reserves, the hospitals, &c., he and Marshal Victor deter- 
mined to give battle to the Allies in front, for if they were 
defeated, Madrid could he easily protected. General Wel¬ 
lesley, perceiving, from the movements of the enemy, that a 
battle was at hand, placed the Spanish army on the right 
near the Tagus, before the town of Talavera, its front 
protected by natural and artificial barriers. In this posi¬ 
tion they could hardly be seriously attacked. The British 
infantry, on whom the General could depend, occupied 
the left of the line, which was open in front, but its ex¬ 
treme left rested upon a steep hill, which was the key of 
the whole position. The whole line extended in length 
about two miles. On the 27th of July the French moved 
from S. Olalla, crossed the river Alberche, drove in the 
British outposts, and attacked two advanced brigades of the 
English, which fell back steadily across the plain into their 
assigned position in the line.* 

Victor next attacked the British left, while Sebastiani 
made a demonstration against the Spaniards on our right, 
several thousands of whom, after discharging their loaded 
muskets, fled panic-stricken to the rear, followed by their 
artillery, and creating a terrible confusion among the bag¬ 
gage, retainers, mules, &c.; and it was with difficulty that 
the rest of the Spanish troops were prevented from follow¬ 
ing this pernicious example. Thanks to Sir Arthur Wel¬ 
lesley, the Spaniards, when once rallied, found that their 
position could not be seriously attacked; it afforded in 
abundance those covers under which they, in modern times 
at least, had always been found to fight best; the ground 
was covered with olive trees, and much intersected by thick 
mud walls and ditches; there was a strong old church with 
a heavy battery in front of it, and along the whole of their 
part of the line were redoubts, walls, banks, and abatties, or 
parapets, made of felled trees. The French, finding the 
Spaniards so well placed, made no further attack on that 
side, but directed their efforts against the British left, which, 
under Lord Hill, occupied the eminence. For a moment 
the enemy succeeded, turning our left and ascending the 
hill. The sun had set, and the short twilight of the south 
was gone. 

“Darkling they fight and only know 

If chance has sped the fatal blow, 

Or, by the trodden corse below, 

Or by the dying groan: 

* A. Vieussenx—- resumt of * Dispatches.’ 


1809.] 


BATTLES OF TALAVERA. 


61 


Furious they strike without a mark. 

Save now and then the sulphurous spark 
Illumes some visage grim and dark, 

That with the flash is gone.”* 

Attacking them with the bayonet, Hill regained possession 
of that key to our position, and drove the French down the 
steeps. At the dead of night Victor repeated the attack 
on this point, on which everything depended; but Hill was 
now reinforced, and Sir Arthur himself rode to the spot, 
ordering up more artillery. Another terrible conflict, in 
the dark, took place; but the assailants were again hurled 
back into the valley, and again left the level ground on the 
hill top thickly strewed with dead bodies and wounded men. 
There, side by side, lay 1,000 French and 800 British. Of 
the survivors, the French returned to their bivouacs, and 
the English stretched themselves on the hill-top. 

“ And wearied all, and none elate, 

With equal hope and doubt they wait 
A fiercer, bloodier day.”t 

At daylight on the morning of the 28th, Victor hurled 
two more strong divisions of infantry against the fatal 
height; but the Englishmen there had been told by Sir 
Arthur that they must maintain that position. Ilill lost 
many brave officers and soldiers, and was himself wounded ; 
but he soon had the satisfaction of seeing the two French 
columns reel from before his British bayonets, and roll 
down the steep, after losing entire brigades. 

Another long pause ensued ; but about the hour of noon 
the French renewed their attack, spreading it along the 
whole part of the line occupied by the British. Heavy 
columns of French infantry twice attacked our right, under 
General Campbell, which joined the Spanish forces, but 
each time they were repulsed; and a Spanish cavalry regi¬ 
ment charging on their flank at the same time, obliged them 
to retire in great disorder. In these attacks the French 
columns lost ten guns and a great number of men. Mean¬ 
while, a strong French division, supported by two regiments 
of cavalry, advanced to turn the British left, and here a 
cavalry fight occurred, in which our 23rd light dragoons lost 
one-half of their number. But some corps of Spanish in¬ 
fantry and English and Spanish cavalry, properly posted by 

* ‘The Battles of Talavera.’ This patriotic, spirited, and correctly 
descriptive poem, published anonymously in 1809, is now the avowed 
production of the Bight Honourable John Wilson Croker. 
t ‘ The Battles of Talavera,’ 


62 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


General Wellesley, checked all further advance on this side. 
Victor, failing on our left, made a desperate attack on our 
centre. His men went close up to our line with stubborn 
resolve, but they had to reel back in disorder under a great 
discharge of musketry. But the English guards there 
placed were too hot and rash in pursuing the retreating 
foe. The supporting columns and dragoons of the French 
advanced; the French, who had been repulsed, rallied and 
faced again, and some French batteries hammered the flank 
of the guards, who in their turn drew back in disorder. 
At the same time our German legion, on the left of our 
guards, being hard pressed by the French, got into confu- 
sion. In fact, our centre was broken. This was the critical 
moment of the battle—the “ agony of fame” to Sir Arthur 
Wellesley. But our great Captain was on the stern hill-top 
on the left of the position, and had a clear view of the whole 
field. He knew what was to be done, and knew how to do 
it. Instantly, he ordered the 48th regiment, which was on 
the hill, to descend and advance in support of the centre, 
and at the same time he gave the word “forward” to Gene¬ 
ral Cotton’s light cavalr}u The advance of the 48th foot 
was a sight to see; they moved in beautiful order amidst 
the retiring crowds, and, wheeling back by companies, let 
them pass through their intervals; and then resuming line, 
they marched against the pursuing columns of the French, 
plied them with destructive charges of musketry, and then, 
closing upon them with a pace firm and regular as if they 
were on parade, checked all forward movement. Our guards 
and our German legion quickly rallied, and Cotton and his 
brigade of light cavalry coming up at a trot, the French 
began to waver, and at last they fairly gave way and made 
a run for it. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s own force, now re¬ 
duced to less than 14,000 men, and exhausted by fatigue, 
were unable to give pursuit, and the Spaniards, who (with 
the exception of a little cavalry) had scarcely been en¬ 
gaged at all, were utterly incapable of making any evolu¬ 
tions ; and thus, about six in the evening, on the second day 
of combat, all fighting and firing ceased, each army retain¬ 
ing the position which it had occupied in the morning. The 
guards and the French reserve of that timid and very pseudo 
king, Joseph Buonaparte, had not been engaged during the 
day, and had Napoleon been there he would—at that period 
of his life—have tried a last effort against our lines with 
these two uninjured, untouched corps. But Joseph, Jour- 
dan, and Victor had by this time quite enough of Talavera; 


DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH. 


63 


1809.] 

their troops were evidently disheartened, having been re¬ 
pulsed at all points, and having lost two generals in killed, 
besides 7,000 men in killed and wounded, and seventeen 
of their guns. On the side of the British, two generals, Mack¬ 
enzie and Langvvorth, were slain, with 800 men ; and three 
generals and above 4,000 men were wounded. The battle, 
or rather the battles, of Talavera (for there were two of 
them) were like the “battles of giants.” I would only call 
attention to the size and dimensions of the contending giants. 
Counting, as I do, the Spaniards for next to nothing, the 
English Briareus had, at the beginning, 20,000 arms, while 
the French giant had 50,000.* 

The next morning, at daybreak, the whole French army, 
who had begun crossing that river in the dead of night, were 
on the other side of the Alberche, and taking up a position 
on the heights of Salinas. Except at Albuhera, the French 
never again fought so well throughout the rest of the 
Spanish war; and yet France confessed, in a hurried night 
retreat, that she had been beaten and humiliated. 

“ Far from the field where late she fought—• 

The tents where late she lay— 

With ra]/id step and humbled thought, 

All night she holds her way; 

Leaving to Britain’s conquering sons 
Standards rent and ponderous guns. 

The trophies of the fray; 

The weak, the wounded, and the slain. 

The triumph of the battle-plain. 

The glory of the day.” f 

In the course of the same day—the 29th of July— 
General Robert Craufurd reached Sir Arthur’s camp from 
Lisbon, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th (rides). The re-, 
inforcement altogether amounted to nearly 3,000 men. This 
was the light brigade, which was ever after in advance 
during the Peninsular campaigns, and which acquired mili¬ 
tary celebrity for its gallantry and quickness of move¬ 
ment. | 

Having retreated before 14,000 British, the French were 
not at all disposed to return and renew the combat with 
17,000. “ La sancjlante journee de Talavera avait rep undue 

* ‘Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. hr. pp. 530-9.—A. Yieusseux.—Col. 
Leith Hay.—Napier.—M. Sherer, &c. &c. 
f ‘ The Battles of Talavera.’ 

X Andre Vieusseux’s ‘ Military Life.’ This gentleman served for some 
time with the light brigade. 


64 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


Veifroi dans Vamice Francaise /” * They felt that British 
troops could stand and light against double their numbers. 
“ There is nothing,” wrote Buonaparte to his generals, 
“ that is dangerous in Spain except the English; all the 
rest is canaille that can never keep the fieldf’f Sir Arthur 
Wellesley passed the 29th and 30th in establishing his 
hospitals in the town of Talavera, and endeavouring to get 
provisions, as his men were nearly starving. In this he was 
not at all assisted by the Spanish authorities or the Spanish 
inhabitants. “ We are miserably supplied with provisions,” 
thus he wrote to Lord Castlereagh, on the 1st of August, 
from Talavera ; “ the Spanish armies are now so numerous 
that they eat up the whole country. They have no ma¬ 
gazines, nor have we; nor can we collect any, and there is a 
scramble for everything. I think the battle of the 28th is 
likely to be of great use to the Spaniards; but I do not 
think them in a state of discipline to contend with the 
French. * * * The French in the late battle threw 

their whole force upon us, and although they did not suc¬ 
ceed, and will not succeed in future, we shall lose great 
numbers of men, which we can but ill afford. I dare not 
attempt to relieve ourselves from the weight of the attack 
by bringing forward the Spanish troops, owing to their 
miserable state of discipline, and their want of officers pro¬ 
perly qualified. These troops are entirely incapable of 
performing any manoeuvre, however simple. They would 
get into irretrievable confusion; and the result would pro¬ 
bably be, the loss of everything.” J 

The intrusive King Joseph, with the 4th corps and the 
reserve, moved on the 1st of'August farther back, to Illescas, 
between Madrid and Toledo, in order to oppose the army 
of Andalusia, under General Venegas; and Victor, with the 
first corps, retreated likewise along the Madrid road, through 
alarm at the movements of Sir Robert Wilson on his flank. 
But Soult was now advancing from the north with no less 
than three corps, and with one of these corps he entered 
Placencia on the 1st of August, while Key was steadily 
moving on from Salamanca in the same direction. Soult 
found Placencia deserted by most of its inhabitants, and he 
could gather no intelligence of the position of the British 
and Spanish armies under Wellesley and Cuesta; he only 

* The bloody day of Talavera had spread terror in the French armv. 
These are the words of Sarrazin, a French general and writer on war. 

t J. helmas,‘Journaux de Sieges,’ &c. Paris, 1836. 

X ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. iv. p, 554. 


ADVANCE OF SOULT. 


G5 


1309.] 

heard vague rumours of a terrible battle having been fought 
a few days before. This ignorance of each others move¬ 
ments was a common occurrence in the Spanish war, and is 
to be accounted for by the nature of the country, the diffi¬ 
culties of communication, the thinness of the population, 
and the incurious indolent habits of the people. There 
were cases where a great battle was fought in one valley, 
and not known behind the mountains which divided it from 
another valley; and when more was learned of what was 
passing, it was seldom that any great pains were taken by the 
Spaniards to convey information to their friends.* On the 
2nd of August, however, Sir Arthur learned that the enemy 
had entered Placencia; but that was all he could learn. 
Supposing that Soult was alone with his corps, which he 
estimated at only 15,000 men, and that his intention was to 
join Victor, he determined to encounter him before he could 
effect the junction ; he therefore marched on the 3rd of 
August to Oropesa with the British army, leaving Cuesta at 
Talavera, particularly recommending him to protect the 
hospitals; and, in case he should be obliged by any advance 
of Victor to leave Talavera, to collect carts to move away 
the wounded. The position of the hostile armies was now 
very singular; they were all crowded along the narrow 
valiey of the Tagus, from the neighbourhood of Madrid to 
the frontiers of Portugal. King Joseph and Sebastiani 
w r ere at Illescas and Valdemoro, between Madrid and the 
Tagus, while the advanced posts of Venegas were on the left 
or opposite side of the river, near Toledo. Victor was lower 
down on the right bank, at Maqueda, near the Alberche, 
watching Cuesta, who was at Talavera ; General Wellesley 
was farther down, at Oropesa; whilst Soult was on the 
Tietar, on the road from Placencia to Almaraz; and Beres- 
ford, with the Portuguese, was said to be moving farther 
west along the frontiers of Portugal.]* “The allies under 
Wellesley and Cuesta held the centre, being only one day’s 
march asunder; but their force, when concentrated, was not 
more than 47,000 men. The French could not unite under 
three days, but their combined forces exceeded 90,000 men, 
of whom 53,000 were under Soult ;* and this singular situa¬ 
tion was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in 
which all parties were as to the strength and movements of 
their adversaries. Victor and the king, frightened by Wil¬ 
son’s partisan corps of 4,000 men, were preparing to unite at 

* 1 Pictorial Hist.’—lleign of George III. vol. iv. 

t Andre Vieusseux. 


F 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


6(5 

Mostoles, near Madrid, while Cuesta, equally alarmed at 
Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
was supposed by King Joseph to be at the head of 25,000 
British ; and Sir Arthur, calculating on Soult's weakness, 
was marching with 23,000 English and Spanish to engage 
53,000 French ; while Soult, unable to ascertain the exact 
situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that 
the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the 
fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not 
hear the weight for twenty-four hours; yet fortune so 
ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.”* 

In the evening of the 3rd of August, Sir Arthur learned 
that Soult’s advanced posts were at Naval Moral, and con¬ 
sequently between him and, the bridge of Ahnaraz, on the 
Tagus, thus cutting his line of communication with Por¬ 
tugal. About an hour after receiving this intelligence, Sir 
Arthur got letters from Cuesta, informing him that the 
enemy was moving upon his (Cuesta’s) flank, and had 
returned to S. Olalla in his front,—that Joseph was coming 
back to join Victor,—that Soult must be far stronger than 
General Wellesley had supposed,—and that, therefore, and 
from the consideration that Wellesley was not strong enough 
to check Soult’s corps coming from Placencia, he (Cuesta) 
intended to leave Talavera that evening (and to abandon in 
it the English hospitals, excepting such men as could be 
moved by the means he had already collected), in order to 
join the British army at Oropesa, and assist it in repelling 
Soult. These reasons did not appear to Sir Arthur quite 
sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera, for 
exposing the combined arms to an attack in front and rear 
at one and the same time, and for abandoning his sick and 
wounded. He wrote one of his short and earnest letters to 
the wilful old man, imploring him to stay where he was, or 
to wait at least until the next morning, in order to cover the 
removal of our hospitals. But before this letter could reach 
him, Cuesta, who was evidently afraid of staying at Tala¬ 
vera without Wellesley, had begun his march; and, on the 
next morning, the rising sun shone upon his dirty, ragged 
troops, marching into Oropesa. This was the 4th of August. 
About 2,000 of the British wounded had been brought 
away, but about 1,500 had been left at Talavera to be made 
prisoners.f 

Cuesta’s retreat must almost immediately bring Marshal 

* Napier’s * History of the Peninsular War,’ book is. 

f ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol, iv, p. 601. 


OUR ARMY IN PERIL. 


1809.] 


67 


Victor and Joseph Buonaparte upon Sir Arthur, who by 
this time had ascertained, through intercepted letters, that 
Soult’s force was indeed much stronger than he had reckoned. 
The English General was now placed between the mountains 
and the Tagus, with a French army advancing upon each 
Hank, and with his retreat by the bridge of Almaraz com¬ 
pletely cut off. After the experience he had had of Cuesta 
and his Spaniards, he could not rely upon them in an open 
field of battle; and he could not, with 17,000 British, 
fatigued and famishing, hope to fight successively two 
French armies, each nearly three times stronger than his 
own. Before this moment of real jeopardy, he had ex¬ 
pressed and repeated his opinions that, with their present 
commanders and officers, and in their present state of dis¬ 
cipline, the Spaniards were next to useless in the open 
country, and that everything would be lost by the British if 
any reliance were placed upon them.* 

These, be it observed, in justice to the memory of a brave, 
good man, were precisely the same convictions that were 
entertained by Sir John Moore when he began his retreat 
upon Coruna; and yet our diplomatist, Mr. Frere, insisted 
at the time, and Mr. Southey and other friends of Mr. 
Frere, and romantical admirers of the people of the coun¬ 
try, continued to repeat, many years afterwards, that, with 
the assistance of Spanish generals and Spanish troops, Sir 
John Moore and his little army ought to have driven the 
French beyond the Pyrenees. I take the opinion of our 
great Captain as a perfect refutation of such nonsense. 

But, hemmed in as they were, there was still one—and 
only one — line of retreat left open to the British; for, a 
little below Talavera the Tagus was crossed by the bridge 
of Arzobispo; and by this route, and by this bridge, Sir 
Arthur determined to retire immediately, before the enemy 
should have time to intercept him. He communicated his 
designs to Cuesta, who, according to custom, opposed them. 
The perverse, silly old man wanted, forsooth, to stop and 
fight the French at Oropesa! Wearied out with his ab¬ 
surdities, Sir Arthur sternly told him that he might do as 
he liked, but that, for his own part, being responsible for 
the British army, he should march forthwith. And accord¬ 
ingly, on that same morning, before Cuesta’s disorderly rear 
reached Oropesa, the British filed off towards Arzobispo. 
It was a blessing that the Spaniards, who generally de¬ 
stroyed what they ought to have left standing, and left 

* * Welliagton Dispatches,’ yoI. iv. p. 561. 

F 2 


68 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


standing what they ought to have destroyed, had not blown 
up the only bridge open to us. The 2,000 wounded, the 
artillery, the stores, were all carried safely over the Tagus. 
Before evening, Sir Arthur took up an excellent position 
behind the right bank of that river, and then the British 
army was safe. “ I hope,” wrote our General to Viscount 
Castlereagh, “that my public dispatches will justify me 
from all blame, excepting that of having trusted the Spanish 
general in anything .” 

That insensate commander was not mad enough to stay 
when Sir Arthur was gone. He, too, crossed the bridge of 
Arzobispo, but in so slovenly a manner that the French, 
who closely followed him, took a good part of his artillery, 
and would have taken it all if General Wellesley had not 
sent British troops to the rescue. Here ended the fighting 
campaign of the British for 1809. Sir Arthur moved his 
head-quarters to Jaraicejo, on the high-road to Badajoz, 
leaving a strong rear-guard to prevent the enemy from 
passing the Tagus. The bridge of Almaraz had already 
been broken by the Spaniards, but Sir Arthur left British 
troops to guard the strong pass of Mirabete, which faced 
the broken bridge of Almaraz; and he caused all the Spa¬ 
nish artillery that was left to be dragged up the mountain 
of Meza d’lbor, another very strong position. The line of 
defence of the allies was thus skilfully re-established. “ All 
is now safe,” wrote Sir Arthur, “and I should feel no 
anxiety on any subject if we had provisions; but we are 
almost starving .” 

Meantime Joseph Buonaparte recalled a corps which had 
crossed the Tagus at Talavera, and ordered it to join Sebas- 
tiani against Venegas, who was now at Almonacid, near 
Toledo. Marshal Hey, on the other side, whom Soult had 
directed to ford the Tagus below the broken bridge of 
Almaraz, could not discover the ford. Soult now proposed 
the bold plan of marching with his three corps by Coria and 
Abrantes, and reaching Lisbon by the right bank of the 
Tagus before the English; but Hey, Jourdan, and Joseph 
opposed the scheme, and soon after a despatch came from 
Napoleon forbidding any further offensive operations till 
the great reinforcements, which his successful termination 
of the Austrian war now placed at his disposal, should have 
time to march from the Danube to the Tagus, or to be 
actually in Spain. 

Napoleon, since he had assumed the imperial crown, 
trusted almost entirely to superiority of numbers, and to 


PARLIAMENTARY CRITICISM. 


69 


1809.] 

those overwhelming masses which he recruited so cheaply by 
means of the conscription. The proportion of cavalry and 
artillery in his armies in Spain was beyond all precedent. 
“ How different from the adventurous general of the Army 
of Italy, who with 35,000 men encountered and defeated 
three Austrian armies, each stronger than his own, in 1796. 
But he was now bloated with success, and war must be with 
him a sure game. He had already 200,000 men in Spain, 
and yet he did not think them enough. His generals had 
adopted the same views: — ‘It is large masses only, the 
strongest that you can form, that will succeed.’ Thus 
wrote Soult to King Joseph before the battle of Talavera. 
It is worthy of remark that Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing 
about this time, said — ‘I conceive that the French are 
dangerous only when in large masses.’ Such was the 
character of the wars of the French empire. And yet, with 
all his tremendous masses, and a proportionate waste of 
human life, Napoleon failed in the end.”* 

Soult’s army now went into cantonments in Estremadura 
and Leon, near the borders of Portugal. Sebastiani having 
defeated Venegas at Almonacid, in the month of August, 
drove him back upon the Sierra Morena—Joseph Buona¬ 
parte, cursed by the people, was again residing as a rot 
faineant at Madrid. French moveable columns, not unlike 
the infernal columns which had formerly devastated the 
Vendee, now traversed various parts of Spain; a bloody 
guerilla warfare was waged by the Spaniards in many 
distant provinces and districts; some towns on the eastern 
coast, in Catalonia and Valencia, were taken by the French, 
while others held out, costing the besiegers an enormous 
sacrifice of life. When covered by a few old walls, and 
when trusting to their own instinct, without relying on 
pedantic officers, the Spanish burghers and peasants fought 
like heroes. 

The violent opposition party at home, which never ceased 
predicting his defeat, ruin, and disgrace until he stood a 
conqueror on the crest of the Pyrenees, and poured his in¬ 
vading columns into France, had been very busy in criticis¬ 
ing this campaign, and were at their invidious work while 
Sir Arthur was engaged at Talavera. 

“Oli, heart of honour, soul of fire, 

Even at that moment fierce and dire, 

Thy agony of fame ! 

* Andre Vieusseux’s ‘ Military Life of the Duke.’ I doubt whether 
Buonaparte’s great secret has ever been so well told in so few words. 


70 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


When Britain’s fortune dubious hung, 

And France tremendous swept along, 

In tides of blood and flame ; 

Even while thy genius and thy arm 
Retrieved the day and turned the storm, 

Even at that moment factious spite, 

And envious fraud essayed to blight 
The honours of thy name.”* 

But the good old King, the Duke of York, the Duke of 
Clarence, Lord Castlereagh, with every member of the 
cabinet, and with large majorities in both houses of Parlia¬ 
ment, took a very different view of the campaign, as did, 
most assuredly, the mass of the British nation. On the 4th 
of September 1809, shortly after receipt of the news of his 
remarkable battle, Sir Arthur was raised to the peerage 
with the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley and Yiscount 
Wellington of Talavera. In announcing this elevation to 
our hero, the Duke of Portland said—“ Long may you enjoy 
that honour, and be placed, for the advantage and honour 
of your country, in those situations which may enable you 
to add to your own.” The hearty Amen , the “ so be it,” 
then pronounced by every true English heart, has been 
more than responded unto. The “so be it” has been and is. 

On the 20th of August, before receiving his well-merited 
honours, Sir Arthur removed his head-quarters to Badajoz, 
and placed his army in cantonments on the line of the Gua- 
diana. His chief motive was the neglect of the Spanish 
authorities in supplying his army with provisions, which 
obliged him to draw near his magazines in Portugal: and 
another reason was, the impossibility of co-operation with 
the undisciplined Spanish armies. An unpleasant corre¬ 
spondence took place on the subject between the Spanish 
Supreme Junta and the English ambassador at Seville. In 
the autumn the British troops suffered greatly from the 
malaria-fever, which prevails at that season near the banks 
of the Guadiana. 

“ The handful of troops whom Sir Arthur now com¬ 
manded,” says one of his gallant companions in arms, “ was 
composed of second battalions, of mere youths, both officers 

and men. Indeed, the Guards, the Buffs, the 48th 

and 61st, with the light division, which had lately joined, 
under Craufurd, were the only portions of the army which 
at other periods would have been regarded as fit for active 
service. Of the cavalry, again, it is impossible to speak in 
higher terms. They were dropping off daily; and both 
* Right Hon. John Wilson Croker, ‘Battles of Talavera.* 



1809.] QUALITIES or SPANISH ARMIES. 71 

men and horses suffered from sickness, to a degree even 
more appalling than that which befel the infantry.”* The 
Spaniards would furnish nothing to our sick troops, and 
their generals in the field arrogantly and insolently rejected 
all advice, and refused all co-operation. “ I wish,” said his 
lordship, “ that the eyes of the people of England were 

open to the real state of affairs as mine are. The 

Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, 
bravery, nor arrangement, to carry on the contest.”f To 
Lord Castlereagh he wrote —“ Their practice of running 
away, and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, 
is fatal to everything, excepting a reassembly of the men 
in a state of nature; who as regularly perform the same 
manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2,000 
ran off on the evening of the 27th from the battle of Tala- 
vera (not a hundred yards from the place where I was 
standing), who were neither attacked nor threatened with 
an attack, and who were frightened only by the noise of 
their own fire ; they left their arms and accoutrements on 
the ground; their officers went with them, and they and 
their fugitive cavalry plundered the baggage of the British 
army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went 
off, whom I did not see. Nothing can be worse than the 
officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that 
when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has, 
by the measures it has adopted in the last twm years, so 
little progress has been made in any one branch of the 
military profession by any individual, and that the business 
of an army should be so little understood. They are really 
children in the art of war.”j Without Spaniards on his 
hand, Lord Wellington was quite sure that he could main¬ 
tain Portugal against the French. 

In October his lordship repaired to Lisbon, and pro¬ 
ceeded to reconnoitre the whole country in front of that 
capital, for it was then that he resolved upon the con¬ 
struction of the celebrated lines of Torres Yedras, which 
enabled him to baffle all the efforts of the French in the 
following year. I can only refer the reader to the 
“ Memorandum” which he wrote at Lisbon on the 20th of 
October for Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, of the Engineers, 
in wdiich he clearly points out the double line of position, 
the entrenchments and redoubts, the number of men re- 

* Marquis of Londonderry’s Narrative. 

f Letter to Mr. Huskisson, Secretary to the Treasury. 

J ‘Dispatches/ vol. v, pp. 82-90. 



72 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


quired at each post, &c., as if the whole were already in 
existence before his eyes. This paper, so remarkable, con¬ 
sidering the epoch and circumstances in which it was written, 
is a most striking evidence of Wellington's comprehensive 
mind, bis penetration, and foresight.* Of his plan, how¬ 
ever, nothing was said or even whispered at the time. 

He returned to his head-quarters at Badajoz, from whence 
he made an excursion to Seville, where he conferred with 
his brother, the Ambassador, whom he accompanied to Cadiz. 
On the 11th of November he returned to his head-quarters 
at Badajoz. At the same time another fatal blunder was 
committed by the Spaniards. 

About the middle of November the Supreme Junta 
ordered the army of Andalusia, joined by the greater part 
of the army of Estremadura, to advance suddenly upon 
Madrid, and this without any previous communication with 
Lord Wellington, who was at Badajoz, or with the Duke 
del Parque and other Spanish commanders in the north of 
Spain. Venegas, the general of the army of Andalusia, had 
been superseded by Areizaga, an inexperienced young officer, 
who was in favour with the Junta. Old Cuesta had also 
retired, and made room for Eguia in the command of the 
army of Estremadura. These two armies, which constituted 
the principal regular force of the Spaniards, and which, 
posted within the line of the Tagus and along the range of 
the Sierra Morena, protected, and might long have pro¬ 
tected the south of Spain, were thrown away upon a foolish 
errand. Areizaga, with nearly 50,000 men and sixty pieces 
of artillery, advanced into the plains of La Mancha, and was 
attacked on the 16th November, in the open fields of Ocana, 
by the two French corps of Mortier and Sebastiani; and, 
although his men fought with sufficient courage, yet he was 
completely routed, with the loss of more than one-half of 
his army, and all his baggage and artillery, with the ex¬ 
ception of fifteen guns. Not deterred by this awful catas¬ 
trophe, the Duke del Parque, with 20,000 Spaniards in the 
north, advanced from Salamanca against Kellerman, but he 
was beaten and driven to the mountains of Pena de Francia. 
The French north of the Tagus were thus left at liberty to 
attack Ciudad Rodrigo and the frontiers of Portugal. “ I 
lament,” thus Lord Wellington writes from Badajoz on the 
news of these mishaps,—“ 1 lament that a cause which pro¬ 
mised so well a few weeks ago should have been so com¬ 
pletely lost by the ignorance, presumption, and mismanagc- 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. v, p. 231-9, 


1810.] RETIRES FROM SPANISH GROUND. 73 

ment of those to whose direction it was entrusted. I declare 
that, if they had preserved their two armies, or even one of 
them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent no 
reinforcements which could have been of any use ; time 
would have been gained; the state of affairs would have 
improved daily; all the chances were in our favour; and in 
the first moment of weakness, occasioned by any diversion 
on the Continent, or by the growing discontent of the 
French themselves with the war, the French armies must 
have been driven out of Spain. But no! nothing will 
answer except to fight great battles in plains, in which the 
defeat of the Spanish armies is as certain as is the com¬ 
mencement of the battle. They will not credit the accounts 
I have repeatedly given them of the superior number even 
of the French; they will seek them out, and they find 
them invariably in all parts in numbers superior to them¬ 
selves. I am only afraid, now, that I shall be too late to 
save Ciudad Rodrigo, the loss of which will secure for the 
French Old Castile, and will cut off all communication with 
the northern provinces and leave them to their fate. I 
wonder whether the Spanish officers ever read the history of 
the American war, or of their own war in the Dutch pro¬ 
vinces, or of their own war in Portugal.” 

A storm now gathering in the north-east was sure to 
burst upon Portugal. Accordingly, Lord Wellington re¬ 
tired from Spanish ground altogether, and moving through 
Alemtejo with the mass of his army, in December he 
crossed the Tagus at Abrantes; and marching thence to 
the Mondego, he fixed his head - quarters at Yiseu in 
January 1810, having his outposts along the Portuguese 
frontiers towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and having left General 
Hill’s division, south of the Tagus, to protect the Alemtejo. 
In the mean time, both he and Beresford laboured might 
and main to raise the Portuguese regular army to a state of 
efficiency in numbers, armament, and discipline. Too much 
praise could hardly be bestowed on Beresford for the part 
he took in these endeavours. Most happily the Portuguese, 
whom the Spaniards always affected to despise, were far 
more modest and tractable than their neighbours. 

Campaign of 1810.—Lord Wellington, in maintaining 
that the defence of Portugal was a practicability, never 
meant that he should be able to defend the whole frontier 
of that country, the frontier being too extensive and open 
on too many points. His assurance was, that he could secure 
Lisbon the capital, and the other strongholds, and the 


74 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


mountains and fastnesses, so as to keep his footing in the 
country, and tire and famish out the invaders. As Jong as 
the British kept Portugal, the French tenure of Spain must 
be insecure. Buonaparte knew this well, and was, there¬ 
fore, so anxious to dispel the English from Portugal. 
Months before the storm burst, Lord Wellington had 
written to the Earl of Liverpool—“ I do not think that the 
French will succeed in getting possession of Portugal, with 
an army of 70,000 or even of 80,000 men.” This was now 
to be proved. 

The French armies in Spain had received during the 
winter great reinforcements from Germany, in consequence 
of the peace which their emperor had been enabled to 
dictate to Austria under the walls of Vienna. Junot and 
Drouet, with two fresh corps, had crossed the Pyrenees, 
followed by a part of the Imperial Guards. It was reported 
that Napoleon himself was coming. Ney, Kellerman, and 
Loison, in Old Castile and Leon, pressed on the Portuguese 
frontier with 60,000 men, and seemed, in the month of 
April, to be quite ready for an attack. To open the way for 
it, they had besieged and taken Astorga from the Spaniards, 
and were making preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rod¬ 
rigo. Soult was now in the south of Spain, with Victor 
and Mortier under his orders, and was displaying his activity 
and administrative abilities in organising his military re¬ 
sources, and establishing French authority in Andalusia. 
General Regnier was in Estremadura, ready to co-operate in 
the invasion of Portugal by either bank of the Tagus. But 
Regnier’s movements were watched by General Hill, with 
about 12,000 British and Portuguese, whom Lord Welling¬ 
ton had stationed on the frontiers of Alemtejo. At the south 
extremity of Spain, Cadiz, strong by its natural situation, 
was garrisoned by a British force of 7,000 men, under 
General Graham, in addition to some Spanish troops; and 
the French, under Marshal Victor, were blockading that 
place. In the north, the Spaniards remained in possession 
of Gallicia and Asturias, but were not in condition to effect 
any powerful diversion. In the east of Spain, Valencia and 
Murcia still held out, but Catalonia was the only province in 
which the Spaniards kept up a regular, active system of 
warfare against the French. O’Donnell, the best of the 
Spanish generals, commanded the Catalonians, and was 
favoured by the nature of the country, by the numerous 
fortresses which were in it, and by part of an English fleet 
which kept along that coast. The Catalonians had also an 


ADVANCE OF MASSENA. 


75 


1810.] 

organised and a daring militia, known by the names of 
Somatenes and Miguelets,—a force far more efficient than 
any regular army which the Spaniards had, as yet, on foot. 
But the struggle in Catalonia was too remote to have much 
influence on the operations in Portugal. 

About the middle of May, Marshal Massena arrived at 
Valladolid, having been sent by Buonaparte to take the 
command of the army assembled on the frontier of Portugal. 
Massena’s force, disposable for the invasion, exceeded 72,000 
men. To this number was afterwards added, in the course 
of the campaign, about 18,000 men, under General Drouet. 
Lord Wellington’s force, in regular troops, counting both 
Portuguese and English troops, did not exceed 54,000. 
There was, indeed, a considerable Portuguese militia, but 
this w r as employed mostly in garrisons, and in the provinces 
beyond the Douro. Massena had this advantage; he could 
concentrate his whole force for the attack on the north of the 
Tagus, while Lord Wellington w r as obliged to leave part of 
his army to the south of that river, to guard against the 
French army of Andalusia, which was more than 60,000 
strong, and a part of which might advance into the Por¬ 
tuguese province of Alemtejo. Moreover, let this be 
marked,—Massena’s immense host w T as composed chiefly 
of old soldiers, while Lord Wellington could rely con¬ 
fidently only upon the British part of his army, which did 
not exceed 25,000 men, the Portuguese regular troops being 
as yet untried, and the militia being a militia, and no 
more. 

That the campaign would open with the siege of Ciudad 
Rodrigo was the general expectation. Early in June, 
Massena’s French invested that place, almost in sight of the 
British advanced division; but Lord Wellington could not 
risk his army for the relief of that Spanish fortress, his 
object being to defend Portugal, and above all, Lisbon. On 
the 10th of July, Ciudad Rodrigo capitulated. Our great 
Captain retained his position on the left bank of the Coa. 
The French advanced to that river, and near a bridge 
were encountered by General Craufurd, who inflicted upon 
them a loss of about 1,000 men. Craufurd’s engaging was 
against Wellington’s order; but it gave Massena a striking 
specimen of the stern resistance that he had to encounter on 
his march to Lisbon. 

The French marshal issued a proclamation, abusing the 
“insatiable ambition” of England; sneering at Lord Wel¬ 
lington, recommending the Portuguese population to remain 


76 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


quiet, and assuring them of protection for their persons and 
property. How this last promise was kept, was stated by 
our Commander-in-chief, in a counter-proclamation, dated a 
few weeks after the entrance ot Massena:—“The time which 
has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon 
the frontiers of Portu gal has fortunately afforded the Por¬ 
tuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from 
the French. The people had remained in some villages 
trusting to the enemy’s promises, and vainly believing that, 
by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly man¬ 
ner, they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their 
properties would be respected, their women would be saved 
from violation, and their lives would be spared. Vain 
hopes ! The people in these devoted villages have suffered 
every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their pro¬ 
perty has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, 
their women have been ravished, and the unfortunate in¬ 
habitants whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal violence 
of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent 
confidence they reposed in promises which were only made 
to be violated. The Portuguese now see that they have no 
remedy for the evils with which they are threatened, but 
determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to 
render the enemy’s advance into their country as difficult as 
possible, by removing out ot his way everything that is 
valuable, or that can contribute to his existence or frustrate 
his progress, are the only and certain remedies for the evils 
with which they are threatened. The army under my com¬ 
mand will protect as large a proportion ot the country as 
will be in their power; but it is obvious that the people can 
save themselves only b}^ resistance to the enemy, and their 
properties only by removing them. The duty, however, 
which I owe to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and 
to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power 
and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indo¬ 
lent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger 
which awaits them, and to save their country; and I hereby 
declare that all the magistrates or persons in authority who 
remain in the towns or villages after receiving orders from 
any of the military officers to retire from them, and all 
persons of whatever description who hold any communication, 
with the enemy, and aid and assist them in any manner, will 
be considered traitors to the stale, and shall be tried and 
punished accordingly.” * 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches/ vol. vi, pp. 229, 230. 


1810.] TIIE HTDGE OP BUSACO. 77 

Marshal Massena, a very low-bred soldier of fortune, 
found he could not move quite so rapidly as he had an¬ 
ticipated. In one of those inflated papers which disgraced 
the French during all the Buonaparte period, he had given 
himself only three months to achieve the conquest of Por¬ 
tugal, and drive Lord Wellington into the sea; but he 
passed nearly one entire month inactively on the line of the 
Coa, ere he commenced the siege of Almeida. It was the 
15th of August when he began to break ground before that 
place. Then Lord Wellington moved part of his army to 
the front, to take advantage of any opportunity for relieving 
the place. Almeida was defended by a Portuguese garrison, 
commanded by an English officer. Lord Wellington ex¬ 
pected that it would hold out well; but on the night of the 
27th of August, under French fire, a magazine blew up, 
which contained nearly all the powder, and by the explosion 
a good part of the town and its defences were destroyed; 
and this obliged the governor to capitulate. Disappointed 
and vexed—for he reckoned on the place detaining the 
French until the rainy season set in—Wellington then fell 
back with the main body of his army to the valley of the 
Mondego. Soon, however, he had the consolation of know¬ 
ing practically, and to a certainty, that Massena was not 
entitled to the reputation which revolutionism and Buona- 
partism had conferred upon him. The marshal lost many 
more days; and it was on the 15th of September, when the 
rain was pouring down, as from hogsheads, that he really 
began his march along the valley of the Mondego, by the 
right bank of that river, taking the direction of Coimbra, 
through our old quarters at Viseu. It was no laughing 
time ; but our great Captain could not help indulging in 
a smile at Massena’s monstrous mistake. “ There are, 
certainly,” said he, “ man} 7 bad roads in Portugal, but 
the enemy has taken decidedly the worst in the whole 
kingdom.”* 

Lord Wellington, who had retired by the left bank of 
the Mondego, now crossed the river, and took up a strong 
position in front of Coimbra, along the memorable ridge of 
Busaco. He was joined in good time (on the morning of 
the 26th) by General Hill, from the south, who had left 
some of his troops on the left bank of the Mondego, to bar 
the road to Lisbon on that side. The position at Busaco 
was grim to look at; but on the evening of the 26th of 
August, the French were at its foot, and began skirmishing. 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches/ 


78 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


“Nothing,” says a British officer present, “could be con¬ 
ceived more enlivening, more interesting, or more varied 
than the scene from the heights of Busaco. Commanding a 
very extensive prospect to the eastward, the movements of 

the French army were thence distinctly perceptible. 

Rising grounds were covered with troops, cannon, or equi¬ 
pages: the widely-extended country contained a host moving 
forward, or gradually condensing into masses, checked in 
their progress by the grand natural barrier.”* 

In the course of the night, 70,000 men, formidable for 
their discipline and the long habit of conquest, were at the 
foot of that ridge, under conduct of three marshals of France, 
the chief of whom. Massena, was renowned by a life of great 
military successes. On the top of the ridge, or, rather, a 
little upon the backward slope of the Serra—ia order that 
their disposition and numbers might be masked from the 
enemy—lay 25,000 British soldiers, and a like number of 
Portuguese. 

As early as two in the morning of the 27th, the sentinels 
on our picket-posts could hear the stir of preparation in the 
French camp; and the British line stood silently to arms. 
In the order of battle, Hill occupied the right, with Leith 
upon his left, and the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Next in 
order stood the 3rd division, under fiery Picton. Our 1st 
division was formed near an old convent, at the very top of 
the Serra, with the brigade of Pack posted considerably in 
advance on the descent. The light division was formed on 
the left of Pack, and, in like manner, upon the descent from 
that lofty culm where the convent stood. A sweil of earth 
and rock concealed their line from the enemy; while, at 
some distance behind their posts, a brigade of German 
infantry stood exposed to full view, as if it were the only 
body to oppose the French. Our 4th division, under General 
Cole, held the extreme left of the ridge, covering a road 
which led into a flat country, on which the British cavalry 
were drawn up in reserve. The British and Portuguese 
artillery was distributed along the front, at those points 
where it could be employed with the best effect.f 

The grey mist of early dawn hung yet upon the moun¬ 
tain ; and it was but a doubtful light when the enemy 
quitted their camp. But as they advance, column upon 
column, the sun shone forth on their multitudinous array. 


* Colonel Leith Hay, 


f Captain Moyle Sherer. 



1810.] 


BATTLE OP BUSACO. 


70 


“ And is it now a goodly sight, 

Or dreadful to behold, 

The pomp of that approaching fight, 

Waving ensigns, pennons light, 

And gleaming blades and bayonets bright. 

And eagles winged with gold.” * 

I have been told by a brave English officer—then a young 
ensign, and going, for the first time, into battle—that the 
sight took away his breath, and that our soldiers, on the 
ridge of Busaco, gazed for a time at it, motionless and silent. 
But this was soon over — the French moved up the hills. 
“ Two columns, under Begnier, pressed up to the assault of 
the third division; and three, under Ney, moved rapidly 
against the convent. These points of attack were about 
three miles asunder. The firing first opened in front of 
Craufurd’s division ; but, despite its earnest loudness, at the 
first faint report of guns from the right, Wellington, antici¬ 
pating the object of lMassena, rode thither, and found, as 
lie had expected, that the main effort of the enemy was to 
possess themselves of the road which traverses the Busaco, 
from St. Antonio de Cantara, and to turn his right. They 
were ignorant of the presence of Generals Hill and Leith, 
and considered themselves engaged with the extreme right 
of the British. Blit, from the summit of that rocky brow, 
which they had ascended, through a storm of opposing fire 
with astonishing resolution, and for which they were still 
contending, though vainly, with the brave division of Picton, 
they beheld the strong and steady columns of those generals 
moving swiftly to the scene of action. The right of the 
third division had been, in the first instance, borne back : 
the 8th Portuguese had suffered most severely; the enemy 
had formed, in good order, upon the ground which they 
had so boldly won, and were preparing to bear down to 
the right, and sweep our field of battle. Lord Wellington 
arrived on the spot at this moment, and aided the gallant 
efforts of Picton’s regiments, the tire of whose musketry was 
terrible, by causing two guns to play upon the French flank 
with grape. Unshaken even with this destruction, they still 
held their ground, till, with levelled bayonets and the shout 
of the charge, the 45th and 88th regiments British, most 
gallantly supported by the 8th Portuguese, rushed for¬ 
wards, and hurried them down the mountain side with a 
fearlul slaughter.”f 

But there was another column of the enem}^, which had 
* * The battles of Talavera.* j* Captain Moyle Slierer. 


80 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


gained a height beyond the line of Picton’s division. Upon 
this column, Colonel Edward Barnes’s brigade , of General 
Leith’s corps, headed by the 9th regt., under Colonel Cameron, 
made a rush ; and the French, though defending themselves 
with a fierce fire of musketry, were borne over the rocks by 
the bayonets of the brave 9th. Another hopeless assault 
was made on General Craufurd, in front of the convent. 
The French advanced with great ardour, in spite of the 
musketry of our light troops and the bullets of our artillery, 
which made great havoc in their columns as they ascended 
the steep; but they had as yet no footing on the swelling 
ridge winch masked the 43rd and 52nd regiments, when, at 
the given word, those gallant regiments ran upon them at 
the charge step, overthrew them with the bayonet, and then 

f loured such a murderous fire upon the fuyards , that their 
ine of retreat was strewed a long way down the hill with 
their dead and disabled. 

After this lesson, the French marshals would not think of 
renewing the combat on the grim Serra de Busaco. They 
had lost one general and about 1,000 in killed, two generals 
and about 3,000 in wounded; while one general and several 
hundred men had been made prisoners—in all nearly 5,000. 
The loss of the allies did not exceed 1,300, whereof 578 were 
Portuguese — being their full proportion, and a convincing 
proof that they had stood to their work like soldiers. 

The conduct of the Portuguese was, indeed, worthy of 
their ancient, but long obscured, fame. By the victory of 
Busaco they were inspired with a confidence in Wellington, 
and with a confidence in themselves, which never after¬ 
wards forsook them. Their gallant bearing was, to Marshal 
Beresford especially, and to all the British officers serving 
under him (who had helped to turn “a lawless rabble” 
into a fine army), a very high honour, and a well-earned 
reward.* 

“ This movement,” says Wellington, “ has brought the 
Portuguese levies into action with the enemy, for the first 
time, in ail advantageous situation; and they have proved 
that the trouble which has been taken with them has not 
been thrown away, and that they are worthy of contending, 
in the same ranks with British troops, in this interesting 
cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving.” f 

One great object of Lord Wellington, in fighting the 
battle of Busaco, was to give time to the population of the 

* Captain Moyle Slierer, ‘ Military Memoirs of the Duke.’ 
f ‘ "Wellington Dispatches/ vol. vi. p. 475.* 


1810.] THE ALLIES ItETREAT TOWARDS LI3BOTST. 81 

country in liis rear to get out of the way of the enemy with 
their goods and provisions, especially from Coimbra, a popu¬ 
lous and rather wealthy town; but the orders he had given 
to that effect were ill obeyed, and, in many instances, totally 
neglected until the French marauders were in the towns and 
villages. North of the ridge of Busaco, there was the pass 
of Boyalva; and thither Massena now directed the heads 
of his formidable columns. Lord Wellington had directed 
Colonel Trant to occupy the Boyalva pass with a Portu¬ 
guese division; but Trant missed the direct road, and arrived 
too late; and the French descended through the pass into 
the maritime plains, seizing on the road leading from Oporto 
to Coimbra. Massena had thus turned Lord Wellington's 
position, and got in his rear. But, facing about, the allies, 
on the 28th, quitted the ridge of Busaco, crossed the Mon- 
dego, and began their retreat towards Lisbon — with full 
couiidence that Massena was not to plant his eagles there 
this time. 

On the 1st of September, the British rear-guard, after 
some skirmishing with the French, evacuated Coimbra, 
accompanied by nearly all the remaining inhabitants, who 
now ran away with whatever moveable property they could 
carry, not knowing whither they were going, or by -whom 
they were to be lodged and fed. The sick, the aged, and the 
children were put upon carts, mules, and asses ; but respect¬ 
able men and delicate women were seen walking slowly and 
painfully on foot, under heavy burdens, and encumbering 
the road, while the French cavalry was hovering on our 
flank and rear. “It was a piteous sight,” says an officer 
present, “ and one which those who saw it can never forget.” 
The French entered the forsaken city of Coimbra, where 
they found ample stores of provision, which the soldiers 
pillaged and wasted, instead of husbanding them for the 
future necessities of their army. Massena halted three 
days in the town, and then pursued his march, leaving 
5,000 sick and wounded behind him. Three days after his 
departure, Colonel Trant rushed into Coimbra, with a body 
of Portuguese militia, and captured these 5,000 French, 
together with some effective soldiers who had been left to 
protect the hospitals. Other bodies of militia and of 
organised peasants acted also upon the enemy’s rear in co¬ 
operation with Trant; and every town or post which the 
French evacuated as they advanced towards Lisbon, was 
taken immediate possession of. 

As the English and Portuguese pursued their leisurely 

G 


82 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE* 


march in echellons of divisions, by the two roads of Espin- 
hal and Leiria, they found the villages deserted, the mill in 
the valley motionless, the mountain cottages open and un¬ 
tenanted, the bells of the monastery silent, and the white 
churches empty. The flank of our columns were now literally 
covered with the flying population. It was like the up¬ 
rooting and sweeping away of the population of whole pro¬ 
vinces, with their flocks and their herds, their household 
goods and gods, and everything that was theirs : it was a 
scene such as Europe might have presented at the first 
irruption of the Huns. 

It is to be remarked, however, that great as might have 
been the sufferings c\f this forced emigration, the people 
must have suffered infinitely more if they had remained in 
their homes during the French advance, and the infernal 
retreat which followed it. And better had it been for the 
general cause in the Peninsula, if Lord Wellington’s pro¬ 
clamation had been in all instances more strictly obeyed. 

Meanwhile, Massena followed our columns, and talked 
as loudly as before of driving the English into the sea. 
When intelligence of these movements reached England, the 
political party which had always represented the glorious 
struggle as a hopeless one, said that Wellington had gained 
another victory onty to commence another retreat; and that 
it was one of the wildest flights of human presumption to 
think of defending a country like Portugal against the vast, 
victorious armies and surpassing genius of Buonaparte. 
They, too, anticipated that our 25,000 British must flee to 
their ships if they could only escape the ignominy of a capitu¬ 
lation ; but no such raven croaked over the tent of our 
great Commander. The plan of defence which he had 
formed and matured was still unbroken and entire, and so 
were his own hopes. Writing to our admiral in the Tagus, 
during the retreat, he said,—“ I have very little doubt of 
being able to hold this country against the force which has 
now attacked it. There will be a breeze near Lisbon, but I 
know that Ave shall have the Lest of it.” And writing to 
his brother Henry,* now ambassador in Spain, he said,— 
“We shall make our retreat to the positions in front of 
Lisbon without much difficulty or any loss. My opinion A, 
tjiat the French are in a acra])e. They are not a suflicient 
army for the purpose, particularly since their late losses, 
and since the Portuguese have behaved so well; and they 


* Henry Wellesley, afterwards Lord Cowley. 


THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 


1810.] 


83 


■will find tlieir retreat from this country a most difficult and 
dangerous operation ,” ;f: 

Ilis own retreat from Busaco, a distance of nearly 200 
miles, was performed without loss or irregularity, although 
the van of Massena’s immense column was several times near 
enough to skirmish with our rear-guard. On the 7th of 
October, the French came in sight of the chain of hills 
behind which, at the distance of twenty-four miles, lay the 
city of Lisbon. And now up Lines of Torres Yedras, and 
show the lion in the middle path ! j 

But those lines were already up; and everything was 
prepared to keep the French at bay. 

This grand defensive scheme had more or less occupied 
the mind of Wellington ever since the campaign of 1808. 
It had been indispensable to conceal the great project, and 
to mystify the French ; anil this had been done with aston¬ 
ishing address. Even when most actively engaged in 
directing the construction of the works, our great Com¬ 
mander had the art to make not only the enem}^, but also 
the people of the country, believe that he intended nothing 
serious there; and it is said, that, in order to keep up the 
illusion, he sometimes spoke of the plan, even to officers of 
his own army, as a thing which had flitted through his 
head, but which had been abandoned; and even when he 
received better information, Massena remained in the belief 
that the works thrown up were little more than field-works, 
which might easily be turned or overpowered by his own 
batteries, and that so extensive a line was not defensible by 
such a force as Wellington commanded, but must have 
several weak points, at one or two of which a concentrated 
sustained attack, costing, perhaps, a few thousands in killed 
and wounded, must eventually succeed. But along the whole 
line there was not one weak point; nor was there an open¬ 
ing or interstice through which a mountain goat could pass 
but was blocked up or guarded. Down the hollows in 
which the roads ran, w'ere pointed the black muzzles of 
numerous guns, projecting from batteries which could main¬ 
tain a fire in front, and a crossing fire from the flanks. 
While Massena had been waiting at Coimbra and Sobral, 
stupendous exertions had been made to give the last 
finish to these grand defences. To complete the bar- 
piers, palisades, platforms, and planked bridges leading into 

* ‘Dispatches,’ vol. vi. 
f ‘ But in the middle path a lion lav.’ 

Sir Walter Scott, ‘ Vision of Don Itoderic,’ 

G 2 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


84 

the works, 50,000 trees were placed at the disposal of 
the engineer department. There was no lack of hands to 
do the necessary work; 3,000 artillery men and officers of 
the country were on the spot; 7,000 Portuguese peasantry 
were employed as labourers; and the British engineers, 
artillery-men, and artificers, were aided by our soldiers of 
the line who had been left to garrison Lisbon, and who 
found a pleasant excitement and much amusement in the 
occupation. From Torres Vedras to Lisbon, the whole 
country was covered or constantly traversed, like an ant¬ 
hill in an autumnal evening. By night and by day, people, 
cars, mules, horses, and donkeys, were bringing up ma¬ 
terials and implement; and every day, every hour, the 
position was gaining strength from all this unremitting 
labour. The roads leading up to the position were de¬ 
stroyed ; and as Wellington had gained time, and brought 
down the French just as the rainy season was setting in, 
they found an inundated country and a swamp to give 
them damp Avelcome. A finer field for manoeuvring than 
that which our troops had behind the ridges of Torres 
Vedras could scarcely be desired or conceived. One of 
Wellington’s bravest and most illustrious comrades, says,— 
“ I cannot proceed further without desiring to draiv the 
attention of my brother soldiers in a particular manner, not 
only to the subject (Torres Vedras) of which I am now 
speaking, but to the whole plan of this campaign, because I 
am sure that a British army never took part in one better 
adapted to instruct it in the art of manoeuvring on a grand 
scale, nor, consequently, so well calculated to make efficient 
officers of those who shared in it, or are disposed to take the 
trouble of studying it as it deserves.”* 

I Avas at Torres Vedras in the spring of 1815, Avhen the 
works might be traced, and the whole plan easily under¬ 
stood. For a complete notion of the lines, the reader must 
consult military and scientific books, and Wellington’s OAvn 
despatches. The following is an outline sketch by an officer 
Avho served behind those lines Avith the 60th Rifles :— 

“ The line of defence Avas double. The first, Avhich Avas 
twenty-nine miles long, began at Alhandra, on the Tagus, 
crossed the valley of Armia, Avhich Avas rather a Aveak 
point, and passed along the skirts of Mount AgraQa, Avhere 
there was a large and strong redoubt; it then parsed across 
the valley of Tibreira, and skirted the ravine of Runa to the 
heights of Torres Vedras, Avhich Avere Avell fortified; and 
* Marquess of Londonderry, ‘ Memoir of the War in the Peninsula.’ 


1810.] THE LTXES OF TOItRES VEDItAS. 85 

from thence followed the course of the little river Zizandre 
to its mouth on the sea-coast. The line followed the 
sinuosities of the mountain tract which extends from the 
Tagus to the sea, about thirty miles north of Lisbon. Lord 
Wellington’s head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, a 
little in the rear of the centre of the line, where a telegraph 
was fixed corresponding with every part of the position. 
The second line, at a distance varying from six to ten miles 
in the rear of the first, extended from Quintella, on the 
Tagus, by Bucellas, Monte Chique, and Mafia, to the mouth 
of the little river S. Lorenqo, on the sea-coast, and was 
twenty-four miles long. This was the stronger line of the 
two, both by nature and art, and, if the first line were 
forced by the enemy, the retreat of the army upon the 
second was secure at all times. Both lines were secured by 
breastworks, abattis, stone walls with banquettes, and scarps. 
In the rear of the second line there was a line of embarka¬ 
tion, should that measure become necessary, enclosing an 
entrenched camp and the fort of St. Julian. More than 
two redoubts or forts, and 600 pieces of artillery, were 
scattered along these lines. Lord Wellington had received 
reinforcements from England and Cadiz; the Portuguese 
army had also been strengthened, and the Spanish division 
of La Romana, 5,000 strong, came from Estremadura to 
join the allies; so that the British commander had about 
60,000 regular troops posted along the first and second lines, 
besides the Portuguese militia and artillery (which manned 
the forts and redoubts and garrisoned Lisbon,) a fine body of 
English marines which occupied the line of embarkation, a 
powerful fleet in the Tagus, and a flotilla of gun-boats 
flanking the right of the British line.* It was altogether a 
stupendous line of defence, conceived by the military genius 
of the British commander, and executed by the military skill 
of the British engineer officers.” f 

The highest praise was due and was given by Lord 
Wellington to these engineer officers, whose labours were 
directed at first by Colonel Fletcher, and afterwards by 
Captain J. T. Jones, both of the Royal Engineers. 

Another officer says,—“ Indeed, it was rather a mighty 
and impregnable fortress than a camp. Here the faces of 
mountains were scarped — there rivers dammed to make 
defensive inundations; while, upon the lines of defence, a 
triple chain of redoubts was most skilfully disposed. 

* * Dispatches,’ vol. vi. p. 582. 

f A. Vieusseux, ‘ Military Life of the Duke.’ 



86 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


The communications within the works were excellent, and 
all the roads and positions free for the movement of our 
troops.” * 

On the 8th of October, the allied army began entering 
these lines, each division taking lip its assigned quarters as 
quietly and orderly as if it were marching into a garrison- 
town of its own; and by the 10th, our entire force was col¬ 
lected on those heights, leaving the French, in the wet plain 
below, to gaze at our positions, 

“ As famished wolves survey a guarded fold.”f 

Massena’s astonishment was equalled only by his mor¬ 
tification ! For three days he did nothing but stare at the 
lines, and examine them through a telescope. He then 
employed several days in reconnoitering them, and in 
making demonstrations in order to induce the British gene¬ 
ral to show out his forces—a thing which Wellington never 
did, or would do, until the moment when it was absolutely 
necessary and unavoidable. 

“ On the 14th of October the French made an attack on a 
detachment of the 71st regiment, which was in advance of 
the lines near the town of Sobral, but they were repulsed 
with the bayonet and driven back into Sobral. Another 
skirmish occurred near Villa Franca, in front of the right of 
the line, in which the French General St. Croix was killed 
by the fire of the English gun-boats. After this, no further 
demonstrations were made. Ma«sena put the second and 
eighth corps partly in the villages and partly in bivouacs in 
front of the right and centre-of the British position, leaving 
the sixth corps at Otta in his rear. He established his 
depot and hospitals, and commenced forming magazines at 
Santarem, and for this purpose sent moveable columns to 
scour the country for provisions, for he had entered Por¬ 
tugal without magazines, every soldier carrying fifteen 
days’ bread, which many, however, threw away or wasted on 
the road. The country had been partly stripped by the 
inhabitants, who had retired to the mountains or within the 
lines, and the devastation of the French foraging parties 
destroyed what was left, so that for many leagues in rear of 
the French the country became a perfect desert. To add to 
this, the Portuguese militia, under Trant, Miller, and Wil¬ 
son, came down from the north and cut off all communica¬ 
tion between Massena’s army and the Spanish frontier.” | 

* Captain M. Slierer, ‘Military Memoirs of the Duke.’ 
f Sir Walter Scott, ‘Vision of Don Koderic.’ 
f A. Vieusseux, ‘Military Life.’ ‘Wellington Dispatches.’ 


LOSSES OF MASSENA. 


87 


1810.] 

Toward the end of October, Massena sent 2,000 men 
across the Zezere in order to re-open a communication with 
Spain by way of Castellobranco ; and General Toy proceeded 
with a strong escort by way of Penornacor to Ciudad Rod¬ 
rigo, from whence he hastened to Paris to inform Napoleon 
of the real state of affairs in Portugal. If Foy told the 
truth, lie had a sad tale to tell. The French, who had 
entered Portugal 70,000 strong, had lost 15,000 men; they 
had become very sickly in consequence of privations, 
bivouacking in low grounds, and being exposed, with little 
or no shelter, to heavy rains and inclement weather. 

Massena had now given up all idea of attempting to force 
the lines unless he received immense reinforcements. On 
the 15th of November, he began a retrograde movement, 
with great caution, for the purpose of placing his army in 
cantonments for the winter. There were terrible discontent¬ 
ments among his officers as well as among his men. 

On the 17th, the French second corps was established 
at and near Santarem, in a very strong position; the eighth 
corps at Pernes, and the sixth corps at Thomar, farther in 
the rear. Massena’s head-quarters were fixed at Torres 
Novas. The British light divisions and cavalry followed the 
French movements, and took some prisoners, but nothing of 
importance occurred. Lord Wellington, leaving part of his 
troops in the lines, moved forward the remainder towards 
the Rio Mayor, which separated him from the French 
position at Santarem. Hill’s division was placed on the left 
bank of the Tagus, opposite Santarem. Wellington’s head¬ 
quarters were fixed at Cartaxo. Thus ended the campaign 
of 1810.* 

As the French had advanced by the valley of the Mondego 
and the country west of the Estrella ridge, the people of 
that tract of country had in great measure deserted it, and 
carried off the provisions; but the population east of the 
mountains had remained in fancied security, so that when 
Massena withdrew his army to that quarter, he found the 
towns of Thomar, Pernes, Torres Novas, and Golegao in¬ 
habited and untouched. Cattle and corn were procured, 
and the French were supplied at least for part of the 
winter. By a scandalous remissness, a number of boats had 
been left behind at Santarem, on the right bank of the 
Tagus, by means of which the enemy had the power of 
crossing the river whenever he liked. This annoyed Lord 
Wellington more than anything else, and he expressed him- 

* ' Dispatches/ vnl. vi. 


88 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


self strongly concerning the Portuguese regency for not 
having enforced the necessary orders for removing every¬ 
thing out of the reach of the enemy, as lie had urged them 
to do months before. “The French could not have stayed, 

if the provisions had been removed.All our 

military arrangements are useless, if they can find subsistence 

on the ground which they occupy.Then the 

boats are left at Santarem in order to give the enemy an 

opportunity of acting upon our flanks.It is 

heartbreaking to contemplate the chances of failure from 
such obstinacy and folly.”* 

A perverse spirit had manifested itself in the Portuguese 
regency ever since the fall of Almeida, absurd men having 
taken up the notion tliat Lord Wellington ought to have 
risked his entire army in an attempt to save that fortress. 
By degrees, a violent faction was formed by Principal Souza 
and the Patriarch (formerly Bishop of Oporto), who wanted 
to control and direct the operations of our great Commander. 
As his lordship would not submit to their dictation, they 
thwarted him in every way. While yet in the field, and on 
his retreat before Massena, Wellington had written to Mr. 
Charles Stuart, our ambassador at Lisbon, to denounce the 
practices of this faction, and the meddling, insolent spirit 
of a set of priests : — “ In order to put an end at once 
to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform 
the Portuguese Government that I will not stay in the 
country, and that I shall advise the King’s Government 
to withdraw the assistance which his Majesty affords them, 
if they interfere in any manner with the appointments 
of Marshal Beresford’s staff, for which he is responsible; or 
with the operations of the army; or with any of the points 
which, under the original arrangement with Marshal Beres- 
ford, were referred exclusively to his management. I pro¬ 
pose also to report to his Majesty’s Government, and refer 
to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if the 
Portuguese Government refuse or delay to adopt the civil 
and political arrangements recommended by me, and cor¬ 
responding with the military operations which I am carry¬ 
ing on. (This refers to the measure of destroying, or rather 
rendering useless, the mills, by removing the sails, &c.) 
But it appears that the Portuguese Government have lately 
discovered that we are all wrong; they have become im¬ 
patient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the 
Central Junta of Spain, call out for a battle and early suc- 
* ‘Dispatches,’ vol. vi, pp. 515, 521, 570. 


THK PORTUGUESE REGENCY. 


89 


1810 .] 

ccss. If I had had the power I would have prevented the 
Spanish armies from attending to this call.”* 

In another letter, dated Rio Mayor, October 6, addressed 
likewise to Mr. Stuart, Lord Wellington says—“ You will 
do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the 
Principal Souza, that, his Majesty and the Prince Regent 
having intrusted me with the command of their armies, and 
likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will 
not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with them; 
that I know best where to station my troops, and when to 
make a stand against the enemy; and I shall not alter a 
system formed upon mature consideration upon any sug¬ 
gestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they 
are not; and I recommend them to look to the measures 
for which they are responsible, and which I long ago recom¬ 
mended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of 
Lisbon, and for the food of their own army and of the 
people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. 
As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that 
I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of his 
country, since he has been a member of the government; 
that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of 
which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall con¬ 
tinue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on 
earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one 
moment after I shall have obtained his Majesty’s leave to 
resign my charge, if Principal Souza is to remain either 
a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. 
Either he must quit the country, or I will; and if I should 
be obliged to go, I vvill take care that the world, or Por¬ 
tugal, at least, and the Prince Regent, shall be made ac¬ 
quainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3rd, 
which I have received from Don Miguel Forjaz, I had 
hoped that the Government was satisfied with what I had 
done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavour¬ 
ing to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the 
minds of the populace of Lisbon, they would have done 
their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of 
the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, 
they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their ex¬ 
pressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended 
to convey censure. ... I have but little doubt of suc¬ 
cess ; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to 
know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. vi. p. 412. 


90 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


best arrangements , 1 am anxious tliat the Government should 
adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy’s 
way those persons and their families who would suffer if they 
were to fall into their hands.”* 

On the 1st of November, being then at Pero Negro, his 
lordship wrote a still more remarkable letter to our am¬ 
bassador. Beginning with a cutting sarcasm on the priests, 
he said, “ I may have mistaken the system of defence to 
be adopted in this country; and Principal Souza and other 
members of the Regency may be better judges of the capa¬ 
city of the troops, and of the operations to be carried on, 
than I am. In this case, they should desire his Majesty and 
the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of the 
army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in 
which we are engaged; and they know that there is not a 
moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not 
devoted to promote it; and the records of the Government 
will show what I have done for them and their country. If, 
therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want 
of confidence in the measures which I adopt, by desiring 
that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men 
and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me 
by all the means in their power, and thus should neither 
thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by 

useless delays and discussions.The truth is, that, 

notwithstanding the opinion of some of the Government, 
every Portuguese into whose hand a firelock is placed, does 
not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Expe¬ 
rience, which the members of the Government have not had, 
has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use 
of the different description of troops in this country ; and it 
would be very desirable if the Government would leave, 
exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of 
all military arrangements.” f 

It has been truly said, that the perusal of this correspon¬ 
dence is absolutely necessary to enable a person to have a just 
idea of the difficulties which Lord Wellington had to contend 
with, and of the strength of mind which enabled him to rise 
superior to them. There was not another general officer in 
the army whose patience would have stood the enormous 
draughts made upon it. As for fiery Picton and impetuous 
Crautiird, it may be seriously doubted whether they would 
not have shot patriarch and principal, and involved us in a 
war with our allies. 

* ‘Dispatches,’ vol. vi. p. 494. 


f ‘ lib’ vol. vii. pp. 573-4 


CHARACTERISTIC ANECDOTE. 


91 


1811.] 

Campaign of 1811.—During the months of January and 
February, the hostile armies in Portugal remained in the 
same respective positions; the French knowing that the 
English would not be driven from the lines of Torres 
Yedras, and the English not knowing what movements the 
French intended to make. 

A dear old friend and travelling companion has favoured 
me with the following amusing and characteristic anecdote:— 

“ There is one circumstance which I have never for- 
fotten, though it occurred forty years ago. I was staying 
at head-quarters at Cartaxo during the winter of 1810—11. 

My superior officer and friend, Captain H-, was invited 

one day to dine at the Commander-in-chief’s; for Lord 
Wellington occasionally invited regimental officers, and even 
young subalterns, if they attracted his notice or brought 
any introduction to his lordship. I remember a Tyrolese 
officer, one of Ilofer’s sacred band, who had found his way 
to Portugal; he obtained a commission in a Portuguese 
regiment, and was killed soon after, in our advance. He 
had letters for Lord Wellington, presented them, and was 
asked to dinner the same day. Being a blunt, honest Ger¬ 
man, and speaking very little English, he must have afforded 
some entertainment to his noble entertainer and staff. But 

to return to Capt. II-. He dined with Lord Wellington 

some day either at the end of January or the beginning of 
February 1811, and when he came back to our quarters at 
night I asked him—of course with some degree of curiosity 
and anxiety—if anything had been said at table concerning 
our prospects in the ensuing campaign. Lord Wellington, as 
may be supposed, never spoke upon military operations 
before company; but it so happened that, that evening, 
some one among the guests, perhaps an officer high in rank, 
ventured to say,—‘1 wonder what Massena will do next.’ 
Looking at the guest, his lordship said, in a hurried man¬ 
ner,— ‘They will march in March,’ and said no more. 

These Avere the words that Captain II-repeated to me 

that evening, at least a month or five weeks before the break¬ 
ing up of the French from Santarem, which, sure enough, 
took place in the month of March, when they began their 
retreat to the frontiers of Spain. But at the time the words 
Avere uttered Ave had no idea in the army that the French 
AA’ould be gone sc soon; Ave knew that Massena was being 
reinforced, and the opposition papers at home Avere loud in 
their forebodings of a formidable reneAved attack upon us in 
the spring.” 





92 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


Meanwhile, Buonaparte’s 9th corps, under Drouet, had 
entered Portugal b}' the valley of the Mondego, with a 
large convoy of provisions from Spain, and had reinforced 
Massena’s army. At the same time, Marshal Soult, who 
commanded the army of Andalusia, received orders from 
Napoleon himself to act in concert with Massena, by attack¬ 
ing Portugal south of the Tagus; and a new French army, 
under Marshal Bessihres, was formed in the north of Spain, 
consisting of about 70,000 men, this Marshal being ordered 
to support the army of Portugal. Buonaparte w r as intent 
on his favourite scheme of crushing by immense masses. 
“ Make a bridge across the Tagus,” said he, “ and let 
Massena and Soult fprin a junction; meantime keep the 
English in check, and make them lose men every day by 
engagements of the advanced guards; their army is small, 
and they cannot afford to lose many men; besides, people 
in London are much alarmed about their army in Portugal; 
and when the season becomes favourable let the main opera¬ 
tions be carried on on the south bank of the Tagus.”* 

Such v r ere the gigantic efforts made by the master of half 
of Europe to crush an English army of 30,000 men, whilst 
Lord Wellington, after urgent applications to ministers at 
home, received reinforcements to the amount of from 6,000 
to 7,000 men only in the beginning of March. But yet a 
horrible disaster for the French was at hand. Massena was 
waiting for Soult to appear on the left bank of the Tagus 
opposite to his position, but Soult was obliged to maintain 
the blockade of Cadiz, in which there was a British garrison 
of 6,000 men; he was obliged to leave Sebastiani on the side 
of Granada and Murcia to keep in check the Spanish armed 
parties, and he could not therefore dispose of more than 
20,000 men, with whom he durst not enter Alemtejo, leav¬ 
ing the Spanish fortress of Badajoz in his rear. He there¬ 
fore began by attacking the fortress of Olivenga, which he 
took on the 22nd of January, and then marched to Badajoz. 
On the 19th of February he defeated a Spanish force of 
nearly 12,000 men under General Mendizabal, which was 
posted on the river Gebora, an affluent of the Guadiana, and 
then sat down to besiege Badajoz. 

“ You will observe,” wrote Lord Wellington to his brother 
Henry, “ the fate of Olivenga for want of provisions, and I 
am sadly afraid that Badajoz is not much better off. The 

* Letters from Berthier, at the head of the war department in Paris, to 
Massena and Soult, in Appendix to vol. iii. of Napier’s ‘War in the 
Peninsula.’ 


RETREAT OF MASSENA. 


93 


1811 .] 

Spaniards have had the whole province of Estremadura 
open to them since the beginning of last July; and it was 
particularly settled between the Marques de la Romana 
and me, not only that the abundant harvest of Estremadura 
should supply his garrisons, but that a large magazine 
should be formed for my army. To form these magazines, 
however, required arrangement, foresight, and activity, and 
there our allies invariably fail us. If it be true that there 
are no provisions in Badajoz, the French will undoubtedly 
get that place, if they only approach it; and then there avill 
be a fine breeze.”* Badajoz, being better supplied than he 
had anticipated, detained Soult for some time. 

In the mean while, Massena remained in his position at 
Santarem, waiting for Soult’s appearance on the Tagus, till 
he became so distressed for provisions that he could wait no 
longer. All the means of collecting provisions by violence 
were exhausted, large moveable columns had been sent at 
different times both on the side of Castellobranco and on 
that of the Mondego, which scoured the country and carried 
away cattle and provisions, committing horrible excesses, 
which were retaliated by the infuriated peasantry upon the 
French stragglers and wounded. The discipline of the army 
was broken by this barbarous system of warfare; they had 
no less than 10,000 sick, no news from Spain, and no more 
provisions left than would serve the troops during their 
retreat to the frontiers. In the beginning of March, Massena 
moved his sick and baggage by degrees to the rear, and after 
demonstrations in various directions, the divisions of his 
army filed off in the direction of Pombal. Santarem was 
evacuated in the night of the oth, and next morning it was 
entered by the English. Massena, however, had gained two 
days march, and his army was not overtaken by the Eng¬ 
lish till the 10th, when it was concentrated on a table-land 
before Pombal, presenting a front of resistance. There Avas 
some skirmishing with the light division, whilst Wellington 
brought up his other divisions, but the French, having 
gained time for their baggage to file off, retreated on the 
lltli through the town. A detachment which Ney had left 
in the castle of Pombal was driven away with some loss by 
the English, and in the night Massena continued his retreat. 
On the 12th, the English advance found Ney with the French 
rear-guard posted on a high table-land in front of the village 
of Redinha, when another skirmishing took place. As the 
French seemed disposed to stand their ground, and made a 
* ‘Dispatches/ vol. vii. p. 166. 


94 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 

sIioav of considerable force, Lord Wellington formed his 
army in line and moved on to the attack, when, after a 
general discharge from the French battalions, which hid 
them in smoke, the French were again in full retreat 
through the village, and joined that evening the main body 
at Condeixa, where one road leads to Coimbra and another 
ascends the valley of the Mondego. Massena's intention 
was to seize Coimbra and, if possible, Oporto, and there to 
wait for reinforcements from Spain, and he had sent a divi¬ 
sion under Montbrun to secure the bridge of Coimbra. 
Wellington had foreseen his intention, and had ordered 
Wilson and Trant, with the Portuguese militia, to look to 
the security of the important town of Oporto, and to aban¬ 
don the line of the Mondego, which river was fordable in 
many places, and retire across the Douro. Coimbra was 
thus exposed to attack. But it fortunately happened that 
Trant lingered behind at that town with a small force, and 
having destroyed one arch of the bridge and placed guards 
at the fords, he determined to defend the place, calculating 
that, if he could parry a coup-de-main , Marshal Massena, 
with Lord Wellington at his heels, would not stay long on 
the left bank of the Mondego. On the 11th, Montbrun 
appeared in the suburbs, and on the 12th, making an attempt 
to force the bridge, he was repulsed with grape-shot. Upon 
this, Massena relinquished the idea of crossing the Mondego, 
and determined to retreat by Ponte de Murcella and the left 
bank. Thus Coimbra was saved from French fury. If 
he could have crossed the river he would have found sup¬ 
plies, but the country through which he was now to move 
was quite exhausted. 

Massena resumed his retreat on the 13th in rather a con* 
fused manner, being on the point of having his left turned 
by Picton’s division, which had taken a short cut by a 
rugged path across the mountains of Anciao. Ney, with 
the rear-guard, set tire to the town of Condeixa, in order to 
stop the passage of the British artillery and powder-waggons. 
But our light division rushed through the burning town, 
and followed the flying enemy as fast and close as obstacles 
prepared on the road would permit. With part of his 
column Picton overtook their rear, cut in between their 
columns, separated them from one another, and nearly made 
FTey prisoner. The darkness of night saved the French 
from further disasters. They scrambled over the mountains 
in that darkness, and got together again. The English 
must also have marched in the night, for on the morning 


RETREAT OF MASSENA. 


95 


1811 .] 

of the 14th, when the fog which enveloped the mountains 
began to clear, Marshal Ney was discovered posted on a hill 
near Casal Nova. The most advanced part of our light 
division engaged immediately, and the 52nd regiment suffered 
some loss; but Picton’s and Cole’s divisions soon appeared 
on the left flank of the enemy and compelled them to renew 
their retreat. This Marshal Ney did with admirable skill 
and precision, moving from ridge to ridge, until he gained 
the strong defile of Miranda de Corvo, where the main body 
of the French was already posted. In the night, Massena, 
fearing that some of our divisions would get in his rear, set 
fire to the town of Miranda and passed the river Ceira, an 
affluent of the Mondego, destroying a great quantity of his 
baggage and ammunition, and leaving Ney to cover the 
passage of the river, without, however, risking an action. 
Put Ney remained on the left bank of the river, in a rugged 
and defensible position, near the village of Fons d'Arronce. 
Here Lord Wellington found him at four o’clock in the 
afternoon on the 15th, and amusing his right with a feint 
attack, vigorously charged his left, while a battery of horse 
artillery, being advanced rapidly to a favourable point, 
opened hotly upon the French battalions, which were soon 
driven upon the river in such confusion, that many were 
drowned in attempting to discover the fords, and many were 
trampled to death on the bridge. In this panic the French 
lost at the least 500 men. Night put an end to the combat, 
but not to the confusion; for, as the French baggage and 
other encumbrances were pressing along the bridge, another 
panic spread among their troops, who, in the midst of the 
disorder, darkness, and a torrent of rain, fired upon one 
another. This affair on the Ceira was by far the most 
serious engagement that had }*et taken place during the 
French retreat. In the night Ney blew up part of the 
bridge, and moved on his corps, keeping a rear-guard on 
the right bank the whole of the following day. 'Hie allies 
lialted on the left bank that day (the 16th), partly because 
the river, swollen b}^ the heavy rains, was not fordable, and 
partly because they were sadly in want of provisions, the re¬ 
gency at Lisbon having again neglected to collect supplies for 
the march. By his vigorous and skilful movements, Lord 
Wellington had succeeded in confining the army of Massena 
to one narrow line of retreat along the twice ravaged country 
between the mountains and the Mondego ; but he had to 
follow in the same famine track, and to march through 
regions utterly bare of provisions and forage. While there 


96 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


was abundance in Lisbon, some of the Portuguese brigades 
in the field with us were actually starving; many of their 
men fell off and died, and to save the rest the British sup¬ 
plies were shared with them. The British commissary- 
general’s means were thus overlaid, and the movements ot 
the army impeded. In an indignant yet quiet letter addressed 
to the Earl of Liverpool on this very day (the 16th of 
March), Wellington said—“ Marshal Sir William Beresford 
and I had repeatedly urged the government of this kingdom 
to adopt measures to supply the troops with regularity, and 
to keep up the establishments while the army was in canton¬ 
ments. Our representations were not attended to; and when 
the army was to movq forward, the Portuguese troops had 
no provisions, nor any means of conveying any to them. 
They were to move through a country ravaged and 
exhausted by the enemy; and it is literally true that 
General Pack’s brigade and Colonel Ashworth’s had nothing 
to cat for four days, although constantly marching or en¬ 
gaged with the enemy.” Ills lordship expected provisions 
to be brought round by sea in English vessels; and it 
appears some arrived during this busy day (the 16th), on 
the night of which a bridge upon trestles was thrown over 
the Ceira by the staff corps. On the morning of the 17th, 
our army crossed the bridge, and went in pursuit, the French 
having, according to their practice, withdrawn in the night. 
Wellington soon found his old adversary Massenaat rest, and 
expecting a secure repose, for some time, behind the Alva, an¬ 
other affluent of the Mondego, the waters of which were swol¬ 
len by the rains, while the two bridges which traversed it 
at Pombeiro and Ponte Murcella had been destroyed by 
his people, to prevent the passage of the English. So conli- 
dent was the French marshal of a good breathing time, 
that he had sent out his foragers in strength to hunt for 
provisions. “We moved three divisions on Pombeiro,” says 
Wellington, “and this put them all in a bustle.” Disturbing 
the Marshal by a strong demonstration and a lively can¬ 
nonade, his Lordship then menaced his left and rear by 
marching three divisions by the mountains of Quiteria to 
Arganil, on the Upper Alva, upon which Massena aban¬ 
doned the Lower Alva, and continued his retreat bj^ Moita 
towards Celorico, abandoning his foraging parties, who, to 
the number of 800, were taken by the English and Portu¬ 
guese. The mass of our army, having crossed the Alva by 
a flying bridge, •went in pursuit; but was obliged to halt at 
Moita for the old and cruel want—the want of provisions. 


HORRORS OP THE RETREAT. 


97 


1811.] 

Again destroying much of liis baggage and ammunition for 
want of cattle to drag it on, Massena distanced the allies ; 
being, however, followed and watched by the light division 
of our cavalry until the 21st, when he reached Celorico and 
Guarda, and reopened his communications with the captured 
fortress of Almeida, and with the French on the frontier of 
Spain. 

The retreat of Massena, properly speaking, may be consi¬ 
dered as having terminated here. It had lasted a fort¬ 
night, during which the Marshal and his infuriated soldiers 
displayed a ruthless spirit. An eye-witness says :—“ I pass 
over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de 
Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of 
those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, 
and something must be attributed to the disorder which 
usually attends a forced retreat ; but the town of Leiria and 
the convent of Alcoba^a were given to the flames by express 
orders from the French head-quarters ; and, although the 
laws of war, rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples 
when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done 
for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a 
spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every 
horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful 
march. Distress, conflagration, death in all modes ! from 
wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from star¬ 
vation ! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited ven¬ 
geance ! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to 
devour the dead and dying,—and the spirit of cruelty, once 
unchained, smote even the brute creation. On the loth, the 
French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, 
ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed ; the 
inhuman fellow charged with the execution hamstrung 500 
asses, and left them to starve, and thus they were found by 
the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression 
of pain and grief visible in these poor creatures’ looks, won* 
derliilly roused the fury of our soldiers, and so little weight 
has reason with the multitude when opposed by a momen¬ 
tary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any 
prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led 
to direct cruelty. This shows how dangerous it is in Avar to 
listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy 
could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of 
circumstances.”* 

* Napier, ‘History of the War in the Peninsula,’ vol. iii. pp. 471-2, 
Edition of 1832, 

H 


98 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


Lord Wellington, habitually sober and measured in the 
expression of his sentiments, assumed even a more decided 
and indignant tone. While following up Massena, he wrote 
to the Earl of Liverpool:—“ I am sorry to be obliged to say 
that the conduct of the French throughout this retreat has 
been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never sur¬ 
passed. Even in the towns of Torres Hhvas, Thomar, and 
Femes, in which the head-quarters of some of their corps 
had been for four months, and in which the inhabitants 
had been invited, by promises of good treatment, to remain, 
they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed, 
on the night the enemy withdrew from their position, and 
they have since burpt every town and village through 
which they have passed. The convent of Alcoba^a (a 
splendid structure) was burnt by orders from the French 
head-quarters. The bishop’s palace, and the whole town of 
Leiria, in which General Drouet had had his head-quarters, 
shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of 
the country, of any class or description, who has had any 
dealing or communication with the French army, who has 
not had reason to repent of it, and to complain of them. 
This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, 
and the assurances have been fulfilled, which were held out 
in the proclamation of the French commander-in-chief, in 
which he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not 
come to make war upon them, but, with a powerful army of - 
110,000 men, to drive the English into the sea. It is to be 
hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country 
will teach the people of this and of other nations what value 
they ought to place on such promises and assurances; and 
that there is no security for life, or for anything which 
makes life valuable, excepting in decided resistance to the 
enemy.”* 

Though it had not been starved out, the Spanish garrison 
of Badajoz had made but a feeble and disgraceful resistance. 
By signals and otherwise, the governor of that place had 
been informed that Massena was in full retreat; that he 
might expect English assistance as soon as it could be sent 
him ; and that Lord Wellington expected he would hold 
out till the last extremity. His Lordship had made all the 
arrangements for detaching a force on Badajoz; and Sir 
William Beresford, with a considerable Portuguese force, 
was actually on his march, when the place surrendered to a 
corps of Soult’s army numerically weaker than the garrison. 

* * Dispatches,’ vol, vii. p. 358. 


END OF THE RETREAT. 


99 


1811 .] 

It appears that on the 9th of March the French had made 
a breach in the place about eighteen feet wide ; but which 
was by no means practicable. On the same day the Spanish 
governor acknowledged, b} r signal, the receipt of the message 
which Lord Wellington had sent him; vet on the 10th he 
suspended hostilities, and on the 11th he threw open his 
gates to become, with all his people, a prisoner of war. That 
inexplicable rogue or idiot, the governor of Badajoz, had 
been urged by Wellington to keep secret the intelligence of 
Massena’s retreat, lest, by means of deserters, it should reach 
the enemy, whom his Lordship was in hopes to find engaged 
in the siege. But the governor published the intelligence 
as soon as he received it, stating at the same time that he 
did not believe it. He did more, he communicated the 
intelligence to the French general.* Verily these Spanish 
officers were enough to craze or disconcert any man co¬ 
operating with them. But Wellington calmly wrote,—“ It 
is useless to add any reflection to these facts. The Spaniards 
have lost Tortosa, Olivenpa, and Badajoz, in the course of 
two months, without sufficient cause; and in the same 
period, Marshal Soult, with a corps never supposed to be 
more than 20,000 men, has taken (besides the last two places) 
or destroj'ed above 22,000 Spanish troops! f 

“ However unfortunate the Spanish armies have been 
in the field, the defences which they have made of several 
places were calculated to inspire confidence in the exertions 
of the troops at Badajoz ; particularly considering that they 
had plenty of provisions and ammunition, that their cannons 
were still mounted on the works ; and, above all, that they 
were certain of being relieved. This confidence has, how¬ 
ever, been disappointed. . . . It is useless now to specu¬ 

late upon the consequences which would have resulted from 
a more determined and protracted resistance at Badajoz. 
Sir William Beresford is at Portalegrc, and his troops will 
be collected there on the 22nd. Soult cannot remain north 
of the Guadiana, even under existing circumstances. If 
Badajoz were still in the possession of the allies, we might 
expect to free from the enemy, not only Estremadura, but 
also Andalusia.”| 

His Lordship had not recalled Beresford on learning the 
fall of Badajoz, it being necessary that that general should 
be on the Guadiana to watch Soult, and manoeuvre on his 
right. And on the 18th of March, while yet at Pombeiro, 
on the Alva, his Lordship had written to Beresford :—“ Lose 

* ‘Dispatches/ vol. vii. p. 371. t Id. p. 361. X Id. p. 381. 

li 2 


100 


MEMOIR or THE DUKE. 


ho time in moving up, and attack Soult, if jmu can, at 
Campo Mayor. I will come to you, if I can; but if I 
cannot, do not wait for me. Get Castanos to join you, from 
Estremoz, with any Spanish troops he can bring with 
him.”* 

Soult was kept in check by Beresford, and Wellington was 
still delayed for want of forage and provisions and draught 
cattle. On the 25 th of March, the French abandoned Celorico, 
but retained possession of Guarda, which Massena was un¬ 
willing to give up, because he expected every hour to hear of 
Soult’s advance, and dreaded the responsibility of abandoning 
Portugal altogether, without orders from his emperor. Warm 
and passionate discussions took place between him and Mar¬ 
shal Ney, who urged the necessity of an immediate march 
upon Almeida. Ney gave up his command in disgust, and 
went to Salamanca, and Massena gave FTey’s corps to 
Loison. It appears that Massena, in his present position at 
Guarda, still calculated on being able to open a communica¬ 
tion with Soult, and by his co-operation to maintain himself 
on the skirts of Portugal till he could get reinforcements and 
resume the offensive. This dream was dissipated on the 
morning of the 29th of March, by the sudden and simul¬ 
taneous appearance of five of Lord Wellington’s columns of 
attack ascending the Guarda mountain by five different 
roads or paths. This position, one of the strongest in the 
country, was abandoned by the French with much precipi¬ 
tation ; without one effort for its defence, they hurried down 
the only road open to them, and crossed the Coa. Upon 
this river they halted till the 3rd of May. By a good dis¬ 
position of his forces, Massena held command of some passes 
to the south, communicated with Almeida, guarded the 
bridges and fords on the Coa, and presented two bold 
fronts, covered by the river, and connected by the strong 
and convenient point of Sabugal. At daylight on the 3rd, 
Wellington put liis men in motion : our light division passed 
the Coa on the left of the French, and drove in their light 
infantry; but the main body of the French advanced, and a 
. rain-storm coming on at the moment, the men of our light 
division could not see that they were pushing too far. When 
the weather cleared up, the French, perceiving that onty a 
small force had crossed the river, attacked it in columns 
with cavalry and artillery. Three times the 43rd and 52nd 
regiments were driven back towards the river, and three 
times they rallied and beat back their foes. Colonel Beck’ 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. vii. p. 373. 


1811.] LOSSES OI* THE FRENCH. 101 

with, who was foremost in these fights, displayed as much 
ability as heroism. Taking advantage of a small stone 
enclosure, he made it good against all assaults. The combat 
was maintained with great fury by the French ; but at last, 
seeing that Picton’s division had crossed the Coa, and that 
our 5th division was pouring across the bridge of Sabugal, 
their whole army retreated upon Alfayetes having sustained, 
considerable loss in men and also in baggage. This was 
called the combat of Sabugal, in which our light division, 
which did nearly all the work, lost about 200 men. Lord 
Wellington recorded it in his dispatches as “one of the 
most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged 
in.” On the 4th, the French were on the extreme frontier 
of Portugal, and on the 6th they crossed the Agueda into 
Spain, not without a serious loss inflicted on their rear by our 
light cavalry and horse artillery. Thus terminated their 
third and last invasion of Portugal. They left a garrison in 
Almeida, which was blockaded by the English immediately. 
The horn of “ the spoiled child of victory,” as Massena was 
called in the French army, was sadly lowered; and our 
great General had effected his purpose and delivered Portu¬ 
gal. “Nevertheless,” says Captain Sherer, “those public 
men and public prints at home, whose patriotic care it was 
to disparage the exploits of Wellington, and to exalt the 
generalship of the French, described the retreat of Massena 
as ‘a mere change of position from the Zezere to the Agueda ,’ 
as a manoeuvre to lead the allies to a distance from their 
resources, and to approach his own. Thus spoke the oppo¬ 
sition, both in and out of Parliament; but the people of 
England held very different language.” * 

Considerably more than half of the invading army had 
perished. On the 9th of April, Wellington wrote to Lord 
Liverpool:—“ The enemy’s loss in this expedition to Portugal 
is immense ; I should think no less than 45,000 men, includ¬ 
ing the sick and wounded.’T 

I again quote from an officer, who was an eye-witness of 
most of the horrors attendant upon Massena’s retreat:— 

“ A great part of the loss of the French in killed was 
from the hands of the Portuguese peasantry, who revenged 
themselves for the injuries which had been inflicted on their 
countrymen during the six or seven months that the French 
had remained in Portugal, by killing every straggler whom 
they could lay their hands upon before the heads of the 
British columns came up. They killed those who fell be- 
* ‘Military Memoirs of the Duke.’ f ‘Dispatches,’ vol. vii. p. 448. 


102 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


hind from sickness, as well as those who straggled for the 
purpose of marauding or seeking for food ; they killed the 
wounded who were left behind for want of means of trans¬ 
port, as well as those who dropped down from weakness 
and fatigue; they killed them with their knives, or dashed 
out their brains with stones, or with the long knobbed sticks 
which the Portuguese peasantry carry on their shoulders: 
The appearance of the British advance (for the British 
army always protected the prisoners) made the Portuguese 
leave their work of death at times unfinished, and they left 
their victims, whom they generally stripped stark naked, 
to die in the fields right and left of the line of march. 
The writer of this article, then a very young man, speaks 
from recollection. It was on the 10th of March, on the 
road from Payalva to Pombal, that he saw the first dismal 
traces of the disastrous retreat of the French : bodies of dead 
soldiers, carts broken down on the road, carcasses of horses and 
mules ; and from that day till he arrived at Celorico, on the 
29th of March, there was hardly a day on which he did not 
see numbers of dead bodies scattered about the fields right and 
left of the road, generally naked, most of whom had no marks 
of wounds from firearms, and had either died of disease, of 
which many of them bore evidence, or had been finished 
by the peasantry in the manner described. One day he 
remembers counting them; and in a few hours of the march 
he reckoned between 100 and 200, till he felt too sick to 
reckon any more. He became at last familiarized with the 
sight, for men become used to any sight, however offensive, 
by continual repetition of it. Some of the poor creatures 
seemed to have crawled or been dragged out of the road to 
die behind the loose stone-walls with which the fields are 
enclosed; and, on looking over the stone-walls into the 
fields, they were seen lying in clusters of three or four or 
more, in all sorts of positions. A few were still breathing. 
It was a horrid sight. He also remembers once or twice 
seeing Portuguese villagers, men and women, insulting and 
kicking the bodies of dead Frenchmen on the road, when 
they were properly reproved and driven away by a British 
non-commissioned officer. A Portuguese farmer in the 
Estrella showed him the uniforms of four or five French¬ 
men whom he had surprised singly, and killed in his 
neighbourhood during the winter. It was chiefly in the 
mountains of the Estrella that the work of destruction had 
been carried on during the winter of 1810-11. The French 
marauding parties went hunting for provisions in those 


MASSACRES. 


103 


1811.] 

sequestered valleys, and when they fell upon a hamlet or 
farmhouse they showed no mercy to the inmates. Some¬ 
times in the mountains they pounced upon several families 
huddled together in a cave, with a provision of Indian corn 
or pulse to last them for the winter. The males were soon 
despatched, the females spared for a time, but not in mercy. 
It happened, however, at times that these marauding 
parties were small, and they were overpowered by the 
peasantry, who gave no quarter. 

“ A body of tAvo or three hundred men, of General Foy’s 
escort, on his return from France, were crossing the Estrella 
summit by Covilhao, in the midst of the Avinter, Avhen they 
Avere benighted; some died of cold, and the rest, being 
attacked in the morning by the Portuguese peasants, could 
not use their arms, as their fingers were benumbed, and 
they Avere all killed. General Gardanne, Avith a body of 
about 3,000 men, advanced, in November 1810, from the 
frontiers of Spain with a supply of ammunition and other 
necessaries for the army of Massena; he took the road by 
Sabugal and the Lower Beira as far as Cardigos. They 
were within a few leagues of Massena’s outposts on the 
Zezere, Avhen, alarmed at their own situation, being nearly 
surrounded by the Portuguese militia, and being afraid of 
not meeting with Massena at last, they retired into Spain 
with considerable loss. In the latter part of the folloAving 
December, Massena sent a body of 2,000 men, cavalry and 
infantry, to forage, or, in other words, to plunder the district 
of Casteilobranco. The town of Castellobranco was a con¬ 
siderable place, and as its situation Avas remote from the 
actual scene of warfare, the people Avere off their guard. 
On Christmas-eve, whilst most of the inhabitants Avere in 
the churches, the French rushed in, and a scene of outrage 
and bloodshed ensued, Avhich is easier to imagine than to 
describe. Next morning, some order being restored, the 
officer Avho commanded the division demanded of the local 
magistrates a supply of stores, shoes, clothes, &c., for the 
army, Avhich being complied with, in a few days the French 
quitted the place.”* 

This will give the reader some idea of the system of Avar 
carried on by Buonaparte’s armies, according to his once 
applauded principle—“ Let war support Avar.” It was, in¬ 
deed, a principle of the Tartar kind ! The French general, 
Foy, himself, says, “ Like the avalanche rushing doAvn from 
the summit of the Alps into the valley beneath, our in* 

* Audre Vicusscux, * Military Life of the Duke.’ 


104 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


numerable armies, by their mere passage, destroyed, in a few 
hours, the resources of a whole country. They habitually 
bivouacked, and where they halted our soldiers demolished 
houses which had stood for half a century, in order to con¬ 
struct with their materials those long right-lined villages 
which were frequently destined to last but for a day. 
When forest timber was not at hand, fruit-trees of the most 
valuable kind, such as the olive, mulberry, and orange-trees, 
were felled for fuel. Had they waited for food till the 
administration of the army served them with rations, they 
might have starved. The young conscripts, transported by 
a magic power from tbeir homes to the extremities of 
Europe, intermingled All at once with men of all countries, 
and irritated by want and danger, contracted a moral in¬ 
toxication, of which we cared not to cure them, because it 
prevented their sinking under unparalleled fatigues. . . . . 
This disorder being considered inevitable, it was not possible 
to fix its limits: it attached itself to the war of invasion 
like a consuming cancer. The scourge became still more 
fearful when exasperated passions put arms into the hands 
of men who were not called by their condition in life to 
bear them. The war between army and people partook of 
the nature of civil war, in which crimes are perpetrated 
on both sides which excite neither disgust nor horror. Our 
soldiers, generous in their relations with other warriors, 
were inexorable towards the patriot who had taken up arms 
to defend the fruit of his garden, or the honour of his 
daughter : the tool concealed beneath the garb of labour 
seemed to them the poniard of the disguised assassin. The 
military reports now presented nothing but a series of 
villages plundered, and towns taken by assault; and if it 
happened that the ministers of a God of peace transformed 
themselves into leaders of insurrection, one cannot be 
surprised that young soldiers, though accustomed to re¬ 
ligious practices, threw aside their former habits, and vio¬ 
lated churches, convents, and even the asylum of the grave.” * 
Knowing what I know of the French soldiery, and of the 
temper and outrageous infidelity’- of those times, I much doubt 
whether any part of Massena’s army was, in the slightest de¬ 
gree, “accustomed to religious practices.” But the conclusion 
of all General Toy’s remarks is, that whenever a people are 
determined not to submit to the invader, a war of extermi¬ 
nation must ensue. We regret to see this sentiment nearly 
shared by a gallant English officer; who is at the same time 
* Poy, c Histone dc la Guerre de la Pcnmsule, > 


FRENCH WAR SYSTEM. 


105 


1811.] 

an accomplished and eloquent English writer. Napier, 
the historian of our Peninsular war, would novel' have the 
population of a country take up arms against a regular 
invading army : he would have people trust for their pro¬ 
tection solely to such regular forces as their governments 
may have in the field. Seeing what the armies of their 
country were, it was well that the Spaniards had no concep¬ 
tion of Napier’s system. 

But let me now quote Lord Wellington’s calm observa¬ 
tions to those who asked why he could not make war like 
the French, and go on with his army, as the French troops 
did, without pay, provisions, or magazines. “ The French 
army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to 
form such an one, we must form such a government as 
exists in France, which can with impunity lose one-half of 
the troops employed in the field every year, only by the 
privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we 
must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of 
the population of the country; from the good and middling, 
as well in rank as in education, as from the bad; and not 
as other nations, and we in particular do, from the bad only. 
Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the 
French have ; a system founded upon the strength of the 
tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army 
composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well- 
disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated. 
When we shall have done all this, and shall have made 
these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, 
we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by 
authorized and regular plunder of the country and its inha¬ 
bitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to 
the labour, hardships, and privations which the French sol¬ 
dier suffers every day; and we must expect the same pro¬ 
portion of loss every campaign, viz., one-half of those who 
take the field.”* 

On the 10th of April, when the last of the French had 
cleared out of the country, his lordship issued a proclamation 
to the Portuguese nation, in which, among other things, he 
said :—“ Tile Portuguese now know by experience, that the 
Marshal-General was not mistaken either in the nature or 
the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or 
respecting the only remedies to avoid it; viz., decided and 
resolute resistance, or the removal and concealment of all 

* Letter to the Marquis Wellesley. ‘Dispatches/ vol, vii. p, 195. 


106 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


property, and of everything which could tend to the subsis¬ 
tence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress. 

“ Nearly four years have now elapsed since the tyrant of 
Europe first invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The 
cause of this invasion was not self-defence; it was not to 
seek revenge for insults offered, or injuries done by the 
benevolent sovereign of this kingdom; it was not even the 
ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power, as 
the Portuguese government had, without resistance, yielded 
to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was, the 
insatiable desire to plunder, the wish to disturb the tran¬ 
quillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed 
nearly half a century in peace. 

“The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern 
provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same want of plun¬ 
der the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the 
Marshal-General appeals to the experience of those who 
have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army 
during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, 
and outrage are not the sole objects of their attention, from 
the General down to the soldier.* 

“ Those countries which submitted have not been better 
treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have 
lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, 
their laws overturned, their religion destroyed, and, above 
all, they have deprived themselves of the honour of that 
manly resistance to their oppressor of which the people of 
Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.” 

He warned the people of Portugal, that, although the 
danger was removed, it was not entirely over—that Buona¬ 
parte might yet endeavour to force them to submit to his 
iron yoke. 

“They should be unremitting in their preparations for 
decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing 
arms should learn the use of them; and those whose age 
or sex renders them unfit to bear arms should fix upon 
places of security and concealment, and should make all the 

* I know, upon many unquestionable authorities, that during this 
retreat, and on other occasions, Frenchmen, holding the rank of general 
officers, meanly plundered the people in whose houses they had quartered 
themselves. The late Sir George Murray told me that he was once'' 
quartered in the house of a respectable Portuguese family, which had 
been vacated the day before by a French General, who had carried off 
every thing that was worth taking, even down to a little silver ornament 
in which the family had served his Excellency the General with toothpicks 
—in the Portuguese fashion—after dinner. 


1811.] PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUESE. 107 

arrangements for their easy removal to them when the 

moment of danger shall approach.Measures 

should he taken to conceal or destroy provisions which can¬ 
not be removed, and everything which can tend to facilitate 
the enemy’s progress; lor this may be depended upon,—• 
the enemy’s troops seize upon everything, and leave nothing 
for the owner. By these measures, whatever may be the 
superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and 
of revenge may induce, and his power may enable the tyrant 
again to invade this country, the result will be certain.”* 

The people of Beira and Portuguese Estremadura, Avho 
had withdrawn from the open country upon the advance of 
Massena after the battle oi Busaco, had caused a vast influx 
of population within or rather behind the lines of Torres 
Yedras. A part of this living stream had flowed down to 
Lisbon, and another had crossed to the south bank of the 
Tagus, entering districts which were safe from the French, 
and had not been devastated. These people were assisted 
partly by their own countrymen and partly by a gift of 
100,000/., voted by Parliament, and by voluntary subscrip¬ 
tions raised in England. They came in for a share of the 
cares, toils, and troubles which — apart from his duties 
as a military commander—constantly beset Lord Welling¬ 
ton ; and it may safely be said that, but for his exertions 
and moral influence, many of those poor people must have 
perished for want. After the exit of Massena they returned 
to their homes, where the poorer classes received further 
assistance during the remainder of the year and in the 
following spring. 

Having placed his army in cantonments between the Coa 
and the Agueda, his lordship set out for the south in order 
to see the state of affairs on the Guadiana. For a long time 
Soult had had his own way in that quarter ; but the defeat 
of Marshal Victor at the battle of Barrosa, in Andalusia, 
by General Graham (the late veteran and venerable Lord 
Lynedoch), the advance of Beresford, and other incidents, 
had compelled Soult to return to Cadiz. Mortier, who 
succeeded Soult in command in Estremadura, laid siege to 
Campo Mayor, a weak place within the frontiers of Portu¬ 
gal, and very weakly garrisoned. The Portuguese com¬ 
mandant was obliged to surrender at last. Marshal Beres¬ 
ford, having been reinforced from the north by Lord 
Wellington, was advancing at the head of 22,000 men ; and 
at his ajipearance, on the 25th of March, the French, evacu- 
* ‘ "Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. vii. pp. 455-G-7. 


108 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


ating Campo Mayor, withdrew to Badajoz, after a warm 
skirmish with some of the British cavalry. Beresford had 
received orders from Wellington to invest Badajoz before 
the enemy should have time to provision and repair that 
fortress which they had so recently taken. Crossing the 
Guadiana, Beresford advanced into Spanish Estremadura— 
Mortier having retired before him—and placed his army in 
cantonments to cover the siege of Badajoz. He began by 
besieging and capturing Olivenpa. Affairs were at this point 
when, on the 20th of April, Lord Wellington arrived from 
the north, reconnoitred Badajoz, and ordered Beresford to 
push on the siege with vigour. Until that place should be 
recaptured, the allied armies could not safely penetrate into 
Spain, while the French could command an easy entrance 
into the southern provinces of Portugal, to which Badajoz 
was the key. While arrangements were making for the 
siege, his lordship was recalled to the north by Massena's 
movements; and, on the 28th of April, he was back again 
to his main army, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa 
Fermosa, near the Coa. 

Having recruited his army to a considerable extent at 
Salamanca, and having obtained a reinforcement of cavalry 
from Marshal Bessieres, Massena moved from Ciudad Ro¬ 
drigo, and crossed the Agueda with 40,000 infantry, 5,000 
horse, and about 30 pieces of artillery, for the purpose of 
relieving the French garrison in Almeida. Expecting 
every day to be superseded in his command, he wished, 
before returning to Paris, to make one effort more for the 
sake of his own military character. To face him Lord 
Wellington could muster no more than 32,000 men, of 
which force only 1,200 were cavalry. His lordship, how¬ 
ever, determined to fight rather than give up the blockade 
of Almeida. He drew back his army half-way between 
the Agueda and the Coa, and placed it in an extended 
line on a table-land between the two parallel rivers, 
Turones and Das Casas, which are both affluents of the 
Agueda; his left, leaning on Fort Conception, covered the 
blockade of Almeida; his centre lay opposite the village 
of Almeida, and his right was atFuentes de Onoro, a fair 
village, and extended towards the hill of Nava d’Aver, 
on the road to Sabugal : the whole length of the line wafc 
about seven miles. The river Coa flowed in our rear, and 
there was only one bridge whereby to cross it in case of 
a retreat, the bridge of Castello Bom. The ground was 
open on the side of Fuentes de Onoro, which village soon 


1811.] BATTLES OF FUENTES DE ONOKO. 109 

merited the name of “ Tlie Fountains of Honour,” and 
there Massena resolved to attack iu force, hoping to gain 
the village, turn Lord Wellington’s right, push it upon 
its centre, and then drive the whole of that army hack 
upon the Coa and its one narrow and perilous bridge. To¬ 
wards evening, on the 3rd of May, the French left, under 
cover of a hot cannonade from a ridge which commanded 
the village, made a resolute assault upon Fuentes de Onoro. 
They carried the lower part of the village, and drove the 
English to the upper part, where the defence was, for a time, 
confined to a few strong houses and a chapel, which stood 
upon a rock. But Wellington, at the opportune moment, 
sent down a fresh brigade, and the French were driven 
back at the point of the bayonet. Massena fed his columns 
of attack with more and more reinforcements, and the 
struggle in the narrow streets of the village was awful. 
Repeatedly bayonets were crossed (that very rare occurrence 
in war), the French and English being occasionally inter¬ 
mixed. But no French troops ever yet stood such a contest 
with the British ; and the assailants were soon driven out of 
the lower part of the village, and across the Das Casas river. 
Completely foiled in this desperate effort, Massena passed 
all the following day in reconnoitering, and in making plans 
of attack, which were all foreseen by Wellington and pro¬ 
vided for. In the course of that day (the 4tli of May) 
Marshal Bessieres, who had come up and joined Massena 
with a body of Buonaparte’s Imperial Guards, reconnoitered 
also, declaring to his impatient and irritated colleague, that 
great caution and circumspection would be necessar} r against 
a commander so skilful and troops so steady as those now 
before them. On the morrow (5th), as early as three 
o’clock in the morning, the French columns were in motion, 
and at about six Massena made a grand attack on the British 
right with the greater part of his army, including the 
entire mass of his cavalry. Some irregular Spanish cavalry, 
under Don Julian Sanchez, which Wellington had placed on 
the hill of Nava d’Aver, at his extreme right, were very 
soon swept away ; and our 7th light division, and other 
troops on our right, had to sustain the whole force and fury 
of Massena’s columns. Our men formed into squares ; but 
the numerous French cavalry fell upon the 7th division 
before it could effect that formation. The troops, however, 
stood firm; and although some were cut down by Montbrun’s 
heavy horse, the enemy was checked by the steady fire of 
the Chasseurs Britanniques, a foreign regiment in the 


110 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


British service, and of the other regiments of the 7th 
division. Lord Wellington, however, considering his posi¬ 
tion too far extended to the right, gave up the ground 
near Nava d’Aver and his communication with Sabugal, 
and ordered the 7th and light divisions to retire across 
the plain, and the 1st and 3rd divisions to wheel back and 
take up a new alignement on a steep ridge which runs 
from the Das Casas to the Turones. Such a movement, in 
the midst of a battle, is, at all times, difficult, and never to be 
attempted except with the steadiest troops. At this time 
the movement was well executed, though under very critical 
circumstances, for the British squares had to cross a vast 
open plain, exposed to the charge of that numerous French 
cavalry, supported by artillery, the British cavalry being 
too weak to give much protection. The non-combatants, 
who had gathered behind the first British line for pro¬ 
tection, were hurrying away in-panic and with loud lamen¬ 
tations, being driven and goaded by the French horsemen 
across the plain. It was a dangerous hour for England! 
and a most trying one for her greatest general! 

“ The .whole of the vast plain, as far as the Turones, was 
covered with a confused multitude, amidst which the squares 
appeared but as specks; for there was a great concourse, 
composed of commissariat followers of the camp, servants, 
baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and, 
finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out of the 
woods. The 7th division was separated from the army by 
the Turones; 5,000 French cavalry, with fifteeen pieces of 
artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge ; the infantry 
of the 8th corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; 
the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the 6th corps; 
and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued 
forth, while Drouet’s divisions fell on that village, while the 
8th corps attacked the light division, and while the whole of 
the cavalry made a general charge, the loose multitude 
encumbering the plain would have been driven violently in 
upon the 1st division, in such a manner as to have intercepted 
the latter’s fire, and broken their ranks. No such effort, how¬ 
ever, was made; Montbrun’s cavalry merely hovered about 
Craufurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry 
took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a 
reserve to the right of the 1st division, sending the riflemen 
among the rocks to connect it with the 7th division, which had 
arrived at Freneda, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez, 
^t the sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, 


1811.] BATTLES OF FUENTES DE ONORO. Ill 

the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannon¬ 
ade, which did great execution, from the closeness of the 
allied masses; but twelve British guns replied with vigour, and 
the violence of the enemy’s fire abated; their cavalry then 
drew out of range, and a body of French infantry attempt¬ 
ing to glide down the ravine of the Turones, was repulsed by 
the riflemen and light companies of the guards.”* 

By the movement which had been effected, the village 
of Fuentes de Onoro was now the left of our position, and 
Freneda beyond the Turones was our right. All the time 
of the combat on the ridge, and the movement across the 
plain, a fierce battle had been going on at Fuentes. 

Massena had directed Drouet to carry the village as soon 
as Montbrun’s cavalry should turn our right. But the village 
was again defended as stoutly as it had been on the 3rd. 
Again, there seemed different shiftings and changes of for¬ 
tune : early in the contest that noble Highlander, Colonel 
Cameron, was mortally wounded, and three brave regiments 
(the 24th, 71st, and 79th) were driven from the lower parts 
of the village, by an attacking column of tremendous strength. 
At one time the very chapel on the rock, in the upper part 
of the village, was abandoned. The upper part of the village 
was, however, stiffly held ; and the rolling of the musketry 
was there incessant. Lord Wellington, having all his re¬ 
serves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support 
of the regiments in Fuentes ; and Massena sent mass after 
mass to reinforce General Drouet. Having got the 71st 
and 79th into good order, and having joined the 88th to 
those two regiments which had severely suffered, Colonel 
Mackinnon turned upon the French with his infuriated 
brigade:— 

“ Wild from the plaided rants the yell was given! ” 

and the Highlanders rushed to take vengeance for the fall 
of noble Cameron. The entire village was recovered; and, 
cleared of all the French, save their dead and their badly 
wounded. The battle was prolonged round the village, 
and on the banks of the stream till the fall of night, when 
Massena’s column crossed the river, and retired to the distance 
of a cannon-shot from its banks. The French generals had 
committed various and gross blunders, scarcely to be ex¬ 
pected from officers who had obtained so much celebrity; 
but on the British side there does not appear to have been 
a single mistake. Our total loss from the beginning of the 

* Kap : er, * Hist, of War in the Peninsula,’ vol. iii. p. 514. 


112 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


fighting on the 3rd, was 235 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 317 
missing or prisoners. The loss of the French was far greater; 
400 of their dead were counted in the village of Fuentes 
alone, strewing the streets or piled upon one another; many 
prisoners were taken, and intercepted letters showed that 
from 3,000 to 4,000 had been wounded either in the attacks 
on the village on the 3rd, or in this more general affair of 
the 5th. 

The battle of Fuentes de Onoro was of importance in the 
eyes of the world, and to the military fame of onr country, 
by being a regular pitched battle, fought by the British in 
a position (forced upon Wellington, unless he left Almeida 
open to Massena) of rp particular strength, and, indeed, weak 
at one point, and fought with a very inferior force. A good 
part of the disciplined Portuguese were away in the south 
with Beresford, so that the great majority of the troops 
engaged were British-born soldiers. Two of our divisions, 
the 5th and 6th, were posted far on the left to protect the 
blockade of Almeida, and, being observed all the time by a 
superior French force, they could take no part in the engage¬ 
ments. There were only four British divisions of infantry, 
one Portuguese brigade, and about 1,000 horse actually 
engaged against three entire corps of infantry and nearly 
5,000 cavalry; for Montbrun, expecting to decide the battle 
by that one coup , moved with all his squadrons when the 
British were traversing the open plain.* The Portuguese 
engaged appear to have done their duty manfully, although 
they had received no pay for months, and had been left by 
their government on their usual low diet. 

Massena avowedly fought the battle of Fuentes de Onoro, 
for the purpose of relieving Almeida ; and in that purpose 
he completely failed. The French army remained quiet 
throughout the 6th and 7th. Lord Wellington, expecting a 
renewal of the struggle, threw up some works in the upper 
village, and upon the position behind it. But upon the 8th 
the French testified that they would fight no more there, by 
withdrawing from their ground; and upon the 10th, they 
crossed the Agueda into Spain. 

Buonaparte, before this, had come to the conclusion 
that Massena was not the man to drive Wellington out of 
Portugal, and he had sent Marshal Marmont, a younger 
officer, to supersede him. The order by which the former 
“Favourite of Fortune ” was ordered to give up the com- 

* * Wellington Dispatches.’ Napier, ‘Hist, of War in the Peninsula.’ 
Sherer, ‘ Military Memoirs,’ A, Yieusseux, ‘Military Life of the Duke, 


1811.] GENEROSITY OF THE BRITISH SOLDIERS. 113 

mand, was harsh, ungenerous, and unfeeling; but Massena 
had sh 0 ht claims to the sympathy of any one, and this 
measure was what Buonaparte meted to nearly all his unsuc¬ 
cessful generals. Massena was allowed to take with him to 
Paris only his son, and one aide-de-camp. He had finished 
his last act, and played out its last scene in defeat and dis¬ 
grace : he appeared no more on the stage where he had first 
presented himself as a common sergeant, a deserter, and a 
traitor.- 

Nearly at the same time Marshal Ney, General Junot, 
and General Loison repaired to Paris, whither Joseph Buona¬ 
parte had gone before them. They all left behind them 
evil names, and carried with them hatreds, jealousies, and 
fierce recriminations of one another. La guerre d'Espagne , 
a word of ill omen before their return, took a more sinister 
sound and signification when Massena, Ney, Loison, and the 
very rash and talkative Junot had been a week in the French 
capital. 

Lord Wellington had frequently occasion to report the 
humanity and generosity of his British soldiers. A few 
days after the battle of Puentes de Onoro, in a letter ad¬ 
dressed to Mr. Perceval, then our prime minister, thanking 
him for attending to his charitable recommendation in favour 
of the distressed Portuguese people, his lordship said,—“ My 
soldiers have continued to show to them every kindness in 
their power, as well as to the Spaniards. The village of 
Puentes de Onoro having been the field of battle the other 
day, and not being much improved by this circumstance, 
they immediately and voluntarily subscribed to raise a sum 
of money, to be given to the poor inhabitants as a compensa¬ 
tion for the damage which their properties had sustained in 

* Massena was a native of Nice and a subject of the King of Sardinia, 
whose flag he deserted to join the French Republican Array, at that time 
preparing for the invasion of Italy. 

On his homeward journey through Spain, Massena narrowly escaped 
falling into the avenging hands of Mina, and the fierce guerillas led by 
that famous chief. 

In Navarre, Mina, the most active and able of the guerilla leaders (with 
the exception, perhaps, of Porlier), defeated, on the 22nd of May, at the 
Puerto d’Arlaban, near Yittoria, 1,200 men, who were escorting a con¬ 
voy of prisoners and treasure to Prance. Massena, whose baggage was 
captured, was to have travelled with this escort, but, disliking the manner 
of the march, he had remained in Yittoria to wait a better opportunity, 
and so escaped. These guerilla bands were almost always merciless; after 
the fight they murdered in cold blood six Spanish ladies who, in defiance 
of patriotism, had attached themselves to French officers.—Napier, * Ilist. 
of War in the Peninsular.’ 

I \ 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


114 

the contest.”* At the same time the wounded and the sick 
Portuguese soldiers, having no hospitals of their own, were 
taken into our hospitals, where our men shared with them 
whatever little comforts they could procure. 

A few days after Massena’s retreat, the Frencli garrison in 
Almeida evacuated the place, blew up some of the works, 
fled by night, and getting across the Agueda, joined their 
main army, though not without the loss of 400 men, the 
third part of their entire force, and the loss of their 
artillery, ammunition, baggage, and everything except 
the ragged clothes on their backs, their side-arms, and 
muskets. But for some negligence on the part of our 
blockading divisions scarcely a man of that garrison 
could have escaped. Lord Wellington was exceedingly 
annoyed; and he did not fail to express his sentiments 
to some of the commanding officers, who ought to have been 
better prepared for the sortie of the French, seeing that 
they had no alternative but to make a desperate attempt to 
fly by night, or surrender at discretion. 

Marmont had been ordered to take the command of the 
army of Portugal with a firm hand; but this marshal, find¬ 
ing that he could do nothing more than continue the re¬ 
treat which Massena had commenced, retired to Salamanca, 
and put the disheartened, half naked, and half starving 
army into cantonments. 

Lord Wellington set out once more for the south. But 
before he could arrive on the Guadiana, great events had 
taken place in that quarter. By the 4th of May—the day 
which intervened between the two conflicts at Fuentes— 
Beresford had invested Badajoz. But Soult was now 
marching back from Seville to relieve and then reinforce 
the garrison of that important place. The departure from 
Madrid of Joseph Buonaparte, had left disposable a consi¬ 
derable body of French troops, which that timid usurper 
had considered necessary for the protection of his own per¬ 
son and flitting ephemeral government; some troops, too, 
had been drawn from the corps of General Sebastiani, so 
that Soult, the best or most skilful of the French marshals, 
was bringing a great accession of strength to the army, 
which he had been compelled to leave two months before by 
the daring movements of General Graham in Andalusia. In 
the same interval, however, some Spanish generals and a 
Spanish army had gradually collected in Estremadura, to 
co-operate with Beresford in pressing the siege of Badajoz. 

* * Dispatches,’ vol. vii. 


BATTLE OP ALBUERA. 


1811.] 


115 


If Marshal Beresford had been properly supplied with the 
materiel and means of pushing the siege vigorously, lie 
might—as the French had then had but little time for pre¬ 
paration—have possibly breached and taken Badajoz before 
Soult could get near it; but Beresford had hardly anything 
that was needful except courage and good will; he had 
scarcely any entrenching tools; his train of artillery was 
contemptible, his cannon balls did not fit the breaching 
guns which had been sent to him, the howitzers were too 
small for his shells, and it should seem that he had with 
• him no very skilful artillery or engineer officer. The soil 
was hard and rocky, and Beresford’s people, besides being 
insufficient in number, were but little accustomed to trench¬ 
ing, mining, and the other operations of sieges. In these 
particulars the whole British army was defective, for it had 
not at the time a single corps of sappers and miners. [If 
the Government had only thought of sending out from 
England a few hundred of the men called navigators, with 
their proper tools, our siege work would have been done in 
perfection, and with a rapidity which no soldiers, or 
sappers and miners, or labourers of any other class or 
country could have equalled.] Very little progress had 
been made in the siege when Beresford received intelligence 
that Soult-was rapidly advancing. This was on the night 
of the 12th of May; and on the following morning our 
General, far too weak to attend to two objects at once, 
raised the siege and prepared to fight Soult in a pitched 
battle, and on an open field. 

Having removed their artillery, stores, &c., the allies took 
post on the memorable ridge of Albuera : they were be¬ 
tween 7,000 and 8,000 British infantry, several of the Portu¬ 
guese brigades, which Beresford had so-admirably disciplined, 
the Spanish corps of Blake and Oastanos, and about 2,000 
cavalry—in all about 27,000 men. But the Spaniards, who 
formed more than 10,000 of this total, had scarcely been 
disciplined at all, and w r ere but little to be depended upon. 
Another Spanish brigade, under Don Carlos d’Espana, 
arrived at Albuera on the 14th ; and on the evening of the 
15th (while Lord Wellington was still on the Coa), after a 
day of heavy rain, Soult came up with about 19,000 chosen 
infantry, about 4,000 cavalry, and 50 guns. As at Fuentes 
de Onoro, the ground was very favourable for cavalry. The 
French marshal immediately reconnoitred our position, and 
determined upon an attack, in force, on the right Hank, which 


11G 


MEMOIR or THE DUKE. 


was occupied by Blake’s Spanish corps, the British holding 
the centre, and the Portuguese the left. 

At eight o’clock on the following morning, theFrench troops 
were seen in full motion, dense masses of infantry and clouds 
of cavalry rolling towards Blake’s division, while two heavy 
columns of infantry and some horse, marching out of a 
wood, pointed towards the front of the allied position, as if to 
attack the bridge and the unroofed, ruined village of Albuera. 
Other demonstrations were made, as though Soult intended 
to attack the British centre in front; but Beresford saw that 
this Avas but a feint, and he immediately sent the alert Colo¬ 
nel Hardinge to request that Blake Avould change his front 
so as to face the Flench, who assuredly meant to attack the 
Spanish right. The Spanish general refused, doggedly in¬ 
sisting that the real attack of Soult was against the centre, 
by the bridge of Albuera. The truth appears to have been 
that Blake knew very well that if he attempted, with his 
undisciplined rabble, to change front, or to make any other 
evolution in the presence of an active and highly-disciplined 
enemy, they Avouldfall into irremediable confusion, and either 
throw down their arms and ask for quarter, or fly—to be 
pursued and cut to pieces. But when the attempt to manoeuvre 
had become infinitely more difficult than it Avas Avhen Colonel 
Hardinge gave Blake his order to change front—when the 
French Avere actually appearing on the table-land onhisriglit, 
and getting ready to enfilade nearly the Avhole position of the 
allies—that presumptuous, self-Avilled man proceeded to make 
the evolution Avith pedantic sloAvness. And forthwith, attacked 
by the French, the Spaniards gave Avay in disorder, leaving, 
for a moment, the British centre entirely exposed, and too 
truly telling the English soldiers what little assistance they 
were to expect from such allies. The day might have been 
considered by a less brave man than Beresford as already 
lost. “TAVo-thirds of the French AA r ere in a compact order 
of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, 
disordered and composed of different nations, Avas still in the 

difficult act of changing its front.The Spaniards 

Avere in disorder at all points, and Soult, thinking the Avhole 
army Avas yielding, pushed forward his columns, Avhile his 
reserves also mounted the hill, and General Ituty placed all 
the batteries in position.” * 

As the heights the enemy had gained raked and entirely 
commanded our old position, it became necessary to make 
every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble effort 

* Napier. 


1811.] BATTLE OB ALBUEItA. 117 

was made by the brigades of the 2nd British division. The 
1st of these brigades (General Colborne’s), while in the act 
of deploying on the ascent of the hill under a heavy fire of 
French artillery from the ridges which Blake and his 
Spaniards ought to have held, was attacked in front and 
rear by the French cavalry and the fierce Polish lancers, 
who, concealed by a heavy storm of rain and the thick 
smoke from the firing, passed round the flank of the hill, 
and committed dreadful havoc. Wherever these Poles had 
served the French—whether in Italy, Egypt, Germany, 
Spain, or Portugal,—they had distinguished themselves by 
their savage ferocity as much as by their bravery and their 
address as light cavalry. On the present, as on other 
occasions, these lancers, with their blood - red pennons 
shaking under the heads of their lances, rode madly over 
the field to spear the wounded and finish them where they 
fell. The tremendous slaughter made upon Colborne’s 
brigade would, however, have been still greater, if these 
Poles had not thus lost time in gratifying their unsoldier¬ 
like appetite for blood and death ; or if, instead of scattering 
themselves over the hill, they had kept together with the 
French dragoons, and pursued their first advantage, which 
had been chiefly owing to surprise. Two British regiments 
were almost annihilated; but the 31st, (the left of Col¬ 
borne’s brigade of three regiments) which fortunately 
had not begun to deploy, escaped the cavalry charge 
and manfully kept its ground under Major l’Estrange. 
While this stern fighting was in progress on the hill, some 
Spanish corps, regardless that their fire was falling fast, 
not upon the French, but upon the English ranks, kept up 
a mad, blind, unabating fusilade; but when ordered to 
advance, and succour men who were perishing through the 
celerity with which they had rushed to cover and assist 
them, no power could move them forward. At one time 
Beresford seized a Spanish ensign and dragged him forward 
with the colours, hoping that the useless regiment would be 
inspirited to follow. Not a man stirred, and the standard- 
bearer flew back to his herd, as soon as the marshal relaxed 
his grasp. Houghton’s brigade, the next of the two brigades 
which had been sent forward to recover possession of the ridge, 
soon reached the summit, joined the immoveable 31st, and 
maintained a most desperate struggle against an immensely 
superior force, and against all arms — artillery, infantry, 
cavalry, both light and heavy. When we shall see a well 
authenticated instance of the troops of any other nation 


118 


MEMOIR OE THE DUKE. 


gaining and keeping suck a position against such odds, then we 
may qualify, or waver in, our national faith that the British 
infantry is the best in the world.* Houghton’s men, how¬ 
ever, fell fast, and his ammunition, expended in a rapid, 
sustained fire, began to fail. At the same moment another 
and a fresh French column appeared moving round the 
right flank of the hill. Marshal Beresford now thought of 
retreat, and it is said that orders were on the point of being 
issued to commence it. But there was a young, quick-sighted, 
noble-hearted officer on the field, who saw that the battle 
might yet be won. This was Colonel, now General Vis¬ 
count Hardinge, who had shown the greatest intrepidity, 
activity, vigilance, and address in Sir John Moore’s unfor¬ 
tunate campaign, who had been at the side of that general 
on the hard fought field of Coruna when he received his 
death-wound, who had raised the dying veteran from the 
ground, tried to stop the effusion of blood with his sash, and 
then assisted in carrying him to the rear, displaying the deli¬ 
cate tenderness of a woman united with the fortitude of a 
Christian warrior. Colonel Hardinge, who was now acting 
as deputy quarter-master-general to the Portuguese troops, 
without waiting for Marshal Beresford’s orders, hurled 
General Cole’s division against the French. With this 
division, which consisted only of the English fusilier 
brigade and of one Portuguese brigade, Cole moved for¬ 
ward. It was this British fusilier brigade that restored 
the fight, and saved the allied army from a fearful catas¬ 
trophe. While the Portuguese brigade, under General 
Harvey, moved round the shoulder of the hill on the 
right, and some troops under Colonel Abercrombie moved 
round on the left, Cole himself led the matchless fusi¬ 
liers straight up the fatal hill, which was now completely 
crowned by the French masses and their artillery. Two 
or three flags of regiments and six British guns were 
already in the enemy’s possession, and the whole of Soult’s 
reserve was coming forward, en masse , to reinforce his 
columns on the ridge, from which the 31st and Houghton’s 
thinned brigade seemed, at last, on the point of being swept. 
On the ridge and on the slopes the ground was heaped with 
dead bodies, and the Polish lancers were riding furiously 
about the captured English guns. But General Cole, at the 
head of his fusiliers, moved steadily onward and upward, 
dispersed those savage lancers, recovered our six* guns, and 
appeared on the summit of the hill and on the right of 
* * Piet, Hist.’ Reign of George III. 


1811.] BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 119 

Houghton’s brigade just as Abercrombie took post on its 
left. The military historian of these exciting events has 
given a most animated and perfect picture of the scene which 
followed. His description has often been quoted ; but it 
would savour of presumption in any man to attempt to write 
another. 

“ Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the 
smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused and 
broken multitude, startled the enemy’s heavy masses, which 
were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory: 
they wavered, hesitated, and then, vomiting forth a storm of 
fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a 
fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled 
through the British ranks. Sir William Myers was killed, 
Cole, and the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawk- 
sliawe, fell wounded, and the fusilier battalions, struck by 
the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. 
Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their ter¬ 
rible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and 
majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by 
voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the 
hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded 
columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to 
open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself 
bear up, and, fiercely arising, fire indiscriminately upon 
friends and foes, while the horsemen, hovering on the flank, 
threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could 
stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of un¬ 
disciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the 
stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on 
the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook 
the ground ; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of 
every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the 
dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous 
crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was 
driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest 
edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining 
with the struggling multitudes, endeavour to sustain the 
fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable con¬ 
fusion, and the mighty mass, giving way like a loosened 
cliff, went headlong down the steep. The rain flowed 
after in streams discoloured with blood, and 1,500 unwounded 
men, the remnant of 6,000 unconquerable British soldiers, 
stood triumphant on the fatal hill.” * 

* Napier, ‘ Ilist. of the War in the Peninsula/ vol. iii. p. 516, 


120 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


“ It was observed,” wrote Beresford to the Commander- 
in-chief, “that oiu* dead, particularly the 57th regiment, 
were lying, as they had fought, in ranks, and that every 
wound was in front.” * 

The day was now won as Hardinge had seen it might be, 
and Beresford ordering the Portuguese and Spaniards to 
advance, the French retreated in dismay and confusion 
across the Albuera river. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon, 
the firing, which had begun hotly at about 9 o’clock in the 
morning, ceased. The allies had lost, in killed and wounded, 
about 7,000 men, of whom more than two-thirds were 
British. The French were computed to have lost not less 
than 9,000 men,'including two generals killed and three 
generals wounded. 

Beresford warmly thanked Colonel Hardinge for the abili¬ 
ties he had displayed, and for the exertions he had made, 
and properly praised the heroic conduct of Major-General 
W. Stuart, Major-General Cole, Colonel Colborne, Major 
l’Estrange, and nearly all the distinguished officers who 
survived the murderous conflict, making especial mention of 
General Lumley, who did wonders with the comparatively 
weak cavalry under his command, f 

The fighting had not been entirely on one point, for the 
French General Godinct, had made some efforts on our left 
and on the village of Albuera, from which he had been 
forced to desist by a threatened charge from Lumley’s 
cavalry. In every crisis of the fight, and on every part 
of the field, Marshal Beresford was seen conspicuously : and 
if he committed errors as a general, his bravery as a man 
ought to have commanded the respect of many who have 
since treated his arrangements with unsparing severity.]; 

But if censure was showered upon his head for his manage¬ 
ment of this battle, and for his fighting it at all, it was cer¬ 
tainly not by his considerate and generous minded Com¬ 
mander-in-chief. Wellington praised Beresford for having 
raised the siege of Badajoz without loss of ordnance or 
stores, and he did not hesitate to call the battle of Albuera a 
signal victory, gained by the marshal and his British sol¬ 
diers in the most gallant manner. As soon as he heard of 

* ‘ Dispatch to Lord Wellington,’ dated Albuera, 18th of May. 

f When the Polish lancers were on the hill-top butchering our two 
unfortunate regiments, and preparing to charge the 31st, Lumley rode at 
a gallop to the rescue. The British cavalry charged nobly. The lancers 
were in their turn taken in the rear; and numbers of these desperadoes 
fell beneath the sabres of Lumley’s horsemen ! 

+ ‘ Victories of the British Army.* 



BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 


121 


1811.] 

the battle, his lordship wrote to Beresford—“ Your loss, 
by all accounts, has been very large.. .. You could not be 
successful in such an action without a large loss; and we 
must make up our minds to affairs of this kind sometimes, 
or give up the game.” * His lordship joined to his admira¬ 
tion of the battle, his cordial concurrence in the favourable 
reports made by Beresford to the Government, of the good 
conduct of all who had been engaged in it. "When he 
became acquainted with the facts, he attributed the great 
sacrifices which the battle had cost us, and the unmolested 
condition of the French after they had crossed the river, to 
the right cause.—“ It was owing to the Spaniards, who 
could not be moved.” “I should,” said his lordship, “feel 
no anxiety about the result of any of our operations, if the 
Spaniards were as well disciplined as the soldiers of that 
nation are brave, and if they were at all moveable; but this 
is, I fear, beyond hope! All our losses have been caused 
by this defect. At Talavera, the enemy would have been 
destroyed, if we could have moved the Spaniards; at 
Albuera, the natural thing would have been to support the 
Spaniards on the right with the Spaniards who were next 
to them; but any movement of that body would have 
created inextricable confusion ; and it was necessary to sup¬ 
port the right solely with British, and thus the great loss 
fell upon our troops. In the same way, I suspect, the diffi¬ 
culty and danger of moving the Spanish troops was the 
cause that General Lapena did not support General Graham 
at Barrosa.” f 

On the evening of the 16th, the day which had witnessed 
one of the most murderous conflicts of modern times, consi¬ 
dering the number of troops engaged, Beresford improved 
his position; his freshest troops were placed in front, and 
some hundreds of spears and flags, taken from the Poles, 
were planted in defiance along the crest.f On the morrow, 
the 17th of May, the two armies remained in their respec¬ 
tive positions, Beresford fully expecting to be attacked 
again. But the morning passed, and the afternoon, and the 
evening, and the night, without any movement on the side 
of Soult; and on the 18th, Kemmis’s brigade of 1,500 Eng¬ 
lish came up and joined Beresford on the ridge of Albuera, 
and then, late at night, Soult began to move off his 
wounded, and to prepare for his retreat upon Seville, which 
he commenced on the morning of the 19th, leaving behind 

* ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. vii. p. 573. f Id. vol. vii, p. 599. * 

I Southey, ‘ Hist, of the Peninsular War.’ 


122 


MEMOIR OE THE DUKE. 


him 800 soldiers, severely wounded, to the generosity and 
humanity of the English. The French marshal had no 
doubt heard of the approach of Lord Wellington. On the 
very next day his lordship arrived at Albuera with two 
fresh divisions, and ordered that the siege of Badajoz 
should be instantly resumed. Through our deficiency in 
cavalry, Soult’s retreat was not so much molested as it 
ought to have been; but, nevertheless, he lost some hun¬ 
dreds of men, and our weak horse defeated his strong rear¬ 
guard at Usagre. 

Trenches were opened before Badajoz, and on the 5th of 
June, a breach being made, the assault was given. Through 
various wants and deficiencies in our siege appointments, 
this failed completely, nor did another attempt on the 9th 
prove more successful. These two assaults cost our army, 
in killed and wounded, 400 of our very best men. On the 
10th, his lordship received certain intelligence that Mar- 
mont was marching from Salamanca to join Soult with the 
whole of his forces, and that Drouet’s corps was advancing 
from Toledo, and would probably join Soult that veiy day. 
lie therefore fell back, and took up a position on the heights 
near Campo Mayor, along the Portuguese frontier. Al¬ 
though the French brought together from 60,000 to 70,000 
infantry, and 8,000 horse, while Wellington, counting 
Portuguese and some Spaniards, had not more than 56,000, 
of which only 3,500 were horse, the two French marshals 
would not venture to attack him on those heights ; and after 
losing many days, Mannont, about the middle of July, sepa¬ 
rated from Soult, and marched back upon Salamanca. This 
rendered indispensable a corresponding movement to the 
northward on the part of Wellington; and his lordship, leav¬ 
ing General Hill with one British division, and the Portu¬ 
guese troops in the Alemtejo, marched back to his old line of 
the Agueda, and established his head-quarters at Fuente 
Guinaldo. Here he was at no great distance from Ciudad 
Bodrigo, and, aiming at the recovery of that fortress, he 
caused it to be watched. * Towards the end of September, 
Marmont, having received large reinforcements from France, 
advanced to the Agueda, and by his superiority of num¬ 
bers, and especially of cavalry, obliged Wellington to with¬ 
draw to his old position on the Coa—whither the French 
did not choose to follow him. 

Meanwhile General Hill obtained signal successes in the 
south. Marshal Soult had gone back again to Seville, and 
thence to Cadiz, to have an eye upon the interminable 


1811.] RESULTS OF TITE CAMPAIGN OF 1811. 123 

blockade of the latter city. The French general, Gerard, 
was left near the Guadiana, at Arroyo Molinos ; and here, 
on the 28th of October, he was surprised, surrounded, and 
completely routed by Hill, who took 1,500 men and several 
officers of rank prisoners, and seized the whole of his artil¬ 
lery, ammunition, stores, and baggage. General Hill then 
advanced to Merida, where he placed his troops in canton¬ 
ments. In all Spanish Estremadura the French had now 
no firm footing except within the walls of Badajoz. 

Thus terminated the campaign of 1811. Lord Welling¬ 
ton in the course of this year, besides having firmly esta¬ 
blished his complete possession of Portugal, had, by his 
operations within the Spanish frontiers, given employment 
to two French armies, and prevented the French from act¬ 
ing with vigour either against Gallicia in the north, or 
against Cadiz in the south. He had more than redeemed 
his pledge and promise to retain possession of Portugal, and 
make it a 'point cl'appui for future operations against the 
French in Spain. 

The opposition party at home, who would have with¬ 
drawn the army altogether had they been able, complained 
loudly of the expense. His lordship, in striking language, 
told ministers that it would cost much more to keep up 
a defensive army at home. 

“ I shall be sorry,” he thus wrote to Lord Liverpool, 
on the 23rd March 1811, whilst he was following Massena’s 
track of devastation, by the light of burning towns and 
villages, “ I shall be sorry if Government should think 
themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this 
country on account of the expense of the contest. From 
what I have seen of the objects of the French government, 
and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have 
no doubt that, if the British army were for any reason to 
withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government 
were relieved from the pressure of military operations on 
the continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in 
his Majesty’s dominions. Then, indeed, would commence 
an expensive contest; then would his Majesty’s subjects 
discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the 
blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge ; 
and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the 
country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, 
would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the 
military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, 
much less an actor, in the scene; and I only hope that the 


124 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


King’s Government will consider well what I have above 
stated to your lordship, and will ascertain, as nearly as 
it is in their power, the actual expense of employing a 
certain number of men in this country, beyond that of 
employing them at home or elsewhere.”* 

The Spanish general, Blake, did not improve in military 
skill or wisdom after the battle of Albuera. Risking 
another battle by himself near Valencia, he was, of course, 
defeated by Suchet. He then shut himself up in the city 
of Valencia with his whole army—the last Spanish army 
which had remained in the field—and there, in the begin¬ 
ning of January J 812, he capitulated with 18,000 soldiers, 
23 general officers, and between 300 and 400 guns. Again, 
a loud noise was made by our opposition. “ I believe,” 
observed Lord Wellington at the time, “ there is no man 
who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has 
read Suchet’s account of his action with Blake on the 
25th of October, who does not believe, that if Blake had 
not fought that action Valencia would have been safe. Are 
the English ministers and generals responsible for the blun¬ 
ders of Blake ?”f 

Unfortunately, during this year, 1811, the French had 
obtained great successes against the unassisted Spaniards on 
the distant eastern coast. Under the butcher, Suchet, they 
took Tarragona by storm, and committed a massacre on the 
unarmed population, without regard to age or sex. Still the 
brave Catalonians continued undismayed and firm in their 
resistance; and in the course of the ensuing year they 
received the assistance of a powerful armament. On that 
eastern coast the loss of the French had been immense ; 
and, while they had been capturing towns and fortresses in 
Catalonia, the brave Baron d’Eroles, with a flying column, 
passed the Pyrenees into France, swept a good part of 
Gascony, and returned back to his own mountains with 
corn, cattle, and a good round contribution in money. 

In the south the French vainly pressed their blockade 
of Cadiz. Ballasteros, supported by Gibraltar and the 
mountains of Ronda, kept the field with about 8,000 parti¬ 
sans, harassing the French with dreadful long marches and 
frequent skirmishes, baffling and cutting up a good part of 
the pursuing column of Godinot, and causing that French 
general so much mortification, that he went crazy, and shot 
himself. 

* e Dispatches,’ vol. vii. p. 392. 


t Id. vol. viii. p. 520. 


1812.] 


SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 


125 


BOOK III. 

Campaign of 1812.— Lord Wellington, from liis head¬ 
quarters at Grenada, had been preparing the means of 
recapturing the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. These cares 
had occupied him ever since he retired before Soult in 
the preceding autumn. Great things were done secretly 
and without any noise. Under the appearance of repairing 
and fortifying Almeida, he had collected there a battering 
train, and abundant stores. A portable bridge on trestles 
was also constructed in the same place. He also effected the 
formation of a commissariat waggon-train, with several 
hundred waggons constructed for the purpose, in order to 
supersede the rude carts of Portuguese construction which 
had been hitherto used as a means of transport for the 
army, but which would have often proved quite ineffectual 
without the assistance of a large body of Spanish mules and 
muleteers, which followed all the movements of the divi¬ 
sions of the British army. By the exertions of the engineer 
officers, the river Douro had been rendered navigable as far 
as the confluence of the Agueda; that is to say, forty miles 
higher than boats had ever before ascended it. All this was 
done with so little outward bustle and show, that Marmont 
does not seem to have anticipated any attack upon Ciudad 
Rodrigo, at least for the remainder of the winter. The 
French marshal had placed his army, the “ Army of Por¬ 
tugal,” in extensive cantonments about Placencia and Tala- 
vcra, towards the Tagus, and had detached part of it east¬ 
ward towards La Mancha, and two divisions to the north, 
to occupy the Asturias. Suddenly Lord Wellington, on 
the 6th of January, moved his head-quarters forward to 
Gallegos, and on the 8th part of the army crossed the 
Agueda, and immediately invested Ciudad Rodrigo. * 

That very night an external redoubt, on a hill, called the 
Great Teson, ivas stormed by a party of our light division ; 
by the 15th two strongly fortified convents outside the walls 
were carried by assault, our second parallel was completed, 
and fresh batteries were established. Two practicable 
breaches were made on the 19th, and that very evening 
orders were given to storm the place. No time w r as to be 
lost, for Marmont was advancing to relieve the garrison. 
The assault was made by two breaches and by the gate of 
St. Jago, and in less than half an hour the Allies were in 
* A. Vicusseux, s Military Life.’ 


126 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


possession of, and formed on the ramparts; and then the 
French garrison surrendered. * But the fighting had been 
awful, and an accident had swelled our great loss, General 
Mackinnon and many of his men having been blown up 
by the explosion of a magazine on the ramparts. General 
Craufurd, the gallant commander of the light division, was 
mortally wounded, and soon died ; General Vandeleur and 
Colonel Colborne were wounded less seriously, as was also 
Major G. Napier, who led one of the storming parties, and 
who was not hit for the first time. The total loss of the 
British and Portuguese amounted to about 1,000 killed and 
wounded. The' loss of the garrison was about the same, 
besides 1,700 prisoners. More than 300 pieces of cannon, a 
battering train complete, an armoury of small arms, a well- 
stocked arsenal, and military stores of all descriptions, were 
found in the place. Marshal Marmont had collected 
60,000 men, and had advanced as far as Salamanca, nothing 
doubting of success; when, to his astonishment and dismay, 
he learned that the British flag was Hying on the walls, that 
the trenches were filled in, and the breaches already in a 
defensible state. 

The Spanish Cortes assembled at Cadiz passed unanimously 
a vote of thanks to his lordship, and conferred on him the 
title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo. In England he was 
raised to the dignity of an earl of the United Kingdom, and 
Parliament, in addition to a vote of thanks to him and his 
brave army, annexed to the title an annuity of 2,000/. In 
the debate in the LoAver House, when the grant Avas proposed, 
Mr. Canning stated that a revenue of 5,000/. a year had been 
granted to Lord Wellington by the Portuguese government 
when they conferred upon him the title of Conde de Vimeira; 
that as Captain-General of Spain, 5,000/. a year had been 
offered him, and 7,000/. as Marshal in the Portuguese ser¬ 
vice, all of which he had declined, saying, “ he Avould re¬ 
ceive nothing from Spain and Portugal in their present 
state; he had only done his duty to his country, and to his 
country alone he would look for revvard.”f 

Marshal Marmont retired again to Valladolid, his troops 
exhausted by forced marches which had no result, and him¬ 
self unable to comprehend Avhat next objects his dangerous 
adversary might have in Anew. 

His lordship’s first object of all Avas to take Badajoz before 
Marmont and Soult could unite for its defence. Having 

* Letter to Lord Li\ r erpool, * Dispatches,’ vol. viii. p. 549. 

f ‘ Parliamentary Register.’ ‘ Annual Register for 1812.’ 


1812.] SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJCZ. 127 

repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, and handed over the 
command of the place to a Spanish general on the 5th of 
March, he, on the afternoon of the same day, began to move 
to the south, leaving one division of his army on the Agueda. 
Again his preparations were carried on with all possible 
secrecy. The artillery for the siege was embarked at Lis¬ 
bon for a fictitious destination, then transshipped at sea into 
small craft, in which it was conveyed up the Setubal river 
to Alcacer do Sol, and thence by land across the Alemtejo 
to the banks of the Guadiana. In this manner fifty-two 
heavy guns and twenty-four pounder howitzers, and an 
enormous quantity of powder, shot, and shell, were got up to 
Badajoz before the French knew anything about it. But 
the exertions and anxieties all this had cost Lord Wellington, 
had nearly broken up even his iron constitution. 

On the 16tli March our army crossed the Guadiana, and 
Badajoz was immediately invested, while several of our divi¬ 
sions advanced to Llerena and Merida to cover the siege. 

When Lord Wellington thus sat down before Badajoz, its 
garrison consisted of 5,000 effective men, under the command 
of a most distinguished engineer, Phillipon, who had already 
defended the fortress with success, and who had been labour¬ 
ing for many months to increase its strength and to provide 
means of destruction for its assailants. More guns had been 
mounted, more retrenchments made, more covered ways 
established, more shafts sunk, and more mines formed; the 
place had been well provisioned and nearly all the Spanish 
inhabitants had been expelled from it. Such was the con¬ 
dition of Badajoz when, limited both in time and means 
Lord Wellington determined to attack it. Although his 
battering train Avas respectable, he was unprepared to under¬ 
take a sIoav formal siege. Mortars he had none—his miners 
were feAV and inexperienced—and if his operations were 
delayed, an advance of the French armies, or even stormy 
Aveather, must certainly interrupt the investment.* 

While getting ready for his first assault on the out¬ 
works, his lordship’s attention was distracted and his spirit 
vexed by intelligence from the south. He received a letter 
from Don Carlos d’Espana stating that Ciudad llodrigo was 
provisioned for only twenty-three days, that the garrison 
had no money, that the repairs of the AA r orks could not be 
completed unless his lordship sent back some English Avork- 
men, and, finally, that if Marmont should only establish a 
single division between the Coa and the Agueda, that place, 

* Maxwell, ‘ Life of the Duke,’ vol. ii. p. 419. ■ 


128 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


whose reduction had cost so much British blood and trea¬ 
sure, must assuredly pass again into the hands of the French. 
Lord Wellington, who had reduced his own magazines to 
provision Ciudad Rodrigo, and who had almost emptied his 
military chest by leaving 12,000 dollars to repair the works, 
was justly incensed; and he wrote to the incapable Don,— 
“ The report which you make of Ciudad Rodrigo distresses 
me much. I had hoped that when, by the labour of the 
British and Portuguese troops, and at the expense of the 
British Government, I had, in concert with General Cas- 
tanos, improved and repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
so that at all events the place was made secure from a 
coup-de-main , and had left money in order to complete the 
execution of what our troops had not time to complete, I 
should not have been told by your Excellency that, for want 
of the assistance of fifteen or twenty British soldiers, who 
are artificers, and whose services are required for other 
objects essential to the cause of Spain, the whole business is 
at a stand. Is it possible that your Excellency can be in 
earnest P Is it possible that Castile cannot furnish fifteen 
or twenty stone-cutters, masons, and carpenters for the 
repair of this important post ? How have all the great 
works been performed which we see in your country ? 

“ But your Excellency’s letter suggests this melancholy 
reflection that everything, as well of a military as of a 
laborious nature, must be performed by British soldiers. 

. . . In writing this letter to your Excellency, I do 

not mean to make any reproach. I wish only to place upon 
record the facts as they have occurred, and to show to your 
country, and to my country and to the world, that if this 
important place should fall, or if I should be obliged to 
abandon plans important to Spain, in order to go to its 
relief, the fault is not mine.”* 

Five days after writing this letter, on the 25th of March, 
his lordship ordered an attack to be made on the Piciirina, 
an advanced post, separated from Badajoz by the small river 
Rivillas. That post was bravely carried by storm ; and, on 
the 26th, two breaching batteries opened a heavy fire on the 
town, in the midst of rainy, deplorable weather. 

In the mean time, Soult was collecting his disposable force 
at Seville for the relief of the place, and Marmont, in order 
to effect a diversion, entered Portugal by Sabugal and Pena- 
macor, and ravaged the country east of the Estrella. This 

* Dated Camp before Badajoz, 20th March 1812.—‘ Dispatches,’ vol. 
viii. p. 608. 


SECOND SIEGE Ol’ 11ADAJOZ. 


129 


1812.] 

compelled Lord Wellington to accelerate the operations of 
the siege. On the 6th of April, three breaches having 
become practicable, orders were given for the assault in the 
evening. The various divisions passed the glacis under a 
tremendous fire from the garrison, which greatly thinned 
their ranks; they descended into the ditch, and ascended the 
breaches, but here they found obstacles which appeared 
insuperable. Planks studded with iron spike-like harrows, 
and chevaux-de-frize formed of sword-blades, effectually 
stopped the way, and the ramparts and neighbouring build¬ 
ings were occupied by light infantry, which showered their 
volleys upon the assailants. Shells, hand-grenades, every 
kind of burning composition, and missiles of every sort, 
were hurled at them. At last (about the hour of midnight), 
Lord Wellington ordered them to withdraw, just as a report 
came that General Picton’s division had taken the castle by 
escalade, and soon after General Walker’s brigade also 
entered the town by escalade on the side of the Olivenea 
gate. The other divisions then formed again for the attack 
of the breaches, when all resistance ceased. The French 
governor, Philippon, with a few hundred men, escaped across 
the Guadiana to Fort San Christoval, where he surrendered 
the following morning. Many excesses and outrages were 
committed by the soldiers, until severe measures on the part 
of Lord Wellington restored order. The prisoners, how¬ 
ever, were spared. 

“ Never,” says Colonel Jones,—“ probably never since the 
discovery of gunpowder, were men more seriously exposed 
to its action.”* The loss of the allies had been dreadful: 
including the Portuguese, 72 officers and 963 men were 
killed, and 306 officers and 3,480 men wounded. Covered 
as they were, the French lost from 1,200 to 1,500 men 
during the siege and in the assault. Philippon, in surren¬ 
dering with the survivors of the garrison, gave up from 
3,000 to 4,000 prisoners, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Eng¬ 
lish, who had been collected in Badajoz as a safe depot. 
Writing to Colonel Torrens, the day after this dearly- 
bought triumph, his lordship said,—“ Our loss has indeed 
been very great; but I send you a letter to Lord Liverpool 
which accounts for it. The truth is, that, equipped as we 
are, the British army is not capable of carrying on a long 
siege.” This letter to the Earl of Liverpool has not been 
found; but from documents in the Ordnance-office, and 
from other sources, it appears that it recommended the 

* * Hist, of Sieges.* 

K 


130 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


immediate formation of a corps of sappers and miners ; the 
want of such an establishment with the army being a chief 
cause of the great loss of lives in our sieges.* Our military 
historian has ably vindicated these sieges, showing the 
relation they had with other transactions, and with nume¬ 
rous and remote considerations:—“ Many of Lord Wei- 

%/ 

lington’s proceedings," he observes, “might be called rash, 
and others timid and slow, if taken separately; yet when 
viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole 
Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring, as the cir¬ 
cumstances warranted : nor is there any portion of his cam¬ 
paigns that requires this wide-based consideration more 
than his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to 
the rules of art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, 
attended with a mournful slaughter, have given occasion 
for questioning his great military qualities, which were, 
however, then most signally displayed.”f 

It was not until daybreak on the 7th of April, that his 
lordship was completely master of Badajoz. On the 8th, 
Soult collected his army at Villafranca, between Llerena 
and Merida, at a short distance from Badajoz; but hearing 
of the fall of that place, on the morning of the 9th, long 
before daylight, he began to retreat once more to Seville. 
Again the French were w r armly pursued by the British 
cavalry, who cut up Soult’s rear-guard at Villa Garcia. { 

By the 13th, Wellington was again in motion with the 
main body of his army, to drive Marmont out of Beira, and 
to make sure of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was blockaded by 
one of the marshal’s divisions, and was certainly not safe 
with its Spanish garrison. On learning that he was in 
motion, Marmont withdrew with all possible speed into 
Spain, and again retreated to Salamanca. His lordship’s 
head-quarters were again between the Coa and the Agueda, 
at Fuente Guinaldo, where they remained till the middle of 
June, nothing of importance occurring in that quarter during 
the interval. But Wellington had left General Hill with a 
good force in the south, and Hill, by a happy combina¬ 
tion of rapidity, daring, and skill, attacked and carried by 
brilliant cou'pa-de-main the strong forts the French had 
erected at Almaraz on the Tagus to protect a bridge of boats, 
which secured the communications between their armies of 
the north and south. By this operation Marmont was cut off 

* See Note by Colonel Gurwood in * Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. ix. 

+ W. Napier, ‘ Hist, of the War in the Peninsula.’ 

+ ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. ix. 


ADVANCE TO SALAMANCA. 


131 


1312 .] 

from Soult, and Soult from Marmont. Moreover, Hill’s rapid 
movements in Estremadura carried consternation among the 
French in Andalusia, where nothing could be done against 
Cadiz, and where Marshal Victor had been previously toiled 
by Colonel Skerrett, and a very weak garrison thrown 
into the old Moresque fortress of Tarifa on the Straits of 
Gibraltar. 

On the 13th of June, Wellington, having completed his 
preparations for an advance into Spain, broke up from his 
cantonments with about 40,000 men, leaving General Hill on 
the Tagus, near Almaraz, with about 12,000 more. On the 
17th, he appeared before Salamanca, to the surprise of Mar¬ 
mont, who retired on his approach, leaving about 800 French 
in some forts, constructed on the ruins of convents, which 
commanded the only bridge which crossed the river Tormes 
into the town. The allied army forded the river and entered 
Salamanca, to the great joy of its inhabitants, who had been 
scandalously treated by the enemy. His lordship himself 
wrote,—“ They have now been suffering for more than 
three years, during which time the French, among other 
acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed thirteen out 
of twenty-five convents, and twenty-two of twenty-five 
colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning.” * 
The convent forts, which were found to be of great strength, 
were immediately invested by General Clinton’s division : 
Marmont retired to Toro on the Douro, and the British 
advance took up a position at San Christoval, a few miles in 
front of Salamanca. In a rash attempt to carry the forts 
by escalade, Major-general Bowes was slain, and 120 men 
were killed or wounded. On the 20th, Marmont, wheeling 
round, came in front of our position at San Christoval, and 
made a demonstration with his cavalry, which brought on a 
skirmish, but nothing more. The French marshal remained 
in our front all that night and all the next day, and on the 
foliowing night established a post on our right flank, the 
possession of which would have deprived Wellington of an 
advantage which might eventually be of importance. Ac¬ 
cordingly, on the following morning, the 22nd, that post 
was attacked by the hero of Barrosa, General Sir Thomas 
Graham, who drove the French from the ground imme¬ 
diately with some loss. “Our troops conducted themselves 
remarkably well in this affair, which took place in the view 
of every man of both armies.”* Marmont retired during 
that night; and on the following evening he posted his 
* * Dispatches,’ vol. ix. p. 239. f Id. vol. ix. 


132 


MEMOIR or TIIE DUKE. 


army with its right on some heights, its centre at Aldea 
Rubia, and its left on the Tonnes. There was no mistaking 
his intention,—he wanted to communicate with and aid the 
garrisons in the convent forts at Salamanca, by the left 
bank of the Tormes. Wellington changed his front, and 
extended his troops so as to cover Salamanca completely, 
retaining the power of crossing and recrossing the Tormes, 
and of concentrating his army on any one point at a short 
notice. More than once Marmont made a false move, and 
exposed himself to attack; but, for the present, his adversary 
did not think it advisable to avail himself of his opportu¬ 
nities. Every effort that Marmont could make for the 
relief of the forts was completely baffled; those forts had 
all surrendered or been taken by the 27th; and thereupon 
the marshal retreated once more. In the beginning of July, 
Marmont was in a strong position on the northern bank of 
the Douro, and Wellington in lines on the southern bank of 
that river, the British and Portuguese facing the French. 
Marmont, who is taxed with being rather too fond of dis¬ 
playing his skill in directing the movements of large masses 
of men, changed front repeatedly, marched and counter¬ 
marched, and perplexed his own people far more than his 
able opponent by numerous and complicated manoeuvres. In 
the interval, the French marshal was reinforced by Bonnet’s 
division, which had marched from the Asturias, not without 
having been harassed by the guerillas. On the 11th of July, 
Marmont threw two divisions across the Douro at Toro, 
when Wellington moved his army to the left to concentrate 
it on the Guarena, an affluent of the Douro. On the same 
night, the two French divisions recrossed the Douro where 
they had crossed it in the morning, and then Marmont, with 
his whole army, ascended the northern bank of the river to 
Tordesillas. Here he again crossed over to the southern 
bank, and thence, making a forced march, assembled at 
Nava del Rey on the 17th. On the 18th, he attempted to 
cut off Wellington’s right wing; but his troops were re¬ 
pulsed by the charges of the British and Hanoverian cavalry, 
and the smart advance of the British and Portuguese light 
infantry. By his manoeuvres, however, Marmont had now 
succeeded in re-establishing his communications with Joseph 
Buonaparte and the army of the centre, which was advanc¬ 
ing from Madrid to join him. 

The two armies of Marmont and Wellington were now 
in line on the opposite banks of the narrow Guarena. But 
on the 20th, the French marshal crossed that stream ou 


BRILLIANT MOVEMENT. 


133 


1812.] 

Wellington’s riglit, and advanced towards the Tonnes, in 
the design of cutting off his communications with Salamanca 
and Ciudad Rodrigo. This must not be! Wellington’s 
columns were in motion as soon as Marmont’s, and during 
part of that day’s march, the two hostile armies moved 
towards the Tormes in parallel lines, and within half 
cannon-shot of each other. This striking spectacle has 
been described by several British officers who were eye¬ 
witnesses. <. 

“ A sight more glorious, and more solemn, war does not 
often present. Ninety thousand combatants marched side 
by side, as it were, without collision, each host admiring the 
array of its opponent, all eyes eager in their gaze, and all 
ears attent for the signal sound of battle.” * 

“ Nothing intervened to obstruct a view of the columns 
of enemies that thus continued to pursue their course with¬ 
out the least obstacle to prevent their coming into instan¬ 
taneous coi tact; for the slightest divergement from either 
line of march towards the other, would have brought them 
within musketry distance. I have always considered this 
day’s march as a very extraordinary scene, only to have 
occurred from the generals opposed commanding highly 
disciplined armies, each at the same time pursuing an object 
from which he was not to be for an instant abstracted by 
minor circumstances; the French marshal pressing forward 
to arrive first on the Tormes, Lord Wellington following 
his motions, and steadily adhering to the defensive, until 
substantial reasons appeared to demand the adoption of a 
more decided conduct_No spectator would have ima¬ 

gined that the two immense moving columns that filled the 
whole country, and seemed interminable—being lost to the 
eye in dust and distance—composed two armies, animated 
with earnest desires for the destruction of each other, but 
who, although possessed of numerous artillery and cavalry, 
were persevering on their way, as if by mutual consent 
refraining from serious hostility, until arrived at the arena 
destined lor the great trial, to which either was now advan¬ 
cing with confidence and without interruption.”! 

Wellington’s determinations were to recross the Tormes, 
if Marmont should cross it; to cover Salamanca as long as 
he could; not to give up his communication with Ciudad 
Rodrigo; and, above all, not to fight a battle unless under 
very advantageous circumstances, or under absolute neces- 

* M. Slierer, ‘ Military Memoirs . 1 

t Colonel Leith Hay, ‘ Narrative of the Peninsular War.’ 


134 


MEMOIR OF THE DEICE. 


sity. He saw that there was not much to be got, or to be 
hoped for, by advancing into Castile. The wheat harvest 
had not yet been reaped; and even if he had had plenty of 
money—which he had not—he could not have procured 
anything from the country; for he could not follow the 
example of the French, who were laying waste whole dis¬ 
tricts in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe 
wheat.* To the British general the keeping open of com¬ 
munications was almost everything; while to the French 
general, who had not to look to legitimate or regular sup¬ 
plies, it was next to nothing. Both Soult and Massena had 
contrived to'live in Portugal for months when all their 
communications had been cut off; and now Marmont, for a 
certain time, could do as much in Spain. Even at this 
moment he had been surrounded for six weeks, and scarcely 
even a letter had reached him. “ But,” said Wellington, 
“ the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the extra¬ 
ordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, 
enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the 
country in which it has been placed, and I am not certain 
that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater 
quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than 
we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would 
only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own 
situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that 

of the enemy. I have invariably been of opinion 

that, unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one 
should not be fought by the Allied Army, unless under such 
favourable circumstances as that there would be reason to 
hope that the Allied Army would be able to maintain the 
field, while that of the enemy should not. Your lordship 
will have seen by the returns of the two armies that we have 
no superiority of numbers even over that single army im¬ 
mediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French 
army is of the two the strongest, and it is certainly equipped 
with a profusion of artillery double ours in number, 
and of larger calibres. It cannot therefore be attacked 
in a chosen position without considerable loss on our side. 
To this circumstance add, that I am quite certain that Mar- 
mont’s army is to be joined by the king’s, which will be 
10,000 or 1*2,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, 
and that troops are still expected from the army of the 
north, and some are ordered from that of the south; and it 

* ‘ Dispatches/ vol. ix. Letter from Lord Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 
dated near Salamanca, 21st Julv. 

7 V 



1812 .] SYSTEM OF LORD WELLINGTON. 135 

will be seen that I ought to consider it almost impossible to 
remain in Castile after an action, the circumstances of which 
should not have been so advantageous as to have left the 
Allied Army in a situation of comparative strength, while 
that of the enemy should have been much weakened. I 
have therefore determined to cross the Tormes if the enemy 
should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can, and, above 
all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rod¬ 
rigo ; and not to fight an action unless under very advan¬ 
tageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely ne¬ 
cessary.” * 

By advancing even the short distance he had done into 
Spain, his lordship had compelled Marmont to abandon the 
Ast urias, by calling to his aid Bonnet and every French soldier 
that was there ; he had afforded encouragement to the Span¬ 
iards, and an opportunity of recruiting fresh armies; he had 
diverted the attention of the French from several remaining 
provinces of the kingdom, and had compelled them to leave 
Madrid in a very weak state. On commencing his forward 
movement, he was justified in calculating upon a chance of 
out-manoeuvring the French marshal; and any brilliant suc¬ 
cess on his part was almost sure to compel Soult to raise the 
blockade of Cadiz, if not to evacuate the whole of Anda¬ 
lusia. Moreover, his lordship had been promised the active 
co-operation of an Anglo-Sicilian force of from 12,000 to 
15,000 men, which was to land on the eastern coast of Spain, 
and which might be expected to draw to that distant quarter 
some of the French divisions that were now near to him. 

On the 21st of July, both Marmont and Wellington 
crossed the Tormes, the Allied Army passing by the bridge 
of Salamanca, the French by the fords higher up the river. 
Night closed in before this passage was completed; and our 
troops had scarcely reached their bivouacs, ere a tremendous 
thunderstorm commenced. The rain fell in torrents, the most 
vivid flashes of lightning were succeeded by instantaneous 
peals of thunder. A more violent crash of the elements had 
seldom been witnessed. General Le Marchant’s brigade of 
cavalry had halted; the men, dismounted, were seated or lying 
on the ground, holding their horses, which, alarmed by the 
storm, snorted and started with such violence that many of 
them broke loose, and galloped across the country in all 
directions. “ This dispersion, and the frightened horses, 
passing without riders in a state of wildness, added to the 


* ( despatches,’ vol. is. p. 290-8. 


136 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


awful effect of the tempest; nor was the situation in which 
we were otherwise placed one of great brightness.”* 

In the course of this stormy night, Lord Wellington 
received certain intelligence that General Clausel had 
arrived at Polios on the 20th, with the cavalry and horse- 
artillery of the army of the north; and his lordship was 
quite certain that these troops could join Marmont on the 
22nd or 23rd at latest. There was, therefore, no time to be 
lost; and his lordship determined that, if circumstance or 
some lucky chance should not permit him to attack Mar¬ 
mont on the morrow (the 22nd), he would move at once 
towards Ciudad Rodrigo, as the great difference in the 
numbers of cavalry might render a march of manoeuvre, 
such as he had been making for the last four or five days, 
very difficult, and its result doubtful.f 

The storm died away in the night. The rising sun of the 
22nd shone upon the two hostile armies in their near posi¬ 
tions, and upon many a brave soldier who was not to see the 
setting of that sun. The British general had placed his troops 
in a position the left of which rested on the Tormes, below the 
ford of Santa Martha, and the right on one of two steep hills 
which rise abruptly in the midst of the plain, and from their 
similarity and contiguity are called Dos Arapiles. The 
French marshal nearly faced him, occupying the heights of 
Lapena, holding the village of Calvarasso de Ariba, and 
inclining his left towards the roads leading to Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Both armies were still very near the city of Sala¬ 
manca, both were masters of their respective lines, and free 
to accept or decline battle, as their commanders might choose. 
Marmont was already at the head of 47,000 good troops, out¬ 
numbering the allies by nearly 5,000 men ; and he had this 
additional advantage—a good part of his position was covered 
and concealed by thick wood. His experimental manoeuvres 
to get between the allies and their Ciudad Rodrigo route, 
gave Wellington the chance he was looking for, and brought 
on the battle. 

Soon after dawn skirmishing began, and this was followed 
by the advance of a strong French detachment, which 
seized the more distant and stronger of the two hills, called 
Arapiles. The right of Wellington’s position being thus 
rather open to annoyance, his lordship instantly extended 
it en potence to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, 
and occupied that hamlet with light infantry. Still per- 

* Colonel Leith Hay, ‘ Narrative.’ 

t Dispatch to Earl Bathurst, dated July 24th. 


BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. 


137 


1812.] 

severing in his attempt to turn our right, or make Welling¬ 
ton believe he might turn it, and get on the Ciudad 
Rodrigo road, Marmont, after a variety of evolutions and 
manoeuvres, in which many hours were consumed, began to 
extend his troops considerably to his left. This manoeuvre— 
accompanied with a great display, with a noisy cannonade, and 
a cloudy cover of skirmishers—was performed by the mar¬ 
shal upon some heights, not above have half a mile in front 
of the British. No sooner was Wellington fully aware of 
the error which Marmont was committing by over-extend¬ 
ing and weakening his line, than he uttered a joyful excla¬ 
mation, and made dispositions for the attack. It was now 
two o’clock in the afternoon. Ignorant of our great Cap¬ 
tain’s intention, the French were, at this moment, engaged 
in a partial combat with a detachment of our guards, which 
held the village of Arapiles, and resisted all efforts to dis¬ 
lodge them. Wellington had disposed his divisions so as 
to turn the French left, and to attack them in front at the 
same time. 

Suddenly our 3rd division, under General Packenham, 
supported by two brigades of artillery and several squadrons 
under d’ Ur ban, rapidly and steadily ascended the ridge 
occupied by Marmont’s extreme left, formed line across the 
flank of the French, and then moved on towards the centre 
of the enemy, driving everything before him. “ Wherever 
the French attempted to make a stand, they were charged 
with the bayonet; the cavalry at the same time charged 
the enemy in front, and the whole left wing of the French 
made a disorderly retreat towards their right, leaving many 
killed and wounded behind, and about 3,000 prisoners. 
Meantime the 4th and 5 th divisions, after a very severe 
struggle, succeeded in driving in the centre of the enemy, 
whose right, however, remained unbroken, when General 
Clausel, who, having joined the French army that day, 
succeeded to the command in consequence of Marshal Mar¬ 
mont being wounded, withdrew his troops with great skill, 
and formed them in a new position, nearly at right angles 
with the original one. Plis cavalry was numerous, and his 
artillery formidable. Lord Wellington directed a fresh 
attack, and the 6th division, ascending to the enemy’s 
position, under a sweeping fire of artillery and mrfeketry, 
gained the level ground, when they charged with the 
bayonet, and the 4th division coming up at the same time, 
the French abandoned the ground in great confusion, re¬ 
treating towards Alba de Tormes, followed closely by the 


138 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


British, till night stopped the pursuit, which was renewed 
by the cavalry on the morning of the 23rd. The cavalry 
came up with the French rear near La Serna, when three 
battalions surrendered, being forsaken by their own cavalry. 
Clausel retired by Pefiaranda to Arevalo, whence he took 
the direction of Valladolid. The loss of the French was 
very severe; three generals killed, four wounded; one 
general, six field-officers, 130 officers of inferior rank, and 
between 6,000 and 7,000 men taken prisoners, besides two 
eagles. Their total loss in killed and wounded could not 
be ascertained. The Allies had 694 killed, and 4,270 
wounded; but the proportion of officers was very great. 
General Le Marchant was killed, and Generals Beresford, 
Leith, Cole, Cotton, and Spry were wounded. The con¬ 
sequences. of the victory of Salamanca were considerable; 
but they would have been much greater if the promised 
Anglo-Sicilian expedition had been sent in time, and in 
sufficient numbers, to the eastern coast of Spain. The 
French would then, probably, have been obliged’to with¬ 
draw to the Ebro. But the expedition arrived late, and 
then consisted only of 6,000 men, and effected little or 
nothing. Yet the ultimate though not immediate results 
of the victory of Salamanca were great, and a French his¬ 
torian, generally very warm in the cause of Napoleon, does 
not hesitate to attribute to the military and political con¬ 
sequences of that battle the ultimate loss of Spain by the 
French. — (Thibaudeau, Ilistoire de l'Empire , ch. 83.) 
Among the political consequences must be reckoned the 
obliteration of any tendency that there might have been 
in the minds of some of the influential men in Spain, 
and even in the Cortes, to give up the English alliance, 
and make their peace with King Joseph, on condition of 
his acknowledging the constitution proclaimed by the Cortes 
assembled at Cadiz in March of that year. The author, 
just quoted, says, ‘ We are assured that a negotiation to that 
effect had been entered into, which the battle of Salamanca 
broke off for ever.’ What chance there would have been 
afterwards of Napoleon observing and fulfilling any agree¬ 
ment of the kind alluded to, those who have studied his 
character and his course of policy can easily guess. But 
the' Spaniards, at least those who had something to lose, were 
then in the condition of drowning men catching at straws.”* 

* A. Vieusseux, ‘ Military Life.’ Tor Lord Wellington’s own clear, 
modest, admirable, account of the battle of Salamanca, and of the remark¬ 
able movements by which it was preceded and followed, see ‘ Dispatches,’ 
vol. ix. from p. 294 to p. 32S. 


ADVANCE TO MADRID. 


139 


1812.] 

During their flight, on the 23rd, the day after the great 
battle, the enemy were joined by the cavalry and artillery 
of the army of the north, which, through Wellington’s 
prompt decision, had joined too late to be of much use. 
On the night of the 23rd, Clausel’s head-quarters were at 
Flores de Avila, not less than ten leagues from the field 
of Salamanca. Headlong as was their flight, the French 
were followed very closely the whole way from Sala¬ 
manca to Valladolid. But for our numerical inferiority in 
cavalry, Marmont’s so-called Army of Portugal would have 
been utterly destroyed on this retreat; as it would have 
been on the field of battle, but for the setting-in of night. 
“ They all agree,” wrote Lord Wellington, “ that if we 
had had an hour more of daylight at Salamanca, the whole 
arm} r would have been in our hands. General Clausel, 
who is wounded, now commands it. The only apprehen¬ 
sion I have, is, that when the army of Portugal and the 
army of the king shall have joined, they will be too strong 
for us in cavalry. I am convinced that their infantry ivill 
make no stand 

Marshal Soult would not yet give up his Cadiz blockade. 
Might not the advance of the allies to Madrid oblige him? 
Piis adversary determined to try. 

Having crossed the Douro, Lord Wellington reached 
Valladolid on the 30th of July, Clausel clearing out of 
that city on his lordship’s approach, and continuing his re¬ 
treat towards Burgos, with almost incredible speed. The 
British general entered Valladolid amidst the rejoicing of 
the people, and there captured seventeen pieces of artillery, 
considerable stores, and 800 sick and wounded French, left 
behind by Clausel. The priests would have made processions 
and have sung Te Deum, as had been done at Salamanca, 
but Wellington had no time to spare. Joseph Buonaparte, 
with all the troops he could muster at Madrid and pick 
up on his road (in all, he had about 20,000 men), had 
marched from the Escurial on the 21st of July, the day 
before the battle of Salamanca, to join Marmont. On 
arriving at Arevalo, Joseph, to his consternation, heard of 
Marmont’s defeat; and thereupon he changed his route, 
striking off by the right to Segovia to attempt a diversion in 
favour of Clausel and the retreating army. Lord Welling¬ 
ton, therefore, quitted Valladolid the day after he arrived at 
it, recrossed the Douro, and marched against Joseph, leaving 

* Letter to Earl Bathurst, dated July 28th.—‘ Wellington Dispatches,' 

vol. ix. 


]40 


MEMOIR OF Tl 


DUKE. 


a force on the Douro to watch Clausel. His lordship’s 
movements were again delayed for want of supplies and 
want of money. He Avrote to the noble Secretary at War 
—“We are absolutely bankrupt. The troops are now five 
months in arrears instead of being one in advance. The staff 
have not been paid since February, the muleteers not since 
June, 1811.”* But by great exertions some provisions were 
brought up, and on the 6th of August he was enabled to 
point the heads of his columns towards Madrid. Joseph 
made some eccentric movements, then fell back upon S. Ilde- 
fonso, and then continued his retreat tOAvards the capital. 
On the 9th, Wellington had his head-quarters at S. Ilde- 
fonso ; and on the 10th and 11th, his victorious troops, 
defiling by the passes of Guadarama and Naval Serrada, 
crossed the mountains and descended into the plain on which 
Madrid is situated. Joseph Buonaparte had done little more 
than flit through that city; followed by the French intruders 
and their Spanish partisans, he was uoav flying to the left 
bank of the Tagus. 

On the 12th of August, Wellington entered Madrid, and 
was received Avith enthusiastic acclamations. He rode in¬ 
stantly through the town to reconnoitre the defences of the 
Retiro palace, Avhere Joseph had left a weak garrison, Avhich 
surrendered on the morning of the 14th, and put into his 
lordship’s possession 20,000 stand of arms, 180 pieces of 
ordnance, and military stores of every description. 

Noav all was joy in Madrid. I quote from an officer who 
was present. “The entire population poured into the streets 
and squares ; every tongue Avas loosened; on all sides were 
heard the accents of joy; laurels and floAvers decorated the 
gay scene; tapestry and carpets Avere hung from the bal¬ 
conies ; holiday dresses were put on; holiday greetings Avere 
given; and the holiday smiles of men, women, and children 
repaid the army for all its toils. But Wellington Avas more 
especially the object of their praise and honour : wherever 
he appeared, cries rent the air of ‘Long live the Duke of 
Ciudad Rodrigo! ’—‘ Long live Wellington ! ’ Green boughs, 
and floAvers, and shawls were strewn before his horse’s feet. 
Here it should be recorded, that when, upon the 22nd of 
August, the neAv council Avaited upon him with all the 
ceremonies of state to offer to him a congratulatory address as 
Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, conceived in those glowing terms 
which are fitting towards a deliverer, Wellington replied 

* Letter to Earl Bathurst, dated IStli of July 1812.—* Dispatches, 
vol. ix. 


AT MADRID. 


141 


1312.] 

with simple dignityr and unaffected modesty; nor did lie 
notice in his reply their proud and swelling enumeration of 
his great successes, further than by one line:— 4 The events of 
war are in the hands of Providence.’ In this spirit he looked 
back upon his past achievements; in this spirit he contem¬ 
plated the severe trials and arduous duties which coming 
events might yet impose on him.”* 

The municipal authorities gave a grand bull-fight in his 
honour, and when he appeared in the amphitheatre on the 
seat which had been usually occupied by royalty, the air 
rang with the prolonged shouts of more than 12,000 spec¬ 
tators. “ He could not walk abroad by daylight, because 
of the pressure of the multitudes who gathered round him ; 
even in the dark, when he went into the Prado, though he 
and his suite were dressed in blue greatcoats in hopes of 
escaping notice, they were generally recognised and followed 
by crowds, the women pressing to shake hands, and some 
even to embrace them.”]' 

In consequence of Wellington’s bold advance to Madrid, 
Marshal Soult raised the blockade of Cadiz, destroying the 
works which the French had constructed with an enormous 
expenditure of money and labour, and abandoning the Avhole 
of Western Andalusia, he concentrated his forces in Granada. 
But the French abandoned these famed lines with so much 
haste, that they could not destroy the half of their stores 
and other materials; thirty gun-boats and some hundred of 
pieces of ordnance, including some cannon of portentous 
length, which had been cast expressly for the siege of Cadiz, 
fell into the hands of the Spaniards, and were found to be in 
good part but little injured.]: Soult’s retreat was very dis¬ 
astrous ; his rear-guard was attacked by an allied force of 
English and Spanish, who issued from Cadiz, drove it 
from San Lucar, and took Seville by assault, although 
eight French battalions had been left to maintain that city. 
In his march to Granada by Cremona, Soult suffered fur-' 
ther loss from excessive heat, fatigue, scarcity, and the occa¬ 
sional attacks of armed bands of peasantry. At Granada, 
Soult concentrated his army. General Hill at the same time 
advanced from the banks of the Guadiana to the Tagus, con¬ 
necting his operations with those of the main body of Lord 

* Captain M. Sherer, 1 Military Memoir.’ _ f Southey. 

I In the summer of 1815, just after we had received authentic intelli¬ 
gence ot the Duke’s crowning victory at Waterloo, I saw some of these 
fine, long Drench guns lying on the sands at the edge of Cadiz Day. Dor 
three years the lazy Spaniards had left them there to spoil. 


142 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


Wellington’s army. On his approach, King Joseph abnn- 
doned Toledo, and fell back to Almanza, in Murcia, to keep 
himself in communication with Soult and Suchet. A great 
part of southern and central Spain was thus freed from 
the French, who never after retook Seville. By the close of 
August, Hill occupied Toledo, Ypez, and Aranjuez, thus 
covering the right of the allied main army; and guarding 
all the roads which led from the south to Madrid. 

The situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid was, how¬ 
ever, critical. Clausel’s army in the north had been largely 
reinforced, and Soult, and Suchet, and King Joseph, by 
forming a junction, might advance from the south, and thus 
the Allies would be attacked by a combined force nearly treble 
in number to their own. The Anglo-Sicilian expedition 
on the eastern coast was a disappointment and a failure; 
instead of 12,000 or 15,000 men, only 6,000 came from Sicily; 
of these a good part were unreliable foreign auxiliaries, and 
now the whole force was cooped up in Alicante, and could 
not effect any powerful diversion. There was no Spanish force 
of any magnitude upon which Lord Wellington could depend 
for field operations. The Gallician army under Santocildes, 
which was the most effective Spanish corps, after taking 
Astorga, had advanced towards Zamora, but was driven 
back by Clausel. Ballasteros, who commanded a Spanish 
force in Andalusia, refused to be directed by Lord Wel¬ 
lington, and O’Donnell had been defeated in Valencia by 
Suchet, and driven into Murcia. In Castile and at Madrid, 
Lord Wellington heard many expressions of good-will, but 
no active exertions were made in the common cause. The 
country was exhausted, the people appeared disheartened, 
and the British commander-in-chief could not realize at 
Madrid, upon drafts on the British treasury, a sum of money 
adequate to his most pressing wants. 

Nothing was heard of General Castanos, who had promised 
to join his lordship soon after the battle of Salamanca. 
Before he had been twelve days in Madrid, Wellington 
wrote: —“I do not expect much from their exertions; 
notwithstanding all we have done for them. They cry 
Viva, and are very fond of us, and hate the French; 
but they are in general the most incapable of useful exer¬ 
tion of all the nations that I have known: the most vain, 
and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of 
military affairs, and, above all, of military affairs in their 
own country.” The constitution made by the Cortes at 
Cadiz had been proclaimed in Madrid, as in the other libe- 


SPANISH HELPLESSNESS. 


143 


1812.] 

rated cities; a regency, restricted by parliamentary votes, bad 
been formed ; and the affairs of government were supposed 
to be conducted on constitutional principles ; but it was not 
found that government appointments were made upon purer 
motives, or that better men were named than under the old 
absolutism of the Bourbon monarchs. His lordship re¬ 
peatedly complained that the appointments to offices, and 
great situations and military commands were given to in¬ 
efficient persons and to men without character. “What,” 
said he, “ can be done for this lost nation ? As for raising 
men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them 
to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, 
there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advan¬ 
tage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity 
against the French. Even the guerillas are getting quietly 
into the large towns, and amusing themselves, or collecting 
plunder of a better and more valuable description ; and 
nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether 
to improve or to secure our advantage. 

“ This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs, and 
though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in 
Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder 
when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have 
undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything, 
and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or, 
I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation. 

“ I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for 
the Spanish cause. If, from any cause, I should be over¬ 
powered, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world 
say ? What will the people of England say ? What will 
those in Spain say? That we had made a great effort, 
attended by some glorious circumstances; and that from 
January 1812 we had gained more advantages for the cause, 
and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations, 
than had ever been gained by any army in the same period 
of time against so powerful an enemy; but that, being un¬ 
aided by the Spanish officers and troops, not from disinclina¬ 
tion, but from inability, on account of the gross ignorance 
of the former and the want of discipline of the latter, and 
from the inefficiency of all the persons selected by the 
Government for great employment, we were at last over¬ 
powered, and compelled to withdraw within our own frontier. 

“ What will be Lord Castlereagh’s reply to the next pro¬ 
position for peace ? Not that we will not treat if the go¬ 
vernment of Joseph is to be the guaranteed government; but 



144 


MEMOIR 01’ THE DURE. 


he will he too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of 
withdrawing with honour from a contest in which it will be 
manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to 
carry it on on the part of the Spaniards, there is no pros¬ 
pect of military success. Thus, this great cause will be 
lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at 
their head capable of conducting them.”* 

To other annoyances at this crisis of the war to which 
his lordship was exposed, the following must be mentioned: 
—The Portuguese Government had an old money-claim 
upon the Spanish Government; and, instead of providing 
funds for tho maintenance of their own troops, they made 
an arrangement to take provisions in lieu of cash; the 
Spaniards were to support the Portuguese troops; and, when 
their own armies were half-starved, they undertook to feed 
another ! If the Portuguese army had been left to depend 
upon this precious bargain, it must have been disbanded. 
But Lord Wellington, with his habitual promptness and 
firmness, ordered the suspension of the subsidies which Eng¬ 
land was paying to Portugal, and this brought the regency 
at Lisbon to their senses. 

In every sense, for Wellington to remain at Madrid was 
impracticable; he must either advance to the north against 
Clausel, or to the south against Soult, and he determined on 
the first of these movements, for the purpose of striking a 
blow at Clausel before the French in the south and east 
could advance to his support. Leaving two divisions at 
Madrid, he marched with the remainder, on the 1st of Sep¬ 
tember, for Valladolid, which he entered on the 7th, and, 
continuing his march towards Burgos, was joined at Valencia 
by the Spanish army of Gallicia, which scarcely mustered 
10,000 men, undisciplined and deficient in equipment. On 
the 19th, the Allied Army entered Burgos, and the French, 
under General Souham, who had assumed the command in 
the north, fell back to Briviesca, leaving 2,000 men, under 
General Dubreton, in the Castle of Burgos, strong by its 
position, which had been fortified with care. 

The possession of that fort was necessary for the security 
of the Allied Army in its present advanced and exposed 
position, and Lord Wellington directed it to be invested 
forthwith, though he was ill furnished with siege-artillery. 
A horn-work on a hill, which commanded several of the 
works of the castle, was carried by assault. The fort itself 

* Letter to the Right Honourable Henry Wellesley, dated Madrid, 
23rd of August 1S12.—‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vul. ix. pp. 372-G. 


RETREAT FROM EURGOS. 


145 


1812.] 

was "battered, but with little effect, and sapping was then 
resorted to. On the 29th, a breach being effected in the 
outer wall by the explosion of a mine, an attempt was made 
to storm it, but failed. Another breach was effected in like 
manner on the evening of the 4th of October, and being 
stormed with success, the besiegers were established within 
the exterior line of the works of the castle. The garrison 
made two sorties, by which they materially injured the works 
of the Allies, and occasioned them great loss. Want of am¬ 
munition greatly retarded the operations of the siege. A 
breach at last being effected, by mining, in the second line on 
the 18th, orders were given to storm it. A detachment of 
the King’s German Legion carried the breach, and a de¬ 
tachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line; but 
the enemy brought such a fire upon them from the third line 
and from the body of the castle, and attacked them with num¬ 
bers so superior before they could be supported, that they were 
obliged to retire with considerable loss. General Dubreton had 
made a brave stand and a skilful resistance, but no bravery or 
skill could have saved the castle in the face of so bold and per¬ 
severing an enemy. But now the French army of the north 
advanced with evident intention to raise the siege; and at 
the same time Lord Wellington learned from General Hill 
that the armies of the south and centre, which, being united, 
mustered 70,000 strong, were advancing from Valencia 
towards the Tagus, and that the Spanish General Ballas- 
teros had not assumed a position in La Mancha which the 
Spanish Government, at Lord AVellington’s suggestion, had 
directed him to take, in order to intercept the enemy’s move¬ 
ments. The British commander was therefore under the 
painful necessity of abandoning the siege of Burgos, and of 
effecting a retrograde movement in order to draw near to 
General Hill, who, at the approach of Soult, abandoned 
Madrid, and retired slowly towards Salamanca. On the 
21st of October the siege of Burgos was raised, and Lord 
Wellington retired in good order to Valencia, and was 
joined by a brigade from England under Lord Dalhousie, 
which had landed at Coruna. The French, under Souham, 
repeatedly attacked the rear-guard of the Allies until they 
reached the Douro at Tudela, when Souham halted, wait¬ 
ing to be joined by Soult from the south. Lord Wellington 
continued his retreat to the Tormes, being joined on the 3rd 
of November by General Sir Rowland ILli.* 

* A. Vieusseux, ‘ Military Life of the Duke,’ and ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. 
h. from p. 3 f J0 to p. 510. 

L 


146 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


After getting across the Douro, and effecting his junction 
with Hill, his lordship congratulated himself on his suc¬ 
cess. “ I assure you,” he wrote to the Secretary at War, 
“ that, considering the numbers of the enemy (among whom 
is Caffarelli’s infantry, as well as his cavalry), and considering 
the state of the Spanish troops, the great proportion of foreign 
troops in the divisions which I have with me, and their general 
weakness, and the weakness of our cavalry, I think I have 
escaped from the worst military situation 1 was ever in.” * 

On the 8th of November, the Allies took up their old 
position on the heights of San Christoval, in front of 
Salamanca. On the 10th, Souham and Soult joined their 
forces, which amounted to 75,000 infantry and 12,000 
cavalry, whilst Lord Wellington’s army did not exceed 
48,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. On the 14th, the French 
crossed the Tormes in force near Lucinas. Lord Wellington 
took position at the Arapiles, being the ground of his former 
victoiy; but as the enemy, through his superiority of num¬ 
bers, and especially of cavalry, was in motion to intercept 
his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, he withdrew 
through Salamanca, and continued his retreat towards the 
Agueda. The French might have given battle at Salamanca 
•—and did not. As he moved from the Arapiles, Wellington 
saw them still fortifying the position they had taken up— 
so cautious had they been rendered by his lordship’s skill 
and successes, and by their own defeats and reverses. 

Putting the Allied Army in march in three columns, and 
crossing the Zurguen, which Sir Edward Paget had guarded, 

. and then turning and passing the enemy’s left flank, his lord- 
ship encamped the night of the 15th on the Valmuza. On 
the following day, the 16th of November, the French fol¬ 
lowed his movements with immense masses of cavalry and 
a considerable body of infantry ; but they did not attempt 
to press upon his rear. On the 17th, they took advantage 
of the ground to cannonade our light division, which formed 
the rear-guard, and was now commanded by General Alten, 
on its passage over the river, and caused it some loss. In 
the course of the same day, General Sir Edward Paget, who 
had ridden to the rear to discover the cause of some delay in 
the march of the 7tli division of infantry, was surprised, 
when on the top of a hill, with a spy-glass in his hand, and 
was taken prisoner by some Italian cavalry which issued 
from a wood. I was well acquainted with the officer who 

* Dispatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Lueda 31st October.—‘ Wellingtoa 
Dispatches/ vol. ix. p. 526. 


GENERAL SIR E. PAGET. 


147 


1812 .] 

had the principal share in this capture. It was Don Marc 
Antonio Colonna, son of the Prince of Stigliano, a branch of 
the most ancient and noble family of the Colonna, long 
settled in the kingdom of Naples. He discovered, with his 
glass, an English general officer on the top of a hill, and, 
galloping to the spot, surrounded the base of the hill. I 
have often heard him give a graphic and touching account 
of the behaviour of the stately and gallant veteran, who had 
already lost an arm, and was very short-sighted. Sir Edward, 
upon first seeing the dragoons, put spurs to his horse, and 
would have galloped down the hill, but Colonna cried out 
that it was surrounded, that escape was impossible, that the 
attempt might, lead to destruction ; and, as he closed upon 
him with several troopers, Sir Edward presented his sword 
and surrendered. Upon learning the capture, Lord Wel¬ 
lington wrote the following considerate, delicate, warm¬ 
hearted, and nobly characteristic letter :— 

“Head-quarters, 19th Nov. 1812. 

“ My dear Paget,— 

“ I did not hear of your misfortune till more than an hour 
after it had occurred, nor was I certain of it till the enemy 
attacked our rear-guard, and the firing had continued for 
some time, and I found you were not on the field ; and you 
will judge of my concern by the sense which I hope you feel 
I entertain of the cordial assistance which I received from 
you during the short time that you have been with us. 

“ I cannot account for your misfortune, excepting that 
you were alone, and could not see the approach of the 
enemy’s cavalry. 

“ That which must now be done, is to endeavour to ob¬ 
tain your exchange. 

“ I have no French general officer in the Peninsula ; but 
I beg you to make it known to the king and to the Duke 
of Dalmatia, that I will engage that any general officer 
they will name shall be sent from England to France in 
exchange for you. If you should find that there is any 
prospect of your being exchanged, I recommend to you to 
endeavour to prevail upon the king not to send you to 
France. It is not necessary to enter into the reason for 
giving you this advice. If the king or the Duke of Dal¬ 
matia * will not name an officer to be exchanged for you, 
the sooner you are sent to France the better. 

“ I send you some money—£200. I will take care of 
your friend Morley. You cannot conceive how much I 

* Marshal Soult. 


148 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


regret your loss. This is the second time I have been de¬ 
prived of your assistance, at an early period after you had 
joined us, and I am almost afraid to wish to have you again; 
but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your 
being liberated, and shall see you with us. 

“ Believe me, &c. 

(Signed) “ Wellington. 

“ Lieut.-General the lion. Sir E. Paget, K.B. 

P. S.—“ Let me know your wishes on any subject, and 
they shall be carried into execution.” * 

On the 18 th, the day after losing brave Paget, Lord 
Wellington, without let or hindrance, established his head¬ 
quarters at Ciudad Rodrigo, the French having kept at a 
cautious distance all that day. Soult, in fact, after he had 
crossed the Tormes, made no serious movement, being called 
upon by Joseph to send some troops into old Castile. “ I 
believe, too,” said his lordship, “ that the enemy require 
repose as much, if not more, than we do; and that their 
immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a 
country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain 
that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this 
winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them ; 
but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to have a 
winter campaign, and if the weather should continue as 
severe as it has been since the 15th of November.” f 

The main army of the British and Portuguese were now 
distributed in their old quarters within the frontiers of Por¬ 
tugal, their left- resting at Lamego on the Douro, whilst 
General Hill’s corps moved into Spanish Estremadura, into 
cantonments, near Coria, and towards the Tagus, placing 
strong posts at the passes of Banos and Bejar. The cam¬ 
paign of 1812 was terminated. 

During the retreat from Burgos the Allied troops suffered 
much fatigue and privation; the weather was very incle¬ 
ment, the roads were deep and miry, the rivulets were all 
filled, and the rivers were great ty swelled, and some of 
them were breast high at the fords. Owing to the irreme- 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. ix. p. 550. A few days afterwards—husy as he 
was in getting his troops into cantonments and in restoring discipline— 
his lordship wrote a condoling and affectionate letter to the Honourable 
Berkeley Paget, the general’s brother, and another letter to the Drench 
general, Maucune, thanking him for the kindness he had shown to his 
prisoner, and requesting to know what sums he had advanced to General 
Paget, so that lie might repay them. See ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. ix. pp. 561 
and. 585. 

f Letter to the Earl of Liverpool. ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. ix. p. 570. 


A LESSON TO OFFICEKS. 


149 


1812 .] 

diable difficulty of obtaining 1 provisions in Spain, a great 
part of the army had neither bread nor biscuit, and the men 
had only a ration of lean tough beef, which they could not 
cook, but heated upon such smoky fires as they could make, 
and so ate it half raw. Many irregularities were committed 
by the soldiers, which Lord Wellington severely reprobated 
in a circular which he addressed to all commanding officers 
of divisions and brigades, dated Frenada, 28 th of November 
1812. 

Throwing the blame where it was due, his lordship said, 
—“ I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the 
habitual inattention of the officers of regiments to their 
duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the ser¬ 
vice, and by the orders of this army. 

“I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gal¬ 
lantry and spirit, of the officers of the army; and I am quite 
certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity 
of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, 
and carry into execution the orders which have been issued 
for the performance of their duty, and that the strict per¬ 
formance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to 
serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future 
give their attention to these points. 

“Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of the 
army has induced many to consider that the period during 
which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all 
rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of 
all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the 
conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his 
arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field 
equipments, and his horse and horse appointments ; for the 
receipt, and issue, and care of his provisions ; and the regu¬ 
lation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his 
horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of 
his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British 
army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle 
in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial. 

“ These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly 
entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the 
officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese 
as well as English, during the period in which it may be in 
my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The 
commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of 
the army regarding the constant inspection and superinten¬ 
dence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their 


150 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour 
to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their 
situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers 
must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under 
the view and superintendence of the officers. By these 
means, the frequent and discreditable recourse to the autho¬ 
rity of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of 
courts-martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not 
dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are 
too many complaints, when they well know that their offi¬ 
cers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and 
attention turned towards them. 

“ The commanding officers of regiments must likewise 
enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real 
inspection of the soldier’s arms, ammunition, accoutrements, 
and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful 
waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the 
soldier’s necessaries. With this view both should be in¬ 
spected daily. 

“ In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently 
observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and 
celerity with which the French soldiers cooked, in comparison 
with those of our army. 

“ The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of 
every other description, the want of attention of the officers 
to the orders of the army; and the conduct of their men, 
and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. 
Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and 
bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the 
meat, &c., to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if 
this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for 
seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it 
ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no 
longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has 
lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be 
exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at 
which the army may be engaged in operations with the 
enemy. 

“ You will, of course, give your attention to the field ex¬ 
ercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that 
the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and the 
division should march ten or twelve miles twice in each 
week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the 
neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be 
dry. 


1812.] OUTCRY OF THE OPPOSITION PARTY. 151 

“ But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the 
general and field officers must be to get the captains and 
subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the 
duties required from them, as the only mode by which the 
discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and 
maintained during the next campaign. 

“ I have the honour to be, &c. 

“ Wellington.” 

To Officers commanding Divisions and Brigades.* 

This severe lesson was certainly called for. Many of our 
officers—particularly in the cavalry regiments—were above 
their duty, or fancied that their duty consisted merely in 
bravely leading their men in battle, and that all details and 
superintendence might be left very well to old sergeants and 
sergeant-majors. This was not Wellington’s notion; and 
we find his lordship frequently complaining that he had 
too many fine gentlemen; that the War-office sent him out 
too many thoughtless young men; that he wanted men who 
would do their work thoroughly, and not take amiss any 
detail of duty. 

But, while he was thus rating his officers, he was himself 
severely rated in England: the opposition party had re¬ 
newed their outcry, and people totally ignorant of the 
science and practice of war were criticising his late cam¬ 
paign, and dogmatically sitting in judgment on his wonder¬ 
ful retreat. He thus modestly and manfully explained 
what he had done, and took upon himself the responsibility 
of what he had been obliged to leave undone:— 

“ From what I see in the newspapers,” he wrote to Lord 
Liverpool from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 23rd of November, 
“I am much afraid that the public will be much disap¬ 
pointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding 
that it is, in fact, the most successful campaign in all its cir¬ 
cumstances, and has produced for the common cause more 
important results than any campaign in which a British 
army has been engaged for the last century. We have 
taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca, 
and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the Allies 
have taken Astorga, Consuegra, and Guadalaxara, besides 
other places. In the months elapsed since January, this 
army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and 
they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use 
of the enemy’s arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Sala¬ 
manca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before 
* ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. ix. pp. 582-5. 


152 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Cadiz, &c.; and, upon the whole, we have taken and de¬ 
stroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3,000 pieces of 
cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the 
countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy. 
We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, 
and should have remained in possession of Castile and 
Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as 
I ought, early in October, or if Ballasteros had moved upon 
Alcaraz, as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own 

aggrandizement.I see that a disposition 

already exists to blame the government for the failure of 
the siege of Burgos. The government had nothing to 
say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard 
to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and 
Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That 
which was wanting at both places was means of transporting 
ordnance and artillery stores to the place where it was de¬ 
sirable to use them. The people of England, so happy as 
they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every de¬ 
scription, having the use of such excellent roads, &c., will not ‘ 
readily believe that important results here frequently depend 
upon fifty or sixty mules more or less, or a few bundles 
of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstand¬ 
ing their incredulity. I could not find means of moving 
even one gun from Madrid. ... As for the two guns 

which-endeavoured to send, I was obliged to send 

our own cattle to draw them, and we felt great inconvenience 
from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements 
of the army.” * 

The Prince Regent, the government, and what was de¬ 
cidedly the vast majority of the British nation, again took a 
fairer view of the services of our illustrious warrior, diplo¬ 
matist, and statesman. In the course of the year he was 
raised to the rank of Marquis, and Parliament voted him 
£100,000 for the purchase of an estate. 

During this eventful year, the United States of America 
saw fit to enter into a war against England, and to cover the 
seas with fast frigates and privateers. Many of our trading 
vessels were captured; at times whole convoys, carrying 
recruits, stores, &c., for our army in the Peninsula were put 
in jeopardy ; some of our old frigates w r ere overmatched by 
American frigates which were as strong as ships of the line; 
and, worst of all, the attention of our government was dis¬ 
tracted from the war on the Continent. But in the same 
* ‘ Dispatches, 1 yoI. ix. pp. 570-1. 




1812.] Buonaparte’s Russian campaign. 153 

year Napoleon Buonaparte declared war against Russia, and 
madly crossed the Vistula with by far the greatest army 
that modern Europe had ever seen. 

“Go forward and be choked by thy ambition! ” 

Campaign of 1813.—During the winter and spring months 
discipline was restored and improved, our officers profited by 
the lesson which had been given to them by their great leader; 
and our army was in admirable condition, and in high spirits 
before its services were required. By command of his lord¬ 
ship, the large lumbering iron camp-kettles were no longer 
to be used, and the mules which had hitherto carried them 
were now to carry tents for the soldiers. Every company 
was to have three tents. Thus the men off duty would 
always be provided with some cover in the field, which 
would save many casualties from sickness. Moreover, ex¬ 
pedition in preparing their food, as well as real comfort was 
gained by issuing small kettles, and dividing the companies 
into small messes. These changes were vast improvements, 
promoting comfort and health in a manner not before 
thought of in our armies. In this winter, also, a pontoon 
train had been prepared to accompany the line of march in 
the next campaign. * 

The grand army of Buonaparte had perished in Russia. 
Taken as a mass, the men who had formed it were veterans 
in crime as well as in war. “ C'elait une race gangrenec 
qui rietait plus bonne quia mourir ! ”f 

The Russian catastrophe not only prevented Buonaparte 
from reinforcing his marshals in Spain, but it also obliged 
him to recall the best of them, and the only one among 
them whose generalship had cost Lord Wellington any very 
serious thoughts. This, of course, was Marshal Soult, who, 
early in the year, was removed from the Peninsula to 
oppose the Russians, then about to advance through Ger¬ 
many to the banks of the Rhine and the old frontier of 
France. Soult, however, took only 20,000 men with him, 
thus leaving about 70,000 to oppose Wellington, besides the 
army of Suchet in the eastern provinces. “ The army of 
Portugal,” as it continued to be called, was now placed 
under the command of General Reille, who had his head¬ 
quarters at Valladolid; the “ Army of the Centre,” under 
Drouet, was distributed round Madrid; and the “ Army of 
the South” had its head-quarters at Toledo. All these 

* Captain M. Slierer, ‘ Military Memoirs of the Duke.’ 

t It was a gangrened race, no longer good for anything but to die. 


154 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


forces were nominally under the command of King Joseph ; 
hut as Joseph was no soldier, and never could learn to be 
one, he was assisted by Marshal Jourdan, who could only 
have earned his great reputation of former days, by being 
opposed to incompetent or unfaithful commanders. General 
Clausel and Foy, commanded separate divisions in Arragon 
and Biscay. Before the campaign began, Andalusia and 
Estremadura in the south, and Gallicia and Asturias in the 
north, were entirely free from the French. 

Doing at last that which they ought to have done at first, 
the Spanish Provisional Government, with the consent and 
approbation of the Cortes, had appointed Lord Wellington 
to be commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, and had 
taken some measures to improve the discipline and effective¬ 
ness of their troops. As, however, the Regency had hardly 
any money except the subsidies they received from Eng¬ 
land, these things remained only as so many good inten¬ 
tions. Nor were the pride and ignorance of the Spanish 
commanding officers, and the slothfulness and indocility of 
their troops, evils that could be remedied of a sudden, or in 
the course of one trying campaign. And, therefore, the 
only army upon which Wellington could firmly rely for 
field operations, consisted of about 63,000 British and Portu¬ 
guese infantry, and about 6,000 cavalry. 

It was the middle of May before his lordship took the 
field. Then, breaking up from his Portuguese canton¬ 
ments, he put his army in motion for Spain in three sepa¬ 
rate bodies ; the left under Sir Thomas Graham, the hero of 
Barrosa; the right under the indefatigable Hill; and the 
centre under his own immediate command. The combined 
movements of these three divisions were admirably managed, 
and without precision and perfect concert such movements 
never succeed. His lordship directed Graham to pass to the 
north of the Douro at Lamego, and march through Tras-os- 
Montes to Braganza and Zamora, and thence upon Valladolid, 
thus securing the position along the northern bank of the 
Douro, which the enemy had taken up, and which, with great 
pains, they had been strengthening. The French were taken 
completely by surprise, never having anticipated this move¬ 
ment through Tras-os-Montes. Graham reached the Esla, 
an affluent of the Douro, without meeting a foe. On the 1st 
of June, having crossed the Esla, Graham encamped near 
Zamora, the French retreating before him. On the same 
day, Lord Wellington came up from Salamanca, and joined 
Graham. On the morrow, the 2nd of June, these two re- 


MARCH UP THE EBRO. 


1 55 


1813.] 

united columns Avere in full march for Valladolid, the French 
columns still retiring. On the 3rd, General Hill, who had 
crossed the Douro at Toro, came up with his division, and 
the Allied Army was also joined by several Spanish corps. 

As Lord Wellington advanced, Joseph Buonaparte fled 
from Madrid, for the last of many times. He was followed 
by his court and retainers, who hastily packed up whatever 
they could carry off with them. The French army retired 
to Burgos, where they had strengthened the works of the 
castle. But on the 12th of June, Wellington being near at 
hand, they abandoned Burgos, blew up the fortifications, 
and retreated to the Ebro. This line, so much nearer to 
their own frontiers, the French thought they could defend, 
and they threw a strong garrison into the fortress of Pan- 
corvo, a little in advance of the river. They were much 
mistaken. Taking care of the lives of his men, avoiding the 
fortress and everything which rendered the passage of the 
Ebro dangerous or difficult, and finding out a new road 
across a rugged country, towards the sources of the Ebro, 
his lordship completely turned their position on the river, 
and drove the French back upon Vittoria, after a sharp 
affair on the mountain side near Osma. The French were 
now cut off from the sea-coast, and their immediate evacua¬ 
tion of all the ports in that part of Spain, excepting Santona 
and Bilbao, was one of the important results. Portugal was 
no longer to be the depot for Wellington’s supplies ; a new 
base of operations was obtained, and the Tagus was aban¬ 
doned for the sea-coast of Biscay.* 

Rarely had any army traversed a country so difficult as 
that through which his lordship had led his forces. Hill 
and valley, roaring torrents and broad, deep, dry ravines; 
all the difficulties found in an alpine district, were met and 
surmounted. At times, the labour of a hundred soldiers was 
required to move forward a piece of artillery; at others, the 
gun was obliged to be dismounted, lowered down a precipice 
by ropes, or swayed up the rugged goat-paths by the united 
efforts of men and animals. “ Strongly did the rough 
veteran infantry work their way through those wild but 
beautiful regions; six days they toiled unceasingly; on 
the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa’s division, 
and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the 
mountains, they burst like raging streams from every 
defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.”f 

* Maxwell, ‘ Life of the Duke/ vol. iii. p. 116. f Napier. 


156 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


While engaged on this novel and daring inarch, the French 
had been asking whether Lord Wellington was asleep. 

By the 20th of June, the whole of the Allied Army was 
beyond the Ebro, and concentrated near the picturesque old 
town of Yittoria, within sight of the ground on which 
Edward the Black Prince, in the olden time, had gained a 
splendid victory over the best troops of France. The whole 
of the 20th, was employed by Wellington in closing up his 
columns, and in reconnoitring the positions of the French. 

The day before, on the 19th, the enemy, commanded by 
Joseph and Jourdan, had taken up strong ground in front of 
the town, their left resting upon the heights which termi¬ 
nate at La Puebla de Argnnzon, and extending from thence 
across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of 
Arinez, the right of their centre occupying a height which 
commanded all the valley to the Zadorra, and their right 
being stationed near to the walls of Yittoria, being destined 
to defend the passages of the river Zadorra. The French 
had also a reserve, in rear of their left, at the village of 
Gomecha. By this disposition they covered the three great 
roads from Madrid, Bilbao and Logrono, which unite at 
Yittoria. The two hostile armies were nearly equal in num¬ 
bers, amounting to from 73,000 to 75,000 each. The 
French lay on their arms as if confident that they could 
maintain their ground. The evening and the night passed 
quietly away; but early on the 21st of June, the glorious 
battle of Vittoria was begun. 

Lord Wellington moved his army for the attack in three 
great divisions. The left, under General Graham, was 
directed by a circuitous movement to turn the enemy’s right 
across the Bilbao road, and cut off his retreat to France 
by the Bayonne road ; the right, under General Hill, was 
to commence the action by crossing the river Zadorra where 
the road from Madrid to Yittoria intersects the river, and to 
attack the enemy’s left on the high ridge behind the village 
of Subijana de Alava; and the centre, consisting of the 
3rd, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, in two columns, was to 
attack the French centre. Hill’s advance being the first to 
get into action, obtained possession of the ridge of La Puebla, 
on which the enemy’s left leaned. Marshal Jourdan made 
repeated and desperate efforts to recover the ridge; but all 
was in vain, and Hill’s battalions, among whom was a 
Spanish brigade under General Murillo, kept possession 
of that important post throughout the battle. The contest 
here was, however, dreadfully severe, and our loss con- 


BATTLE OF VITTORIA. 


157 


1813 .] 

siderable. Murillo was wounded, but remained on the 
field; Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan was mor¬ 
tally wounded, but would not be removed. Under cover 
of the possession of these well-defended heights, the rest of 
Sir Rowland Hill's division successively crossed the Za- 
dorra, and attacked and gained the village of Subijana dc 
Alava, which also stood on a height. Here, too, the French 
made desperate efforts to dislodge the allies. The combat 
was of the deadliest. In the mean while, our other two 
columns of attack were coming up, or round. But of a 
sudden Lord Wellington, with the centre, was seen to 
pause. The French believed then, and reported afterwards, 
that Wellington was awed by their determined countenance, 
and that, for ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, his column 
of attack wavered and trepidated. Even English writers, 
who might have been better informed, took up and repeated 
the same tale. It was a pure fable. There was no waver¬ 
ing or trepidation whatever; but General Sir George 
Murray, the admirable quartermaster-general, knowing 
that Graham would require a little more time to get into 
action, rode up to the Commander-in-chief, and advised 
him to wait a short quarter of an hour. Of this fact I was 
assured by Sir G. Murray himself, at the Ordnance office 
in 1845, not many months before his lamented death. The 
difficult nature of the country, prevented communication 
between our three several columns, so that, for a short tune, 
the centre knew neither what was doing by the right, nor by 
the left. But in the end everything went well, and the 
combined movements were executed with what might be 
called a rare precision, both as to place and time. As the 
divisions forming our centre crossed the river, the scene 
exhibited to those on the heights was one of the most 
animating ever beheld by soldiers. “ The whole country,” 
says one, who wa.s both an actor and a spectator, “ seemed 
to be filling with troops; the sun shone bright; not a cloud 
obscured the brilliant and glowing atmosphere. From 
right to left, as far as the eye could reach, scarcely the 
most diminutive space intervened between bodies of troops, 
either already engaged, or rapidly advancing into action. 
Artillery and musketry were heard in one continued, unin¬ 
terrupted volume of sound ; and, although the great force of 
French cannon had not yet opened upon the assailants, the 
fire had already become exceedingly violent.”* 

The cdtumn under the Earl ot Dalhousie, about which 
* Colonel Leith Ilav, ‘ Narrative of the Peninsular War.’ 


158 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


some momentary apprehension had been entertained, got to 
its assigned place. The 4th and light divisions under General 
Cole, and forming part of our middle column, crossed the 
Zadorra by the bridges of Nanclaras and Tras-Puentes, im¬ 
mediately after Iiill had got possession of Subijana de Alava; 
and shortly after our 3rd and 7th divisions crossed the river 
higher up, and these four united divisions marched with firm 
steps against the centre of the French, who met their advan¬ 
cing columns with a destructive fire of artillery. General 
Picton’s division—the always foremost and always fighting 
3rd—coming in contact with a strong body of the enemy 
drove it back, and captured its guns. With very little more 
fighting the French centre abandoned its position, and began 
to retreat in good order towards Vittoria. As Jourdan thus 
fell back, closing up his long lines, which—like those of 
Marmont, at Salamanca—had been far too much extended, 
our troops continued to advance in admirable order, not¬ 
withstanding the difficult nature of the ground. 

While this was passing in front, General Sir Thomas 
Graham, moving along the road from Bilbao with our left, 
had attacked the French right, which was posted on the 
heights beyond the Zadorra, above the village of Abe- 
chuco, and had dislodged it from thence, and then, ascend¬ 
ing the right bank of the Zadorra towards the Bayonne 
road, he carried the village of Gamarra Mayor; and, at nearly 
the same time, the Spanish division of Longa carried the 
village of Gamarra Menor, on the right bank of the river 
opposite the Bayonne road, which runs along the left bank of 
the river, the heights of which were occupied by two divisions 
of French infantry in reserve. In the execution of these ser¬ 
vices Graham’s division, including Spanish as well as Portu¬ 
guese troops, were closely and desperately engaged; and all 
behaved admirably—more especially some of the Portuguese 
light troops, called Ca^adores. Both at Gamarra Mayor 
and at Abechuco—which had been strongly occupied as 
tetes-de-ponts , and garnished with great guns — they had 
advanced under a murderous fire of artillery, with bayonets 
fixed, and without firing a shot.* 

Towards the evening, the main body of the French army 
having been driven right through the town of Vittoria, the 
divisions on their right withdrew hastily from their posi¬ 
tions; then General Graham (he was there for that pur¬ 
pose) dashing across the Zadorra, took possession of the 

* For Lord Wellington’s own short, quiet account of thiPsignal vic¬ 
tory, see ‘ Dispatches/ vol. x. p. 416. 


BATTLE OF VITTORIA. 


159 


1813 .] 

Bayonne road by which the enemy meant to retreat towards 
France; and this movement threw their entire army into 
irretrievable confusion. The French were obliged, in this 
state, to alter their line of retreat, and take the road leading 
to Pamplona; and they were unable to hold any position 
beyond Vittoria for a sufficient length of time to allow their 
baggage, stores, and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, 
therefore, of the artillery which had not already been taken 
byL ord Wellington’s troops in their successive attacks of 
positions, together with all their ammunition and baggage, 
and nearly everything else they had, were captured close to 
Vittoria. “We had beaten them,” said one of our officers, 
“ before the town, and in the town, and through the town, 
and out of the town, and behind the town, and all round 
about the town.” * “ I have reason to believe,” wrote his 

lordship, “ that the enemy carried off with them one gun 
and one howitzer only.” As darkness set in, the broken 
French columns mixed and dispersed, running off in all 
directions. The intruder Joseph had a very narrow escape, 
the 10th hussars entered Vittoria at the moment that he 
was hastening out of it in his carriage; one squadron of the 
10th under Captain Wyndham, gave pursuit and fired into 
the carriage; Joseph had barely time to throw himself on a 
horse and gallop off under the protection of a body of dra¬ 
goons ; the carriage was taken, and in it the most splendid 
of his trinkets, and some of the most precious articles he 
had abstracted from the palaces, monasteries, and churches 
of Spain. M. Lalande, his private secretary, was over¬ 
taken and put to death, and several of his attendants were 
captured or cut down, or shot in their flight by the revenge¬ 
ful Spaniards. In some instances French veterans were 
seen flying in the dark before handfuls of our camp fol¬ 
lowers — mere Spanish and Portuguese striplings armed 
with nothing but their long knives and their implacable 
fury. Now did the French pay dearly for their burnings 
of towns and villages, for their massacres en masse , and ior 
all the atrocities they had perpetrated.f 

It was not a retreat; it was a debacle. The French 
army rallied at no point of its line; nor was the slightest 
effort made, after passing the city of Vittoria, to check the 
rapid progress of the Allies. To escape with nothing but 
lile and the clothes on their backs seemed to be their sole 
object. Their artillery drivers cut their traces, left their 

* ‘ Quarterly Review,’*vol. xiii. p. 270. 

f ‘ lict. Ilist.’ Reign of George lit. 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


160 

guns on the heavy road, and galloped off with their horses. 
The amount of spoil gathered by the pursuers was im¬ 
mense, and of the most varied description, resembling in 
many particulars the spoils of an Oriental rather than those 
of an European army. Joseph Buonaparte—who had been 
nicknamed by the sober Spaniards “King of the Cooks,” 
“Little Joseph of the Bottles”—was a self-indulging, 
luxurious, sensual, voluptuary; and wherever he went he 
carried with him all his luxuries and means of enjoyment. 
His splendid side-board of plate, his larder, and his cellar, 
or its choicest contents, fell into the hands of the conquerors ; 
his tine wardrobe, some of his women, and some of his plun¬ 
der—including splendid pictures by the old Spanish mas¬ 
ters—were also taken. Many of the French officers had 
followed Joseph’s example as far as their means had per¬ 
mitted; and thus the finest wines and the richest viands 
were picked up in profusion. “ The wives and mistresses of 
the officers had gathered together in one house, where they 
were safe, and from whence they were sent in their own 
carriages with a flag of truce to Pamplona. Poodles, par¬ 
rots, and monkeys were among the prisoners. Seldom 
has such a scene of confusion been witnessed as that which 
the roads leading from the field of battle presented ; broken 
down waggons stocked with claret and champagne, others 
laden with eatables dressed and undressed, casks of brand}’ - , 
apparel of every kind, barrels of money, books, papers, 
sheep, cattle, horses, and mules, abandoned in the flight! 
The baggage was presently rifled ; and the followers of our 
camp attired themselves in the gala dresses of the flying 
enemy. Portuguese boys figured about in the dress-coats of 
French general officers; and if they happened to draw' a 
woman’s w'ardrohe in the lotter}', they converted silks, satins, 
and embroidered muslins, into scarfs and sashes for their 
masquerade triumph. Some of the more fortunate soldiers 
got possession of the army chest, and loaded themselves 

with money. The camp of every division was 

like a fair; benches w r ere laid from w aggon to waggon, and 
there the soldiers held an auction through the night, and 
disposed of such plunder as had fallen to their share to any 
one who would purchase it.”* 

“ The soldiers of the army,” said Wellington, “ have got 
among them about a million sterling in money, with the 
exception of about 100,000 dollars which were got for the 
military chest.”f 

* Southey, ‘ Peninsular War.’ -j* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. 2 . 



DAY AFTER THE VICTORY. 


161 


1813 .] 

Among the innumerable trophies of the field was the 
baton or marshal’s staff of Jourdan. His lordship sent it to 
the prince regent, who gave him in return the baton of a 
field-marshal of Great Britain. Of arms and materials of 
war, there were taken 151 pieces of brass ordnance, 415 
caissons, more than 14,000 round of ammunition, nearly 
2,000,000 of musket ball cartridges, nearly 41,000 pounds of 
loose gunpowder, and an immense train of forage waggons, 
forge waggons, &c. &c. 

The French had in many actions made greater slaughter 
of the Spaniards, but they had never reduced an army, even 
of raw volunteers, to such a state of total wreck. Not above 
1,000 of the fugitives were taken; for, lightened of every¬ 
thing, they ran like lapwings. The country, too, was inter¬ 
sected with canals and ditches, which impeded our cavalry; 
and our infantry, moving in military order, could not be 
expected to keep up with a rout that had renounced all 
order, and was realizing the adage, “ the devil may take the 
hindmost.” Moreover, as Wellington deeply regretted, 
the spoils of the field occupied and detained his troops, and 
his infantry, by this time, were shoeless. The French ac¬ 
knowledged a loss, in killed and wounded, of 8,000 men ; 
but that loss was unquestionably much greater. The total 
loss of the Allies was 740 killed, and 4,174 wounded. Lord 
Wellington was liberal, and even enthusiastic in his praise 
of all engaged; officers and men. Fie particularly acknow¬ 
ledged his obligations to Graham, Hill, Moriilo, the Hon. 
W. Stewart, the Earl of Dalhousie, Picton, Sir Lowry Cole, 
Sir George Murray, Lord Aylmer, and to many others, 
including Sir Richard Fletcher, and the officers of the roj^al 
engineers. He mentioned in his dispatch that his serene 
highness the hereditary Prince of Orange (the late king of 
Holland) was in the field as his aide-de-camp, and con¬ 
ducted himself with his usual gallantry and intelligence. 

The morrow of a victory, however great and glorious, is a 
day of sadness to all feeling hearts. The dead have to be 
buried ; the wounded to be counted and moved; the knife of 
the surgeon is at work, and the hospitals ring with cries of 
anguish, or moans and groans; men look round for men 
who have fought at their sides in many battles, and shared 
with them the pleasures of the mess-table, and the frolics of 
the bivouac, and shudder to find so many places vacant, so 
many dear comrades gone forever ! Grieving for all, Lord 
Wellington appears to have grieved most for the gallant 

M 


162 MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 

young Cadogan; and, as was his wont, he sat down and 
wrote condoling letters. 

He said to his brother Sir II. Wellesley :—“ I am much 
concerned for the death of Cadogan. He had distinguished 
himself early in the action.His private cha¬ 

racter and his worth as an individual were not greater than 
his merits as an officer, and I shall ever regret him. . . 

. . The concern which I feel upon his loss has dimi¬ 

nished exceedingly the satisfaction I should derive from our 
success.”* 

And again, writing to the same brother four days after the 
battle, he said, “ I know how much you will feel for the 
loss of poor Cadogan, which has distressed me exceedingly. 
He was so anxious respecting what was going on, that, after 
he was wounded, he had himself carried to a place whence 
he could see all the operations ! Pray let George and Louisa 
know of their misfortune.” f Pie could not away with this 
mournful subject; and the like intensity of feeling may be 
traced in his dispatches whenever he has met with a loss 
of the same nature, or when any brave and good man fami¬ 
liarly acquainted with him has perished. Plis feelings are 
always expressed in short but affecting sentences, denoting 
the most touching of all griefs, the grief of a firm, manly 
heart with all its feelings habitually under control. Let 
those who entertain the vulgar idea to which I have already 
alluded, turn over the Wellington Dispatches, and dismiss 
it for ever. 

The victory at Salamanca had been attended by great 
events; but these were now surpassed. 

The news of this decisive battle of Yittoria gave strength, 
spirit, and union to the allied armies acting against Buona¬ 
parte in Germany, dissipated the last misgivings and indeci¬ 
sions of Austria, broke up the congress assembled at Prague, 
in Bohemia, which before would have treated w r ith the 
French, and have left them in possession of many of their 
conquests; and it gave to the voice of the British Govern¬ 
ment, and its envoys, a vast increase of consideration and 
influence. Without this battle of Yittoria and its glorious 
results in June, there would have been no battle of Leipzig 
in October. 

The flight of the French from Vittoria was favoured by 
the weather; it rained heavily on the succeeding days, and 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. x. p. 454. 

f Id. p. 455. The Honourable George and Louisa Cadogan, brother 
and sister to the deceased colonel. 


AT THE PYRENEES. 


163 


1813 .] 

this, with the consequent state of the roads slackened our 
pursuit, for, again we had to pursue as a regular army with 
all its encumbrances. The Roitelet Joseph hardly once 
looked back until he had reached the strong walls of Pam¬ 
plona, in Navarre, among lofty mountains, the offshoots of 
the Pyrenean chain. The garrison of that place had been 
reinforced and well supplied, but it had also received orders 
to husband its provisions and stores, in case of a siege or 
blockade ; thus they admitted the runagate pretender with 
his staff and some corps, but would not open the gates to the 
flying disorganized soldiers, who had lost all signs of disci¬ 
pline, and were starving. These fugitives attempted to 
force an entrance over the wall of Pamplona; but they were 
repulsed by a fire of musketry from their own countrymen. 
After this they continued their flight across the Pyrenees 
towards France; but, meeting with some supplies, they ral¬ 
lied in the fastnesses of those mountains. 

General Clausel, who was coming up fast from Logrono 
with about 15,000 men, and who would have been on the 
field of Yittoria if Wellington had delayed his attack, upon 
learning the issue of that battle, had fled across the central 
Pyrenees into France, losing all his artillery and most of 
his baggage on the road. General Foy, who was with an¬ 
other corps d'armee near Bilbao, fell back rapidly on the 
fortress of Bayonne, being followed up by General Graham. 
A French garrison was left in San Sebastian, which place, 
as well as Pamplona, was soon invested. Except on the 
eastern coast, where Suche kept his ground with about 
40,000 men, there was not an open spot in all Spain but was 
freed from the French. 

Having established the blockade of Pamplona, and directed 
Graham to invest San Sebastian, Lord Wellington advanced 
with the main body of his army to occupy the passes of the 
Pyrenees, from Roncesvalles, so famed in war and poetry, to 
Irun, at the mouth of the Bidassoa. His lordship’s move¬ 
ments were again impeded by Spanish procrastination and 
poverty, and by want of proper ammunition and magazines, 
but by the 7th of July he became master of some of the 
most important of the mountain passes; and his sentinels 
looked down from the Pyrenees upon the level plains of 
France. Thus, in forty-five days from the opening of this 
memorable campaign, his lordship had conducted the allied 
army from the Portuguese to the French frontiers! 

When Napoleon, in his camp in Saxony, heard of the 
disaster of Yittoria, he sent Marshal Soult to the Army of 


164 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE 


Spain, with the rank of ‘ Lieutenant of the Emperor.’ 
Soult arrived on the Spanish frontier on the 13th of July, 
and set about restoring order and confidence in his army, 
which consisted of nine divisions of infantry, nearly 80,000 
men, and three divisions of cavalry. He told them, in a 
stirring proclamation, that the disasters of the preceding 
campaign were owing to the pusillanimous councils and un¬ 
skilful dispositions of their late commanders. 1 Let us not, 
however,’ added he, ‘ defraud the enemy of the praise 
which is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of 
their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, 
and the valour and steadiness of his troops have been 
praiseworthy.’ He concluded by saying that his instruc¬ 
tions from the emperor were, ‘ to drive the enemy from 
those lofty heights which enable him proudly to survey our 
fertile valleys, and drive him across the Ebro. It is on the 
Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and your 
resources drawn. . . . Let the account of our success 

be dated from Yittoria, and the birth of his Imperial 
Majesty be celebrated in that city.’ 

When that auspicious day, the 15th of August, arrived, 
Marshal Soult and his army, instead of being at Yittoria, 
were on the wrong side of the Pyrenees; and the Allied 
Army, instead of having been driven beyond the Ebro, was 
on the Bidassoa, with a firm footing in France. 

“ Soult’s first object was to relieve Pamplona. With this 
view he collected the main body of his army at St. Jean 
Pied de Port, and on the 25th of July attacked, with between 
30,000 and 40,000 men, the British right at Roncesvalles. 
General Cole moved to the support of that post, but the 
French having turned the British position, Cole considered 
it necessary to withdraw in the night, and march to Zubiri. 
In the mean time two French divisions attacked General 
Hill’s position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the 
valley of Baztan. At first they gained ground, but were 
again driven back, when the retrograde movement of General 
Cole, on his right, induced General Hill to withdraw like¬ 
wise to Irurita. Lord Wellington, who had his head-quar¬ 
ters at Lesaca, on the left of the army, heard of these move¬ 
ments late in the night, and concentrated his army to the 
right. On the 27th the French made a partial attack on 
the 4th division, near Sorauren, but were repulsed. On the 
28tli Soult directed a grand attack, first on the left, by the 
valley of the Lanz, and then on the centre of the British 
position. The 4th division General Cole's, sustained nearly 


BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. 


i 65 


1813.] 

the whole brunt of the attack, and repulsed the enemy with 
the bayonet. In one instance the French succeeded in over¬ 
powering a Portuguese battalion on the right of General 
Ross’s brigade, at the chapel of Sorauren, which obliged 
General Ross to withdraw, and the enemy established him¬ 
self for a moment on the line of the Allies, but Lord Wel¬ 
lington directed the 27th and 48th regiments to charge, and 
the French were driven down the hill with great loss. Soon 
after the fighting ceased. On the 29th both armies re¬ 
mained inactive. Soult changed his plan, and on the 30th 
endeavoured to turn the British left by an attack on General 
Hill. He collected a large body on his right for this pur¬ 
pose, and by manoeuvring on the left flank of Hill’s corps, 
obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied 
behind Lizasso to another range about a mile in the rear, 
where, however, General Hill maintained himself against 
every effort that was made to dislodge him. At the same 
time Lord Wellington attacked the French corps in his front, 
in a strong position, between the valley of the Lanz and that 
of Arga, and obliged them to retire. On the morning of the 
31st the French were in full retreat into France, by the 
various passes of the Pyrenees, followed by the Allies, who 
took many prisoners and much baggage. These various 
combats are designated by the name of the 1 Battles of the 
Pyrenees.’ On the 1st of August Lord Wellington re¬ 
sumed possession of the passes in the mountains.” * 

The admirable generalship displayed in this series of rapid 
manoeuvres and successful combats, has been recognised by 
the most competent military critics. It should appear that 
the government at home had fancied that Wellington 
might defend the Pyrenees as he had done the heights of 
Torres Yedras, without allowing the French to penetrate 
anywhere; but he had shown them beforehand that this 
was an impossibility. The mountain range to be guarded 
was not less than 60 English miles in length, the practicable 
passes were not two or three but eight, and there were other 
rough roads or paths across the Pyrenees, running between 
or turning the greater passes, which might be traversed by 
an enemy so light and nimble as the French. Lord Wel¬ 
lington estimated all the passes, good and bad, at not less 
than seventy, f 

* A. Vieusseux, * Military Life of the Duke.’ The dispatches con¬ 
densed in this brief space extend from p. 567. vol. x. to p. 107. vol. xi. 

* Dispatches.’ 

t Letter to the Earl of Liverpool, dated Lesaca, 25th July. ‘Dis¬ 
patches,’ vol. x. pp. 567-70. 


166 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


The fighting had been tremendous. In the pass of Ronces- 
valles and the Maya pass, and on the heights above them 
our people had contended against immense odds — they 
had fought on the mountain tops, which could scarcely have 
witnessed any other combats than those of the Pyrenean 
eagles—they had fought among jagged rocks, and on the 
brink of profound abysses—they had fought amidst clouds 
and mists, for those mountain-tops were 5,000 feet above 
the level of the plains of France, and the rains, which for 
several days had been falling in torrents, were evaporating 
in the morning and noon-day sun. When those passes were 
forced by Soult, Lord Wellington was at a considerable dis¬ 
tance. Sir George Murray, his excellent quartermaster- 
general, at the critical moment, had taken upon himself some 
heavy responsibility, and his movements and arrangements 
were afterwards approved and applauded by his lordship; 
but brave General Picton—as was not unusual with him— 
had acted precipitately, and in contradiction to the spirit 
of his instructions, and this gave great uneasiness to the 
Commander-in-chief. Galloping up at racing speed, almost 
alone, and at great hazard of being intercepted and made 
prisoner by the French, he entered the village of Sorauren, 
where he saw Clausel’s divisions close at hand. On the 
parapet of the bridge of Sorauren he wrote some fresh 
instructions to Sir George Murray. Lord Fitzroy Somer¬ 
set, the only staff-officer who had been sufficiently well 
mounted to keep up with Wellington’s thorougli-bred 
English chestnut, galloped with these orders out of Sorau¬ 
ren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed into the 
village by another, and the English general rode alone up the 
opposite mountain to reach his troops. “ One of Campbell’s 
Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised a cry of 
joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by the next regiments 
swelled as it ran along the line, into that stern and appal¬ 
ling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the 
edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. 
Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place ; 
he desired that both armies should know he was there, and 
a double spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so 
near that his features could be plainly distinguished. The 
English general, it is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon 
tins formidable man, and, speaking as if to himself, said, 

‘ Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious one, 
and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these 
cheers; that will give time for the 6th division to arrive, 


1813.] BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. 1G7 

and I shall beat him.’ And certain it is that the French 
general made no serious attack that day.”* 

In a private letter, written four days after the last of 
these “ Fatties of the Pyrenees,” Wellington said, “ I never 
saw such fighting as we have had here. It began on the 
25th of July, and, excepting the 29th, when not a shot was 
fired, we had it every day till the 2nd of August. The 
battle of the 28th was fair bludgeon worktf' And w r riting to 
Sir Thomas Graham, about the same time, he said, “ I hope 
that Soult will not feel any inclination to renew his expedi¬ 
tion. The French army must have suffered greatly. Between 
the 25th of last month and 2nd of this, they were engaged 
seriously not less than ten times; on many occasions in attack¬ 
ing very strong positions, in others beat from them or pursued. 
I understand that their officers say, they have lost 15,000 men. 
I thought so; but as they say so, I now think more. It is strange 
enough that our diminution of strength to the 31st does not ex¬ 
ceed 1,500 men, although, I believe, our casualties are 6,000.” J 
In their retreat through the passes of the Pyrenees, the 
French were repeatedly attacked, and had their rear cut up by 
our pursuing columns. General Edward Barnes with his single 
brigade, about 1,500 strong, rushed up a steep height under a 
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, charged Clausel’s 6,000 
men, and drove them from their position. During this day 
Lord Wellington, who was grieving that Marshal Soult should 
have escaped him, was nearly taken prisoner himself. He was 
standing near the hill of Echalar, examining his maps, with 
only half a company of the 43rd as an escort. Some French, 
close at hand, sent a detachment to cut the party off; and such 
was the nature of the ground that these troops would have 
fallen upon his lordship unaware, if Sergeant Blood, a young, 
intelligent, and active man, who had been set to watch in front, 
had not rushed down the precipitous rocks and given the 
alarm. As it was, the French arrived in time to send a 
volley of bullets after his lordship as he galloped away.”§ 
Soult drew close to his reserves behind the Bidassao, put 
some of his disorganized corps behind the line of his re¬ 
serves, called loudly for reinforcements, and collected all 
the detachments and national guards he could. It had 
previously been proved that in a rase campagne , or in any 
situation approaching to an open country, the veterans of 
France were not a match for the British infantry, and now 

* Napier, ‘Hist, of Peninsular War,’ vol. vi. p. 130. Edition of 1840. 
f Letter to Lord William Bentinck. ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. x. p. 602. 

X ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. x. p, 591. § Napier, ‘ Peninsular War,’ vol. vi. 


168 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 

they had the additional proof that they were not our match 
in mountain warfare—a warfare in which the French had 
hitherto been considered unrivalled.* 

During the month of August, General Graham was press¬ 
ing the siege of St. Sebastian. On the 31st, the assault was 
made, and the town was carried, hut with great loss. The 
French garrison retired to the castle. Many excesses were 
committed by the British and Portuguese soldiers after they 
had entered the town : most of the houses were plundered, 
and it was not until the 2nd of September that order was 
restored by severe measures. But as this calamitous affair 
was made the ground of accusation against the British 
officers and army in general, we must refer the reader to 
Lord Wellington’s indignant reply to those charges, in a 
letter to his brother Sir Henry Wellesley, British minister 
in Spain. Some Spanish party papers went so far as to say 
that the town was set on fire on purpose by the British, and 
this insinuation has been repeated by Llorente, in his 
‘Memoires de la Revolution d’Espagne,’ and by others. 
“Everything was done,” says Lord Wellington, “that was 
in my power to suggest to save the town Several persons 
urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bom¬ 
barded, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give 
it up. This I positively would not allow, for the same rea¬ 
sons as I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz to be bom¬ 
barded. Neither is it true that the town was set 

on fire by the English and Portuguese troops. To set fire 
to the town was part of the enemy’s defence. It was set on 
fire by the enemy on the 22nd of July, before the final 
attempt was made to take it by storm; and it is a fact that 
the fire was so violent on the 24th of July, that the storm, 
which was to have taken place on that day, was necessarily 
deferred till the 25th, and, as it is well known, failed. I 
was at the siege of St. Sebastian on the 30th of August, and 
I aver that the town was then on fire. It must have been 
set on fire by the enemy, as I repeat that our batteries, by 
positive order, threw no shells into the town; and I saw the 
town on fire on the 31st of August, before the storm took 
place. It is well known that the enemy had prepared for 
a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the 
streets of the town; that traverses were established in the 
streets, formed of combustibles, with the intention of setting 
fire’ to and exploding them during the contest with the 

‘ Annals of the Peninsular Campaign,’ by the author of ‘ Cyril 
Thornton,’—the late Captain Hamilton. 



SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 


169 


1813 .] 

assailants. It is equally known that there was a most severe 
contest in the streets of the town between the assailants 
and the garrison; that many of these traverses were ex¬ 
ploded, by which many lives on both sides were lost; and it 
is a fact that these explosions set fire to many of the houses. 
.... Everything was done that could be done to extin¬ 
guish the fire by our own soldiers. In regard to the plunder 
of the town by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny 
it, because I know that it is true. It is one of the evil conse¬ 
quences attending the necessity of storming a town, which 
every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby 
inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of 
the injury it does to discipline. Notwithstanding that I am 
convinced that it is impossible to prevent a town in such a 
situation from being plundered, I can prove that, upon this 

occasion, particular pains were taken to prevent it. 

If it had not been for the fire, which certainly augmented the 
confusion, and afforded greater facilities for irregularity, and if 
by far the greater proportion of the officers and non-com¬ 
missioned officers, particularly of the principal officers who 
stormed the breach, had not been killed or wounded in the 
performance of their duty in the service of Spain, to the num¬ 
ber of 170 out of about 250,1 believe that the plunder would 
have been, in great measure, though not entirely, prevented.”* 
The castle of St. Sebastian capitulated after a few days. 
The siege and capture of the place cost the Allies nearly 
4,000 men, killed and wounded. Three British general 
officers were wounded, and Sir Richard Fletcher, the com¬ 
manding officer of engineers, was killed. 

It is but too easy to account for our great loss before this 
place. It was not until the 19th of August that transports 
arrived from England with a good supply of heavy guns 
and mortars; and then the besiegers were left with only 
one company of royal sappers and miners — a species of 
force whose formation had been so long and so absurdly 
neglected by our government. On the 11th of February 
1812, Wellington had written to the Earl of Liverpool— 

“ It is inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake 
anything like a siege, for want of assistance of this descrip¬ 
tion. There is no French corps d’armee which has not a 
battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are 
obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the 
regiments of the line; and, although the men are brave and 
willing, they want the knowledge and training which are 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. pp. 172-1. 


170 


MEMOIR OF THE 1)UKE. 


necessary. Many casualties among them consequently 
occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical 
period of the siege.”* Yet, more than eighteen months 
after this earnest representation, only one company of sap¬ 
pers and miners could be sent out for an important siege! 

On the 31st of August, the day of the storm, Soult made 
an effort to relieve the place. Three divisions of Spaniards, 
under General Freyre, occupied the left bank of the Bidas- 
soa, supported on the right and left by English and Portu¬ 
guese brigades. A strong French force forded the Bidassoa, 
and made a desperate attack on the Spaniards posted on the 
heights of St. Marcial. The Spaniards bravely stood the 
attack, charged the enemy with the bayonet, and drove 
them down the height into the river. A second attack was 
made and repelled in the same manner. Lord Wellington, 
who happened to be present, was highly pleased, and said in 
his dispatches that “ the conduct of the Spanish troops was 
equal to that of any troops he had ever seen engaged.” 

On the 31st of October the 4,000 French in Pamplona, 
having lost all hope of relief, surrendered prisoners of war. 
There was nothing now in the rear of the Allies to cause 
them any apprehension, or to intercept their communica¬ 
tions with the interior of Spain. But before the reduction 
of Pamplona—though not before that event had been ren¬ 
dered inevitable—Wellington called down part of his troops 
from the bleak mountain tops, and from the gloomy narrow 
passes, where, to their infinite discomfort, they had been 
encamped or hutted for more than two months. During 
that time, desertions had been rather frequent among them. 
Men not afraid of the French had run away from a dread 
of ghosts or dead bodies. One who was at the time an officer 
among them, says :—“ As this was an event which had but 
rarely occurred before, many opinions were hazarded as to 
its cause. For my part, I attributed it entirely to the opera¬ 
tion of superstitious terror on the minds of the men, and 
for this reason. It is generally the custom, in planting sen¬ 
tinels in the immediate presence of an enemy, to station 
them in pairs, so that one may patrol as far as the next post, 
whilst the other remains steady on his ground. Perhaps, 
too, the wish of giving greater confidence to the men them¬ 
selves may have some weight in dictating the measure ; at 
all events, there can be no doubt that it produces that effect. 
Such, however, was the nature of the ground covered by 
our piquets among the Pyrenees, that in many places there 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. viii. p. 601. 


171 


1813 .] SUPERSTITIOUS FEARS OF THE SOLDIERS. 

was hardly room for a couple of sentinels to occupy a single 
post, whilst it was only at the mouths of the various passes 
that two were more desirable than one for securing the 
safety of the army. Rugged as the country was, however, 
almost every foot of it had been the scene of action, whilst 
the dead, falling among rocks and cliffs, were left in various 
instances, from necessity, unburied; and exactly in those 
parts where the dead lay buried, single sentinels were 
planted. That both soldiers and sailors are frequently super¬ 
stitious, every person knows ; nor can it be pleasant for the 
strongest-minded among them to spend two or three hours 
of a stormy night beside a mangled and half-devoured car¬ 
cass ; indeed, I have been myself, more than once, remon¬ 
strated with, for desiring as brave a fellow as any in the 
corps to keep guard near one of his fallen comrades. ‘1 
don’t care for living men,’ said the soldier; ‘ but, for God’s 
sake, sir, don’t put me beside him and wherever I could 
yield to the remonstrance, I invariably did so. My own 
opinion, therefore, was, that many of our sentries became so 
overpowered by superstition that they could not keep their 
ground. They knew, however, that if they returned to the 
piquet, a severe punishment awaited them ; and hence they 
went over to the enemy, rather than endure the misery of 
a diseased imagination. 

“ As a proof that my notions were correct, it was remarked, 
that the army had no sooner descended from the mountains, 
and taken up a position which required a chain of double 
sentinels to be renewed, than desertion in a very great degree 
ceased. A few instances, indeed, still occurred, as will 
always be the case where men of all tempers are brought 
together, as in an army; but they bore not the proportion 
of one to twenty towards those which took place among the 
Pyrenees.”* 

As soon as they were told that they were to be led a march 
or two upon French ground, the men, recently so gloomy, 
looked as if they were going to a fair or a feast. The Eng¬ 
lish flag waved triumphantly in the pass of Roncesvalles, 
where it had been displayed centuries before by Edward the 
Black Prince, the terror of France, and our bands played 
the merry march of the “British Grenadiers,” and our troops 
defiled through the other passes which their valour had 
won. On the 10th of November, the rest of the Allied army 
were called down from their cold and cheerless positions, 
and marched into France. Before taking this decisive step, 

* Gleig’s' Subaltern.’ 


172 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Wellington issued an order of the day to all the troops of 
the various nations that followed his victorious standard. 
He told “ the officers and soldiers to remember that their 
nations were at war with France, solely because the ruler of 
the French would not allow them to be at peace, and wanted 
to force them to submit to his yoke.” He told them “ not 
to forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy 
in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal had been 
occasioned by the irregularities of his soldiers, and their 
cruelties towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants 
of the countryand that “ to avenge this conduct on the 
peaceful inhabitants of France would be unmanly and 
unworthy of the Allied nations.” This proclamation was 
read over and over again in English, in Portuguese, and in 
Spanish; and his lordship made it the special duty of all 
officers to enforce these salutary orders. Nor was it ever 
left to remain as a piece of merely rhetorical humanity; 
Wellington took incessant care to carry it into operation; 
and whenever he found any part of his troops attempting to 
plunder the peasantry, he not only punished by military 
law those who were caught in the fact, but he placed the 
whole regiment or brigade to which they belonged under 
arms, to prevent further offence. It was difficult to convince 
the Spaniards and Portuguese, who had so long seen their 
own country plundered and ransacked and wasted by fire 
and sword, that they ought not to retaliate upon the French, 
who had attacked them without the shadow of a provocation. 
Discipline, however, works miracles; and the Portuguese 
troops, on the whole, behaved well. But the undisciplined 
part of the Spaniards, who had been a thorn in his lord¬ 
ship’s side ever since he set his foot on the soil of the Penin¬ 
sula, could not be restrained in their revengeful and maraud¬ 
ing propensities. Some excuse for them was, that their 
government had provided them neither with pay nor provi¬ 
sion, neither with clothes nor shoes. 

Lord Wellington’s letters to the Spanish Generals Morillo, 
Wimpffen, and Freyre, are evidence of his earnestness and 
determination not to allow any irregularity of the sort. 
“ Where I command,” says he to Freyre, “ I declare that no 
one shall be allowed to plunder. If plunder must be had, 
then another must have the command. You have large 
armies in Spain, and if it is wished to plunder the French 
peasantry you may enter France, but then the Spanish 
government must remove me from the command of their 
armies.It is a matter of indifference to me 


1813.] ADVANCE INTO FltANCE. 173 

whether I command a large or a small army, but whether 
large or small, the army must obey me, and above all, must 
not plunder."* 

General Sir Thomas Picton, a Welshman more peppery 
than Fluellin, appears always to have been in a passion at 
somebody or something; but much cooler officers re-echoed 
the sentiments he expressed as to the value of Spanish 
troops as co-belligerents in France. In writing to a friend, 
Picton says,—“ The Spaniards, instead of being of any ser¬ 
vice to us in our operations, are a perfect dead weight, and 
do nothing but run away and plunder. We should do much 
better without these vapouring poltroon rascals, whose irre¬ 
gular conduct will indispose every one towards us.”f In no 
very long time, Wellington took the decisive measure of 
sending back most of these Spanish troops into their own 
country. 

Soult now held a strong position on the Nivelle from St. 
Jean de Luz to Ainhoe, about twelve miles in length. 
General Hill, with the British right, advanced from the 
valley of Baztan, and, attacking the French on the heights 
of Ainhoe, drove them towards Cambo on the Nive, while 
the centre of the Allies, consisting of English and Spanish 
troops under Marshal Beresford and General Alten, carried 
the works behind Sarre, and drove the French bevond the 
Nivelle, which the Allies crossed at St. Pre, in the rear of 
the enemy. Upon this the French hastily abandoned their 
ground and works on the left of the Nivelle, and in the 
night withdrew to their entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. 
Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were established at St. 
Jean de Luz, on the right bank of the Nivelle. The Allies 
went into cantonments between the sea and the river Nive, 
where their extreme right rested on Cambo. The enemy 
guarded the right bank of the Nive from Bayonne to St. 
Jean Pied de Port. Lord Wellington, being straitened for 
room and supplies for his large army, determined to cross 
the Nive and occupy the country between that and the 
Adour. On the 9th of December, General Hill forded the 
Nive above Cambo, while the sixth division crossed at 
Ustaritz, and the French w r ere dislodged from their position 
at Ville Franque. In the night all their posts were with¬ 
drawn to Bayonne, and on the 10th the British right rested 
on the Adour. On that day Soult, resuming the offensive, 
issued out of Bayonne, and attacked the British left under 

* * Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. 395. 

f Letter to Mr. Marryatin H. B. Bobinson’s ‘ Memoirs of Picton.’ 


174 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Sir John Hope, which covered St. Jean de Lnz, where the 
Allies had considerable depots of stores. 

The French came on with great spirit, and twice suc¬ 
ceeded in driving in the fifth division of the Allies, and 
twice were repulsed again, the first time by the 9th British 
and a Portuguese battalion, and the second time by the 
brigade of Guards; at last, night put an end to the fight. 
Next morning, 11th December, Soult, having withdrawn 
in the night most of his force from the position in front of 
the British left, prepared to attack the light division with 
overwhelming numbers. General Hope, suspecting this, 
had moved part of his troops to their right to support the 
light division. This occasioned another change in Soult’s 
movements, who again directed several columns against the 
left at Barouilles. The troops were occupied in receiving 
their rations, and their fatigue parties were engaged in 
cutting w r ood, when shouts were heard from the front of 
“ en avant,” answered by a corresponding cry of “ to arms” 
among the British. The French columns were close at 
hand, and the Allies had barely time to run to their arms, 
when they withstood the attack, and at the close of the day 
both armies remained in their respective position. 

Marshal Soult now giving up any further attempt on the 
left of the Allies, and imagining that his repeated attacks 
on that side must have induced Lord Wellington to w r eaken 
his right, changed his plan, and during the night of the 
12th moved with his main force to his left to attack the 
British right. Lord Wellington, however, had foreseen 
this, and had given orders to the fourth and sixth divisions 
to support the right, and the third division was held in 
readiness for the same object. General Hill had under his 
immediate command above 13,000 men, and his position 
extended across from the Adour beyond Vieux Monguerre 
to Ville Franque and the Nive. Soult directed from 
Bayonne on the 13th a force of 30,000 men against his posi¬ 
tion. His columns of the centre gained some ground, but 
were fiercely repulsed. An attack on Hill’s right was like¬ 
wise successful at first, but was ultimately defeated. Soult 
at last drew back his troops towards his entrenched camp 
near Bayonne. General Hill had withstood all the efforts 
of the enemy without any occasion for the assistance of the 
divisions which Lord Wellington had moved towards him. 
Lord Wellington, well pleased at this, told him—“ Hill, the 
day is all your own.” * 

* Resume of‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. A. Vicusseux. 


1813.] SPORTS IN WINTER QUARTERS. 175 

♦ 

In these several affairs the romantic bravery of Sir John 
Hope excited the admiration of the whole army. In the 
Commander-in-chief this warm admiration was mingled 
with friendly apprehensions. When these combats were 
over, he said—“ I have long entertained the highest opinion 
of Sir John Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole 
world, but every day’s experience convinces me more of his 
worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to 
expose himself in fire as he did in the last three days; in¬ 
deed, his escape then was wonderful. His hat and coat were 
shot through in many places, besides the wound in his leg. 
He places himself among the sharp-shooters, without, as 
they do, sheltering himself from the enemy’s fire. This will 
not answer; and I hope that his friends will give him a hint 
on the subject.” * 

Nothing of importance occurred during the few remain- 
ing days of the year 1813. Both armies remained in winter- 
quarters—if so comfortable a name can be given to the 
positions and lodgings occupied by our troops. Amuse¬ 
ments, however, were not quite wanting, although, it 
appears, that Soult was too near to allow of the pleasures 
of the chase, in which our officers had indulged a short time 
previously. 

“ Lord Wellington’s fox-hounds were unkennelled, and 
he himself took the field regularly twice a week, as if he 
had been a denizen of Leicestershire, or any other sporting 
county in England. I need not add that few packs in any 
county could be better attended. Not that the horses of 
all the huntsmen were of the best breed, or of the gayest 
appearance ; but what was wanting in individual splendour 
was made up by the number of Nimrods ; nor would it be 
easy to discover a field more fruitful in laughable occur¬ 
rences, which no man more heartily enjoyed than the 
gallant Marquis himself. When the hounds were out, he 
was no longer the commander of the forces, the general- 
in-chief of three nations, and the representative of three 
sovereigns ; but the gay, merry, country gentleman, who 
rode at everything, and laughed as loud when he fell him¬ 
self as when he witnessed the fall of a brother sportsman.” f 

The peasantry dwelling near that frontier of France 
were devout papists and Bourbonists at heart. As Soult 
had retired, they had begun to give sundry signs of good 
feeling towards Lord Wellington and his army. Worn out 

* Letter to Colonel Torrens, ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. 
f The ‘ Subaltern.’ 


176 


MEMOIR OF T1IE DUKE. 


by the military conscription, and the monstrous excess 
to which it had been carried during the last three years 
they saw no end to their evils except in peace, which was 
to be obtained only by the overthrow of Buonaparte. 
They could no longer bear to see their sons torn from them, 
to be made food for cannon —chair a canon. Flesh or meat 
for cannon was the epithet commonly applied to young 
conscripts towards the end of this war! Seeing that the 
English did not plunder, and that excellent discipline was 
maintained, those peasants and little farmers of the south 
of France came flocking to our camp, with their poultry 
and vegetables, and oil and wine; and there they were 
fairly paid for whatever they provided. 

Campaign of 1814.—In an early stage of the Peninsular 
war, the Earl of Liverpool and Viscount Castlereagh had 
ventured to predict that the day might not be very far 
distant when an English army would traverse France as 
conquerors, and a British general march into Paris as our 
Edwards and Henrys had done. For this their lordships 
had been exposed to much ridicule ; but that period seemed 
now fast approaching, and it was for some time doubt¬ 
ful whether that which really occurred in 1815 might 
not happen in the present year, 1814. In our Parliament, 
even that loud-tongued oppositionist, Mr. Whitbread, joined 
his voice in applause and thanksgiving, and declared that 
never did a more favourable opportunity present itself for 
us to exert our strength. But the most eloquent speech in 
the Commons was delivered by Mr. Charles Grant, jun. 
(now Lord Glenelg), who praised Lord Wellington parti¬ 
cularly for this—that, by an undaunted and intrepid spirit, 
the sure proof of a genius confident of its resources, he 
had been enabled to defy the public opinion as to the invinci¬ 
bility of the French. Wellington had never sunk under 
the weight of the enormous fame which had been made 
to surround Massena, Marmont, Jourdan, Soult, and the 
other French marshals and generals; and he had, turn and 
turn about, foiled or beaten them all! Lord Castlereagh, 
with a not-unbecoming national pride, detailed some of the 
exertions which England had made in 1813—a year in 
which she had most importantly aided in arms, ammunition, 
provisions, money, and otherwise, Russia, Prussia, Austria, 
Bavaria, — every country which had entered the lists 
against Buonaparte, and nearly every district in Europe 
which had shown a disposition to cast off his yoke. It was 
resolved (partly in consequence of the war with the United 


RAriD FALL OF BUONAPARTE. 


177 


1814 .] 

States of America) to raise our naval forces to 140,000 
sailors and 31,000 marines, and to strengthen our land- 
forces on the continent. The opposition party raised some 
murmurs about expense, but they found no echo in the 
country, which was excited by victory, and comforted by 
the conviction that the fall of the bitterest enemy we had 
ever known was now close at hand. 

The last act of the drama was played off rapidly—the 
mighty conflict which had been carried on between France 
and. the rest of Europe was almost at its close. The battle 
of Liepzig, fought in October 1813, had hurried on the 
inevitable catastrophe. There Buonaparte had lost another 
army which he had got together, with great pains, after the 
disasters of the Russian campaign. The remnant of that 
army had been driven out of Germany and across the 
Rhine, the Allies practically refuting Napoleon’s argument 
that the Rhine was the neutral and must remain the inviol¬ 
able frontier of France—a frontier within which his over- 
vaulting ambition had not allowed him to contain himself. 
He was now left no other resources than those he could 
draw from France herself. Lord Wellington had long 
foretold that, when that should come to be the case, the 
feelings of the French population would turn against him. 
Napoleon had hitherto supported his enormous armies 
chiefly at the expense of foreign states. “War must be 
with him a financial resource,” thus wrote Lord Welling¬ 
ton in January 1812, to Baron Constant, an officer of dis¬ 
tinction attached to the Prince of Orange; “ and this 
appears to me the greatest misfortune which the French 
Revolution has entailed upon the present generation. I 
have great hopes, however, that this resource is beginning 
to fail; and I think there are symptoms of a sense in 
France either that war is not so productive as it was, or 
that nations who have still something to lose may resist, as 
those of the Peninsula have, in which case the expense of 
collecting this resource becomes larger than its produce.”* 

Such was the prescience of our illustrious soldier two 
years before the period at which we are now arrived, and 
when four-fifths of the statesmen of Europe seemed to 
believe that the Corsican had a talisman which would enable 
him to carry on war for ever, irrespectively of any consider¬ 
ations of finance, supplies of provisions, foreign conscripts, 
and foreign contingents. 

On his return to Paris in November 1813, Napoleon de- 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. viii. p. 581 to p. 583. 


178 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


creed, by a senatus consultum , a new levy of 300,000 con¬ 
scripts. This was not a pacific prelude. Tn December, lie 
ordered the assembling of 180,000 national guards to gar¬ 
rison the towns and fortresses. He talked, however, of 
peace, but he wanted Antwerp, Ostend, Belgium, Savoy, 
&c.; he hesitated, he lost time in agreeing to the prelimi¬ 
nary basis of a treaty such as was offered to him by the 
Allied powers at Chatillon ; he left his own envoy there 
without instructions or powers; he wished, in short, to try 
once more the chances of war. On the 25th of January 
1814, he left Paris for Chalons to attack the Prussians and 
Russians. 

Lord Wellington now made his preparations to drive the 
army of Soult from all the country on the left of the Adour. 
About the middle of February, by a succession of move¬ 
ments and partial engagements, he drove the French first 
from the Bidassoa, and afterwards across the Gave d’Oleron, 
an affluent of the Adour. On the 27th of February, he 
met Soult’s army concentrated at Orthez on the Gave de 
Pau, attacked and beat it and pursued it to the Adour, 
the French retiring to t he eastward towards Auch. On the 
1st of March Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were at St. 
Sever, north of the Adour. The loss of the Allies at the 
battle of Orthez was 277 killed, and about 2,000 wounded 
or missing. The loss of the French army was considerable 
during the battle, and still more during the retreat, owing 
to desertion having spread to a great extent, especially 
among the conscripts, who threw away their arms in vast 
numbers. The battle of Orthez had important results. 
The garrison of Bayonne was now left to its fate, and the 
road to Bordeaux laid open to the Allies. Lord Wel¬ 
lington gave orders to General Hope for the siege of 
Bayonne, and detached Marshal Beresford with two divi¬ 
sions to occupy the fair and mercantile city of Bordeaux. 
Beresford and his force were received as friends and allies, 
the mayor and most of the inhabitants of Bordeaux having 
of their own accord proclaimed Louis XVIII. 

As the Allied Powers had not yet pledged themselves to 
support the Bourbon cause, or not to treat with Buonaparte 
as the ruler of France, Lord Wellington had most particularly 
and emphatically instructed Beresford not to originate nor 
encourage any rising of the Bourbon party; on no account to 
encourage hopes which might be disappointed, or to excite 
insurrectionary movements which might be put down and 
avenged with blood, if the Allied sovereigns should even- 


POLICY IN FRANCE. 


179 


1814 .] 

tually negotiate a peace with the present ruler, and leave 
Buonaparte on the throne of France. As yet, all the great 
powers of Europe acknowledged that man as emperor, a con¬ 
gress of their Ministers was sitting at Chatillon sur Seine, 
in which Napoleon’s envoys were admitted, notwithstanding 
the marchings of the Russians and Prussians in the pro¬ 
vinces of France and the uninterrupted course of hostilities. 
His lordship had always been extremely cautious about in¬ 
terfering, without positive orders from his own Government, 
in the internal affairs or home politics of other countries, 
and his whole correspondence proves his caution and dis¬ 
cretion with regard to Spain, and the various red-hot 
factions of liberals and absolutists which were already 
quarrelling there. lie knew better than any man, that the 
irreconcilable pretensions of these two fierce factions must 
sooner or later plunge Spain into an anarchy; but he also 
knew that it was not by foreign arms that those Spanish 
quarrels were to be made up, and he hoped to have done 
with the war before this great storm could break out in his 
rear. His business was purely military; in Spain it had 
been to drive the invader out of the country, and then 
leave the people to settle their own affairs. In France, 
upon the same principle, he was averse to giving any coun¬ 
tenance to a royalist rising and a civil war. The Duke 
of Angouleme having landed in the south of France to 
excite a movement in favour of the Bourbons, Lord Wel¬ 
lington advised him politely to keep incognito, and to wait 
for some important demonstration in his favour. When 
Beresford marched upon Bordeaux, we have seen what 
were his orders. “ If,” said his lordship, “ they should 
ask you for your consent to proclaim Louis XVIII., to 
hoist the white standard, &c., you will state that the 
British nation and their Allies wish well to Louis XVIII.; 
and as long as the public peace is preserved where our 
troops are stationed, we shall not interfere to prevent that 
party from doing what may be deemed most for its in¬ 
terest: nay, further, that I am prepared to assist any party 
that may show itself inclined to aid us in getting the better 
of Buonaparte. That the object of the Allies, however, in 
the war, and, above all, in entering France, is, as is stated in 
my proclamation— peace; and that it is well known the 
Allies are now engaged in negotiating a treaty of peace with 
Buonaparte. That, however I might be inclined to aid and 
support any set of people against Buonaparte while at war, 

I could give them no further aid when peace should be con- 


180 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


eluded; and I beg the inhabitants will weigh this matter 
well before they raise a standard against the government of 
Buonaparte and involve themselves in hostilities. If, how¬ 
ever, notwithstanding this warning, the town should think 
proper to hoist the white standard, and should proclaim 
Louis XVIII., or adopt any other measure of that descrip¬ 
tion, you will not oppose them; and you will arrange with 
the authorities the means of drawing, without loss of time, 
for all the arms, ammunition, &c., which are at Dax, which 
you will deliver to them. If the municipality should state 
that they will not proclaim Louis XVIII. without your 
orders, you will decline to give such orders, for the reasons 
above stated.” And to the royalist mayor of St. Sever he 
wrote on the same subject:—“ I have not interfered in any 
way in what has happened at Bordeaux, and if the depart¬ 
ment of the Landes, or any town of the department, chooses 
to acknowledge the house of Bourbon, I shall not oppose it; 
but I cannot enjoin to the individuals or the authorities of 
those districts which, by the operations of the war, have 
fallen under my order, to take a step which must commit 
them personally, because, if peace should be made, I must 
cease to give them that assistance which I could afford them 
under existing circumstances.” * 

For the sake of humanity, for the sake of his own and his 
nation’s honour, he was most anxious to avoid a foul disgrace 
which had several times been incurred in the progress of 
this long war,—we had given premature encouragement to 
partisans, we had urged them to take the field, we had put 
arms in their hands, and had then found ourselves under the 
necessity of abandoning them to the mercy of their powerful 
enemies. Thus no encouragement was given to the French 
royalists as an active counter-revolutionary party, until 
Buonaparte had abdicated the throne and taken his departure 
for the island of Elba. In the month of February or March, 
a general insurrection in the south of France would, no doubt, 
have facilitated the work in hand, and have given great 
satisfaction to the Bourbon princes and their agents, who 
constantly surrounded and importuned his lordship, and 
who not unfrequently complained that he was injuring 
their cause by throwing cold water upon the loyal enthu¬ 
siasm of the French ; but it suited not the political morality 
of Wellington to commit the lives and fortunes of these 
royalists before he knew that they would not be abandoned, 
before he knew, for a certainty, that the Allies would not 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. pp. 558 and 559. 


soult’s proclamation. 


181 


1814.] 

make a peace which should leave Buonaparte on the throne. 
And yet, while he was pursuing this line of conduct, Mar¬ 
shal Soult and General Gazan issued a turgid and insulting 
proclamation, accusing him of fomenting revolt and civil 
war in France; and of seeking to obtain, by means of intes¬ 
tine faction, those advantages which he could not gain by 
the sword.* And this, too, was said when the sword of 
Wellington had lowered the horn of every marshal and 
general that had been opposed to him, and had cut his way 
from the banks of the Tagus far into the interior of France, 
badly aided, often unsupported, and still oftener thwarted or 
impeded by an infinitude of causes and vexatious circum¬ 
stances, which would have broken the heart or have turned 
the brain of almost any other eommander.f This disgraceful 
proclamation, which could still deceive Frenchmen remote 
from the scene of action, did, indeed, go to prove the justness 
of a remark which his lordship had made long ago, when the 
system was in its perfection, that it was impossible for the peo¬ 
ple of France to know the truth, the whole system of Buona¬ 
parte’s government being based on trickery and deception. 

With regard to those, and they were but few, who mani¬ 
fested a wish to carry on a partisan warfare in the interest of 
Napoleon, and against the Allies, Lord Wellington wrote to 
the mayors and other authorities, that the inhabitants could 
not be allowed to remain in their villages and act as soldiers 
at the same time. “ Those who wish to be soldiers must go 
and serve in the enemy’s lines, and those who wish to live 
quietly at home, under the protection of the Allied troops, 
must not bear arms. The Commander-in-chief will not 
allow any one to follow both courses ; and any person found 
in arms in the rear of the army shall be judged according to 
military laws, and treated in the same manner as the enemy’s 
generals have treated the Spaniards and Portuguese.”! 

On the 18th of March, Lord Wellington advanced his vic¬ 
torious columns to Vic Bigorre, and Soult retreated to some 
good positions at Tarbes. It was thought that the French 
marshal would risk a general battle here, but he did not, 
continuing on the 20th his retreat towards Toulouse, where 
he arrived on the 24th. The main object of Soult’s ove- 
ments was to facilitate a junction with Marshal Suchet, who, 
at last, was evacuating Catalonia and all the eastern coast 
of Spain. 

* See ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. 594. 

f * Piet. Hist.’ lleigii of George III. vol. iv. 

^ ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. 618. 


182 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Before the close of the preceding year, Napoleon had 
given up his last faint hope of conquest; but he yet hoped 
to make Spain, and his prisoner the weak King of Spain, the 
means of weakening England, and creating jealousy and dis¬ 
cord among the members of the Grand Alliance. 

Knowing the character of Ferdinand, he had written to 
him on the 12th of November 1813, saying,—“ That the cir¬ 
cumstances of the times made him wish to conclude at once 
the affairs of Spain, where England was fomenting anarchy 
and jacobinism, and was depressing the nobility in order to 
establish a republic. He (Napoleon) was much grieved to 
see the destruction of a nation bordering upon his empire, 
and whose maritime interests were closely connected with 
his own. He wished therefore to remove all pretence for 
the influence of England to interfere in the affairs of Spain, 
and to re-establish the relations of friendship and good 
neighbourhood between the two nations.”* A treaty was 
concluded at Valengay, where Ferdinand had been detained 
a prisoner for five years, in which Napoleon acknowledged 
him as King of Spain and of the Indies, and promised to 
withdraw the French troops from Spain; whilst Ferdinand 
engaged to cause the English to evacuate Spain, to pay his 
father King Charles an annual pension of 30,000,000 of 
reals, and to confirm those of his subjects who had taken 
service under Joseph in their titles and honours. Ferdinand 
dispatched the Duke of San Carlos to Madrid, with a copy of 
the treaty, directing the Kegenc}^ to ratify it. The Regency 
replied with many expressions of satisfaction at the approach¬ 
ing liberation and restoration of their king, and enclosed at 
the same time a copy of the decree of the Cortes, passed a 
year or two before, declaring that no act of the king, while 
in a state of captivitv, should be considered as valid. The 
treaty, therefore, remained without effect, and Ferdinand 
did not re-enter Spain for three months after. “Nothing,” 
said Wellington, “can be more satisfactory than the whole 
conduct of the Spanish Government regarding the negotia¬ 
tions for peace. I am certain that no govern¬ 

ment would act better than they have in this most im¬ 
portant of all concerns; and I doubt that any Regency under 
the existing constitution would have power to act better in 
other matters more peculiarly of internal concern.’fy But 
his lordship had soon reasons to qualify this praise. 

Being hard pressed for troops for the defence of France, 

* Thibaudeau, c Histoire de l’Empire,’ ch. 94. 

f Letter to Sir II. Wellesley. ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. 478. 



1814.] RELEASE OF KING FERDINAND. 183 

wishing to avail himself of the army of Suchet, and seeing 
that nothing could be gained by keeping his captive any 
longer, while something might be got by releasing him, 
Buonaparte ordered King Ferdinand to be let loose and 
whisked across the Pyrenees. Ferdinand reached Perpignan 
on the 22nd of March, and there agreed with Suchet to 
allow him to withdraw all the forces he had in the held, and 
all the garrisons he had in the fortresses of Catalonia, which 
garrisons were all blockaded by the Spaniards, and very 
near the capitulating point. But the Spanish Regency and 
Cortes had previously resolved that these garrisons should 
not be allowed to return to France with their arms; and 
they had referred the question to Lord Wellington, who had 
declared, in the strongest manner, that the said garrisons in 
Catalonia, or any other French force whatsoever, ought to 
be allowed no capitulation, except on the condition of their 
being prisoners of Avar. From 15,000 to 16,000 Frenchmen 
were shut up in these garrisons; they were not conscripts, 
beginning a campaign under most disastrous circumstances, 
but, for the most part, veteran troops, with a spirit as yet 
unbroken by any decisive defeat; and if Suchet could have 
united his entire force and have brought it in time to join 
Soult on the Garonne, the enemy must have been too strong 
for Wellington, whose forces were much weakened by the 
blockade of Bayonne and the occupation of Bordeaux. So 
inactive, however, had been the Regency and the Spanish 
General Copons and other commanders in the east, that 
Suchet had already been enabled to detach 10,000 men into 
France; and, the same causes continuing, he was now allowed 
to move off with the 14,000 disposable men he had in the 
lield, leaving his garrisons behind him. From the defiles of 
Catalonia, where he ought to have been crushed or reduced 
to an unconditional surrender, Marshal Suchet rapidly 
marched across the broad isthmus which joins France to 
Spain; but it was the beginning of April before he reached 
Narbonne, and then he halted. He had still a very long 
march to perform ere he could make a junction with Soult. 
And as part of the Austrian army had poured into France 
through Switzerland, and had reached Lyons, and had 
established its outposts considerably to the south of that 
great city, he had to fear that it might interpose in force be¬ 
tween him and Toulouse. 

Soult, as we have seen, arrived at Toulouse on the 24th 
of March. On the 27th Lord Wellington was close to him, 
in front of Toulouse; but the broad, deep, and rapid river 


184 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


Garonne flowed between them, the best passages were de- 
fended by French artillery, and the English pontoons and 
other means of carrying over troops, cannon, and stores, were 
as vet very defective. It had rained pitilessly for many days, 
and the rain, besides making the bad roads worse, swelled 
the river Garonne, and rendered the passage of the Allies 
more difficult. It was, therefore, the 9th of April before 
Wellington got his army across to the right bank of the 
river. On the 10th, was fought the bloody battle of 
Toulouse. This has been held by many to have been a 
useless display of heroism, and an unnecessary waste of 
human life; but the British general was totally ignorant of 
the events which had really rendered the combat unneces¬ 
sary ; and he had one great motive and incentive to fight 
the battle. This was to beat and scatter the army of Soult 
before it could be joined by Suchet, and to prevent that co¬ 
operation of the two marshals which might have revived the 
hopes of the beaten Napoleon, and have brought him down 
to the south to try another throw of the dice. If this had 
happened, and if the Austrians had failed in moving rapidly 
forward from Lyons, the weakened army of his lordship 
would have been exposed to the chances of a reverse, and of 
a long and disastrous retreat. Under all the circumstances, 
every wise general would have given battle at Toulouse, as 
Lord Wellington did. 

Even since the arrival of our army on the Garonne, Soult 
—through the causes already indicated—had been allowed 
thirteen days to make his defensive preparations. He now 
occupied another entrenched camp, of a very formidable 
description, on the eastern side of the city of Toulouse, 
on a range of heights between the river Ers and the great 
canal of Languedoc. He had redoubts and entrenchments, 
and tremendous teles de pont both on the river and on 
the canal, which must both be crossed by the Allies. To 
strengthen his own army in Champagne, Buonaparte had 
made large drafts upon Soult’s army of the south, yet the 
marshal had pretty nearly an equality in number, while in 
artillery he had a vast superiority. According to the best 
calculation which has been made, Soult had not less than 
42,000 men. Wellington had, in British, Germans, and 
Portuguese about 30,000, and in Spaniards about 15,000. 
Deduct 7,500 from the Spaniards, who, generally speaking, 
were not worth half their number of British troops, and 
Soult had an actual superiority of 4,500 men, and his 
entrenched camp and fortification were to him worth some 


RATTLE OF TOULOUSE. 


185 


1814 .] 

thousands of combatants. Nearly the whole of his position 
was bristling with guns, and many of these were so placed 
in battery on the summits of hills, that they could make 
a plunging fire into our ascending columns of attack. 
Moreover, there were many strongly-built houses, which 
had been fortified and crammed with tirailleurs ; and there 
were scattered villages, strong stone walls separating the 
vineyards and orchards, and a multiplicity of streamlets, 
and of trenches cut for the purposes of irrigation. All the 
roads too continued to be in a deplorable state—a far 
greater disadvantage to those who had to march consider¬ 
able distances to get to the attack than to those who were 
fixed and stationary, and who had to meet the attack behind 
prepared and fortified lines. Most fortunately the 18th 
hussars, under the immediate command of Colonel Vivian, 
had previously attacked and defeated a superior body of 
French cavalry, and driven them from an important bridge 
over the Ers, had pursued them through the village of 
Croix d’Orade, had taken about 100 prisoners, and had 
given time to the British infantry to come up and secure 
the bridge for the Allies.* 

As day dawned on the morning of the 10th of April— 
it was Easter Sunday, the holiest of all Sabbaths, a day of 
peace and reconciliation, and the church-bells of the distant 
villages were calling the devout peasantry to matins and 
early mass—the columns of the Allies began to move to their 
various points of attack, and to one of the fiercest and dead¬ 
liest scenes that war can present. Marshal Beresford moved 
first with the 4th and 6th divisions, which crossed the Ers 
-by the bridge of Croix d’Orade. After some hard fighting, 
Beresford gained possession of the village of Montblanc, 
and then attacked and carried some heights on Soult’s 
right, together with a redoubt which had been intended to 
cover and protect that flank; but the French were still in 

* The eloquent military historian of the war, who is too fond of detect¬ 
ing errors, says that the credit of this brilliant cavalry affair was Licor- 
rectly given in the dispatch to Colonel Vivian, for that officer was wounded 
by a carbine-shot previous to the charge at the bridge, and the attack 
was conceived and conducted entirely by Major Hughes of the 18th. 
(See Napier, Book xxiv.) I always prefer the authority of the ‘ Dis¬ 
patches’ to any other. The Commander-in-chief always took the greatest 
pains to make them correct, and he was never the man to give to one 
officer the praise due to another—whatever might be the difference of 
rank, or birth, or other circumstances. I have always understood that 
Colonel Vivian was wounded on the bridge, after the attack had been 
conceived, and when it was succeeding. 


186 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


possession of four other redoubts, and of the entrenchments 
and fortified houses, from which they could not be dis¬ 
lodged without artillery; and to drag heavy guns up those 
steeps and over those bad roads was work that required 
time, and the exertions of men as well as horses. 

Nearly at the same moment that Beresford fell upon 
Soult’s right, Wellington threw forward the Spanish 
division of General Freyre to fall upon Soult’s left. At first 
these Spaniards were repulsed, and being panic-stricken by 
the fire of the redoubts, and then being charged by French 
bayonets, the mass of them began a flight down the hills, 
which might have been attended with disastrous conse¬ 
quences ; but one Spanish light regiment, the Tiradores de 
Cantabria, got well under the French entrenchments, stand¬ 
ing firmly, and then the British light division, coming up 
at the charging pace, rallied the Spaniards who had given 
ground, and advanced with them to the attack with an 
irresistible fury, and a firmness proof to wounds and death. 
Many officers, as well Spanish as English, were wounded, 
and the men were mowed down by whole ranks at a time; 
but there they stood on the brow of that hill until Wel¬ 
lington was enabled to reinforce them, and until Beresford 
had made sure of the victory by breaking and turning the 
French right. 

Marshal Beresford had left his artillery in the village 
of Montblanc, and, notwithstanding all the exertions that 
were made, some considerable time elapsed before the guns 
could be brought up. During this trying interval Beres- 
ford’s two divisions were exposed to the hot cannonade of 
Soult’s batteries ; but the men sheltered themselves as best 
they could behind the redoubt they had captured. As soon 
as his artillery was up (it was about the hour of noon), 
Beresford continued his movement along the ridge, and 
carried, with the single brigade of General Pack, the two 
principal redoubts, and all the fortified houses in the enemy’s 
centre. The French made a desperate effort to regain 
those redoubts, but they were repulsed by the British 
bayonets. General Taupin, who had led them on, was 
slain; and Beresford’s 6th division moving farther along 
the ridge, of the heights, and the Spanish troops making 
a corresponding movement upon the front, the French 
were soon driven from the two redoubts, and the entrench- 
ments they had on their left; and the whole range of 
heights, which had been fortified with such pains, remained 
in the undisturbed possession of Beresford and the Allies. 


RETREAT OF SOULT. 


1814.] 


187 


The French withdrew with some confusion across the canal 
of Languedoc into the town of Toulouse, which Soult at 
one time thought of defending. 

Victory could not be gained on such ground, and in the 
teeth of so many strong works, without great loss: 600 of 
the Allies lay dead upon the field, and about 4,000 wounded 
were picked up. Soult confessed to 3,200 in killed and 
wounded, and as hisf people had fought in good part under 
cover, it is probable that this time his army sutfered somewhat 
less than the Allies. Our loss fell the heaviest on Beresford’s 
6th division. Some divisions of our army were not engaged 
at all, being held in reserve, ready to fight if they should 
be wanted. But Picton, with his “ fighting 3rd,” getting 
his Welsh head heated, committed an act of imprudence, 
engaging in earnest where he had been ordered only to 
make a feint, and storming a tremendous tete de pont in¬ 
stead of merely observing it. In the repulse sustained at 
this point a good many of the fighting men were laid low, 
Major-General Brisbane was wounded, and Colonel Forbes 
of the 45th was killed. Before the hour of Ave Maria the 
Allies were established on three sides of Toulouse, and the 
French were driven by Sir Rowland Hill from their 
exterior works in the suburb, on the left of the Garonne, 
within the ancient walls of the town.* Our cavalry paraded 
along the banks of the river Ers, guarding the Mont¬ 
pelier road. 

The 11th of March was spent by the Allies in bringing 
up ammunition and stores, and getting the artillery in 
positions, an attack being fixed by Wellington for daylight 
on the 12th; but, during the night of the 11th, Marshal 
Soult evacuated Toulouse by the only road which was still 
open to him, and retired by Castelnaudry to Carcassonne. 
On the 12th Lord Wellington entered Toulouse, to the 
great joy of the inhabitants, who were relieved from the 
tearful apprehensions of a siege. The white flag was 
flying, everybody had put on white cockades, and the 
people had pulled down Napoleon’s statue, and the eagles 
and other emblems of the imperial government. The 
municipality of Toulouse presented an address to Lord 
Wellington, requesting him to receive the keys of their city 
in the name of Louis XVIII. Lord Wellington told them 
what he had told the people of Bordeaux, that he believed 
the negotiations for peace were still being carried on with 
the existing government of France, and that they must 
* ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. 601-3. 


188 


MEMOIR OF TI1E DUKE. 


judge for themselves whether they meant to declare in 
favour of the Bourbons, in which case it would be his duty 
to treat them as Allies as long as the war lasted; but if 
peace should he made with Napoleon, he could not give 
them any more assistance or protection afterwards.* 

In the afternoon, however, of the same day the English 
Colonel Cooke, and the French Colonel St. Simon, arrived 
from Paris, with the news of Napoleon’s first abdication, 
and of the establishment of a provisional government, in the 
name of Louis XVIII. From Lord Wellington’s head¬ 
quarters the two officers proceeded to those of Marshal 
Soult, who did not think himself justified in submitting 
to the provisional government, having received no in¬ 
formation from Napoleon concerning what had happened; 
but he proposed an armistice to Lord Wellington. The 
British commander wrote to him a very polite letter, excus¬ 
ing himself from accepting the armistice, unless the marshal 
acknowledged the provisional government of France.f At 
the same time he made preparations to pursue Soult, if re¬ 
quired. The object of Lord Wellington was to prevent Mar¬ 
shals Soult and Suchet’s armies becoming the noyau of a civil 
war in France in favour of Napoleon’s pretensions for his 
son, or in favour of Napoleon himself. That daring man 
had not yet quitted France; his act of abdication might not 
be very binding upon one who had never been bound by 
any act, agreement, or treaty; he was not a prisoner, but 
still surrounded by many of his devoted guards; by the 
route traced out for him from Fontainebleau, to the island of 
Elba, he must traverse the southern provinces and approach 
Suchet’s army—and might he not join that army and en¬ 
deavour to effect a junction with Soult ? Thus the same 
reasons which induced Wellington to give battle at Toulouse 
still existed. At last, on the 18th of April, Soult, having re¬ 
ceived from Berthier an order to stop all hostilities, concluded 
a convention with Lord Wellington for the purpose. A line 
of demarcation was drawn between the two armies. The 
head-quarters of Lord Wellington remained at Toulouse. 
Marshal Suchet concluded a like convention with Lord 
Wellington on the 19th, by which the final evacuation of 
Catalonia by the French garrisons was provided for. 

On the 21st April, Lord Wellington, by general orders to 
his gallant army, congratulated them on the prospect of a 
speedy termination of their labours, and at the same time 
“ thanked them for their uniform discipline and gallantry 
* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. p. G03. f Id. vol. xi. p. 64*1. 


SIEGE or BAYONNE. 


189 


1814 .] 

in the field, and for their conciliating conduct- towards the 
inhabitants of the country.” 

The behaviour of our troops at Toulouse, Bordeaux, and 
the other towns and numerous villages they occupied, appears 
to have been in all respects excellent, and marked with more 
kindness towards the inhabitants than those people had been 
accustomed to receive from the later armies of the now fallen 
emperor. 

On the 14th of April, four days after Soult’s defeat at 
Toulouse, when the Allies were in full possession of that 
city, and Soult was flying rather than retreating from it, 
General Thouvenot, who commanded in Bayonne, chose to 
make a desperate sortie upon the unprepared Allies, who 
had received from Toulouse the Baris intelligence, and who 
all had reason to believe that Thouvenot had received it also 
through a French channel. The real state of affairs at Paris 
had been communicated to Thouvenot by General Sir John 
Hope the day before, and although that officer affected to 
doubt the authenticity, Hope, judging of other men by his 
own generous nature, evidently could not conceive that he 
would be capable of what must now be considered a base 
surprise, a savage spite, and a wilful shedding of blood. 
For some time Thouvenot and his garrison had been very 
inactive. As the works of the siege had not commenced, 
there were neither guns nor stores upon the ground to tempt 
a sortie. The investing forces were quiet in their positions 
and cantonments, and many of them were buried in sleep, 
and dreaming of an end to war’s alarms, and of a speedy 
return to their own countries, when the French, long before 
it was daylight, sallied forth from the citadel in great 
strength, and fell furiously upon our sleeping people and 
weak pickets. A considerable slaughter was committed 
before the Allied troops could be got under arms and into 
formation. Major-general Ilay was killed, and Major-gene¬ 
ral Stopford wounded. Sir John Hope, ever foremost when 
there was danger, mounted his horse, and galloped up in 
the dark to direct the advance of troops to the support of 
the pickets. He was presently surrounded; his horse was 
shot under him and fell, he received two severe wounds and 
was made prisoner. So dark was it, that for some time the 
French and English could distinguish each other’s ranks 
only by the flashing of the muskets. The guns of the cita¬ 
del, vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their 
shot and shell at random through the lines of fight, smashing 


190 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


quite as many of their own people as they struck of the 
Allies; and the gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened 
their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns which 
Sir John Hone had put in motion. Thus, nearly 100 pieces 
of artillery were in full play at once; and the shells having 
set fire to the fascine depots and to several houses, the flames 
cast a horrid glare over the scene of the confused conflict.* 
The fighting was very severe; but it was terminated by 
British bayonet charges: the French were driven back, the 
little ground which had been lost was all recovered, and by 
seven o’clock in the morning our pickets were reposted on 
their original grounds. But between killed and wounded 
and taken, the Allies had lost 800 men. It was, under the 
circumstances, scarcely a consolation to know that the French 
had suffered still more severely, and that many of their 
casualties were caused by the indiscriminating fire of their 
own guns. General Thouvenot’s conduct was throughout 
that of a savage. The capture of Sir John Hope, and the 
knowledge that he was very severely, if not mortally, 
wounded, carried affliction to the bosom of every man who 
had been serving under him. Major-general C. Colville, 
who succeeded to the command, sent a flag of truce to 
request that Hope’s friend, Colonel Macdonald, might be 
admitted into the fortress to see him and carry him assist¬ 
ance. Thouvenot had the brutality to refuse this request, 
and another which was made after it. It was the embarrassing 
destiny of Louis XVIII. to be compelled to honour and 
reward some of the greatest scoundrels that had sprung 
from the filth of the revolution, and who had struggled 
most desperately and remorselessly to keep Buonaparte upon 
the throne. Thus, on the 27th of June following, the re¬ 
stored Bourbon king was made to confer the cross of St. 
Louis upon Thouvenot, and to confirm him in his command 
at Bayonne. In this case, as in thousands of other cases, the 
royal favour was rather worse than thrown away. As soon as 
Buonaparte returned from Elba, Thouvenot broke his oath 
of allegiance to Louis, and declared for the emperor. Yet in 
ninety-nine out of every hundred French books relating to 
the history of the war, Thouvenot is applauded to the skies 
as a brave, honourable man and true patriot, the climax of 
whose fame was his bloody and useless sally from Bayonne! 
"With such false notions of honour, with such a public 
morality, what could have been expected but the events 
which happened in 1815, and those other convulsions which 

* Napier. 


END OP THE WAR, 


191 


1814 .] 

have kept France in a state of orgasm ever since? Soult 
was also honoured by Louis XVIII, and was also one of 
his betrayers. So was it with the sanguinary Suchet, 
who, had he found the opportunity, would most assuredly 
have behaved to the Allies alter the fashion of Tkou- 
venot. 

The sortie of Bayonne was the last affair of the war in 
1814; but the battle of Toulouse was the last real battle, 
and the glorious winding up of Lord Wellington’s long con¬ 
tests with Soult. It was a remarkable combat; but the 
most remarkable part of the story yet remains to be told 
—the French claimed, and to this day most pertinaciously 
and loudly claim, the victory ! 

The brief preceding account of the battle, in which 
everything is clear and simple, is derived entirely from the 
dispatches and private letters of Lord Wellington, who 
never exaggerated a success or concealed a reverse, who 
never spoke or wrote of his victories except in a short, 
quiet, modest manner, -who never, in his life, spun a rhe¬ 
toric sentence about the exploits of his army, and never 
once dwelt on his own skill or prowess. 

On no former occasion, not even after the great battle at 
Vittoria, which the French themselves are compelled to 
admit was a complete and decisive victory, had his lordship 
spoken more decidedly as to his having beaten the enemy. 
In a private letter to General Sir John Hope, written six 
days after the battle, he said—“ We beat Marshal Soult on 
the 10th in the strong position at Toulouse. The 11th was 
spent in reconnaissances towards the road of Carcassonne, 
and in the arrangements to be adopted for shutting him in 
Toulouse entirely. The 11th, at night, he evacuated the 
town, and marched by the road of Carcassonne.” Before 
sunset on the 10th, the Allies had carried all the positions 
that it was necessary to carry, and Soult was driven into 
Toulouse, -where he could not venture to stay much more 
than twenty-four hours. It has been well said—“ Did 
Marshal Soult fight this battle to retain possession of the 
heights which he had fortified, and which commanded the 
town ? If so, he lost them. Did he fight to keep possession 
of Toulouse ? If so, he lost that .” * Or, again, take the 
words of another British officer who has a superstition for 
Buonaparte, and who is ever inclined rather to extol the 
bravery and skill of the French than to decry them : “ He 
(Wellington) desired to pass the Garonne, and he did pass 
* Lord Burgliersh, ‘ Narrative.' 


192 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave, 
and he. did win them ; lie desired to enter Toulouse, and he 
did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops.” * We 
have Marshal Soult’s own words for the fact that he did 
intend to keep possession of the heights, to fight a battle for 
them, and to keep possession of Toulouse, cost him what it 
might; and w T e have also his own words for the other fact, 
that, after he had fought the battle, he found that he had lost 
the heights, that he could not keep the town, and that 
nothing was left him but a quick retreat. And if a quick 
retreat, and the loss of 1,600 prisoners, of three general 
officers, and of cannon and stores, are good proofs of victory, 
Soult’s victory of Toulouse may remain unquestioned. 

To remove any doubt as to the meaning of Soult’s 
■words, I subjoin them, literally translated into English. 

On the 7th of April, just three days before Lord Wel¬ 
lington attacked him, Soult wrote to Suchet, “ I am deter¬ 
mined to fight a battle near Toulouse, whatever may be the 
superiority of the enemy’s force. For this purpose I am forti¬ 
fying a position which rests on the canal and the town, which 
will afford me an entrenched camp capable of being defended 
whether the enemy attacked from the side of Montaaban or 
from the side of Castelnaudry. I hear the Allies have en¬ 
tered Paris. This great misfortune confirms my determina¬ 
tion to defend Toulouse at all risks; for the preservation of 
this city, which contains establishments of all kinds, is for us 
of the very greatest importance .” On the very evening of 
the battle, he wrote again to Suchet, to tell that marshal, not. 
that he had gained a victory, but that the battle had com¬ 
pletely overset all his determinations. “ The battle,” said 
Soult, “ which I announced to you has taken place to-day. 
It has been most murderous. The enemy suffered horribly, 
but have succeeded in establishing themselves in the position 
which I had occupied on the right of Toulouse. I do not 
think I can remain long in Toulouse. It may even happen 
that I may have to fight my way out.”f And again, on the 
morning of the 11th, while his army was making its prepara¬ 
tions to fly by night, Soult, who would have lessened his re¬ 
verses to a rival in fame, and to a man he hated as he did 
Suchet, if such deception could then have been practicable, 
wrote to his brother marshal“ As I intimated to you in 
my letter of yesterday, I find myself under the necessity of 
retiring from Toulouse, and I am even afraid of being 


* Napier, Book xxiv. chap. 6. 


fid. 


BATTLE OF TOULOUSE* 


193 


1814 .] 

forced to fight for a passage by Baziege, where the enemy 
lias sent a column to cut me off from that communication. 
To-morrow I shall take a position at Villefranehe [ twenty- 
four miles , be it observed, from Toulouse], for 1 hope the 
enemy may not he able to prevent my passing. Thence I 
shall make for Castelnaudry iff teen or sixteen miles far¬ 
ther'] : if I shall be able to stop there, I will do so ; if not, 
I shall take a position at Carcassonne.” Carcassonne was 
twenty-six miles farther still, or at the respectful distance 
from Toulouse of sixty-five or sixty-six miles ! 

When an army marches twenty-two miles in one night, 
it is not retreat but flight. It remained for the acuteness of 
French philosophy to discover in a headlong flight the 
evidence and proof of a victory. jSTor was this retreat, rapid 
as it was, undisturbed by the Allies. Soult was closely pur¬ 
sued, his rear-guard was repeatedly attacked: and he con¬ 
fessed himself, at the time, that in every' attack it was 
worsted. He says that he reached Castelnaudry on the 
13th, and that he was about “to continue his movement,” 
when he received intelligence of the political events at 
Paris, and relaxed his efforts. But what effort could he 
make, what movement could he continue, except that 
movement of rapid retreat which he had begun on the 
night of the 11th. 

The most recent French account of the battle that I have 
read is that of M. Capefigue. In general this very volu¬ 
minous w r riter has less superstition for Buonaparte, and less 
prejudice and rancour against England than the vast ma¬ 
jority of his writing confraternity; but even Capefigue 
clings to the Toulouse victory as if the honour and salva¬ 
tion of France depended upon it. He seems, however, to 
be sensible that plain prose and circumstantial statements 
will not do, for he takes refuge in a rhapsody of prose- 
poetry, and describes the battle as Alexander Dumas or 
Eugene Sue might describe a purely fictitious combat. 
“ The day of April, sad but glorious date for Toulouse! 
The cannon roars; Lord Wellington attacks the French 
entrenched on a line of three leagues. Marshal Soult 
leads with him generals of the first order, Clausel, d’Ar- 
magnac, Bey, Villate; he is alone; Suchet has not joined 
him. It is a day of manoeuvres [there were no manoeuvres 
at all , for none were necessary , the Allies merely marching 
up to attack the enemy's fixed positions] ; the losses on both 
sides are considerable, some of the French lines are carried 
[all their positions were carried] ; the ground is littered 

o 


194 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


with the dead. On the morrow, the 11th, the Allies under 
Lord Wellington recommence the battle, [ the Allies did 
nothing of the sort, for the battle was finished on the IQtli, 
and Soult, by lying close in Toulouse , gave Wellington no op- 
portunity of attacking him , Immunity and good policy alike 
forbidding his lordship to bombard the city , or even to make an 
assault upon the town, where friendly or peaceful citizens 
might have been exposed to as much danger as the Buona- 
parlist troops ]. During three days, Marshal Soult in¬ 
trepidly defends his entrenched camp at Toulouse. [He 
was driven from that entrenched camp in one day , the 10 th ; 
on the second day there was no fighting for the reason afore¬ 
said, and on the third day he was at Castelnaudry, thirty- 
nine or forty miles from Toulouse.'] He only evacuates his 
positions step by step, and on account of the news which 
reaches him from Paris. [Soult tells us himself that the 
Paris news had no effect upon him nor his movements until 
he reached Castelnaudry , and the positions had all been 
evacuated three days before that.] This battle, which took 
the name of Toulouse, is one of the most glorious souvenirs 
of Marshal Soult: it has created a military confraternity 
between him and the Duke of Wellington.”* 

Some few French officers, who were present in the battle, 
have, however, left upon record their frank soldierlike con¬ 
fessions that, though their positions were admirable and 
bravely defended, the day was, beyond contradiction, lost by 
Soult: according to Colonel la Pene, the battle was consi¬ 
dered as lost as soon as Marshal Beresford carried the first * 
redoubt on the French right, an achievement which was 
performed very early in the day. “ This irreparable loss,” 
says the French colonel, an eye-witness and a combatant, 

“ was a thunderstroke to us ! We could not at first believe 
in so great a misfortune ; we saw all of a sudden our hopes 
destroyed, and we abandoned the prospect of a victory which 
before seemed so certain.” 

Thousands of the combatants, officers and men, French 
and English, Spaniards and Portuguese, are yet living 
to bear testimony (if truth be in the French portion of 
these survivors) to the scrupulous veracity of Lord Wel¬ 
lington’s dispatch ; and there are living many hundreds 
upon hundreds of the inhabitants of Toulouse, who saw 
from the windows and the roof-tops of their houses (the 
great part of which commanded an uninterrupted view 

* L’Europe pendant le Consulat et l’Empire, Paris, 1840. 


AT TARTS. 


1814 .] 


195 


of the scene of carnage) how the battle began and how 
it ended, how redoubt was carried, after redoubt, position 
after position, how the French abandoned all the heights, 
and rushed into the town, which was commanded by those 
heights, and how they fled, at the hour of night, from Tou¬ 
louse, by the only road upon which there was any chance 
of escape. Yet, notwithstanding all this evidence, the 
French continue to claim the honours of Toulouse; and 
the government of his late majesty Louis Philippe gave 
its countenance to a project for erecting on the heights 
which Wellington conquered a pillar or column to com¬ 
memorate the glory of Marshal Soult and his army on 
the 10th of April 1814.* 

"When Soult proffered his allegiance to Louis XVIII., a 
line of demarcation was drawn between the two armies in 
the south of France ; the head-quarters of Lord Wellington 
continuing to be at Toulouse. 

On the 30th of April, at night, his lordship left Toulouse, 
for Paris, whither he had been summoned by Lord Castle* 
reagh, who appreciated his political as well as his military 
genius, and who, more than any other minister of the crown, 
had supported and strengthened him in the arduous struggle 
in which he had been so long engaged, constantly predicting 
his final success. He reached the French capital on the 4th of 
May, and was received by Louis XVIII., and by the sove¬ 
reign princes, statesmen, and generals who then crowded the 
French court with every mark of deference, consideration, re¬ 
spect, and honour. It was an assemblage of experience, wis¬ 
dom, and valour, collected from every country in Europe, 
such as the world has not often witnessed at one time and 
place ; but it may be said, without partiality, that the greatest 
man of them all was YVellington. Lord Castlereagh had 
recommended to the prince regent that the important office 
of ambassador to the court of France should be given to our 
great soldier. For good, straightforward, decided, honest 
diplomacy (the only diplomacy worth anything in the end), 
he was eminently qualified by nature, by mature reflection, 
and by experience both in Asia and in Europe; but he 
modestly told Viscount Castlereagh, that, though obliged and 
flattered by the new situation given to him, he doubted his 
own qualifications. “ I hope, however,” said he, “ that the 

* ‘ Piet. Hist.’ Reign of George III. * Quarterly Review,’ vol. 72. In 
this excellent review article, the whole of the vexed question about the 
battle of Toulouse is discussed and set at rest. I have seen no Trench 
attempt at refutation worth a moment’s notice. 

o 2 


193 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


prince regent, his government, and your lordship, are con¬ 
vinced that I am ready to serve in any situation in which it 
may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I 
have been so long absent from England, I should have re¬ 
mained as much longer if it had been necessary; and I feel 
no objection to another absence in the public service, if it be 
necessary or desirable.”* 

Whilst staying at Paris, he received from the prime 
minister of England, intimation that he had been advanced 
to an English dukedom, and that peerages had been con¬ 
ferred on his brave companions, Sir John Hope, Sir Thomas 
Graham, Sir Stapleton Cotton, Sir Rowland Hill, and Sir 
W. C. Beresford. In a letter dated Paris, 9th of May, he 
returned his thanks to the Earl of Liverpool, in his usual 
quiet, brief way, showing that he felt more pleasure at 
the honours conferred on his “ gallant coadjutors,” than 
at his ow r n elevation. In the same letter he intimated that 
he intended to make a journey into Spain. “ I purpose,” 
said he, “ to go to Madrid in order to try w r hether I cannot 
prevail upon all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt 
a constitution more likely to be practicable and to con¬ 
tribute to the peace and happiness of the nation. I am 
afraid that I shall not be in England till the end of June; 
but I hope I shall be able to do much good by this journey. 
A very short time in England will enable me to settle all 
that I have to do there.”! 

The Duke !—he had been for some time a Spanish duke 
and a Portuguese duke, and had received the insignia of 
every distinguished Order in Europe—quitted Paris on the 
10th of May, and, passing four days with his army at 
Toulouse, he repaired to Madrid, where he arrived on the 
24th, to receive fresh honours which he cared not for, and 
to give an infinitude of excellent advice, which the Spaniards 
were not wise and cool enough to follow. The factions were 
infuriated against each other. The liberals w r anted to main¬ 
tain the impracticable ultra-democratic constitution which 
they had manufactured at Cadiz; the royalists would have 
no constitution at all, but only a repristination of the old 
absolute monarchy. Neither would yield an inch or enter 
into any compromise; and the liberates , being the weaker, 
were crushed. The peasantry and the mass of the people, 
whether in towns or in the country, w r ere devotedly attached to 
the restored Ferdinand, and abhorred the name of the Cortes. 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xi. f Id, vol. xii. p, .4. 


AT MADRID. 


197 


1814 .] 

The Duke found that nothing could be more popular than 
the king and his measures, as far as they had gone, to the 
overthrow of the Cadiz constitution ; and that, though some 
thought it an unnecessary and impolitic measure, the arrest 
of the Liberals was liked by the people at large. Seventy 
members of the Cortes seceded at once, and presented a 
memorial to Ferdinand, in which they solemnly protested 
against sundry harsh measures of that house, directed against 
the sovereign, as having been carried by force and intimida¬ 
tion. To the Duke of San Carlos, and others, Wellington 
urged the necessity of governing upon moderate and more 
liberal principles. But of moderation the Spaniards knew 
nothing, and the formation of any rational constitution was, 
for the time, a sheer impracticability. Men there were, 
about the court of Madrid, who entertained the most extra¬ 
vagant expectations, and the idea that they could all be 
realized, and that Spain might resume the foremost position 
she had held among nations at the time of the Emperor 
Charles V., by throwing herself into the arms of France, 
and by making an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the 
restored Bourbon dynasty of that country. They even 
talked of a war with England as a possible contingency. 
They were to recover all their revolted colonies in South 
America, and to shut all their ports against British trade. 
“ It is quite obvious to me,” said the Duke of Wellington, 
“ that, unless we can turn them from their schemes, they will 
throw themselves into the arms of the French, coute qui 
coute; and I am anxious for the early settlement of all 
these points, because we have now the ball at our foot. . . 
But the fact is, that there are no public men in this country 
who are acquainted either with the interests or the wishes of 
the country; and they are so slow in their motions that it is 
impossible to do anything with them.” * 

Before quitting the Spanish capital, the Duke drew up 
the following remarkable diplomatic paper. 

MEMORANDUM TO HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, EERDINAND VII., 

KING OF SPAIN. 

“ The Spanish nation having been engaged for six years 
in one of the most terrible and disastrous contests by which 
any nation was ever afflicted, its territory having been en¬ 
tirely occupied by the enemy, the country torn to pieces by 
internal divisions, its ancient constitution having been de- 

* Letter to Viscount Castlereagh, Madrid June 1st. ‘ Dispatches,’ 
vol, xii. pp. 37-40. 


MEMOIR. OP TIIE DUKE. 


198 

stroyed, and vain attempts made to establish a new one; its 
marine, its commerce, and revenue, entirely annihilated ; its 
colonies in a state of rebellion, and nearly lost to the mother 
country; it becomes a question for serious consideration, 
what line of policy should be adopted by his Majesty upon 
his happy restoration to his throne and authority. 

“ In considering this question, I shall lay aside all national 
partialities and prejudices ; and I shall go so far as to admit, 
what neither his Majesty nor the people of Spain will be 
disposed to admit, that the conduct which Great Britain has 
held during the war is to be put entirely out of the question, 
and that his Majesty has the right, not only in fact, but in 
justice, to choose between the lines of policy and alliance 
which may be offered to his acceptance. 

“ The restoration of the ancient government in France is 
certainly a new feature in the political situation of the whole 
world; and it is but fair to give due weight to this event in 
a consideration of the affairs of Spain. 

“ Spain, like Great Britain, is essentially confined within 
what may be called its natural limits. His Majesty cannot 
hope to hold a dominion beyond those limits for any length 
of time, or to possess an influence which the natural strength 
of his government would not otherwise give him. In the 
last century, by a particular chain of circumstances, Spain 
was enabled to establish a part of the royal family in Italy. 
But, however close the relationship still existing between 
the reigning house in Spain and those branches of it, they 
have been of but little use to Spain in the various wars . 
which have occurred, since that period, in the last and present 
centuries. Those powers, like others, have necessarily fol¬ 
lowed the system which best suited their own interests, and 
have adhered to Spain only in the instances in which this 
adhesion was likely to be beneficial to themselves. This is 
owing to the peninsular situation of Spain, and affords the 
strongest practical proofs how little it suits the interests of 
Spain to push political objects beyond the boundary of 
her natural limits. If this were not true, it will be admitted 
that the first object for every national government to attend 
to is the internal interests of the country under its charge; and 
this object is to be preferred doubly when, as it happens, the 
state of Europe at the moment renders probable a long peace. 

“ There is no doubt, then, that the objects of his Majesty 
will be the amelioration of the internal situation of his 
kingdom, the restoration of its marine, its commerce, and 
revenue, and the settlement of its colonies. 


1814.] NOTE TO THE KING OP SPxVIN. 199 

“ Supposing France, under its new government, to be 
more capable or better disposed than Great Britain to for¬ 
ward his Majesty’s objects abroad, which may be doubted, it 
remains to be seen which of the powers is most likely to 
forward the objects of his internal government, and to 
enable him to restore his monarchy to its ancient splendour. 

“ France, like all the other nations of Europe, has suf¬ 
fered considerably by the war, and is now but little capable 
of giving his Majesty the assistance which he requires for 
the attainment of any of the objects for which assistance is 
wanted. 

“ Notwithstanding the restoration of the ancient govern¬ 
ment in France, this country will not easily forget the in¬ 
juries which it has received from the French armies; and 
the unpopularity w r hich will attend an alliance with France, 
connected, as it probably will be, with a dereliction of the 
alliance with Great Britain, will greatly increase the diffi¬ 
culties of his Majesty’s situation. 

“ The revival of the commerce of Spain is an object of the 
utmost importance, not only for the people but for the 
government itself; but there is no doubt that the commerce 
with the richer country (Great Britain), will be far more 
profitable than that with the poorer, particularly in those 
articles in which consist principally the riches of Spain. 
The cheapness also, and goodness, in respect to their price, 
of ail the manufactures of Great Britain, are an additional 
inducement to prefer them, as they will bear on importation 
larger duties than those of any other country. 

“ But the principal object for the attention of the king’s 
government, at the present moment, is the settlement of the 
colonies. The only mode of effecting any desirable arrange¬ 
ment is, that the Spanish government should open them¬ 
selves entirely upon the question, and come to a clear under¬ 
standing with Great Britain. 

“ It may be depended upon, that if Spain is cordially 
and intimately connected with Great Britain, the British 
ministry are too well acquainted with the interests of their 
country to think of risking their connection with Spain for 
a little more of the trade to the Spanish colonies in 
America. 

“ They may be of opinion that, under existing circum¬ 
stances, it is desirable for Spain to alter the nature of her 
connection with her colonies, and to hold them as dependent 
or federated states, rather than as colonies; and they may 
wish that the king’s subjects should participate in the sup- 


200 


MEMOIR OP TIIE DUKE. 


posed benefits of this commerce ; but they cannot oppose 
the right which the Spanish government have to make 
such arrangements upon these points as they may think 
most beneficial to their own interests; and, a good under¬ 
standing once established, Great Britain will cordially 
support those arrangements to the utmost of her power. 

“ But besides those difficulties which must occur in the 
settlement with the colonies, from the want of a firm alliance 
and good understanding with the British Government on 
that subject, which may be attributed to his Majesty’s 
subjects, there are others of far greater magnitude, which 
are to be attributed to the United States. It will not be 
denied that, in the existing state of the finances of Spain 
and of her marine, his Majesty could not hope to coerce the 
government of the United States, either to do his Majesty 
justice in regard to parts of his territories in America, which 
they have unjustifiably seized, or to refrain from aiding and 
abetting the rebellion of his subjects in the colonies. These 
objects can be effected only by the interference of the British 
Government; and it may be depended upon, that, however 
interested Great Britain may be to prevent the growth of 
the poAver of the United States, the British ministers will 
not increase the difficulties of their peace with that power 
by introducing into the negotiations questions on Spanish 
interest, if there should not be a clear and decided under¬ 
standing betAveen his Majesty and the Prince Regent on all 
points, not only regarding America, but Europe, and that 
they should be quite certain, that, under no circumstances, 
will Great Britain again see Spain in alliance with her 
rivals in Europe, or in the ranks of her enemies. 

“ It appears, then, that all the domestic interests of Spain 
are most likely to be promoted by a good understanding, 
and cementing the alliance with Great Britain; and the 
more minutely this part of the subject is vieAved, the more 
clearly will it appear that such understanding is desirable, if 
not necessary, to Spain. 

“ The finances of Spain are in the utmost disorder; the 
revenue is unproductive, if not nearly destroyed, and is, at 
all events, quite unequal to the expenses. But before those 
expenses can even be reduced by the reduction of the 
military establishment, and even if the government had 
credit, there is but little money in the country which could 
be borrowed as a resource. England alone can be looked to 
for assistance in this respect. 

“It cannot be expected, however, that the British Govern- 


NOTE TO THE KING OP SPAIN. 


201 


1814 .] 

incut will come forward with the resources of the British 
nation to aid his Majesty, if they are not certain of the line 
of policy which his Majesty will adopt both in America and 
in Europe; neither will it be in their power to give that 
aid which every well-wisher of his Majesty would wish to 
see atforded, if he should not at an early period carry into 
execution his gracious promises made to his subjects in his 
decree of the 4th May; and if some steps should not be 
taken to prove to the world the necessity and justice of the 
numerous arrests which attended his Majesty’s restoration 
to his throne, or for the release of the innocent, and the 
judicial trial of the guilty. 

“ All nations are interested in these measures, but Great 
Britain in particular; and the nature of the British consti¬ 
tution, and the necessity which the government are under 
of guiding their measures in a great degree by the wishes 
and sentiments of the people, must prevent them from 
giving aid to his Majesty in money, or from giving coun¬ 
tenance to the endeavours which may be made to raise 
money by loan in England, at least till the world shall be 
convinced by experience of the sincerity of his Majesty’s 
professions in regard to his own subjects, and of his desire 
to unite his interests with those of the British Government. 

“ Great Britain is materially interested in the prosperity 
and greatness of Spain, and a good understanding and close 
alliance with Spain is highly important to her, and she will 
make sacrifices to obtain it, and there is no act of kindness 
which may not be expected from such an ally; but it 
cannot be expected from Great Britain that she will take any 
steps for the firm establishment of a government which she 
shall see in the fair way of connecting itself with her rival, 
and of eventually becoming her enemy : like other nations, 
she must, by prudence and foresight, provide for her own 
interests by other modes, if circumstances should prevent 
his Majesty from connecting himself with Great Britain, as 
it appears by the reasoning in this memorandum is desirable 
to him.* ” 

Madrid, 1814. 

He strongly urged upon the Spanish government the 
propriety of rewarding such of the Spanish officers as had 
behaved meritoriously during the war; he generously and 
ardently supported the claims of various ecclesiastics and 
civilians who had rendered important services, and made 

* ‘ Dispatches/ vol, xii. pp. 40-45, 


202 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


great, sacrifices for their country, and, as a last bequest, lie 
drew up and gave to the Minister at War an admirable 
paper on the organization of the Spanish troops. 

The Duke left Madrid on the 5th of June. On the 10th 
of that month he was again with his army, which, with the 
exception of some divisions previously embaVked for the 
purpose of carrying war into the interior of the United 
States of America, was collected at Bordeaux, in order to 
evacuate France, according to the treaty of Paris. For the 
last time he passed those gallant bands in review. He then 
drew up admirable arrangements for the orderly embarka¬ 
tion of the troops. On the 14th of June he finally took 
leave of the army, leaving General the Earl of Dalhousie to 
superintend the embarkation of the infantry; the cavalry 
marching through the heart of France to embark at ports 
on the British channel. 

Ilis order of thanks is very remarkable “for the con¬ 
trast which it presents to those inflated addresses by which 
the vanity and the passions of Buonaparte’s soldiers were 
flattered and nourished.”* 

“ Adjutant-General’s Office, 

“ G. O. Bordeaux, 14th of June, 1814. 

“ The Commander of the Forces, being upon the point of 
returning to England, takes this opportunity of congra¬ 
tulating the army upon the recent events which have re¬ 
stored peace to their country and to the world. 

“ The share which the British army has had in producing . 
those events, and the high character with which the army 
will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to every 
individual belonging to it, as they are to the Commander of 
the Forces ; and he trusts that the troops will continue the 
same good conduct to the last. 

“The Commander of the Forces once more requests the 
army to accept his thanks. 

“ Although circumstances may alter the relations in which 
he has stood towards them for some years so much to his 
satisfaction, he assures them he will never cease to feel the 
warmest interest in their welfare and honour; and that he 
will be at all times happy to be of any service to those to 
whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry, their country is so 
much indebted. 

(Signed) “ E. M. Pakenham, A. G.f” 

* Captain M. Slierer, * Military Memoir.’ 
f ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 62. 


IN THE HOUSE OP LORDS. 


203 


1814.] 

The duke landed at Dover on the 23rd of June, under a 
salute from the batteries. Although it was at a very early 
hour in the morning, a great concourse of mariners and other 
people assembled on the beach, and the instant his lordship 
set his foot on shore they resolved to carry him in triumph 
to the Ship Hotel; and, as there was no escaping this not 
very convenient honour, he was borne from the beach to the 
house on the shoulders of some of the Dover men, all the 
rest following with shouts and cheers which made the 
walls of the ancient castle and Shakespeare’s cliff ring and 
re-echo. He proceeded instantly to London. In crossing 
Westminster Bridge, and driving up Parliament Street, he 
was recognised and welcomed by the heartiest shouts that 
ever proceeded from an English populace. After a short in¬ 
terview with his family, he hastened to Portsmouth. Here 
the Prince Regent received him with every possible demon¬ 
stration of respect and cordial affection. These distinctions 
gave him honour, not only before England, but in the face 
of Europe; for the Emperor of Russia and the King of 
Prussia were at that period the guests of the Regent, and 
the court was crowded with illustrious warriors and states¬ 
men from all parts of the continent. 

Upon the 28th of June, the Duke of Wellington, for the 
first time, took his seat in the House of Lords. The peers 
assembled in great numbers to do honour to his introduc¬ 
tion. He appeared in a field-marshal’s uniform, with the 
insignia of the Garter, and was introduced to the House by 
the Dukes of Beaufort and Richmond. He had left his 
native country, five years before, a commoner; those years 
he had passed entirely in foreign countries, and mostly in 
camps ; and now, at his first appearance in the upper house, 
his various patents of baron, viscount, earl, marquis, and 
duke, were read upon the same day. The Lady Morning- 
ton, the aged mother of the hero, lived to see her son 
obtain the highest honours that can be conferred upon a 
subject, and had the happiness of being present in the 
House of Lords on this day. 

“ Altius his nihil est.” 

For the son there could be no higher glory upon earth; but 
the pleasure, the joy, the rapture, must have been greatest 
for the venerable and loving mother, who had so carefully 
watched the infancy, boyhood, and youth of the hero, and 
whose first lessons, the most precious and enduring of all, had 
contributed to form young Arthur Wellesley for greatness. 



204 


MEMOIR OE THE DUKE. 


Having taken the oaths and signed the test rolls, Welling¬ 
ton, accompanied by liis two noble supporters, took his 
seat on the dukes’ bench. Lord Chancellor Eldon then rose, 
and, pursuant to their lordships’ vote, pronounced the thanks 
and congratulations of the House. Among other things the 
Chancellor said:—“I cannot forbear to call the especial 
attention of all who hear me to a fact in your grace’s life, 
singular, I believe, in the history of the country, and infi¬ 
nitely honourable to your grace, that you have manifested, 
upon your first entrance into this House, your right, under 
various grants, to all the dignities in the peerage of this 
realm which the Crown can confer. These dignities have 
been conferred at various periods, but in the short compass 
of little more than four years, for great public services, 
occurring in rapid succession, claiming the favour of the 
Crown, influenced by its sense of justice to your grace and 
the country; and on no one occasion in which the Crown has 
thus rewarded your merits, haA^e the Houses of Parliament 
been inattentive to your demands upon the gratitude of the 
country. Upon all such occasions they have offered to your 
grace their acknowledgments and thanks, the highest 
honours they could bestow. 

“ I decline all attempts to state your grace’s eminent merits 
in your military character — to represent those brilliant ac¬ 
tions, those illustrious achievements, which have attached 
immortality to the name of Wellington, and which have 
given to this country a degree of glory unexampled in the 
annals of this kingdom. In thus acting, I believe I best 
consult the feelings which evince your grace’s title to the 

character of a truly great and illustrious man. 

. . . . I presume not to trespass upon the House by 

representing the personal satisfaction which I have derived 
from being the honoured instrument of conveying to your 
grace the acknowledgments and thanks of this House upon 
every occasion upon which they have been offered to your 
grace, or by endeavouring to represent the infinite gratifica¬ 
tion which I enjoy, in presenting to your grace in person these 
acknowledgments and those thanks. Your grace is now called 
to aid hereafter, by your wisdom and judgment, the great 
council of that nation, to the peace, prosperity, and glory of 
which your grace has already so essentially contributed; 
and I tender your grace, now taking your seat in this 
House, in obedience to its commands, the thanks of the 
House, in the words of its resolution :—‘ That the thanks 
of this House be given to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wei- 


IN TIIE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 


205 


IE 14.] 

lington, on his return from his command abroad, for his 
eminent and unremitting service to his Majesty and to the 
public.’ ” * 

The duke’s reply was short, modest, and dignified; hut he 
did not fail to call attention to the valour and exertions of 
the army he had commanded. 

The House of Commons, who had voted 500,000/. for the 
support of his dignity, also passed a vote of thanks, and 
appointed a deputation to wait upon his grace with it. On 
the 1st of July, the duke went to the Lower House to deliver 
his reply : when, in the usual manner and etiquette, it was 
announced that the Duke of Wellington was in attend¬ 
ance, and when the Speaker put the question, “Is it the 
pleasure of the House that his grace be called in ? ” a loud 
and universal “ Aye ”! rang through the hall. On his en¬ 
trance, all the members uncovered, rose, and enthusiastically 
cheered him. 

The duke spoke to the following effect:—“ Mr. Speaker, 
I was anxious to be permitted to attend this House, in order 
to return my thanks in person for the honour they have 
done me, in deputing a committee of their members to con¬ 
gratulate me on my return to this country; and this, after 
the House had animated my exertions by their applause 
upon every occasion which appeared to merit their appro¬ 
bation, and after they had filled up the measure of their 
favour by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of 
the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had been 
known to have received. I hope it will not be deemed pre¬ 
sumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my 
admiration of the great efforts made by this House and the 
country at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, 
in order to support the great scale of operations by which 
the contest was brought to so favourable a termination. By 
the wise policy of Parliament, the Government was enabled 
to give the necessary support to the operations which were 
carried on under my direction; and I was encouraged, by 
the confidence reposed in me by his Majesty’s ministers, and 
b} r the Commander-in-chief, by the gracious favour of his 
royal highness the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which 
I had on the support of my gallant friends, the general 
officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and 
troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to 
acquire for me those marks of the approbation of this House 

* ‘ Annual Register,’ for the year 1811', 


206 


MEMOIR OE THE DUKE. 


for which I have now the honour to make my humble ao 
knowledgments. Sir, it is impossible for me to express t .ie 
gratitude which I feel; I can only assure the House, that I 
shall always be ready to serve his Majesty in any capacity 
in which my services can be deemed useful, with the same 
zeal for my country which has already acquired for me the 
approbation of this House.” * 

This speech was received with loud cheers, at the end of 
which the Speaker, who had sat covered during its delivery, 
rose, and thus addressed his grace“ My Lord,—Since last 
I had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series 
of eventful years has elapsed; but none without some mark 
and note of your rising glory. 

“ The military triumphs which your valour has achieved, 
upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro 
and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts 
of admiring nations. These triumphs it is needless on this 
day to recount. Their names have been written by your 
conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall 
hand them down with exultations to our children’s children. 

“It is not, however, the grandeur of military success 
which lias alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our 
applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which 
inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught 
them to know that the day of battle was always a day of 
victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which 
in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary * 
minds, stood, neverthless, unshaken; and that ascendancy 
of character which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival 
nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes 
of mighty empires. 

“ For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you 
by this House, in gratitude for your many and eminent ser¬ 
vices, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknow¬ 
ledgments ; but this nation well knows that it is still largely 
your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction, that, 
amidst the constellation of illustrious warriors who have 
recently visited our country, we could present to them a 
leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, 
conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven, 
and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept 
away the present generation, you will have left your great 
name an imperishable monument, exciting others to like 
deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and 

* ‘ Annual Register.’ 


1814.] NATIONAL THANKSGIVING. 207 

perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling 
nations of the earth. 

“ It now remains only, that we congratulate your grace 
upon the high and important mission* on which you are 
about to proceed, and we doubt not that the same splendid 
talents so conspicuous in war will maintain, with equal 
authority, firmness, and temper, our national honour and 
interests in peace.” f 

Iiis grace then withdrew; and all the members rising 
again, he was reconducted by the serjeant-at-arms to the 
door of the House. After he was gone, his warm friend 
Lord Castlereagh moved, that what the Duke had said on 
returning thanks, together with the Speaker’s answer, 
should be printed in the votes, which was agreed to nem. 
con. 

On the 7th July a national thanksgiving was held at St. 
Paul’s Cathedral for the restoration of the blessings of peace. 
It was observed with all the state and solemnity then usual 
on such occasions. In the procession from Carlton House to 
the church, the. Duke rode in the same carriage with the 
Regent, sitting on his right hand. And it was during this 
procession that I, then a youth, saw for the first time that 
person and face which once seen can never be forgotten. As 
a schoolboy I had rejoiced at every victory as soon as the 
news of his winning it reached England; from the battle of 
Vimeiro dbwn to the glorious victory at Toulouse, I had 
celebrated them all with boyish glee, and shouts and cap in 
the air, and with a rapidly ascending and increasing admira¬ 
tion and enthusiasm for our great Captain. 

Lives there a strain, whose sounds of mounting fire 
May rise distinguished o’er the din of war; 

Or died it with you master of the lyre. 

Who sung beleaguer’d Ilion’s evil star ? 

Such, Wellington, might reach thee from afar, 

Wafting its descant wide o’er ocean’s range.f 

Fast as he had been winning them, I would have had the 
duke gain still more victories. It was a dull year that did 
not bring to our school three bright holidays and three great 
bonfires. And older heads than mine were equally excited 
during the last years of this war. Those who lived in 
London, or in its neighbourhood, in the years 1812 and 
1813, can never wholly forget the popular enthusiasm which 
prevailed, as month by month, and, at last, week by week, 

* The Embassy to France. f ‘ Annual llegister’ for 1814. 

% Walter Scott, ‘ Vision of Don lloderick.’ , 


203 


MEMOIR OF THE BURE. 


tidings of some fresh victories obtained by Wellington, or 
Kutusoff, Wittgenstein, Bulow, Blucher, or Schwartzen- 
berg, reached the metropolis—can never forget the scenes 
presented at the illuminations and rejoicings for the battles 
of Salamanca, Vittoria, and the Pyrenees. The shouts and 
cheers of that million of English voices still ring in my 
ears; and I still see the captured glittering French eagles 
as they were displayed to the public gaze in Downing- 
street; and, although thirty-seven long years have passed 
since then, I am still thrilled by those sounds and by that 
sight. The heart is cold and un-English, that, with the 
same recollections, has not the same feelings. But now, 
assuredly, men’s hearts seem colder, and their minds more 
prosaic and statistical, than in the days of good King George 
III. ! The tendency of our modern philosophy, or of the 
systems or theories which assume the name of philosophy, 
is not merely to obviate war, but to cast discredit, ridicule, 
and contempt on all military glory and martial achieve¬ 
ments, wanting which, no nation ever was or ever will be 
great or even free. A higher influence than this philo- 
sophism regulates the affairs of this world—a world which 
was never meant to be a paradise, or the happy abode of 
always peaceful spirits. It is Scripture that tells us, that 
so long as this world exists, there shall be wars and rumour3 
of wars. 

Man ! art thou more than He whose name is Love 
And Peace ? And dost thou place thy will above 
Him, the descended, who will come in time 
To purge this earth of folly, blood, and crime? 

Await that day ! Be modest, faithful, true ! 

That which the Gospel doth not, canst thou do ? 

Bor twice nine hundred years the world hath rung, 

With all the truth from inspiration’s tongue; 

But say, have hate and strife on earth been stilled ? 

Hath not the world with constant wars been filled ? 

War and its rumours—this our present doom.* 

Let us make every exertion to diminish this in common 
with all the other evils which flesh is heir to; but let us 
never lose the martial spirit of our forefathers; for, as sure 
as night succeeds to day, war will come again, and if that 
spirit is gone, all is lost. It was not a soldier but a peaceful 
minister of the gospel who said these words :— 

“ Unfortunately for man, it is the sword which decides 
the fate of nations, secures their tranquillity, and promotes 
their aggrandizement; it is the sword alone which is the 

* ‘ The Peace Congress,’ 



AMBASSADOR AT PARIS. 


1814.] 


209 


guardian of national honour, and the protector of public 
and private happiness. Commerce may enrich, the arts 
may civilize, science may illuminate a people; but these 
blessings can only owe their safety and stability to military 
force. War, therefore, to the regret of every milder virtue, 
must form the principal subject of history.” * 


BOOK IV. 

Upon the 8th of August the Duke of Wellington left town 
for the Continent, as ambassador extraordinary and pleni¬ 
potentiary to the Court of France. In his way to Paris, he 
visited the Netherlands, and, in company with the brave 
Prince of Orange, he carefully examined the frontier for¬ 
tresses upon that line—a barrier against the French erected 
by our great William III., improved at an enormous cost 
after the duke’s visit in 1814, and swept away by the 
political arrangements which followed the French revolu¬ 
tion of July 1830. For a long space of time his grace paid 
an annual visit to those fortresses. 

On the 24th of August, the duke was presented to Louis 
XVIII., delivered his credentials, and took up his residence 
in Paris.f 

Under a deceptive appearance of quiet and contentment, 
an immense conspiracy was at work for the restoration of 
Buonaparte, who had cost France such torrents of blood 
and, in the end, so much disgrace, for the flood of invasion 
had returned upon her, and English, Austrians, Russians, 
and Prussians had, among them, held possession of her 
fairest cities, and of the capital itself. 

“ The principles and feelings of revolutionised France 
were of twenty years’ growth. The youth of France, it is 
true, knew little of the revolution or of the republic, but 
of the Bourbons they knew nothing. They had been 
for the most part educated in military schools; had lived 
under a martial autocracy, and had imbibed a military 
spirit. 

“ There were now scattered over the country numbers of 

* * History of the House of Austria.’ By William Coxe, Archdeacon 
of Wilts and Itector of Pemberton. Vol. i. Preface, p. 5. Bohn’s Edition 
of 1847. 

f ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. 





210 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


disbanded and retired officers and soldiers, who had marched 
and fought under the imperial eagles. These men, who had 
been for the most part engaged in Avars of aggression, amid 
changes of scene and chances of plunder, were miserable 
under their new and narrow circumstances. Their habits 
were roving and reckless, and they could not endure a sta¬ 
tionary dAvelling and peaceful occupations. With all such 
of the old army as had been retained under the new govern- 
ment, it Avas as bad or worse. They looked back upon their 
stern and warlike emperor as the soldier’s friend, and they 
despised the unambitious and peaceful Louis. They hated 
the inactivity and the discipline of garrisons and barracks, 
and they panted for the field and the bivouac. They 
thought only of the excitement and the rewards of warfare, 
not upon its sufferings or its horrors—of victory, not of 
defeat—of glory, not of the grave.”* 

But so secretly Avere the machinations carried on, that the 
Duke of Wellington, in common with all the corps diplo¬ 
matique, was led to believe that the government of Louis 
XVIII. Avas daily becoming more popular. He saw his 
Majesty received Avitli acclamations and enthusiastic ap¬ 
plause, as Avell by the troops as by the people f He knew 
the amiable disposition, the enlightenment, and the pure 
intentions of that prince; and he hoped that his subjects 
would not soon forget the lessons Avliich adversity had 
taught them. With good advice the duke was ever ready 
to supply his Majesty and his ministers, some of Avhom were 
but imperfectly acquainted Avith the methods of carrying on 
a government upon constitutional principles; and, instead 
of the absolute tyranny of the soldier of fortune, France 
had now a free and a good constitution under the Bourbon 
prince. 

That the duke was admirably qualified for diplomacy ay as 
acknowledged by all who had business with him at Paris, 
and may be sufficiently proved by referring to such of liis 
dispatches of this period as have been published. He Avas 
accessible at all hours, and always patient, courteous, frank, 
and plain-spoken. It Avas a veteran in diplomacy, a long 
practised member of the Russian legations, the Prince 
Ilasomowsky, Avho told me, many years after this time, 
that there was never any manoeuvring or mystery about the 
duke; that in every conference he spoke as plainly and as 
simply as if he Avere speaking to his officers at a mess-table ; 

¥ Captain M. Sherer, ‘ Military Memoir of the Duhc.’ 

t Letter to Viscount Castlcrenir’i, ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 09. 


AS A DTPLCM ATTST. 


211 


1814.] 

that there was no possibility of misunderstanding him ; that 
he put more meaning into a dozen words than most trained 
diplomatists could put in three score; and that whether the 
conference ended agreeably to the wishes of those who had 
sought it, or called it, or far otherwise, there was no leaving 
the duke without an increase of personal good-will and 
esteem. 

“ The sure way to make afoolish ambassador,”says Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, “ is to bring him up to it. What can an 
English minister abroad really want, but an honest and bold 
heart, a love for his country and the ten commandments ? 
Your art diplomatic is stuff! ”* 

On the 23rd of January 1815, the duke took leave of 
Louis XVIII., and on the following day he set out for 
Vienna to attend the general congress of the European 
powers, assembling in that capital. Here he was brought in 
contact with the most experienced diplomatists and statesmen 
of Europe. Austria was represented by Prince Metternich, 
and the Baron de Wessenberg; France, by Prince Talleyrand, 
the Duke de Dalberg, Latour du Pin, and the Count Alexis 
de Noailles; Great Britain, by Wellington, Lord Cathcart, 
Ciancartv, and Sir Charles Stuart; Portugal, by the accom¬ 
plished Count de Palmella'; Prussia, by Prince Ilardenberg 
and Baron Humboldt; Russia, by the Counts Rasomowsky, 
Stackelberg, and Nesselrode ; Sweden, by Lowenhielm ; 
and Spain, by Labrador; and again our great Captain was 
recognized as the clearest of heads and the best of diplo¬ 
matists. 

While thus engaged at Vienna, the duke, on the 7th of 
March, received from Lord Burghersh the first intelligence 
that Buonaparte had quitted the island of Elba, with ail his 
civil and military officers, and about 1200 troops, on the 26th 
of February.f lie immediately communicated this account to 
the Emperors of Austria and Prussia, and to the ministers of 
the different powers, and he found among all one prevailing 
sentiment,—a determination to unite their efforts to support 
the system established by the peace of Paris in 1814. J On 
the 13th of March, the very moment it was known that 
Buonaparte had landed in France, the ministers of the eight 
allied powers, including the ministers of the King of France, 
signed the solemn declaration of their sentiments and in¬ 
tentions. 

* ‘ Table Talk,’ vol. ii. p. 258. 

f ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 26(5. 

+ Dispatch to Viscount Castlerengh, vol, xii. p. 2GG. 

r 2 


214 


MEMOIR OR TIIE DURE. 


lands were not to be trusted either for valour and discipline 
or for fidelity; many of our British troops were young, 
and had never been under fire; many of the Peninsula 
veterans were away in America; and, instead of 150 British 
guns, the duke could never muster more than eighty-four, 
including Dutch and German pieces. While Buonaparte’s 
people were all of one nation, and speaking one tongue, the 
duke’s people were drawn from six or seven different 
nations, and his camp was a Babel of languages and dialects. 
Some of the Prussians, as well as the Belgians, were not 
very amenable to orders; and Wellington told Prince 
Hardenberg, as he had previously told the Spanish govern¬ 
ment, that he was entirely indifferent whether he had many 
or few foreign troops under his orders, but that those who 
were under his command must obey him.* 

During the months of April and May, Buonaparte, by 
great exertions, collected near the frontiers of Flanders an 
army of about 125,000 men, chiefly veteran troops, of 
whom 25,000 were cavalry, and 350 pieces of artillery. 
On the night of the lltli of June, lie quitted Paris to open 
the campaign. Ilis countenance, which had long been 
clouded, brightened up as he sprang into his carriage, and 
as he said, or as he is reported to have said, “ Je vciis me 
mesurer avec ce VHlainton'\ (I am going to measure my¬ 
self with this Wellington). On the 14th of June he and his 
army pressed on the Belgian frontier, and on the very next 
daj 7 the long stern conflict began. 

The duke’s head-quarters -were at Brussels, which it was 
Buonaparte’s first great object to gain, and the possession 
of which would have given him immense advantages, moral 
and political, as well as military. On the duke’s left lay 
Marshal Blucher with the Prussian army, estimated (after 
the junction of Billow’s corps) at about 80,000 men. The 
brave old marshal was well supplied with artillery, he 
having 200 cannon; but, unluckily, his artillerymen were 
not very good, and he had to complain of the manner in 
which his guns were served when the French fell upon 
him. 

Bluclier’s head-quarters continued to be at Namur. The 
two armies were, of necessity, spread over a wide extent of 
country. The Duke of Wellington’s had to preserve its 
communications with England, Holland, and Germany, to 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 345. 

t The French, who could never pronounce the duke’s name, found a 
pleasure iu so maiming it as to give it an odious signification. 


SKILFUL STRATEGY. 


215 


1815.] 

be near enough to connect readily with the Prussian array, 
and to protect Brussels. Blucher’s army bad to preserve 
its communications with the country in its rear and on its 
left, through which the reinforcements of the Grand Allied 
Annies were to advance; it had to give the hand to Wel¬ 
lington, and at the same time it had to watch a long extent 
of frontier ; and on that north-east frontier of France there 
were many strong fortresses, which enabled Buonaparte to 
mask his movements, and to attack wherever he chose, 
without letting liis attack be foreseen by his enemy. In 
front of the extended lines of the British, and their imme¬ 
diate coadjutors, the Hanoverians, Brunswickers, &c., there 
were, besides country by-roads, no fewer than four great 
roads (paved roads, proper for the passage of artillery, and 
for all military purposes); and it was because there were 
all these roads leading from the French frontier and the 
French fortresses, and because the Duke of Wellington 
could not possibly foresee by which of these roads the 
French might choose to advance, that part of his forces 
were widely spread in order to watch them all, while the 
remainder of his army was kept in hand in order to he 
thrown upon whatsoever point the attack should be made 
at. These men were every way better in and round 
Brussels than they would have been if cantoned or bivou¬ 
acked on the high roads; and the artillery was also better 
there, for of this arm the duke had not to spare ; it was 
indispensable that he should have it all on the field of 
battle, and embracing all the possible lines by which the 
French might attack, he had, where it stood, the best means 
of moving it rapidly to any one of these lines. Had the 
guns been all collected at one point in advance of Brussels, 
and had the enemy attacked at another point, the guns 
could not have been so easily moved. If, as some com¬ 
manders might have done, the duke had kept his troops 
marching and counter-marching from road to road, from 
point to point, he would very uselessly have wasted the 
strength and spirit of his men before the battle arrived. 
But this is just one of the things which Wellington never 
did ; and hence his men had always been up to their work 
when the work was to be done. Concentration of force is 
the finest of all things in war, in its jumper place; but there 
are cases in which the idea of concentration is an absurdity. 
If, as he had once hoped, the Duke of Wellington had been 
enabled to commence operations b} r acting on the offensive, 
then be would have attacked Buonaparte on the French 


214 


MEMOIR or TIIE DUKE. 


lands were not to be trusted either for valour and discipline 
or for fidelity; many of our British troops were young, 
and had never been under fire; many of the Peninsula 
veterans were away in America; and, instead of 150 British 
guns, the duke could never muster more than eighty-four, 
including Dutch and German pieces. While Buonaparte’s 
people were all of one nation, and speaking one tongue, the 
duke’s people were drawn from six or seven different 
nations, and his camp was a Babel of languages and dialects. 
Some of the Prussians, as well as the Belgians, were not 
very amenable to orders; and Wellington told Prince 
Hardenberg, as he had previously told the Spanish govern¬ 
ment, that he was entirely indifferent whether he had many 
or few foreign troops under his orders, but that those who 
were under his command must obe} 7 him.* 

During the months of April and May, Buonaparte, by 
great exertions, collected near the frontiers of Flanders an 
army of about 125,000 men, chiefly veteran troops, of 
whom 25,000 were cavalry, and 350 pieces of artillery. 
On the night of the lltli of June, he quitted Paris to open 
the campaign. His countenance, which had long been 
clouded, brightened up as he sprang into his carriage, and 
as he said, or as he is reported to have said, “ Je vais me 
mesurer ovec ce Villainton ,’’f (I am going to measure my¬ 
self with this Wellington). On the 14th of June he and his 
army pressed on the Belgian frontier, and on the very next 
day the long stern conflict began. 

The duke’s head-quarters were at Brussels, which it was 
Buonaparte’s first great object to gain, and the possession 
of which would have given him immense advantages, moral 
and political, as well as military. On the duke’s left lay 
Marshal Blucher with the Prussian army, estimated (after 
the junction of Bulow’s corps) at about 80,000 men. The 
brave old marshal was well supplied with artillery, he 
having 200 cannon; but, unluckily, his artillerymen were 
not very good, and he had to complain of the manner in 
which his guns were served when the French fell upon 
him. 

Bluclier’s head-quarters continued to be at Namur. The 
two armies were, of necessity, spread over a wide extent of 
country. The Duke of Wellington’s had to preserve its 
communications with England, Holland, and Germany, to 

* * Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 345. 

t The French,.who could never pronounce the duke’s name, found a 
pleasure iu so maiming it as to give it an odious signification. 


SKILFUL STRATEGY. 


215 


1815.] 

he near enough to connect readily with the Prussian army, 
and to protect Brussels. Blucher’s army had to preserve 
its communications with the country in its rear and on its 
left, through which the reinforcements of the Grand Allied 
Armies were to advance; it had to give the hand to Wel¬ 
lington, and at the same time it had to watch a long extent 
of frontier; and on that north-east frontier of France there 
were many strong fortresses, which enabled Buonaparte to 
mask his movements, and to attack wherever he chose, 
without letting his attack be foreseen by his enemy. In 
front of the extended lines of the British, and their imme¬ 
diate coadjutors, the Hanoverians, Brunswickers, &c., there 
were, besides country by-roads, no fewer than four great 
roads (paved roads, proper for the passage of artillery, and 
for all military purposes); and it was because there were 
all these roads leading from the French frontier and the 
French fortresses, and because the Duke of Wellington 
could not possibly foresee by which of these roads the 
French might choose to advance, that part of his forces 
were widely spread in order to watch them all, while the 
remainder of his army was kept in hand in order to he 
thrown upon whatsoever point the attack should be made 
at. These men were every way better in and round 
Brussels than they would have been if cantoned or bivou¬ 
acked on the high roads; and the artillery was also better 
there, for of this arm the duke had not to spare ; it was 
indispensable that he should have it all on the field of 
battle, and embracing all the possible lines by which the 
French might attack, he had, where it stood, the best means 
of moving it rapidly to any one of these lines. Had the 
guns been all collected at one point in advance,of Brussels, 
and had the enemy attacked at another point, the guns 
could not have been so easily moved. If, as some com¬ 
manders might have done, the duke had kept his troops 
marching and counter-marching from road to road, from 
point to point, he would very uselessly have wasted the 
strength and spirit of his men before the battle arrived. 
But this is just one of the things which Wellington never 
did ; and hence his men had always been up to their work 
when the work was to be done. Concentration of force is 
the finest of all things in war, in its proper place; but there 
are cases in which the idea of concentration is an absurdity. 
If, as he had once hoped, the Duke of Wellington had been 
enabled to commence operations by acting on the offensive, 
then he would have attacked Buonaparte on the French 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE, 


21!? 

frontier in one or two condensed masses; and then Buona¬ 
parte, not knowing where the attack would be made, must 
have had his army stretched out in lines along that frontier, 
having merely reserved to himself (as Wellington did) the 
best plan and the best means of concentration to he effected 
when and where the attack should be made. But the duke 
had not received the accession of strength which might have 
been given to him ; the grand army of Prince Schwartzen- 
berg had not yet crossed the Rhine; and with none but 
Blucher to co-operate with him, it would indeed have been 
rash to attack a frontier covered with numerous and well 
garrisoned fortresses, or to invade France, where an army 
of reserve was collecting to support Buonaparte. I trust 
that these few words will enable the reader to understand 
the absurd charge that the duke was not only out-man¬ 
oeuvred and out-generaled, but actually taken by surprise.* 
It was on the 15th of June that Buonaparte crossed the 
Sambre, and advanced upon Charleroi. At sunset on the 
preceding evening, all had been quiet upon the frontier, and 
nothing had been observed by the Prussian outposts. Being 
attacked just as day was dawning, those outposts fell back, 
and then a report was sent to the duke, who issued his 
orders for holding his troops in readiness to march. But it 
was not as yet sufficiently clear that Buonaparte intended 
the attack upon Charleroi to be a serious one, and that 
he really intended to open his road to Brussels by the valley 
of the Sambre. The duke, therefore, tranquilly waited until 
intelligence from various quarters proved, beyond the reach * 
of a doubt, that the advance upon Charleroi was a real 
move and no feint. It was useless to move, and the duke 
had determined all along not to move, until he got this cer¬ 
tain and full assurance; and the information could not be 
obtained before the event happened, that is, before the 
French columns, advancing by the valley of the Sambre, 
were swelled to a great army—an operation which requires 
rather more time than is taken in the writing of a critical or 
rhapsodical sentence in a book. The certain and deciding 
information was brought to Brussels by the Prince of Orange, 
who had acted as aide-de-camp, and had very often “ gone 
the pace” for our great Captain in the Peninsula. It was 
about three o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th, and the 
prince found the duke at dinner at his hotel, about a hun¬ 
dred yards from quarters, in the park at Brussels, which he 

* On this subject read a clever memorandum by Sir Francis Head iu 
Quarterly Review, No. 143. 


THE EVE OP BATTLE. 


217 


1815.] 

had taken care not to quit during the morning, or even 
during the preceding day.* The Prince of Orange was soon 
followed by the Prussian general, Mufflin, who brought 
accounts of the French onset. 

Kow that it was time to put his army in motion, Wel¬ 
lington put it in motion to his left. The orders for this ever- 
memorable march were not decided upon in a scene of 
merriment and festivity, and at midnight, but in the duke’s 
hotel, and by about live o’clock in the afternoon. These 
orders must have reached most of the corps by eight, and 
probably all by ten o’clock at night. It is quite true that 
the duke did go to a ball that evening, and that many of 
his officers went as -well as he, because their business 
for the day was done. Instead*of a proof of his being taken 
by surprise, the duke’s presence at the ball was a proof 
of his perfect self-possession and equanimity at the most 
critical moment of his whole liie.f The Duchess of Rich¬ 
mond’s ball was a gay one, and the duke and his officers 
were as cheerful as any part of that gay company. I know 
that many persons present at that ball believed that the 
marching orders were decided upon there ; but the contrary 
has been proved by the writer of the memorandum which I 
have quoted. That old fable is, moreover, utterly at variance 
with the duke’s memorandum for the Deputy-Quarter- 
Master-General, of the 15th of June, which must have been 
written in the afternoon, as soon as the Prince of Orange 
arrived at Brussels with Ins decisive intelligence. We also 
gather, from his own dispatches, that the duke’s stay at the 
Duchess of Richmond's entertainment must have been but 
short; for at half-past nine o’clock in the evening we find 
him writing to the Duke of Berri, and at ten to a French 
general who had remained faithful to Louis XVIII. 

About midnight, the general officers were quietly warned, 
and quietly disappeared from the ball-room. Shortly after 
the younger officers were summoned from the dance, but 
without any bustle. 

By this time the troops at Brussels were mustering, and 
before the sun of the 16th of June arose, “all were marching 
to the field of honour, and many to an early grave.” j 

Before these columns moved, there had been some hard 
fighting in front. In the course of the 15th, Buonaparte had 
established his head-quarters at Charleroi, and Blucher 

* Sir Francis Head, * Memorandum.’ 

f * Piet. Hist.’ Reign of Geo. III. J Sherer, ‘ Military Memoirs.* 


218 


MEMOIR OP THE DURE. 


Lad concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, occupy¬ 
ing the villages of St. Amand and Ligny; and Marshal Ney, 
continuing his march along the road which leads from 
Charleroi to Brussels, had attacked (on the evening of the 
15th), with his advanced guard, a brigade of the army of the 
Netherlands, under the Prince of Weimar, and had forced it 
back to a farm-house, on the road, called Quatre Bras, But 
the Prince of Orange had promptly reinforced Weimar’s 
brigade, and had kept the farm-house as if it had been a 
fortress. The time which would allow Ney to bring up his 
main body, would also allow Wellington to bring up a 
sufficient force to checkmate the French marshal. But 
early on the morning of the 16th, while our troops were 
marching, the Prince of Orange pushed back Ney’s advanced 
guard, and recovered some of the ground between Quatre 
Bras and Charleroi, which had been lost the preceding 
evening. 

At about 2*30 p.m., Picton came up to Quatre Bras with 
the fifth division, and he was soon followed by the corps of 
the Duke of Brunswick and the troops of Nassau. 

Some hours before this the Duke of Wellington had 
ridden across the country to confer with Marshal Blucher. - 
At that time Ney was not in strength in front of Quatre 
Bras, nor was Buonaparte in strength in the immediate front 
of the Prussians at Ligny. But the French, having all 
the advantages which are inseparable from offensive move¬ 
ments, massed their columns of attack very quickly in 
Blucher’s front; and, at the same time, Ney gathered his 
strength near Quatre Bras. The game to be played was now 
opened. Buonaparte was to crush the Prussian marshal, 
while Ney was driving in the English duke. 

As the Prussian corps of General Bulow had not joined, 
Blucher was attacked by a force numerically superior to his 
own; and after making a most desperate resistance, particu-. 
larly in the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, and after 
displaying the greatest personal bravery, old “ Marshal 
Forwards ” was obliged to go a little way back, and to quit 
bis position at Sombref. His horse had been killed under 
him French cuirassiers had galloped over him as he lay on 
the ’ground; and, stunned and sorely bruised, lie must have 
been taken prisoner, but for the devotion and presence of 
mind of Nostitz, his faithful aide-de-camp. Brave Colonel, 
now Viscount, Hardinge, who, for good and weighty reasons, 
was with Blucher’s army, had his left hand shattered, and 
was obliged, in the course of that dismal night, to undergo 


1815. 


BATTLE OF LTGNY. 


219 


tlie amputation of his left arm. With a frightful loss, but 
still with perfect order, the Prussians retired in the course 
of the night upon Wavre. The French, who had suffered 
severely, did not pursue. But, in point of fact, there could 
be no pursuit, as the French did not know for some hours 
that there was any retreat; the Prussians not having ceased 
fighting until it was dark night. At daylight on the fol¬ 
lowing morning (the 17th), it was seen that the Prussians 
were gone; but it was not until the hour of noon that 
Buonaparte ascertained what route Blucher had taken, and 
ordered General Grouchy to follow him with 32.000 men. 

In the mean while, Fey had failed in his attacks upon 
Wellington at Quatre Bras. At a little after 3 o’clock in 
the afternoon of the 16th, the French marshal, having con¬ 
centrated nearly 40,000 men, commenced fighting with two 
heavy columns of infantry, a large body of cavalry, and a 
numerous and well-served artillery. At that moment there 
were not more than 19,000 of the Allies at Quatre Bras, 
and of these only 4,500 were British infantry. These last 
forces, and the Bruns wickers, were, however, not to be 
broken by any charge, or by any mode of attack. Our 3rd 
division, under General Alten, now came up, and joined 
Picton’s unflinching 5th. Ney made another grand attack 
upon the left, but he was again met by impenetrable, im¬ 
moveable squares of infantry, and was again repulsed. He 
then tried the right of the position of Quatre Bras, and 
advancing under cover of a little wood, and attacking in 
great force, he cowed some of the worst of Wellington’s 
contingents that were posted on that right. But as these 
foreigners were giving way, General Cooke came up, and 
joined battle with part of the English guards; and the 
French were once more repelled. They gathered thickly in 
the little wood near the farm-house; but General Mait¬ 
land’s brigade soon cleared that wood; and then the French 
were seen retreating m great confusion. The conflict had 
been tremendous; but the duke had succeeded in his pre¬ 
sent great object, which was to prevent Fey getting be¬ 
tween the Prussians and the British. The tw r o great battles 
fought on this day w’ere only preludes to the greater 
massacre at Waterloo; yet at Ligny, Blucher had lost, in 
killed and wounded, from 11,000 to 12,000 men, and Wel¬ 
lington had lost at Quatre Bras, in killed and wounded, 
nearly 5,000 men, besides about 200 in missing. Our loss 
was made up entirely of British and Brunswickers, or 
Hanoverians. The brave Duke of Brunswick fell lighting 


220 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


gallantly at the head of his troops.* During the greater 
part of the combat, we had little or no artillery wherewith 
to respond to the heavy tire of the French ; and in no part 
of the day had we any cavalry, except some squadrons of 
the black hussars of .Brunswick, to oppose to jST ey’s im¬ 
mense squadrons; for 2,000 Belgian horse could never be 
brought to face the enemy, and when, at an early period of 
the action, an attempt was made to lead them to the charge 
they wheeled round and tied with such precipitation, that 
they swept the Duke of Wellington and his staff with them 
through Quatre Bras. These cavaliers did not again appear 
in the field, finding a pleasanter occupation in scampering 
through the towns and villages, and reporting everywhere 
that the English were'beaten, and the French in full march 
for Brussels. During the battle, Ney sent off a courier to 
Paris with a captured regimental flag, and with the confi¬ 
dent assurance that victory would be his. Marshal Soulfc 
did still more than this at Ligny, for falsehoods of the first 
magnitude were deemed necessary to give courage to the 
French people, and to keep Buonaparte’s cause up and alive 
in the capital. In a dispatch to Marshal Davoust, now 
war-minister, Soult did not scruple to announce that the 
Emperor had beaten both Wellington and Blucher, and had" 
so completely separated their two armies that there was no 
chance of their ever uniting them again in his front, 
“Wellington and Blucher,” wrote Soult, “saved them¬ 
selves with difficulty; the effect was theatrical; in an in¬ 
stant the firing ceased, and the enemy was routed in all 
directions.” It was announced that the Emperor would 
enter Brussels on the 17th ! Another dispatch, published 
in the Moniteur , said, “The noble lord must have been 
confounded! Prisoners are taken by bands; they do not 
know what has become of their commanders; the rout is 
complete on this side; and we hope to hear no more of the 
Prussians for some time, even if the}' should ever be able to 
rally. As for the English, we shall see what will become 
of them! The Emperor is there /” 

As at Ligny, the fighting at Quatre Bras did not cease 
until the setting-in of night. “ They fell back upon the 
road to Frasnes. The moon rose angrily — still a few 
cannon-shot were heard after daylight had departed; but 
gradually they ceased. The fires were lighted, and such 
miserable provisions as could be procured were furnished 


* See c Dispatches,* vol. xii. p. 478-80. 


BATTLE OP QUATRE BIIAS. 


221 


1815.] 

to our harassed soldiery; and while strong pickets were 
posted in the front and flanks, the remnant of the British 
and their brave Allies piled arms and stretched themselves 
on the battle-field.”* The failure of the French attacks 
on Quatre Bras, made by veteran troops in very superior 
numbers, seemed to most continental officers quite un¬ 
accountable ; and Key’s apology, for what all must admit 
to have been a defeat, is not maintainable for a moment. 
Many of the Allies were raw soldiers, and being a good 
many miles in advance of their reserve, the supporting 
troops reached the ground late in the day. Key, after¬ 
wards, excused himself at the expense of the military repu¬ 
tation of his master, blaming him as the cause that the 
1st corps of the French army “ was idly paraded between 
Ligny and Quatre Bras without firing a shot,” while he 
(Key) was contending with Wellington. The French 
troops had never fought with more fury or ferocity. Horse 
and foot, they had fallen upon our unsupported infantry, 
screaming—“Down with the English ! Ko quarter ! Ko 
quarter!” The Brunswickers, with their skulls and cross- 
* bones on their caps, in commemoration of the bloody death 
of their former duke in battle with the French, and with 
the present death of that duke’s son and successor, little 
needed such incentives; but the British troops were exas¬ 
perated by the cries of the French, and were driven into 
an equal fury by seeing that the enemy really acted accord¬ 
ing to their words. The almost total absence of prisoners, 
alter the battle, in the French and English camps, too^ 
clearly proves that little quarter was given on either 
side. 

On the following morning, the 17th of June, the Duke 
of Wellington made a retrograde movement upon Water¬ 
loo, corresponding indeed to the retreat - movement of 
Blucher upon Wavre, but in strict accordance with the plan 
and combinations which had been previously agreed upon by 
him and the Prussian marshal. He retired leisurely by 
Genappe to the excellent ground which he had chosen, and 
which, many days before, he had most attentively examined. 
Perhaps the field of Waterloo had an additional recommen¬ 
dation in the eyes of the Duke of Wellington, as it had 
once been selected by the great Duke of Marlborough as a 
battle-field, and as Marlborough had been prevented from 
gaining a great victory over the French, upon that ground, 


* Stories of Waterloo. 


222 


MEMOIR OE THE DUKE. 


wholly by the stupid obstinac}? - of the Dutch field-commis¬ 
sioners, who had power to control his movements.* 

Although the retiring from Quatre Bras was made in 
the middle of the day, the French did not attempt to 
molest our march, except by following with a large body 
of cavalry, which was brought up from the right, or from 
the part of Napoleon's forces which had been engaged the 
day before against the Prussians at Ligny. A bocty of 
their lancers charged the English cavalry, and were charged 
in their turn gallantly, though ineffectually, by our 7th 
hussars, who could make no impression on the front of 
their column, in the defile of Genappe. But when these 
lancers, elated with success, debouched on a wider space, in 
front of Genappe, the Earl of Uxbridge (now Marquis of 
Anglesey) charged them with the first regiment of Life 
Guards, and fairly rode over them, j There was no stand¬ 
ing against that charge of our heavy household cavalry, 
on their large, powerful, and high-bred horses. In the 
enemy’s ranks, horses and men went down, and w r ere lite¬ 
rally ridden over. There appears to have been no more 
fighting on the road. 

Marshal Ney was waring to be joined by all the forces of 
Napoleon which had fought Blucher at Ligny, except the 
32,000 men under Grouchy, w ho had been ordered by the 
emperor to follow the Prussians, and, on no account, to quit 
their track. This junction took place in the course of the 
day and night of the 17th. That night, during which Wel¬ 
lington's men lay upon the wet earth, or among the dripping 
corn-fields, was a dreary night, with heavy rain, thunder, 
lightning and violent gusts of wind. A more cheerless 
bivouac was never occupied by an army. The men longed 
for the morrow. 

That morrow came at last; but Sunday, the 18th of June, 
was but a dull day ; for, though the storm censed, the sky 
was overcast with clouds, through which the sun rarely 
broke. The position which the duke had taken up, was in 
front of the village of Waterloo, and crossed the high roads 
from Charleroi and Niveiles ; it had its right thrown back 
to a ravine near Merke-Braine, which w as occupied, and its 
left extended to a height above the hamlet of Ter-la-IIaye, 
which was likewise occupied ; and in front of the right 
centre, and near the Nivelles road, our troops held "the 

_ * Dispatches of the Duke of Marlborough, edited by the late General 
Sir George Murray, 
f ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 480. 


BATTLE OP WATERLOO. 


1815.] 


223 


house and gardens of I-Iougoumont, which covered the 
return of that flank; and in front of the left centre they occu¬ 
pied the farm of La Ilaye Sainte. By our left we commu¬ 
nicated with Marshal Blucher at Wavre, through Qhain, and 
the marshal had promised the duke that in case of his being- 
attacked, he would support him with one or more corps, as 
might be necessary.* In the rear of the British centre, was 
the farm of Mont St. Jean, and a little further behind, the 
village of that name. The French often call the battle of 
Waterloo, “ The massacre of Mont St. Jean.”f. 

The duke’s force, united in the position above indicated, 
was 7*2,720 men. Of this number, including the king’s 
German Legion, who merited to be classed with English 
troops, 36,273 were British, 7,447 were Hanoverians in 
British pay, and partly commanded by British officers, 8,000 
were Brunswickcrs, and 21,000 were Belgian and Nassau 
troops, mostly of an inferior quality. There were good and 
brave men among the German troops that were classed 
under the name Nassau; but it is believed that the duke 
would have given all the truly Belgian regiments for as many 
companies of the Portuguese, who had become under him 
nearly as good soldiers as our own. Let me repeat—and let 
it be borne in mind—that many of the troops, British as well 
as foreign, had never been under fire before this campaign; 
while the enemy’s troops were veterans almost to a man. 

Buonaparte had collected his army on a range of heights 
in front of the British position, and not above a mile from it: 
his right was in advance of Pianehenois, his line crossed the 
Charleroi road at the firm of La Belie Alliance; his left 
rested on the Genappe road. Behind the French the ground 
rose considerably, and was skirted by thick woods; in the 
rear of the British and their Allies, was the famed ©Id forest of 
Soignies. Deducting Grouchy’s 32,000 men (who were look¬ 
ing after Blucher), and about 13,000 for the French killed 
and wounded at St. Amand, Ligny, and Quatre Bras, and 
making a liberal allowance for stragglers, patroles, &c., the 
troops collected must have been at least 75,000 in number. 

Early in the morning, when Buonaparte mounted his 
horse to survey Wellington’s position, he could see but few 
troops. This induced him to fancy that the British general, 
with whom he had come to measure himself, had beaten a 
retreat, and had left only a rear-guard, which would pre¬ 
sently follow him. General Foy, who had served a long 

* Dispatch to Earl Bathurst, vol. xii. p. 481, 

f * Piet. Hist,’ Kcign of George 111. 


224 


MEMOIll OF TIIE DUKE. 


time in Spain, is said to have replied, “ Wellington never 
shows his troops; but if he is yonder, I must warn } r our 
majesty that the English infantry in close combat is the very 
devil! ” (A’ infante vie anglaise en duel e’est le dialled) 
Marshal Soult is said to have added his warning to that of 
Foy. But whatever were the opinions of the marshals and 
generals who had really measured themselves with our great 
Captain in the Peninsula, it seems quite certain that Buona¬ 
parte began the battle with a confident assurance of success, 
for he knew his own vast superiority in artillery, and he had 
run into the woful mistake that Marshal Blucher, dispirited 
by the loss he had sustained at Ligny, would continue his 
retreat in order to avoid Grouchy, and would not rally any¬ 
where near enough to support Wellington. 

Soon after 10 o’clock on the Sabbath morn, a great stir 
was observed along the French lines; and presently a 
furious attack was made upon the post at Hougoumont, on 
the right of Wellington’s centre. Hougoumont, with its 
farm-house and garden, was occupied by a detachment from 
General Byng’s brigade of guards, who maintained the post 
throughout the day, in the teeth of desperate and repeated 
attacks of large bodies of the enemy. This first attack upon 
the right of our centre was accompanied by a very heavy 
cannonade upon our whole line... This cannonade was kept 
up nearly throughout the day, being intended to support 
the frequent attacks of cavalry and infantry, now mixed and 
now separate, which were made along our line, from right 
to left, and from left to right. The duke had not half the 
number of guns which Buonaparte brought forward; but 
such guns as he had were served to perfection; and the 
advanced batteries of our centre, firing case-shot, committed 
a fearful havoc upon the French columns which successively 
attacked our post at Hougoumont. The incessant roar of 
artillery on both sides, for so many hours, gave to the com¬ 
bat a peculiar and awful character. There was no man¬ 
oeuvring either on the part of Buonaparte, or on the part of 
Wellington ; the object of the British general was to main¬ 
tain His position till the arrival of some Prussian -corps 
should enable him to quit it, and crush his foe ; the object 
of that foe was to drive him from his position, and to crush 
him before Blucher should be able to send a single batta¬ 
lion to his support. And to this end Buonaparte kept re¬ 
peating his attacks with heavy columns of infantry, and 
with a numerous and brilliant cavalry, hammering at us 
nearly all the time with his immense artillery. At one 


WATERLOO. 


225 


1815.] 

moment the left of our position was in some danger through 
the sudden retreat of a brigade of Belgians. 

“From each attempt the French columns returned shat¬ 
tered and thinned; but fresh columns were formed and 
hurled against the same or some other part of Wellington’s 
line. The repulses were numerous, the glimpses of success 
brief and few. In one of their attacks the French carried 
the farm-house of La Ilaye Sainte, as a detachment of the 
light battalion of the German Legion which occupied it had 
expended all their ammunition, and the enemy had cut off 
the only communication there was with them. But before 
they yielded that farm-house, those brave Germans were, 
to a man, either killed or wounded; and, as the French 
gave them no quarter, they all died. Buonaparto then 
ordered his cavalry to charge the British infantry in squa¬ 
drons and in masses ; to charge home ; to charge again and 
again ; and to find out some way through those ringing 
muskets, and those hedges of glittering bayonets! But this 
was work beyond the power even of his steel-clad cuiras¬ 
siers, or of his long-armed Polish lancers: our infantry 
formed in squares, and the best of those horsemen bit the 
dust. At times the French cavalry were seen walkircig 
their horses about our infrangible squares, as if they lia< 1 
been of the same army. Some of their regiments gav'-e 
proof, not only of great bravery, but also of rare perseve¬ 
rance. All their efforts, however, were unavailing ; and tha 
dogged determination of Buonaparte in throwing them for-i 
ward so repeatedly to do what they were clearly incapable | 
of doing, ended in their almost total destruction. Their -i 
coup-de-grace was hastened by a magnificent charge of Bri¬ 
tish cavalry.”* Although the Scots Greys—“ those terrible 
Greys!”—had astonished the French, and drawn from Buona¬ 
parte an involuntary exclamation of astonishment and admi¬ 
ration, our cavalry had hitherto been very little more than 
a spectator of the fight; it had suffered somewhat from the 
incessant French cannonade, but all the horses that were 
not wounded were fresh and vigorous, and there were horses 
there of the true high English breed, and riders on them 
whom no continental cavalry could hope to stand against. 

At the proper moment, the Duke of Wellington called up 
Lord E. Somerset’s brigade cf heavy cavalry, consisting of 
the Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards, and the 1st Dra¬ 
goon Guards, and directed them to charge the already 
crippled and disheartened cavalry of Buonaparte. These 
* ‘ Piet. Ilist.’ Reign of George III. 




226 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


splendid regiments absolutely rode down and rode over their 
comparatively feeble opponents; horses and men fell at 
their shock ; the cuirassiers, whose breast-plates had glit¬ 
tered in so many battles and victories, disappeared from the 
world as a corps, and became a thing that had been ; they 
were completely cut up.* After this almost total destruc¬ 
tion of his cavalry, and after the frightful reduction of his 
columns of infantry, Buonaparte was, if not as good as 
beaten, at the least put into a condition from which 
the duke could have had nothing to apprehend, even 
though r.o Prussians had come up. Except the Guards, 
every pa?;t of the French army had been engaged, repulsed, 
and frightfully thinned. Not a point of the British position 
had been carried. Not a single square had been broken; 
and, though our loss in killed and wounded had been great, 
some of the duke’s troops had not yet been engaged at all, 
and. a\l were full of heart and of confidence in their great 
leade:r.”f 

Buonaparte had invited Ney to dine with him that even¬ 
ing at Brussels; and at six o’clock he is said to have re- 
ma rked, that they would yet arrive there in good time. 
This is merely a saij: at 6 p.m., and at no part of the day, 
di d they see a chance of getting to Brussels. 

General Clausewitz may be taken as a competent, and as 
an unprejudiced authority as to the condition in which the 
t wo contending armies stood when the Prussians came up. 
Olausewitz was chief of the staff to the third corps of the 
Prussian army. If he had prejudices, they were not likely 
to be in favour of Wellington and against Blucher. He 
knocks on the head the nonsense that has been circulated 
about the duke having exhausted his reserves in the ac¬ 
tion ; and he enumerates the tenth British brigade, the whole 
division of Chassb, and the cavalry of Collaert, as having 
been little or not at all engaged; and to these he might 
have added two entire brigades of light cavalry. More¬ 
over, General Clausewitz expresses a positive opinion, that, 
even had the whole of Grouchy’s force come up at Waterloo 
(which it could not do, and which it was prevented from 
doing by Buonaparte’s lamentable mistake about Blucher, 
and by the positive orders he had himself given to Grouchy), 
the Duke of Wellington could have had nothing to fear 
pending Blucher’s march and arrival.J Had “ Marshal 

* ‘ Piet. Hist.’ Reign of George III. f Ibid. vol. iv. 

% General Clausewitz, as cited in ‘ Quarterly Review,’ No. 140, article. 
* Life of Blucher.’ 


WATERLOO. 


227 


1815.] 

Forwards” not come up when he did, the duke would have 
kept his own; and the last charges of the French, if made at 
all, would have been repulsed, as all their preceding attacks 
had been. But had the French retreated, there could have 
been no pursuit; and if Blucher had not been at hand, 
there might have been a renewal of the combat on the 
morrow. 

Lord E. Somerset’s heavy brigade of cavalry had made 
its annihilating charge, there was a pause in the battle ; and 
it was about seven o’clock in the evening when artillery was 
heard at a distance, and a staff officer reported to the duke 
that the head of a Prussian column was already coming in 
sight. Very shortly after, Billow’s corps, advancing upon 
La Belle Alliance, began to engage the French right. And 
now was the short agony for Buonaparte. He called forward 
his guard, which he had kept in reserve for a last desperate 
effort. He led it forward, in person, to the foot of our posi¬ 
tion ; but then he turned aside, and took shelter behind 
some swelling ground. The guard moved onward, looking 
on Buonaparte as they passed him. “ Morituri te salu- 
tant /”* He ought to have gone on with it, and to have 
died with it; but he neither headed it nor followed it; nor 
did he, during any part of this day, expose his person freely 
in the melee of battle, as he had done in the spring of 
1814, in the battles of Craonne, Arcis-sur-Aube, and in 
other affairs on French ground. Ney went on with that 
great forlorn hope, and, unluckily for himself, was not 
killed. The guard advanced in two massy columns, leaving 
only four battalions of the old guard in reserve, near to the 
sheltered spot where Buonaparte sat on his horse, sallow, 
rigid, and fixed, like a mummy. The guards moved reso¬ 
lutely on, with supported arms, under a destructive fire 
from our position. They were met by General Maitland’s 
brigade of English guards, and General Adam’s brigade, 
which were rapidly moved from the right by the Duke of 
Wellington in person, who formed them four deep, and 
flanked their line with artillery. That the duke, on first 
moving them from some cover under which they had been 
screened, shouted out, “Up! guards, and at them!” is now 
recognised as a fable. His grace never did anything the¬ 
atrically, and never used any such language to his troops. 
An aide-de-camp gave the order in the usual quiet manner; 
the officers in command of our guards obeyed the order, 

* Suetonius, in Claudian, 

Q 2 


228 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


under the eye of their great chief, and the duke advanced 
with the guards over the brow of the low hill, and then 
stood to meet the last charge. When within fifty yards from 
the line of the English guards, the French guards attempted 
to deploy; but the close fire upon them was too terrible; 
their flanks were enveloped, they got mixed together in a 
confused mass, and in that condition they were slaughtered, 
broken, and driven down the slope of the hill. There was 
no more fighting; that Grand Army of Buonaparte—the last 
of all, and the most desperate of all—never again stood, nor 
attempted to rally : all the rest of the work was headlong, 
unresisted pursuit; slaughter of fugitives, who had entirely 
lost their military formations; and capture of prisoners, 
artillery, and spoiis. The army was destroyed, as an army, 
before the pursuit began. If it had not been so, the Prus¬ 
sians could not possibly have found the pursuit such easy 
work. In flying, Buonaparte and his guards left about 150 
pieces of cannon in the hands of the English. Before that 
flight began, Blucher had been for a time hotly engaged at 
Planchenois. At a farm-house, called “Maison Rouge,” or 
“ Maison du Roi,” at a short distance behind Planchenois 
and the farm of La Belle Alliance, the Duke and the 
Marshal met, and Blucher, in the manner of the continent, 
embraced and hugged his victorious partner. Here Wel¬ 
lington gave orders for the halt and bivouack of his own 
fatigued troops, and handed over the task of further pur¬ 
suit to the Prussians. Blucher swore that he would follow 
up the French Avith his last horse, and his last man. He 
started off immediately with two Prussian corps, who began 
the chase with the encouragement of three cheers from the 
English army.* 

“ The guard dies, but does not surrender! ” This was a 
self-flattering fiction which the French afterwards recorded 
in prose and rhyme, in paintings, engravings, and sculptures, 
and in all manner of ways. But these flying French guards 
really surrendered in bands, and cried for quarter. Close to 
Genappe, Blucher captured 60 guns belonging to the said 
imperial guard, together with carriages, baggage, &c., be¬ 
longing to Buonaparte himself. The moon had now risen, 
and in broad moonlight the Prussians kept up the chase, 
the French abandoning all they had, and scarcely attempting 
to stop anywhere until they got within the lines of their 

* Southey, in * Quarterly Iteview,’ vol. xiii. ‘ Wellington Dispatches,’ 
vol. xii. pp. 481-8. Sir Prancis Head, * Quarterly Preview.* General 
Alava’s account, &c. &c. See. 


WATERLOO. 


1815. J 


229 


own frontier fortresses, from which they had issued with so 
much pride and confidence only five days before. The 
high-road, says General Gueisenau, resembled the sea-shore 
after some great shipwreck—it was covered with cannon, 
caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wreck of every de¬ 
scription. 

In the mean while the British and their Allies, by the 
same broad moonlight, were counting their dead and picking 
up their wounded; or, rather, they were making a begin¬ 
ning, for those sad offices took up not only that night, but 
the whole of the following morning. The loss had been 
immense. The British and Hanoverians alone had 2,432 
killed, and 9,528 w-ounded, in the battle of Waterloo. The 
loss of officers was quite proportionate to the loss of men, 
more than 600 having been killed or wounded in the British 
and Hanoverian corps alone. General Picton, who had 
been wounded at Quatre Bras, and who had concealed his 
hurt, was shot through the brain early in the battle, as he 
was leading his division to a bayonet charge. General Sir 
William Ponsonby, who was with the heavy cavalry, was 
killed by a Polish lancer; his relative, General Sir Frederick 
Ponsonby, was shot through the body by a Frenchman, was 
ridden over by the charging cavalry, and was speared, as he 
lay bleeding and helpless on the ground, by a savage Pole ; 
but he miraculously recovered, and lived many years to 
charm all those who knew him, or who ever approached him. 
Colonel de Lancy, the excellent quarter-master-general, was 
killed by a cannon-shot in the middle of the action. The 
Earl of Uxbridge lost his leg. General Cooke, General 
Ilalkett, General Sir Edward Barnes, General Baron Alten, 
Lieut.-Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Honourable T. 
Howard, the Prince of Orange, were all among the wounded, 
and most of them were severely wounded. Lieut.-Colonel 
the Honourable Sir Alexander Gordon, brother to the pre¬ 
sent Earl of Aberdeen, died of his wounds soon after being- 
removed from the field. The gallant Duke of Brunswick 
perished, as we have seen, on the 16th, at Quatre Bras ; he 
fell at the head of his own black hussars. The officers of 
several foreign nations, who came to volunteer their services 
to the duke, did not escape unhurt: the Austrian General 
Vincent was wounded, and Count Pozzo de Borgo, who was 
then both a general and a diplomatist in the service of the 
Emperor Alexander of Russia, received a contusion. The 
Spanish General Alava had some hairbreadth escapes. 
The present Prince Castelcicala, now Neapolitan Minister 


230 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


at the Court of St. James’s, but then a brave young officer 
in one of our cavalry regiments, ran equal risk. On the 
duke’s staff there was hardly an officer that escaped wounds 
or death. At one moment he had no officer near him to 
carry an immediate order, except a young Piedmontese 
gentleman of the family of De Salis. “ Were you ever in a 
battle before?” said the duke. “ ISTo, my lord,” replied 
the young officer. “ Then,” said the duke, “ you are a 
lucky man, for you will never see such another.” * 

During the whole of the dreadful day the duke was calm 
and collected, his countenance was serene and even cheerful, 
except at times when his eye rested on the heaps of his 
killed and wounded. He stood for a long time near a re¬ 
markable tree with his spy-glass in his hand, and so near to 
some of the French posts that his features could be distinctly 
seen by the aid of a good glass. An Italian officer, who was 
with Buonaparte, told me a few years after the battle, that 
the quietness of the duke’s demeanour, and the tranquillity 
of his countenance, struck him with dismay, and made him 
believe that he must have some enormous force concealed on 
the reverse of his position, or that Blucher was coming up 
hours before he did. I can conceive that this equanimity 
and perfect self-possession afterwards gave way, for a time. 

“ On the night of the memorable battle,” says a British 
officer, “ the words and emotions of the conqueror will long 
be remembered by those who sat with him at supper, after 
the anxious and awful day had closed. The fountain of a 
great heart lies deep, and the self-government of a calm 
mind permits no tears. But this night, Wellington re¬ 
peatedly leaned back upon his chair, and rubbing his hands 
convulsively, exclaimed aloud, ‘ Thank God, I have met 
him! Thank God, I have met him ! ’ And, ever as he 
spake, the smile that lighted up his eye was immediately 
dimmed by those few and big tears that gush warm from 
a grateful heart.”f 

The conduct and movements of General Grouchy, upon 
whom the French would have thrown the entire blame of 
losing the battle, has been grossly misrepresented and falsi¬ 
fied. Grouchy, in tracking Blucher, could do little or 
nothing to injure him; and Grouchy was not up in time 
to take part in the battle with Wellington, simply because 
he could not get there in time, or, indeed, at all. The 
Prussian General Thielman, with 16,000 men, kept him 

* Sir Francis Head, in ‘ Quarterly Review,’ 

f Capt. M. Shgrer, ‘ Military Memoir,* 


WATERLOO. 


231 


1815 .] 

and his 32,000 French fully employed on the river Dyle 
for several hours, during which Blucher threw himself 
between Grouchy and Buonaparte with his superior forces. 
When evening was setting in, when our cavalry was crushing 
the French, and when the Prussian marshal was giving the 
hand to the duke, Grouchy was thirteen or fourteen good 
English miles off, with sorely fatigued troops. lie was not 
at Waterloo, simply because he could not by any possibility 
be there. There was no treachery in the case: if Grouchy 
could even have done that which Buonaparte too con¬ 
fidently expected he would do, he would not have been at 
Waterloo; but, in that case, no more would Blucher. It 
was too much for the French to pretend they anticipated 
that Grouchy would prevent the junction of Blucher and 
Wellington, by driving the Prussians towards the Bhine, and 
be also on the field of "Waterloo ! The day after that battle 
he fell rapidly back upon the frontier of France, conducting 
his retreat in a manner which did honour to him as a 
general.* 

On the first day of his pursuit (the first after the battle), 
brave old Blucher wrote to his lady:—“ My dear wife, you 
well know what I promised you, and I have kept my word. 
Superiority of numbers forced me to give way on the 17th, 
but on the 18th, in conjunction with my friend Wellington, 
I put an end at once to Buonaparte’s dancing !” 

On the same day, the duke (among other letters of con¬ 
dolence and of business) wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen : —> 
“ You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme 
grief with which I announce to you the death of your 
gallant brother. . . . Pie received the wound which 

occasioned his death while rallying one of the Brunswick 
battalions, which was shaking a little, and he lived long 
enough to be informed by myself of the glorious result of 
our actions, to which he had so much contributed by his 
active and zealous assistance. I cannot express to you the 
regret and sorrow with which I look round me and con¬ 
template the loss which I have sustained, particularly in 
your brother. The glory resulting from such actions, so 
dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest 
it as any to you and his friends; but I hope it may be 
expected that this last one has been so decisive, as that no 
doubt remains that our exertions and our individual losses 
will be rewarded by the early attainment of our just object. 
It is then that the glory of the actions in which our friends 
* ‘ Piet, Ilist.’ Reigu of George III, 


232 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


and relations have fallen, will be some consolation for their 
loss.”* • # it 

Buonaparte himself was the first man that carried to 
Paris the news of his irretrievable disaster. He was soon 
followed by Marshal Ney, who was bursting with rage and 
desperation. Innumerable, and worthy of ignoble minds, 
were the criminations and recriminations. Hey accused 
Buonaparte, and Buonaparte, Hey. “ Ney conducted him¬ 
self like a madman; he caused my cavalry to be massacred! ” 
Disgraceful scenes ensued. Hey interrupted Carnot, and 
gave the lie direct to him and to Davoust, who had been led 
by Buonaparte to declare that the Prussians were in retreat, 
and the English in no condition to advance. “That is 
false,” cried Hey, “that is false! You are deceiving the 
people! Wellington is coming! Blucher is not beaten: 
there is nothing left to us but the corps of Marshal Grouchy. 
In six or seven days the enemy will be here !” 

A farcical attempt was made to induce a recognition of 
Buonaparte’s son by Maria Louisa of Austria. Joseph and 
Lucien Buonaparte, Charles Labedoyere, Flahault, and 
others, entered the ephemeral house of peers which Buonaparte 
had made on his return from Elba; they came to announce 
the voluntary abdication of Napoleon I., and to proclaim Na¬ 
poleon II.; and they shouted,—“ The Emperor is politically 
dead! Long live Napoleon II.! ” But these men could 
not find the elements of a party wild enough to support, or 
even to acknowledge, the claims of a child ; and it was clear 
that Buonaparte himself was deserted by the mass of the 
French people. There was a talk of his throwing himself, 
with the remnant of his grand army, into the country beyond 
the Loire, and there collecting more troops; but he knew 
that the armies of all Europe were marching against him; 
that, while Wellington and Blucher were on the north¬ 
eastern frontier, the Austrian General Frimont was ad¬ 
vancing through Switzerland and Savoy, to attack on that 
side; that Prince Schwartzenberg was now ready to cross 
the Rhine with enormous forces; and that the Emperor 
Alexander was not far off with 200,000 Russians. The Allies, 
indeed, could have put 800,000 men into France before the 
end of the month of July. On the 22nd of June, four days 
after his defeat at Waterloo, he retired to the pleasant 
summer palace of Malmaison, in the neighbourhood of Paris, 
and, after lingering there a few days, he repaired to the sea¬ 
port of Rochefort, with the desperate hope of finding some 
* * Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 488,. 


MARCH TO PARIS. 


233 


1815.] 

means whereby to escape to the United States of America. 
Finding that there were no such means, that the population 
was declaring warmly for the Bourbons, and that if he 
remained any longer on shore he might be assassinated or 
made prisoner, he went on board our ship of the line 
the BelleropKon ; Captain Maitland most distinctly telling 
him, “ that he was in total ignorance of the intention of the 
British Government as to his future disposal 

The Chambers of Paris set up a provisional government, 
consisting of Caulaincourt, Quinette, Grenier, Carnot, and 
Fouche, a most strange jumble of men and principles. The 
ex-Jacobin Fouche took the lead. 

The British and Prussian armies met with hardly any 
opposition on the march to the French capital. On the 
1st of July, Wellington took up a position a few short miles 
from Paris; and on the 2nd, Blucher crossed the Seine at 
St. Germain, and posted the Prussians between Plessis-Piquet 
and St. Cloud, with their reserve at Versailles. Two days 
before this, while the Duke of Wellington was at Etrees, 
commissioners were sent to him by the provisional govern¬ 
ment to negotiate a suspension of hostilities. These com¬ 
missioners began with asserting that Buonaparte’s abdication 
had virtually put an end to the war. 

The duke told them that he could not consider the abdi¬ 
cation in any other light than as a trick; and that he could 
not stop his operations. While the duke was talking, he 
received Louis XVIII.’s proclamation, dated Cambray, the 
28th of June, and countersigned by Prince Talleyrand. 
He handed the paper immediately to the French commis¬ 
sioners. These persons took some objection to certain para¬ 
graphs in the proclamation, wherein the king announced 
his intention of punishing some of those concerned in the 
plot which had brought back Buonaparte from Elba. 
Although not named as yet, the commissioners, the provi¬ 
sional government, and all France must have understood 
that Marshal Ney, Charles Labedoyere, and Lavallette 
were included in this traitorous category; and that the 
government of Louis XVIII. reserved to itself the right of 
bringing them to condign punishment. To the remarks of 
the commissioners on the avenging paragraphs, the duke 
had nothing to say; and they themselves really appear to 
have said or thought very little about the matter. I call 
attention to the paragraphs only in order to prove that the 
commissioners, the provisional government, and Marshal 
Davoust, who now commanded in Paris, perfectly well knew 


234 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE, 


the intention of Louis XVIII. with regard to Ney, Labedo¬ 
yere and others, three or four days before they concluded the 
convention of Paris with Wellington and Blucher,—a con¬ 
vention in which the case of those traitors was not pro¬ 
vided for in any way. 

The commissioners went hack to Paris, and then re¬ 
turned to the English camp; but still they attempted to 
make no provision for excepting Ney or Labedoyere, or 
any one from the avenging paragraph by virtue of the 
convention with Wellington and Blucher. What the com¬ 
missioners came for was only to know whether the Allies 
would not agree to an armistice, and keep at some distance 
from Paris. The duke told them that he would not con¬ 
sent to suspend hostilities, so long as a soldier of Buona¬ 
parte’s army remained in Paris. This army, counting 
shattered and disorganized corps, fugitives from Waterloo, 
and all, was estimated by the provisional government at 
40,000 men. It probably amounted to 30,000 ; and, under 
the influence of Labedoyere and other reckless officers it 
had declared for Napoleon II. On the 1st of July, Da- 
voust wrote to the British commander-in-chief on the sub¬ 
ject of the armistice; but the French marshal did not yet 
adopt the terms without which Wellington had resolved not 
to suspend his movements for a single hour. He and 
Blucher had, therefore, advanced, as we have seen, almost 
to the suburbs of the capital. In taking up his position on. 
the left bank of the Seine, on the 2nd of July, the army of 
Napoleon II. offered some resistance to the Prussian mar¬ 
shal ; and there was even some hard fighting on the heights 
of St. Cloud and Meudon, and in the village of Issy, which 
was renewed (at Issy) on the morning of the 3rd, to the 
loss and discomfiture of the French. No attempt was made 
to check the approaches or molest the positions of the 
British. The provisional government and Davoust now 
yielded to necessity, and to the terms which the Duke of 
Wellington had proposed to their commissioners three days 
before, with this important addition, that the city of Paris, 
the heights of Montmartre, and all its other defences, were 
to be put quietly in possession of the British and Prussian 
armies. They sent out a flag of truce, desiring the firing 
might cease on both sides of the Seine, and that negotiations 
might be opened at the palace of St. Cloud, “ for a military 
convention between the armies, under which the French 
army should evacuate Paris''* 

* ‘ Dispatches,’ vol. xii. pp. 533-52. 


THE MILITARY CONVENTION, 


235 


1815.] 

Officers accordingly met on both sides at St. Cloud; 
and on that night the military convention was concluded by 
three French officers, one English officer,- and one Prussian 
officer; and on the following day the convention was ap¬ 
proved by Wellington, Blucher, and Davoust, and fully 
ratified. On the same day, and almost as soon as he had 
signed the deed, the duke wrote to his government, “ This 
convention decides all the military questions at this moment 
existing here, and touches nothing political.” 

The French troops, as by this agreement hound, had all 
evacuated Paris by the 6th, and begun their march towards 
the Loire. Labedoyere is said to have gone with them, 
or to have followed them; but Marshal ISTey fled from 
Paris in disguise on the 6th, with a passport, under a false 
name, given to him by Fouche. This was proof enough— 
this was his own confession by his own act and deed—that 
Hey did not consider himself included in the convention 
or capitulation. lie knew that the provisional govern¬ 
ment, indifferent as to his fate, had introduced no article, 
clause, or paragraph, to shield him and others in his 
predicament. He knew that the Duke of Wellington 
would never interfere with the political or judicial action 
of the French government, and could never have agreed 
to negotiate upon such a subject; and therefore it was that 
Hey, alike conscious of his guilt and of his danger, fled 
in an ignominious manner from Paris the day before the 
Allied Armies took possession of that city. At the moment 
of his flight, Louis XVIII., whom he had betrayed with 
circumstances of the most exasperating kind, was at St. 
Denis, only eight miles from Paris. To punish or to 
protect Ney, was no affair of the duke’s : had he wished it, 
there were good grounds for believing that the astucious 
Fouche would have seized the marshal, and sent him a 
prisoner into his own camp, or to the king at St. Denis. 

On the 7th of July the British and Prussian armies 
took possession of the French capital, without any outward or 
visible sign of that beau desespoir —that war to the knife— 
with which they had been so often menaced. The English 
established themselves in the Bois de Boulogne, where they 
found an encampment: the Prussians occupied some of 
the churches, and bivouacked at the heads of the streets, 
and along the quays on the Seine. The first night passed 
off with perfect order and tranquillity; but at midnight, on 
the 8th, the duke was obliged to take up the pen in order 
to check the pace of “ Marshal Forwards.” 


236 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


In the positions they occupied, the Prussians were 
brought into immediate contact with two objects, which 
roused their nationality and inflamed their ire. These 
obnoxious objects were Buonaparte’s bronzed column of 
Victory in the Place Vendome, which recorded the defeats 
of the Prussians, as well as of other nations; and the 
bridge of Jena, which had been named after the bloody 
battle whereby Napoleon had broken up the Prussian 
monarchy for a time, and had broken the heart of the fair 
Prussian queen for ever. No Prussian in the army felt 
these things more acutely than Blucher, whose body, too, 
had been scarred with wounds in the disastrous campaign 
of Jena. He, therefore, thought it no questionable act to 
blow this Paris bridge of Jena into the air, and to pull 
down the column of a man who, in Prussia, had destroyed 
the pillar which commemorated the great national victory 
of Kosbach, and had plundered the very tomb of Frederick 
the Great. The Prussians were actually at work upon 
the bridge with the insufferable name, when the duke 
intervened. The following letter is, in every way, curious 
and interesting; and it is corroborative of all that has been 
said of our great Captain’s moderation, gentleness, and 
friendliness:— 

“ To Marshal Prince Bluciier. 

Paris, 8th July, 1815, Midnight. 

“ Mein Lieber Furst, 

“ Several reports have been brought to me during the 
evening and night, and some from the government, in con¬ 
sequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one 
of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be 
your intention to destroy. 

“ As this measure will certainly create a good deal of 
disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns, when they 
were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I 
take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction 
of the bridge, at least till they shall arrive; or, at all 
events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow 
morning. Believe me, &c. 

“ Wellington.”* 

“ Marshal Prince Blucher.” 

Blucher held his hand, and consented on the morrow that 
the bridge should be left standing, provided only the French 

* * Dispatches,’ vol. xii. p. 549. 


1815.] WONDERFUL MODERATION. 237 

government changed its odious name — which they did. 
“Marshal Forwards,” moreover, could see no harm in levying 
a military contribution of 100,000,000 francs upon the city 
of Paris; for had not Buonaparte and the French done 
worse than this in Berlin ? and how had the French recom¬ 
pensed the Allies for their forbearance and generosity last 
year when Paris was in their power, even as it now was P 
Upon this and other points also the Duke of Wellington 
interposed; and, after some grumbling, the rough old 
Prussian consented that no military contribution should be 
imposed; that the column of victory should not be destined, 
&c.* And how did the Buonapartists repay this moderation 
and magnanimity? They set it all down to fear—to the 
dread the Allies entertained of their beau desespoir! 

On the 8th of July, Louis XVIII. re-entered Paris, 
escorted by the national guard of that city, and tranquilly 
resumed the government. Even now, through the personal 
character of the French king, and through other influences, 
conspicuous among which were the humane recommen¬ 
dations of Prince Talleyrand and the Duke of Wellington, 
the vengeance taken on the Buonapartists was almost 
miraculously moderate. In order to render their existence 
the more desperate, Labedoyere and others of the faction 
had talked of an interminable list of proscriptions, of the 
guillotine in constant action, as in the Reign of Terror! 
Yet, when the avenging royal ordinance was published (on 
the 24th of July), it was found to contain only fifty-seven 
names; and of these, only nineteen were threatened with 
capital punishment, or trial before a military tribunal. 
The first name on the black list was that of Ney; the. 
second was that of Labedoybre; and, eventually, these 
were the only two men who were put to death. Not to 
mention w T hat was done by the Jacobins of the Republic, or 
by Buonaparte on numerous other occasions, I would 
revive the recollection of what took place in 1812, upon the 
discovery of General Mallet’s conspiracy. That general, 
who was decidedly insane, two other general officers, and 
eleven officers of various grades, were brought before a court- 
martial, which proved itself to be inaccessible to the feeling 
of mercy. “ Gentlemen,” exclaimed one of the prisoners, 
“have mercy—have pity upon us! We are all old officers, 
riddled with balls! and we are all fathers of families! ” 
These fourteen prisoners, who had all fought and bled for 
the republic or for Buonaparte, were all pitilessly fusiladed 
* ‘ Dispatches/ vol. xii. p. 549-54. 


238 


MEMOIR OF THE DUE.fi. 


on the plain of Grenelle, for an insurrection which had 
lasted only five hours, which had cost neither blood nor 
money, and which had been put down with the greatest 
ease. These sanguinary acts were performed under the 
direction of Savary, Cambaceres, and other Buonapartists of 
that quality ; and the party generally, who afterwards 
made heaven and earth ring with their affected lamen¬ 
tations for the death of Labedoyere and Ney, applauded 
what was done on the plain of (Crenelle, as the quick and 
energetic action of a strong government. 

Labedoyere came back to Paris in disguise, and with pro¬ 
jects which have not yet been fully explained. He was 
detected in his hiding-place, arrested, and, in conformity 
with the ordinance of the 24th of July, was handed over to 
a conseil do guerre. This court willingly and readily tried 
him, without once referring to the convention of Paris, 
which, if good for Hey, was good for Labedoyere; and as 
the facts of the case were all capable of being proved by 
thousands of witnesses, as the prisoner himself confessed 
them all—confessed that after taking the oath of fidelity to 
Louis XVIII., he had plotted for the return of Napoleon, 
and had been the very first to join him with troops; and 
as he had no extenuating circumstances to plead, except that 
more powerful officers were more guilty than he, and that 
nearly the whole army had been in the conspiracy, the 
court condemned him to be shot as a traitor; and he was 
shot on the evening of the 19th of August. 

Ney, who had every facility afforded him by Talleyrand, 
Touche, and even by the Austrian general Bubna, to escape 
into other countries, and who would scarcely have been 
found in his own country if he had not entertained some 
wild scheme, was brought to his account a few months 
later. 

Many ardent royalists had been in search of him, and at 
last, when the search had been abandoned, a volunteer of 
this class, who was prefect of police of the department, but 
who had received no instructions from the Bourbon govern¬ 
ment, discovered and seized the marshal in an obscure 
public-house in Auvergne—a region of extinct volcanoes. 
He was immediately brought up to Paris. The council 
of war, composed of marshals and generals, declared that it 
■was not competent to try him. This was on the 9th of 
November. Ney was then handed over to the Chamber of 
Peers, the Duke of Richelieu, President of the Council, pre¬ 
senting to the chamber the Act of Accusation, and the 


FATE OF MAfiSHAL NEY. 


239 


1815 .] 

Royal Ordinance (signed by all the French ministers), or¬ 
dering them to try Fey for high treason, etc. The Cham¬ 
ber of Peers, without demur, proceeded with the trial. The 
proofs of guilt were, of course, even clearer than in Labc- 
doyeres case. Fey, himself, admitted that when Buonaparte 
landed from Elba, he had solicited Louis XVIII. for the 
command of the army which was to be sent against him; 
and that, on getting what he wished, and on kissing the 
king’s hand at parting, he had sworn that within a week he 
would bring Buonaparte to Paris in an iron cage. On the 6th 
of December the peers, by a majority of a hundred and 
thirty-eight against twenty-two, returned a verdict of Guilty 
—Death ; and of the very small minority, not one voted for 
a verdict of Not Guilty; seventeen of the peers recom¬ 
mending transportation, and five of them declining to vote 
at all. 

It was now that the Convention of Paris, which had been 
held to be of no effect with regard to Labedoyere, was to be 
misinterpreted for the benefit of Ney, and that the honoured 
name of the Duke of Wellington was to be brought in as 
that of a man who could break an agreement, and who 
was eager to gratify his personal revenge against the great 
French marshal, for his having (so said the Buonapartists) 
beaten him so often in battle ! 

Madame Ney waited upon the duke to quote the conven¬ 
tion to him, and to demand his interference, not as a favour, 
but as a right,—to prove to him that he was bound in 
honour, and by his own act, to protect her husband. The 
lady says the duke replied, that he had nothing to do with 
the government of the King of France, and that it was not 
in his power to stop its justice. If the Duke of Wellington 
said so, he said that which w r as perfectly true ; for the mili¬ 
tary convention he had signed and ratified gave him no such 
right, and did not in any way cover or protect the great 
delinquent. From the quarters who reported, in their own 
way, these proceedings to the Buonaparte world, which was 
now assuming the congruous name of “ Liberal,” it was not 
to be expected that any notice should be taken of the com¬ 
miseration and delicacy with which the duke treated the 
wife of the condemned traitor. Notes were addressed to all 
the foreign ambassadors in Paris, and every one of them 
took the same view of the convention as was taken by the 
duke. Ney himself wrote to Wellington, but in the same 
sense in which his wife had spoken to his grace. Madame 
Ney then made matters still more hopeless, by publishing a 


240 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


defective and incorrect account of the conversation which 
she had had with the duke. In consequence of this publi¬ 
cation, which set forward in the eyes of the whole world 
the 12th article of the Convention of Paris as binding the 
British and Prussian Commanders-in-chief to protect Ney, 
the Duke of Wellington drew up a memorandum on the 
19th of November, which was communicated to the minis¬ 
ters of the Allied powers, and afterwards published. I give, 
in full, this paper, which ought to have set the question at 
rest for ever, and to have prevented the nonsense which was 
spoken and written at the time, and which has been re¬ 
peated, even by some Englishmen, down to the present day, 
or to quite a recent date. 

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING MARECHAD NEY. 

Paris, 19th Nov. 1815. 

“ It is extraordinary that Madame la Marechale Ney 
should have thought proper to publish in print parts of a 
conversation which she is supposed to have had with the 
Duke of Wellington, and that she has omitted to publish 
that which is a much better record of the duke’s opinion 
on the subject to which the conversation related, viz., the 
duke’s letter to the Marechal Prince de la Moskwa, in 
answer to the Marechal’s note to his grace. That letter 
was as follows:— 

44 ‘ I have had the honour of receiving the note which you 
addressed to me on the 13th of November, relating to the 
operation of the capitulation of Paris on your case. The 
capitulation of Paris of the 3rd July was made between the 
Commanders-iu-chief of the allied British and Prussian 
armies on the one part, and the Prince d'Eckmuhl,* Com¬ 
mander-in-chief of the French army on the other; and re¬ 
lated exclusively to the military occupation of Paris. 

“ 4 The object of the 12th article was to prevent the adop¬ 
tion of any measures of severity, under the military autho¬ 
rity of those who made it, towards any persons in Paris on 
account of the offices which they had tilled, or their conduct, 
or their political opinions. But it was never intended, and 
could not be intended, to prevent either the existing French 
government, under whose authority the French Commander- 
in-chief must have acted, or any French government which 
should succeed to it, from acting in this respect as it might 
deem fit.’— 

“ It is obvious from this letter that the Duke of Wel- 

* Davoust. 


MEMORANDUM ON NEY. 


241 


1815 .] 

lington, one of the parties to the capitulation of Paris, con¬ 
siders that that instrument contains nothing which can pre¬ 
vent the king from bringing Marshal Ney to trial in such 
manner as his Majesty may think proper. 

“ The contents of the capitulation fully confirms the jus¬ 
tice of the duke’s opinion. It is made between the Com¬ 
manders-in-chief of the contending armies respectively ; and 
the first nine articles relate solely to the mode and time of 
evacuation of Paris by the French army, and of the occu¬ 
pation by the British and Prussian armies. 

“ The 10th article provides that the existing authorities 
shall be respected by the two Commanders-in-chief of the 
Allies; the 11th, that public property shall be respected, and 
that the Allies shall not interfere 4 en aucune maniere dans 
leur administration, et dans leur gestion;’ and the 12th 
article states, ‘ seront pareillement respectees les personnes 
et les proprieties particulieres; les habitans, et en general tous 
les individus qui se trovent dans la capitale, continueront 
a jouir de leur droits et iibertes, sans pouvoiretre inquietes 
ou recherches en rien relativement aux fonctions qu’ils occu- 
pent ou auraient occupees, a leur conduite, et a leurs opi¬ 
nions politiques.’ 

“ By whom were these private properties and persons to 
be respected ? By the Allied generals and their troops, men¬ 
tioned in the 10th and lltli articles, and not by other parties 
to whom the convention did not relate in any manner. 

“ The 13th article provides that ‘les troupes etrangeres’ 
shall not obstruct the carriage of provisions by land or water 
to the capital. 

“ Thus it appears that every article in the convention re¬ 
lates exclusively to the operations of the different armies, or 
to the conduct of the Allies and that of their generals when 
they should enter Paris; and as the Duke of Wellington states 
in his dispatch of the 4th of July, with which he trans¬ 
mitted the convention to England, it ‘ decided all the military 
points then existing at Paris, and touched nothing political.’ 

“ But it appears clearly, that not only Avas this the duke’s 
opinion of the convention at the time it Avas signed, but like¬ 
wise the opinion of Carnot, of Marshal Ney, and of every 
other person who had an interest in considering the subject. 

“ Carnot says, in the Expose de la Conduite Politique de 
M. Carnot (page 43), — ‘ II fut resolu d’envoyer aux 
generanx Anglais et Prussiens une commission speciale 
chargee de leur proposer une convention purement militaire, 
pour la remise de la ville de I^aris entre leur mains, en 

n 


242 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


ecartant toute question politique, puisqu on ne pouvait prc- 
juger quelles seraient les intentions dcs Allies, lorsqu’jls 
seraient re unis.’ 

“ It appears that Marshal Ney fled from Paris in dis¬ 
guise, 'with a passport given to him by the Duke d’Otrante,* 
under a feigned name, on the 6th of July. He could not 
he supposed to be ignorant of the tenor of the 12th article of 
the convention; and he must then have known whether it 
was the intention of the parties who made it that it should 
protect him from the measures which the king, then at St. 
Denis, should think proper to adopt against him. 

“ But if Marshal Ney could be supposed ignorant of the 
intention of the 12th article, the Duke d’Otrante could not, 
as he was at the head of the provisional government, under 
whose authority the Prince d’Eckmulil must have acted 
\yhen he signed the convention. 

“ Would the Duke d’Otrante have given a passport under 
a feigned name to Marshal Ney, if he had understood the 
12th article as giving the marshal any protection, excepting 
against measures of severity by the two Commanders-in- 
chief ? 

“ Another proof of what was the opinion of the Duke 
d’Otrante, of the king’s ministers, and of all the persons 
most interested in establishing the meaning now attempted 
to he given to the 12th article of the convention of the 3rd 
of July, is the king’s proclamation of the 12th of July, by 
which nineteen persons are ordered for trial, and thirty- 
eight persons are ordered to quit Paris, and to reside in 
particular parts of France, under the observation and super¬ 
intendence of the police, till the chambers should decide 
upon their fate. 

“ Did the Duke d’Otrante, did any of the persons on their 
behalf, even then, or now, claim for them the protection cf 
the-12th article of the convention ? Certainly the conven¬ 
tion was then understood, as it ought to he understood 
now, viz., that it was exclusively military, and was never 
intended to hind the then existing government of France, or 
any. government which should succeed it. 

“ Wellington.” t 

The French government had been entirely changed in 
the month of September, and Talleyrand, with whom 
AV r ellington had at times conferred on internal French 
affairs, as being the only wise statesman in employment, 
* Douche. f * Dispatches,* vol. xii. pp. 691-0. 


EXECUTION OP NEY. 


243 


1815.] 

and the most moderate, was no longer in office, and was no 
longer consulted by the king. It was Talleyrand and the 
duke who had stopped many measures of severity which 
had been contemplated by the ultra-Bourbonists. That 
hot party was now in power, and could not forgive Ney. 
Others, not nearly so warm, thought it was time that a 
great example should be given. When the cabinet had decided 
on the execution, it would have been a breach of diplomatic 
conyenance, or a bad precedent in one who served a consti¬ 
tutional government, to make a breach between that cabinet 
and the sovereign; yet, like many others, I have been 
assured that the Duke of Wellington did attempt to make 
interest at court and elsewhere in favour, of the condemned 
marshal. Such a line of conduct would have been in keep¬ 
ing with the nobleness and magnanimity of bis nature; 
but Ney merited his fate, and Ney, to him, had never been 
a generous or courteous enemy, as Soult, Marmont, and a 
few—a very few—more of Buonaparte’s generals had been 
during the contest in the Peninsula. Those who formed 
the exceptional cases were French gentlemen ; and a gentle¬ 
man— though a marshal, duke, prince, and peer—Ney never 
was, for he retained to the last the manners, habits, and 
language of a common dragooner, in which capacity he had 
commenced his career. He was shot at 9 o’clock on the 
morning of the 7th of December, in broad daylight, in the 
public gardens of the Luxembourg, without the slightest 
commotion. The public funds, which had been fluctuating, 
rose as soon as it was known that he was dead. 

By the madmen or the impostors of the Buonaparte fac¬ 
tion, the duke was held up to execration and revenge as the 
real murderer of Ney. A subaltern officer, one Marie 
Andre Cantillon, attempted the duke’s life by firing a pistol 
at him, but the ruffian’s ball missed its aim. The assassin 
was acquitted by a Parisian jury, who must have been con¬ 
vinced of his guilt. Cantillon became very popular with 
the revolutionary party ; and Buonaparte, only a few days 
before his own death, put a codicil to his will, bequeathing 
him 10,COO francs, and saying that Cantillon had as much 
right to assassinate the duke, as the duke had to send him 
to St. Helena (which the duke had not done). There were 
other plots to take off the duke, during his residence as 
ambassador at Paris, but he feared them not, and there was 
a blessed Providence to protect him from them all. 

The duke’s splendid military career may be said to have 
terminated with the entrance of the British and Prussian 

p. 2 


244 


MEMOIR OF THE LUKE. 


armies into Paris on the 7th of July 1815 ; and at the end 
of that same year we lose the guiding light of his own Dis¬ 
patches, which contain so many other matters in addition to 
those of mere war and campaigning. The authentic mate¬ 
rials for an account of his diplomacy at the Congress of Aix- 
la-Chapelle, at the Congress of Verona, and elsewhere, are 
not yet accessible; nor is this the time to go even into a 
sketch of his home-political history, or of his conduct as 
Prime Minister of England, as a member of the Government, 
or as a member of the Conservative opposition. I renounce 
these subjects the more willingly, as it appears that justice is 
now rendered to the Octogenarian, and that it is universally 
admitted, in every moment of crisis, that no political ar¬ 
rangement can be made without the advice of the Duke of 
Wellington. 

The most enduring monument of his fame will be his own 
Dispatches. Yet, about the collecting in one body, and the 
publishing of these papers as a separate, arranged work, his 
grace was as indifferent as was Shakspeare about the edit¬ 
ing and printing of his immortal dramas. It required the 
earnest instance of personal friends, and long importunity to 
make the duke take the least trouble about them, or to con¬ 
sent that Colonel Gurwood should revise and edit the Dis¬ 
patches for him. He knew that all the most important 
papers were published in Government Gazettes, Records of 
Parliament, Annual Registers, and other works, that those en¬ 
gaged in historical researches, or in military studies might find 
them there, and for a collective edition, as an ass perennis of 
his own glory, lie cared no more than for a collection of the 
old bullets he had seen shot away at Vittoria and Waterloo. 

I am of the number of those who consider it an insult to 
our great Captain, and wise and humane statesman, to draw 
a parallel, or set up a comparison between him and Buona¬ 
parte. From the days of Plutarch downwards, such pre¬ 
tended parallels have always been strongly diverging lines; 
and, in this instance, to attempt a comparison is only to 
demonstrate a difference. The lines will not run straight even 
here, for the second of these illustrious men had certain ble¬ 
mishes and defects which never attached to the first of them ; 
but (instead of comparing him with Buonaparte) I would 
compare the Duke of Wellington with the Duke of Marlbo¬ 
rough, and would take their several dispatches as the means of 
comparison. While editing the Marlborough Dispatches (in 
which I had the honour and pleasure of lending some little 
aid), the late Sir George Murrgy said to me, “ If I could be- 


CHARACTER OF THE DUKE. 


245 


1815.] 

lieve in the metempsychosis, I should surely say that the soul 
of Marlborough had passed into the body of Wellington.’* 
And there are, indeed, in their several dispatches the most 
wonderful points of resemblance; the same attention to detail, 
the same incessant care for the provision and well-being of 
their troops, the same patience under the blunders of im¬ 
practicable Allies, the same forethought and foresight, the 
same quietness of demeanour and modesty of expression, the 
same total absence of fanfaronade (the French were as great 
boasters in the days of Marlborough and Louis XIY., as in 
those of Wellington and Napoleon), the same averseness to 
evasion and trickery in their own officers or in others they 
might have to deal with, and the same unvarying considera¬ 
tion and humanity for the poor people dwelling on the seat 
of war, and for the vanquished and wounded enemy. Making 
a very slight allowance for the difference of time between 
the beginning of the last century and the commencement 
of this, the styles of our two great commanders have a 
wonderful resemblance, in their English dispatches, to each 
other. And the same may be said of their letters and dis¬ 
patches in the French language. Neither Marlborough 
nor Wellington ever had the time or the pretension to write 
academical French : they had other things to think of; what 
they wrote was written in a hurry, and was never addressed 
to any foreigner who could understand English. Marlbo¬ 
rough’s French was good sound vernacular English, put 
into good French words, and in very fair French grammar. 
So was Wellington’s. Both were open to critical attacks on 
the score of idiom, and what is called classical purity,— 
things to which neither made the slightest pretence (and, 
be it said, things which the modern French school have set at 
nought), but both were perfectly intelligible and unmistake- 
able — which was all they aimed at, and all at which it was 
needful for them to aim. Too great a homage was rendered 
by both in employing the French language at all. 

To a Frenchman, who was ridiculing some French letters 
of the Duke of Wellington, I put these questions—“Why 
did not your marshals and generals correspond in English ? 
or why, by their total ignorance of our language, did they 
oblige the duke to write in yours ? You say that this is 
not idiomatic French; but is it not concise and perfectly 
intelligible ? ” My interlocutor was, of course, ready with 
the common assertions, that French is the passe-par-tout in 
European society, and that French (which never ought to 
have been permitted by other nations) is the language of 


24 6 


MEMOIR Of THE DUKE. 


diplomacy, etc.; but he confessed that there was no possi¬ 
bility of misunderstanding the duke’s meaning, and that 
very few Frenchmen could put so much meaning in so few 
words. 

The dispatches of these illustrious men ought to be found 
side by side in every English library. Open a volume of 
the “ Duke of Wellington” wherever you will, and you are 
almost sure to find some proof of his coolness, sagacity, and 
wisdom, or of that rare sense called common sense. Although 
the didactic tone or intention is never detected, his letters 
abound in the most salutary practical lessons, applicable to 
men of every profession and of every grade or condition of 
life. There cannot be a greater mistake than to consider 
the work as merely a soldier’s book. 

The duke never cared for rhetorical embellishment, or for 
any of the graces of fine writing. He thought merely of the 
matter , and never of the manner. And yet his style is ad¬ 
mirable, and thoroughly English. I prefer it to the style of 
his accomplished brother, the Marquis Wellesley, who was a 
scholar and a ripe one, and who paid that attention to the 
niceties of composition which the duke neither cared for nor 
had time to bestow. The natural, genuine tone, the happy 
facility and carelessness of the duke are charming in them¬ 
selves, apart from the matter. Compared with his dis¬ 
patches, the best of his brother’s (however admirable when 
not brought into this comparison) appear to me somewhat 
artificial, involved, wordy, and inflated. 

Never had a general commanding an army more occasion 
for skill than Wellington, all through the Peninsular War. I 
have pointed out some of the immense difficulties with which 
he had to contend as well at home as abroad; but I must 
again refer the reader to the voluminous dispatches for a 
full or competent idea of what those difficulties really were. 
Thwarted as he was, he, with a small British army (without 
which there never would have been a Portuguese army), 
kept the field against immense forces, and triumphed, after 
a protracted struggle. At the end of the year 1813, it being 
necessary to the character of his army that he should remind 
ministers of what it had done, and of what weight it was 
to the grand Allied Army in other parts of the continent, he 
wrote to Earl Bathurst, — “ By having kept in the field, in 
the Peninsula, about 30,000 men, the British Government 
have now for five years given employment to at least 
200,000 French troops of the best Napoleon had, as it is 
ridiculous to suppose that either the Spaniards or Portu- 


1815.] DEFERENCE PAID BY THE ALLIES. 247 

guese could have resisted for a moment, if the British force 
had been withdrawn. The armies now employed against us 
in France cannot be less than 100,000 men, indeed, more, 
including garrisons; and I see in the French newspapers, 
that orders have been given for the formation, at Bordeaux, 
of an army of reserve of 100,000 men. Is there any man 
weak enough to suppose that one-third of the number first 
mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and 
Portuguese if we were withdrawn ? They would, if it was 
still an object to Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula; and 
he would succeed in his object. But it is much more likely 
that he would make peace with the powers of the Peninsula, 
and then have it in his power to turn against the grand Allied 
Armies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 men are such 
troops as those Allied Armies have not yet had to deal with 

The duke not only fought the battle of Waterloo in the 
manner we have seen, but by his influence in the Congress 
of Vienna he had materially contributed to set in motion 
those immense European armies which, in the course of a 
very few weeks would have destroyed Buonaparte, even if 
Waterloo had been a defeat instead of a victory. He told 
the Emperor of Austria, the. King of Prussia, and the 
Emperor of Russia, that the general strength of the allied 
nations must be put forth for the common cause; and he 
assisted in drawing up at Vienna, that wide, grand plan 
of military operations which was adopted. He told his own 
government that nothing could be done with a small force; 
that with a small force the war would linger on at an enor¬ 
mous expense, and end to the disadvantage of the Allies; 
that motives of economy should induce the British Govern¬ 
ment to take ample measures to enable Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, and other states, to move their immense armies 
against France; and it was upon this wise calculation that 
Lord Liverpool’s government made its prodigious effort, 
and that the budget of the year 1815 was raised to very 
nearly 90,000,000/., and that all the continental powers who 
needed money obtained it. Scarcely an operation or a move¬ 
ment of those grand Allied Armies w r as undertaken without 
some previous consultation with the Duke of Wellington, 
whose military genius was acknowledged by all the foreign 
generals, and whose amiable, conciliating manners had en¬ 
deared him to them «//, whether emperors, kings, royal 
princes, high-born men, or soldiers who had risen from 
obscurity by their skill and valour. 

The motto given to the heroic Nelson was not more 

* ‘ Dispatches/ vol. xi. 


248 


MEMOIR OF TIIE DUKE. 


appropriate than is the motto on the duke’s escutcheon,— 
“ Yirtutis fortuna. comes.” — Fortune is the companion 
of valour.—In all the heady fights and terrible melees in 
which the duke was engaged, he was never seriously 
wounded, and only once hit by an enemy’s ball. This was 
at the battle of Orthes, where he was struck by a spent 
musket-bullet in the thigh. He did not mention the hurt 
until the business of the day was over; but then it wa3 
found necessary to assist him from his horse. It proved, 
however, to be but a contusion, and the pain and stiffness 
were over in a few days. Buonaparte was never hit but 
once, and that was by a spent musket-ball at Eatisbon. If 
none but wounds in front are to be esteemed honourable, 
neither Wellington nor Buonaparte could claim that honour, 
for they were both struck behind, Buonaparte having been 
hit on the heel. But, though pretty in a motto, the notion 
of wounds in front is ridiculous in fact, as, even in a vic¬ 
torious battle, both men and officers may have frequently 
to turn their backs to the enemy. Except in his early cam¬ 
paigns in Italy, and in the desperate campaign of 1814 in 
France, Buonaparte was very chary of his person; but 
Wellington frankly exposed his wherever occasion required 
it. Writing in 1815, just after the battle of Waterloo, the 
lamented Southey said,—“This may not be an improper 
occasion to observe, that the personal behaviour of this 
great Captain has been, on all occasions, as perfect as his 
conduct as a general: to say that he is brave, is to give him 
a praise which he shares with all his army;.but that for 
which, above all other officers, he is distinguished, is that 
wonderful union of the coolest patience with the hottest 
courage; that sense of duty which restrains him from an 
ostentatious exposure of a life, of the value of which he 
could not affect to be ignorant, and that brilliant gallantry 
which, on the proper occasions, flashes terror into the eyes 
of the enemy, and kindles in his own army an enthusiasm 
which nothing can withstand.” * 

At one moment during the battle of Waterloo, when the 
duke was very much in advance, observing the enemy’s 
movements, one of his aides-de-camp ventured to hint that 
lie was exposing himself too much. The duke answered 
with his noble simplicity, “ I know I am, but I must die or 
see what they are doing.”f 

The Duke of Marlborough was never known to be in 
a bustle,—a vulgar word, but very expressive of the condi¬ 
tion of inferior minds when placed in situations wherein 
* * Quarterly Review,’ vol. xiii. p. 470. f Id. p. 522. 


1815.] MARLBOROUGH AND WELLINGTON. 249 

there is much to do. The Duke of Wellington, in the 
busiest periods of his life, was never seen to be in a hurry, 
and always appeared to have time to spare. By his thorough 
business-like and systematic arrangements, he had a time 
for everything, and everything found its proper time. Whe¬ 
ther commander-in-chief of the army in the field, or premier 
in the cabinet, he never left a letter unanswered. Even 
while campaigning, the number of letters he wrote, on nearly 
all possible varieties of subjects, was astounding. Often, in 
one single day, when in presence of the enemy, and in ex¬ 
pectation of an immediate battle, he wrote a dozen long 
letters, which w r ould have been considered as hard work by 
a functionary at home in the War or Foreign office, who 
had nothing else to attend to. 

A perfect economist in time, the space allotted for indul¬ 
gence or repose was very limited ; he slept little, his meals 
were simple and short, and hence, the greater portion of the 
four-and-twenty hours were passed at the writing desk or in 
the saddle. No hospital, no cantonment, however small, 
escaped his visits. He listened as attentively to the com¬ 
plaint of a common soldier, as to the remonstrance of a 
general officer. If a favour were required, it was promptly 
granted or decisively refused; with grace in the one case, 
and without harshness in the other. For a long time he was 
much more thoroughly beloved by the rank and file, than 
by the officers ; and the reason of this will be easily under¬ 
stood by an attentive perusal of his despatches, memoranda, 
and private letters. 

Marlborough, simple and unpretending in his own person, 
took pride in the good equipment and neatness of his men, 
and in hearing the princes of Germany declare that his 
army looked like an army of gentlemen. The Duke of 
Wellington had the same taste and pleasure; in personal 
simplicity his costume was in keeping with his character; he 
despised everything like parade ; and, unless when their ser¬ 
vices were needed, he dispensed with the attendance of his 
staff. Nothing could be more striking than the plainness of 
his appearance in public, when contrasted with the general 
frippery, parade, and display of most of his French adver¬ 
saries. His plain blue frock-coat, unadorned hat, and clean 
white cravat, were well known to every man in his army; 
but strangers had often a difficulty in recognising in this 
quiet garb, and under his habitually cheerful countenance, 
the great statesman and soldier—the hero of so many brilliant 
victories. He was never elated by success, and still less was 
he ever depressed by failure. Under all circumstances, lie 


250 


MEMOIR OR THE DUKE. 


was calm and self-possessed,—his voice, his look, and manner, 
the same. I can almost forgive the eloquent historian of the 
Peninsular war his national derelictions, and his prostration 
before the image of Buonaparte, on account of the justice he 
occasionally deals out to our glorious British infantry, and 
which he always renders to the Duke. “ I saw him late in 
the evening of that great day (of Salamanca), when the ad¬ 
vancing flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as 
the eye could command, showed, in the darkness, how well 
the field was won. He was alone, the flush of victory was 
on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful; but his 
voice was calm and even gentle.”* 

The same calm voice was heard all through the terrible 
day of Waterloo ; and it was not until he had retired from 
the field that he gave way, for a moment, to the feelings 
which filled his heart. 

I cannot better conclude the last book of this brief me¬ 
moir—brief and imperfect, but written with a heart-warm 
admiration for the subject of it—than by giving an eloquent 
passage by the true English, noble prose writer, from whom 
I have often quoted. 

“ In Gascony, as well as in Portugal and Spain, the Duke 
of Wellington’s name was blessed by the people. Seldom, 
indeed, has it fallen to any conqueror to look back upon his 
career with such feelings ! the marshal’s staff, the dukedom, 
the half million, the honours and rewards which his prince 
and his country have so munificently and properly bestowed, 
are neither the only nor the most valuable recompense of 
his labours. There is something more precious than this, 
more to be desired than the high and enduring fame, which 
he has secured by his military achievements : it is the 
satisfaction of thinking to what end those achievements have 
been directed; that they were for the deliverance of two 
most injured and grievously oppressed nations; for the 
safety, honour, and welfare of his own country, and for the 
general interests of Europe, and of the civilized world. TIis 
campaigns have been sanctified by the cause; they have 
been sullied by no cruelties, no crimes ; the chariot-wheels 
of his triumphs have been followed by no curses; his 
laurels are entwined with the amaranths of righteousness, 
and upon his deathbed he may remember his victories 
among his good works.”*}* 

* W, Napier. f Southey iu ‘ Quarterly Review,’ vol. xiii. p. 274. 


1818 .] 1 CONGRESS OF AIN-LA-CHAPELLE. 


251 


CONCLUDING CHAPTER. 

In order to prevent the recurrence of the desolating wars 
which had just been ended, it was determined to place 
France, the originator of the evil, under military jurisdiction. 
The command of the force charged with this critical duty 
was intrusted by common consent to the Duke of Wellington, 
but for whose mediation France would have fared far more 
hardly at the hands of the allies. The exasperated Prussians, 
as we have seen, were bent upon demolishing the monu¬ 
ments of Paris, and even less revengeful spirits inclined to 
think that a great deal was to be got out of a nation which 
had inflicted such troubles and miseries on Europe at large, 
and was now so humiliated. It will hardly surprise the 
reader to learn that, during his residence in Paris, Wel¬ 
lington’s life was twice attempted by assassins—once when 
a quantity of gunpowder was placed in his cellars for ex¬ 
plosion on the occasion of a fete, and, again, when a pistol 
was fired at his carriage on a drive. The author of this 
latter attempt was Cantillon, the miscreant to whom, out of 
respect for this very transaction, Napoleon left a legacy. 

In the year 1818, the King of Prussia and the Emperors 
of Austria and Russia met at Aix-la-Chapelle, in the month 
of September, and this conference was attended on the 
part of the English crown by the Duke of Wellington and 
Lord Castlereagh. The principal, if not the only, public 
business transacted here was the agreement for the evacua¬ 
tion of France by the allied army, and the restoration of that 
State to its independent dignity among European nations. 
The proposal was in anticipation of the provisions of the 
treaty which had fixed five years as the possible term of 
occupation. The private interests of the Duke were largely 
concerned in the maintenance of this arrangement to its full 
extent. His emoluments as Commander-in-Chief of the 
occupying force were very large, and the inclination of 
most of his political colleagues tended, as he well knew, 
to the strict enforcement of the compact. Such con¬ 
siderations, however, had no weight against his impartial 
conclusions, and he so successfully exerted his influence in 
favour of France that the evacuation was decided upon with¬ 
out difficulty or delay. Indeed, so rapid and decided were 
his movements that, even before the time for the evacua¬ 
tion of the country was settled, orders were transmitted to 


252 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


the different armies to march, and, by the end of the year, 
France was again defended by Frenchmen, and Louis le 
Desire an independent .sovereign. 

But England was not unmindful of her hero. Honours, 
offices, and rewards were showered on him from every 
quarter. As the Crown had exhausted its store of titles, 
and Parliament its forms of thanksgiving, the recognitions 
of his crowning victory took a more substantial shape. In 
addition to former grants, the sum of 200,000/. was voted, 
in 1815, for the purchase of a mansion and estate to be 
settled on the dukedom. With these funds, a commission 
appointed for the purpose concluded a bargain with Lord 
Rivers for the domain of Stratlifieldsaye, Hants, to be held 
in perpetuity by the Dukes of Wellington, on condition of 
presenting a tricolour flag to the British Sovereign on every 
18th of June. This symbol, corresponding to a similar 
token presented by the Dukes of Marlborough, is always 
suspended in the Armoury at Windsor Castle, where the 
little silken trophies may be seen hanging together in per¬ 
petual memory of Blenheim and Waterloo. 

It is a remarkable circumstance that the trophy in the 
Park (not the monster) was for twenty years the only 
statue of the Duke which the metropolis possessed. It was 
subscribed for by the ladies of England between 1819 and 

1821, and was erected on the 18th of June, 1822, in which 
year also the citizens of London presented their splendid 
shield. The Duke in 1818 was appointed Master-General 
of the Ordnance, in 1819 Governor of Plymouth, and in 
1820 Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade. As to foreign 
courts, they had already said and done their utmost; but in 
1818, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Sovereigns of 
Austria, Russia, and Prussia, simultaneously promoted the 
Duke to that rank in their respective forces which he had 
already reached in his own; thus, though he gained every 
honour by service and none by birth, he died a Field- 
Marshal of near forty years’ standing in four of the greatest 
armies in the w r orld. 

It was now, however, that the great Duke was to take 
a more direct and visible part in the administration of his 
country. The old Tory Cabinet had subsisted for ten years 
under the presidency of Lord Liverpool, without material 
modification in its constitution or policy. Mr. Canning had 
certainly been for some time at the head of the Board of Con¬ 
trol, but it was not until his accession to the Foreign-Office, in 

1822, that his influence was substantially felt in the measures 


253 


1822.] REFORM AND CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION. 

of the Government. Bat now the elements of a mighty 
change began perceptibly to work. The days of unqualified 
Toryism were almost at an end, and the precursors of 
reform appeared upon the scene. The principles of general 
liberalism in the person of Canning, and of free trade in 
that of Huskisson, were to be gradually introduced into the 
stubborn cabinet of the Regency, and old men were at 
length to give place to new. Of the four ancient notabili¬ 
ties, Lord Londonderry was already gone, Lord Sidmouth 
had just retired, Lord Eldon was declining, and the end of 
Lord Liverpool was at hand. 

Beside the innumerable points of general policy to 
be thus reconsidered, there Avere two great questions 
awaiting a decision—those of Parliamentary Reform and 
Catholic Emancipation. The former of these, though 
originally entertained by a Tory minister, had become poli¬ 
tically identified Avith the pledges of the Whigs, and was 
adopted rather than promoted by the Radicals of the 
time as the chief object of their agitation. The latter Avas 
less essentially a party question, for it concerned the practi¬ 
cal government of Ireland rather than the recognition of a 
theoretical principle; and statesmen and cabinets had been 
divided on its merits ever since the ooenine; of the Avar. The 
measure, hoAvever, had been seized by the Whigs as their 
own; it had been exploded by the Tories, and its destinies 
Avere generally connected with the prospects of Whig 
ascendancy. This party had iioav, for a very long interval, 
been excluded from power. Their adversaries had usurped 
the credit of the Avar and the support of the electoral con¬ 
stituencies, and it appeared as if they Avere iioav irremovably 
established in their seats of office. Although the state 
of the country imperatively needed reforms, the great policy 
of the ministry Avas, nevertheless, that of repression alone. 
While new ideas were fermenting among the people Avith the 
diffusion of political knoAvledge and the rapidly growing 
conviction of misgovernment, the cabinet policy Avas that 
of twenty years before, Avith its rigorous maxims of resistance 
and severity. The consequences Avere nothing but natural. 
The people Avere seduced by demagogues into wicked excesses 
and extravagant demands. They held nightly gatherings in 
the manufacturing counties, hatched chimerical plots of 
inarching on the metropolis, shouted treason at their meet¬ 
ings, and proposed the forcible overthroAV of the Govern¬ 
ment. A conspiracy—known as the Cato-Street conspiracy 
—for the assassination of the ministry Avas actually formed, 


254 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


and was not defeated by any want of resolution or earnest¬ 
ness on the part of the conspirators. However, as an able 
writer observes, “ the scheme was too horrible and too 
foolish. In the end it appeared that the number involved 
was very small; so small, that the affair would scarcely 
deserve a place in history, but for the atrocity of the plan, 
and the illustration the event affords of the working of the 
spy system adopted by the Government of the day.”* 

Of this unpopularity of the administration the Duke had 
his share. His military eminence was no recommendation 
in the eyes of those who denounced soldiers as the instru¬ 
ments of tyranny, and who had scarcely been brought, even 
by a continued series of victories, to approve of an anti-de¬ 
mocratic war. And his known sentiments were not of a ten¬ 
dency to conciliate a suspicious public. As Master-General 
of the Ordnance he had taken a seat in the cabinet, had con¬ 
curred in the prosecution of the Queen, and had spoken in 
terms of soldierlike bluntness about certain proceedings of 
the Opposition. For two or three years affairs proceeded 
without the occurrence of any remarkable conjuncture. Mr. 
Canning and Mr. Iluskisson were looked upon with askant 
eyes. Lord Eldon croaked, Lord Liverpool looked doubt- 
ingly ahead, and the Duke, perhaps, saw further than 
others; yet the old administration remained in outward 
form substantially the same, and the catastrophe was yet 
to come. At length, in February, 1827, Lord Liverpool’s 
faculties suddenly failed him, and his fall left the govern¬ 
ment not only without a head, but without that influence 
which had hitherto kept it together. Its constituents were 
divided among themselves on all the great questions coming 
on. The Duke had not yet discerned the necessity of 
the doctrines of emancipation and progress, but he was too 
wise to consort with dotards or bigots, and allied himself 
rather with Mr. Peel, who had succeeded to Lord Sidmouth’s 
office of Home Secretary in 1822. 

In a few weeks, when it became evident that Lord Liver¬ 
pool’s recovery was hopeless, the formation of a new ministry 
became indispensable, and on the 10th of April the Kin^ 
sent for Mr. Canning. The claims of this statesman to the 
premiership, both from official services and popular favour, 
were incontestible; but his opinions represented those of 
the minority of the cabinet, and it had now to be seen 
whether those who could co-operate with Mr. Canning 
under the conciliatory presidency of Lord Liverpool would 
* Martineau—History of England during the Peace, vol, i. p. 241. 



1827.] POPULAR FEELING AGAINST THE DUKE. 255 

be content to acknowledge his leadership of the administra¬ 
tion. As far as Catholic Emancipation went, no great diffi¬ 
culties need have intervened, for, though the new Premier’s 
favourable disposition towards Ireland was well known, the 
question was an open one. But Mr. Canning, though not 
a Whig by profession, was a liberal by principle, and his 
ministry could not but be a liberal ministry. For this the 
Duke was unprepared, and when the new appointment was 
communicated to the members of the late Government, he, 
like most of his colleagues, sent in his resignation. Nor 
did he stop here, for he also laid down the Master-Gencral- 
, ship of the Ordnance and the Commandership-in-Chief, to 
which, at the Duke of York’s death, he had succeeded. 
Moreover, when the Corn Bill of Canning and Huskisson 
came before the House of Lords, he moved and carried an 
amendment destructive of the measure. 

It was alleged that he desired the premiership for himself, 
and had adopted these measures to disconcert and embarrass 
the Government. On these points he delivered himself of 
an elaborate exculpation from his place in the Hou$e of 
Lords, averring, among other declarations, that, so far-£rom 
seeking to conduct a Government, he Was “ sensible of 
being unqualified for such actuation,” and that he “should 
have been mad to think of it”—words which were not for¬ 
gotten at a later time. No reader will nowfsuppose that the 
Duke of Wellington ever thought of dictating to his sove¬ 
reign, or of combining with others in the spirit imputed to 
him. What the Duke felt at the new appointment all felt, 
and all were ready to mark their disapprobation. They did 
not desire a Liberal Government; they did not admire “ po¬ 
litical adventurers,” and they were unprepared for a cabinet 
in which the premier stood committed to the emancipation 
policy, however open the question might be considered. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the Duke was personally 
adverse to an intimate connection with Canning. 

The whole episode, however, was of brief duration. Worn 
out by mental fatigue and harassment, deserted by those 
who should have been his best adherents, and persecuted on 
all sides by those who distrusted his politics or envied his 
elevation, George Canning expired in the fourth month of 
his office, and left the King and the Government in worse 
perplexities than before. George Canning died in August; 
and, before the end of the year, Lord Goderich had re¬ 
signed his office in despair. Thus there appeared to be 
no chance of a good working ministry under the Canning 


256 


MEMOIR OP THE DUKE. 


policy, while the true days of the old Tories were already 
past, and those of the Whigs not quite come. In his em¬ 
barrassments the King did what kings and queens have so 
often been compelled to do since—he sent for the Duke of 
Wellington. The Duke repaired to the royal closet, and, 
to the surprise of some, the amusement of many, and the 
satisfaction of more, was gazetted as Prime Minister of 
England within eight months after his own declaration that 
the office was wholly beside his powers. 

Since Canning’s death he had so far qualified his recent 
secession from affairs as to return to the command of the 
army, and he had just gratified his countrymen by a series 
of visits to the aristocracy, in a progress which fell little 
short of the splendours of royalty. A more serious task 
was now his lot. He was to charge himself with the for¬ 
mation of a cabinet and the responsible direction of public 
buffaess, under circumstances which had rendered the 
attempts of his predecessors impracticable. Perhaps both 
the King and the Duke would have preferred an adminis¬ 
tration constructed wholly on the principles entertained by 
the premier, but of this there appeared no probability. 
So the Duke took Mr. Huskisson, whom he disliked, and 
four more “ Canningites” besides, but he still retained Peel 
at his side, and it was evident that the soul of the ad¬ 
ministration resided here. The chancellorship of the 
exchequer was filled by Mr. Goulburn, whose name was 
long afterwards respectably connected with the rising 
party; but, though the Canningites formed the weaker 
element of the cabinet, they were thought to contribute 
much towards shaping its policy ; and so, in fact, they did, 
for, though the men were soon changed, their spirit survived 
in the measures brought forward. 

Before the eyes of the great Duke and his colleagues 
there still loomed the three great questions of the time. 
Beligious disabilities, Free Trade, and, last but not least, 
under motions for disfranchising one constituency and en¬ 
franchising another, Parliamentary Reform,—these were the 
perplexing and troublesome matters which were presented 
for decision. On all these the Duke held opinions which 
were probably averse to material change. That he was 
opposed to the views of the Liberal party was not wholly 
the case, for the Liberal part}'- were not unanimous in their 
desire for the modification of the Corn Laws; nor was he 
opposed to the wishes of the country; for the country, on 
the whole, did not desire Catholic Emancipation. But it is 


257 


1827 .] CORPORATION AND TEST ACTS. 

0 * * 

probable that, on his own judgment, he would have main¬ 
tained the existing institutions in substantial integrity. What 
he then thought respecting the Corn Laws he had recently 
shown; what he thought, after much longer consideration 
of Parliamentary Reform is not yet forgotten; and what 
he thought of religious disabilities we shall presently see. 

The very first business of the session brought these ques¬ 
tions forwaid. Lord John Russell moved for a repeal of 
the Corporation and Test Acts—the first step towards 
that religious freedom which Catholic Emancipation would 
manifestly consummate. Government opposed the measure, 
but the Reformers were much too strong for them, and the 
motion was carried in a full house by a majority of forty- 
four. The Duke, however, yielded, took up the bill with a 
good grace, and, against the desperate resistance of his old 
friend Lord Eldon, and of all who thought the church and 
the constitution veritably at stake, carried it, under his own 
auspices, through the House of Lords. 

A month afterwards came a corn bill of Mr. Iluskisson’s 
again, and again did the Duke compromise his private reso¬ 
lutions by accepting it as a Government measure. Later 
still, as if the session was to test the new ministry on every 
vital point, the question of Parliamentary Reform was 
brought under discussion upon a motion to disfranchise the 
two boroughs of Penryn and East Retford, and invest Man¬ 
chester and Birmingham with the electoral privileges thus 
vacated. In the course of the contest, a division was taken 
on the particular substitution of Birmingham for East Ret¬ 
ford. The ministry negatived the proposal, but Mr. Hus- 
kisson, then Colonial Secretary, had committed himself to 
the opposite view. Confused at his position, he sent the 
Duke what was either a resignation, or an offer of resigna¬ 
tion, and what the Duke chose to think was the former. 
There was, in plain truth, but little cordiality between 
them. Though the Duke’s personal feelings had vanished 
with Canning’s death, he had still no affection towards his 
party, and certainly no preference for Mr. Huskisson above 
others. Unpleasant jars had already occurred. Mr. Hus¬ 
kisson had publicly assured his Liverpool constituents that 
he had not entered the new administration without a gua¬ 
rantee for the general adjustment of its policy by that of 
Canning. This sounded as if a pledge had been exacted 
and given—an idea which the Duke indignantly repudiated, 
and parliamentary explanations had to be offered before the 
matter could be set at rest. This time the difference was 

s 


2o8 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


made final. In vain did the common friends and colleagues 
of the two statesmen endeavour to explain the unlucky com¬ 
munication. The Duke, in terms which passed into pro¬ 
verbial use, replied, that there “ was no mistake, could be 
no mistake, and should be no mistake.” He was not sorry, 
in fact, that so convenient an opportunity had been created 
to his hand. Mr. Huskisson therefore retired, and with 
him retired not only Lord Dudley, Mr. Lamb, and Mr. 
Grant, but even Lord Palmerston. 

The Roman Catholic question was formerly regarded in a 
light of such abstract policy that, as the Duke remarked, a 
bill concerning Roman Catholicism in England had been 
introduced into Parliament towards the close of the last 
century without even the cognisance of the authorities of 
Ireland. For a long time it was debated as involving 
points of principle alone, but of latter years an agitation had 
been matured which changed the whole features of the 
subject. Instead of being a question of toleration, it was a 
question of government. To such a state had Ireland been 
reduced by O’Connell and the priests, that Catholic Eman¬ 
cipation was now demanded, not on the intrinsic merits of 
its claims, but as the sole means of satisfying a people 
who could be governed on no other terms, and bringing one- 
third of the empire into harmony and unity with the rest. 
It was under this aspect that it exacted the attention of the 
Duke. Confident in their strength, and exasperated by the 
substitution of what they deemed an oppressive ministry 
for the liberal and promising cabinets of Canning and 
Goderich, the Irish confederates had isolated themselves, as 
it were, from all the relations of political and social life for 
the one sole object of enforcing this demand upon the 
government by a national movement. There was no law 
but that of the priests — no rule but that of O’Connell. 
At length he was even returned to Parliament for Clare, 
and it was proclaimed by an association, whose menaces 
seemed warranted by its power, that every county in Ireland 
should record a like defiance of law and order. 

The Duke at last resolved on conceding to the Roman 
Catholics the emancipation they desired; nor can we now 
err in ascribing a material share in his decision to the co¬ 
operation of Robert Peel. There was no very cheering pros¬ 
pect before the two colleagues. That the influence of the 
ministry and the example of the Duke would carry the 
measure through the legislature as a Government question, 
could hardly be doubted, but other and more serious 


THE DUKE’S SPEECH. 


259 


1829.] 

considerations were in the way. The Wellington cabinet 
had been brought into power on the presumption, whether 
sound or otherwise, that they would maintain the Protestant 
ascendancy; this opinion was strongly felt by the electoral 
constituencies of the kingdom, and the conviction was gene¬ 
rally understood to be shared in its fullest extent by the 
most exalted personage in the realm. 

Measures of pure political reform, however offensive to 
particular classes, are rarely unacceptable to the body of the 
nation; but when religious, instead of civil freedom, is at 
stake, the proposal seldom escapes some violent antagonism. 
Whether the majority of the people were ever really favour¬ 
able to Catholic Emancipation, may be a subject of some 
doubt, and ministers, with all the pledges of their previous 
life against them, amid the reproaches of their former 
friends and the sarcasms of their new allies, seemed to be 
proposing to carry an almost unpopular measure under 
what appeared the intimidation of Irish terrorism. This 
will hereafter claim our notice; but it is enough to observe, 
that what the Duke, however, had once determined to do, 
he did in a manner most like himself. In the first place, he 
resolved that there should be no compromise, insufficiency, 
or hesitation about the act itself. If concession was to be 
made, it should be made fully and freely, so as to satisfy all, 
and leave no rankling vestiges behind. Secondly, like a 
wise general, he left his adversaries no opportunity of pro¬ 
fiting by the disclosure of his plans, but kept his counsels to 
himself till the time came for action. 

However, on the 5th of February, 1829, the policy of the 
Government was plainly announced in the speech from the 
throne ; and when the field had been once taken, the Duke 
made short work and sure. The Duke in the Upper House, 
and Mr. Peel in the Lower, met the exigencies of their re¬ 
spective positions by manful acknowledgments and un¬ 
answerable reasoning. It was on this occasion that the 
Duke, having shown the positive necessity of either ad¬ 
vancing or receding, dismissed the latter alternative with 
his celebrated declaration :—“ My lords, I am one of those 
who have probably passed more of my life in war than most 
men, and principally I may say in civil war too, and I must 
say this, that if I could avoid by any sacrifice whatever 
even one month of civil war in the country to which I am 
attached, I would sacrifice my life in order to do it.” There 
was no rebutting such arguments, although the opposition 
was most determined 5 but the Duke carried his point, and in 


260 


MEMOIR OF THE EUKE. 


little more than a month the Relief Bill passed both Houses 
by large majorities, received the royal assent, and became 
the law of the land. 

The Whigs now perceived that their time was come, 
nor did the" Duke refuse the battle. He knew that the 
fight was for Parliamentary Reform, and he brought the 
point to issue without the delay of an hour. It may sur¬ 
prise observers of our own generation to conceive how such 
a man, at so great a crisis, could ever have fallen into so 
serious a mistake. To all appearances the conjuncture of 
affairs fell peculiarly within the range of his statesmanship. 
It was a question of yielding, or resistance, of assigning a 
due and proper value to the reality of the grievance, the 
demands of the times, and the force of opinion. The Duke 
had understood such questions in the cases of Free Trade 
and Catholic Emancipation, and it seems astonishing that 
he should have stumbled at a case which was clearer 
than either. To us it would appear that the justice of 
the popular demand, the urgency of the crisis, and the 
probable safety of the experiment, ought to have been 
as clear to the Duke’s eyes at that time as they are to 
our own at present. None could read signs around him 
better than he, and yet on this occasion he utterly failed. 
The new Parliament met in November, and at the very 
opening of the session the Duke delivered his memorable 
declaration, “ that the country already possessed a Legis¬ 
lature which answered all the good purposes of legislation, 
that the system of representation possessed the full and 
entire confidence of the country, and that he was not only 
not prepared to bring forward any measure of reform, but 
would resist such as long as he held any station in the 
Government of the country.” These few words decided 
the destinies of the Government and the country too. 
Radical reform became an immediate certainty, and away 
went the Tories for ever, and the Wellington party for 
ten long years. 

From this period the Duke’s time went on p^asantly 
enough. His transient unpopularity speedily vanished with 
the declme of agitation. The people soon forgot that he 
had been an obstructive, and the Tories that he had been a 
repealer. He was soon cheered in the streets again as 
“ the Great Duke and when the University of Oxford, in 
1834, elected him its Chancellor, we may have reason to 
believe that his compulsory liberalism had been excused. 
In the same year, it for a moment appeared as if his minis- 


THE DUKE’S OFFICES. 


1834.] 


261 


terial life were to recommence, and under singular conditions 
too. The Whigs had been dismissed, and the King, as 
usual, “ sent for the Duke.” The Duke recommended that 
Sir Robert Peel should be charged with the formation of a 
ministry; and here nothing so clearly manifests the powers 
of the Duke’s mind as his almost superhuman exertions sub¬ 
sequent to the time of the passing of the Reform Bill, at a 
crisis of peculiar peril. It was at the time when, after the 
amalgamation of all parties, they came out afresh—“ with 
new members, a new language, a new task, and a whole set 
of new aims.” But nothing can be more apt than the 
account given us by a distinguished authoress of the present 
day, which renders our own attempts wholly “ works of 
supererogation.” 

“ The new Conservative rule,” says Miss Martineau,* 
“ began with a joke. Some, who could not take the joke 
easily, were very angry; but most people laughed: and, 
among them, the person most nearly concerned — the Duke 
of Wellington—laughed as cheerfully as anybody. Sir 
Robert Peel was at Rome : it must be a fortnight before he 
could arrive, so that the Duke took the business of the 
empire upon himself during the interval. This he called 
not deserting his sovereign; and he was as well satisfied with 
himself in this singular way of getting over the crisis, as on 
all the other occasions when he refused to desert his 
sovereign. His devotion was such, that for the interval he 
undertook eight offices—five principal and three subordinate. 

£ The Irish hold it impossible,’ wrote a contemporary, ‘ for 
a man to be in two places at once, “ like a bird.” The Duke 
has proved this no joke—he is in five places at once. At 
last, then, we have an united government. The Cabinet 
Council sits in the Duke’s head, and the ministers are all of 
one mind.’f . . . Condemnations passed at public 

meetings were forwarded to him, with emphatic assurances 
that the condemnation was unanimous. An orator here 
and there drew out in array all the consequences that could 
ever arise from the temporary shift being made a precedent; 
and Lord Campbell condescended to talk, at a public meeting 
at Edinburgh, of impeaching the multifarious minister. At 
all that, and at a myriad of jokes, the Duke laughed, while 
he worked like a clerk from day to day, till the welcome 
sound of Sir Robert Peel’s carriage-Avheels was heard.” 

In one of the offices—that of Foreign Affairs—he w r as 

* History of England during the Peace, vol. ii. p. 205. 

t England’s Seven Administrations, vol. iii. p. 141. 


262 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


induced to remain; but in a few weeks the whole fabric 
vanished, and there was an end of the hazard till 1841. 
True to his own creed, he then accepted the definite repeal 
of the Corn Laws ; and under the same conditions, indeed, 
would probably have proposed it. He had no longer much 
difficulty in adjusting himself to Conservative Whigs or libe¬ 
ralized Tories. His rule was necessity—and most Govern¬ 
ments of late years have been guided by the same standard. 

Now let us turn to the last scene of his “ strange, eventful 
history.” 

Preserving to the last those temperate habits and that 
bodily activity for which he was so remarkably distinguished, 
on Monday, the 13th of September, 1852, he took his custom¬ 
ary walk in the grounds attached to the castle, inspected the 
stables, made many minute inquiries there, and gave direc¬ 
tions with reference to a journey to Dover on the following 
day, where Lady Westmoreland was expected to arrive on a 
visit to Walmer. His appetite had been observed to be 
keener than usual, and some remarked that he looked pale 
while attending Divine service on Sunday, but otherwise 
nothing had occurred to attract notice or to excite uneasiness, 
and after dining heartily on venison he retired to rest on 
Monday night, apparently quite well. Lord and Lady 
Charles Wellesley were the only visitors at the castle. 

Early on Tuesday morning, when Mr. Kendall, the valet, 
came to awake him, his Grace refused to get up, and desired 
that the “apothecary” should he sent for immediately. In 
obedience to his master’s orders, Mr. Kendall despatched a 
note to Mr. W. Hulke, the eminent surgeon at Deal, who 
has been attached to the family for many years, and whom 
he desired to repair at once to the castle, and to make a 
secret of the summons. So great had for many years past 
been the public interest in the Duke’s health, that rumours 
and fears magnified his most trifling ailments, and the news 
of his desire for medical aid was consequently suppressed. 
Mr. Hulke hastened to the castle, where he arrived at about 
9 o’clock. He found the Duke, to all appearance, suffering 
from indigestion, and complaining of pains in the chest and 
stomach. He was in the full possession of his faculties, and 
described his ailment very clearly. This his last conver¬ 
sation on earth related entirely to his state of health; and 
so slight and seemingly harmless were the symptoms that 
Mr. Hulke confined himself to prescribing some dry toast 
and tea. He then left, promising to call at about 11 o’clock, 
but at Lord Charles Wellesley’s request he said he would 


DEATH OF THE DUKE. 


263 


1852.] 

come at 10. Mr. Hulke, on leaving, called upon Dr. 
M‘Arthur, and told him what he had done, which the latter 
approved of. Neither of the medical gentlemen appear to 
have been present when the fatal attack commenced—an 
attack to which the Duke’s constitution has for years been 
liable, and which, a year and a half ago, had been con¬ 
quered by their successful treatment. His Grace, when 
seized, lost the power of speech and of consciousness. On the 
arrival of the medical attendants emetics were administered, 
which, however, produced no effect. Every effort was used 
to afford relief, but in vain. His Grace was removed from 
bed into an arm-chair, where it was thought he would be 
more at ease; and the attendants of his dying moments stood 
in a group around him, watching the last efforts of expiring 
nature. On one side were Lord Charles Wellesley and 
Dr. M‘Arthur, on the other, Mr. Hulke and the valet. As 
the time passed on and no sign of relief was visible, tele¬ 
graph messages were despatched, first for Dr. Hume and 
then for Dr. Ferguson, who, however, were unfortunately 
both out of town. Finally, Dr. Williams was sent for, but 
he did not arrive at the castle till 11 o’clock at night, when all 
earthly aid was useless. About noon, a fresh attack, shown 
in the exhausted state of the patient by shivering only, came 
on, and from that time hardly any sign of animation could 
be detected. Mr. Ilulke could only ascertain by the con¬ 
tinued action of the pulse, the existence of life. He felt it from 
time to time till about a quarter past three, when he found 
that it had ceased to beat, and declared that all was over. 
Dr. M‘Arthur tried the other arm, and confirmed the fact; 
but Lord Charles Wellesley expressed his belief that the 
Duke still breathed, and a mirror was held to his mouth by 
the valet. The polished surface, however, remained un¬ 
dimmed, and the great commander departed without a 
struggle or even a sigh to mark the exact moment when the 
vital spark was extinguished. 

In Deal and Walmer the event produced the impression 
which was to be expected, and which is felt in every part 
of the country. All the shops were closed, the streets were 
deserted, the flag at the fort was hoisted half-mast high, and 
an air of gloom prevailed, with which the state of the 
weather was in sorrowful keeping. An occurrence which in 
the nature of things was to have been looked for, and could 
not possibly long have been postponed, took every one 
by surprise at last; and though the Duke of Wellington 
quitted life full of years and full of honours, the sudden- 


264- 


memoir OF THE DUKE. 


ness of liis removal fell upon the public mind, from the 
greatness of the man, with somewhat of the shock of a pre¬ 
mature death. 

In forming estimates of the characters of great men, it 
has been fashionable to deal in wholesale comparison, and, 
by putting together persons who have done something like 
the same thing, under circumstances and associations entirely 
different, to do equal injustice to both, and to lower one with¬ 
out elevating the other. The Duke, whose loss we now de¬ 
plore, has shared the common fate of the heroes of history. 
“ A second Alexander,” “ another Csesar,” varied by “ the 
Alexander of England,” “ the Cassar of his time,” are ex¬ 
pressions as common in the mouths of people as they are 
unmeaning. 

It is not by comparing Arthur, Duke of Wellington, with 
some obsolete hero of a time with which we have little sym¬ 
pathy, that we shall either form a fair conception of his 
greatness, or do honour to his deserts. The lives and ex¬ 
ploits of Alexander and Wellington are as different as their 
deaths. The one fought for the lust of empire, the other 
for the safety of his country. The one revelled in the ex¬ 
citement and wild enthusiasm of valour, the other regulated 
his courage by a temperate judgment, which lent effect to 
every blow. The Macedonian conquered, and made no 
provision to secure his conquests ; the English warrior con¬ 
quered only in order to save what was already acquired. 
Foolhardiness and a wild taste for a spurious renown made 
Alexander reckless of life ; Wellington risked his own with¬ 
out hesitation, but without heedlessness. The same cool 
and temperate courage made him careful of the lives of his 
men. In wars, he well knew, lives must be lost; but the 
fewer the better. Of their deaths w r e shall speak presently. 
But what shall we say of the attempt to compare Buona¬ 
parte and his great rival ? What shall we think of the 
long mass of unsatisfactory and ungenerous scribbling of 
Frenchmen and Englishmen alike on a point likely for ever 
to remain at issue? We are too hasty in our judgment; 
much that has been written on this vexatious question only 
resembles the attempts to square the circle, or to discover a 
new authorship for the Homeric poems. 

It must be years ere we are enabled to estimate the full 
effects of the career of these two generals on the respective 
interests of France and England, and little will be gained in 
the meanwhile by captious abuse, or the affectation of con- 



1852.] MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE DUKE. 265 

tempt, on either side. The more you write down an adver¬ 
sary, the greater do you prove his importance to be. Never¬ 
theless, the French, under the bayonet reign of Louis Na¬ 
poleon the Little, have not much to boast of. The glories of 
Napoleon’s battles have left little behind them but a display 
of fireworks, as an equivalent for public freedom and indi¬ 
vidual security. England, on the contrary, enjoys a greater 
amount of liberty at home, and a more extensive and more 
willingly-recognized influence elsewhere, than it was ever 
her lot to possess. So far, the results of the victories of 
Buonaparte and of Wellington leave the balance, as esti¬ 
mated from their consequences, largely in favour of the 
latter. 

It has been a frequent complaint that the character of 
Wellington was wholly unsusceptible of kindly emotions, 
that he was a mere disciplinarian, and that, if not naturally 
cruel, he was professionally harsh, even where human life 
was concerned. To this we must reply, that no man’s 
temper was ever tried so much, and with so little propor¬ 
tionate reason for complaint. It is a misfortune with some 
persons to be severe in their very virtue. A mind of 
exalted firmness, loving the truth, speaking only the truth, 
and ready to devote life, health, and personal comfort to the 
realization of one grand object, can ill sympathise with, or 
find apology for, the relaxed and qualified obedience which 
others may pay to its behest. The lives of single men 
become, by the force of circumstances, of little importance in 
the eyes of him who knows that a single sentinel falling 
asleep, or a single recreant successfully deserting, may peril 
the safety of thousands. His very care for the preservation 
of the whole army must nerve the arm, and steady the 
hand, even while writing the death-warrant of the offender. 
But firmness and severity are qualities which are too apt to 
outstep their legitimate boundaries. They are often so 
nearly allied to hardness and cruelty, that it is difficult to 
know by which term we should designate their acts. 

Although the Duke might be ranked among even the 
severest of disciplinarians, it is an open injustice to deny 
him the possession of many traits of an inward gentleness, 
which, without degenerating into softness, formed the main¬ 
spring of many an act of simple and unostentatious bene¬ 
volence, would make him sympathise with the widow of the 
fallen warrior, or hail some battered old soldier, of whose 
broken leg he knew the whole history. A hundred anec¬ 
dotes are current, which show the love in which the 


266 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


“ Iron Duke” was held by liis whole army. A hundred 
tales, which even the vanquished paraded with delight, 
attest his generosity to the conquered, and his unwillingness 
to revenge the losses which an armed force and a perverse 
government had inflicted upon a helpless and unprotected 
multitude. How often was his very sternness the sole means 
which could prevent the vanquished falling victims to the 
savage and wanton excesses of a soldiery who had been 
exhausted by toil, and were now maddened with success! 
Could we impartially and coolly read over the whole narra¬ 
tive of the Duke’s campaigns, we should find that while the 
severity he exercised was the sole source of the respectability 
and efficiency of our troops in the Peninsular war, the trials 
and privations he underwent were such as, in a less cool and 
systematic nature, must have developed a habit of arbitrary 
cruelty, and given loose rein to all the terrific excesses which 
disgraced the most famous victories of former times. “ I 
must be cruel that I may be kind,” is no merely poetical 
paradox. It is a simple truth that should be engraven in 
the hearts of those who lay claim to any influence over 
others. Compare the amount of strictness which a con¬ 
scientious clergyman must exercise in a parish filled with 
infidelity and dissoluteness—the severity with which the 
management even of an ordinary boys’-school must be con¬ 
ducted—and compare the difficulties in which the Duke 
was placed, and the numbers, and character of the numbers 
whom he had to govern; and the tear of the Recording 
Angel will not be found wanting to efface his severities from 
the page of history. 

But there was nothing misanthropical in the Duke’s se¬ 
verity. He was as finished a gentleman as soldier. He 
had an affable word for everyone, but he had no words to 
waste. He could unbend, and unbend gracefully; but he 
never forgot business. The intensity of his character 
was too great to allow of frivolity, but his accurate good 
sense taught him to consider even the lighter duties of 
society as worthy of consideration. Beauty, wit, and liveli¬ 
ness were not without their attractions for him, but they 
never interfered with the demands of duty. His mind was 
never distracted from the performance even of the most 
ordinary matters, however great might be the temptation. 
To the latest moments of his life, he was always to be found 
when wanting, always willing to forget ease and comfort, 
and begin work afresh. Whether in the field or the cabinet 
he was always to be depended upon, and the harder and less 


1852.] PRIVATE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE. 267 

alluring the duty, the more certain was he to undertake its 
performance. He who could chat good-naturedly with his 
housekeeper about matters on which editors would have 
given worlds for his opinion—who, it has been observed, 
had “a compliment for the prettiest face”—who has gone’ 
alone and in no company save that of a heart satisfied°with 
itself, to put letters into the post - office, enclosing the 
means of relief, often, it is to be regretted, to the successful 
impostor—surely his name is not to be chronicled side-by-side 
with the cold-blooded conquerors who have known society 
only as a field for the display of spectacles in their own 
honor. Wellington courted no show. Unlike a modern 
French adventurer, he had claims on public love which a 
hurricane of fireworks and a cascade of boit-bons could 
never have purchased. 

Of the private occupations of the life of the Duke, the 
little we know is favourable to his memory. His hardy 
frame was kept in constant exercise by early walks. He 
retired to rest early, read, wrote, and took his meals with a 
regularity that well illustrated his previous career. It may 
be doubted whether his life, long as it was, was not shortened 
by the .severity of his early toils in India; but few men 
have preserved health of mind or body in a like perfection 
of efficiency. How great is the contrast between the deaths 
of the Macedonian and the English warrior ! The one died 
prematurely of a childish debauch, after murdering his 
dearest friend in a drunken broil; the other sunk under 
the weight of exhausted nature, after a life in which in¬ 
temperance had had no share. 

The position of Wellington as a statesman has excited no 
small variation among the opinions of politicians. Pane¬ 
gyrists have sought to elevate his political talents to a level 
with his military capacity. Admirers have been unwilling 
to confess the possibility of the Duke ever being mistaken; 
while another class would make us believe that his politics 
were scarcely ever successful, and that his whole Parlia¬ 
mentary career displays little else than a succession of 
failures. Neither extreme is right. The Duke was by no 
means ignorant of financial matters, and is even said to have 
expressed his opinion that his true genius was rather for the 
Exchequer than the AVar-office. At one of the most critical 
conjunctures of the Peninsular war he drew up a most able 
paper on the true principles of Portuguese banking; and 
at Seringapatam, after very serious evils had been ex¬ 
perienced from a long-standing debasement of the coinage, 


268 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


a memorandum was accidentally discovered in the treasury 
from the pen of Colonel Wellesley, every prediction and 
observation of which had been exactly verified by events. 
Wellington’s abilities were tasked in a government where 
all progress is the result of compromise, where no interest 
is destroyed without compensation, where the most resolute 
minister is forced to qualify his own convictions in deference 
to those of his opponents, and where every act has to sustain 
the tedious ordeal of Parliamentary discussion. We do not 
say that Wellington possessed Napoleon’s power of admini¬ 
stration. We are aware that no such pretensions could be 
advanced on his behalf. But it should be also added that 
their respective spheres of action admit of no comparison, 
and that the Duke’s conclusions, if less brilliant than the 
conceptions of his antagonist, have proved better calculated 
for the test of experience. 

The chief characteristic of Wellington’s mind was a 
steady good sense, which invariably led him to investigate 
every bearing of a subject. He was not easily surprised; 
indeed, the nil admirari was developed in his character 
to an extent which easily accounts for the popular opinion 
as to his insensibility to the ordinary attractions of 
life. He was no romancer. He never made eloquent 
speeches, filled with seductive rhetoric and fine-drawn 
metaphors. He did not seek to colour, where a plain 
outline would suffice. Words were never wanting to him 
when really needed, because never wasted uselessly. He did 
not, like “our honourable friend,” devote elegant periods to 
the praise of his hearers, or the condemnation of an 
imaginary abuse—a ghost of his own raising. He spoke 
only of realities; and his language was derived from the real 
world. He was one of the striking and rare instances in 
which plain straightforwardness worked its way, and forced 
the decorative frippery of speech-makers into dumb astonish¬ 
ment. It has been finely and pointedly observed, that “he 
never set human nature at more or less than it was worth. 
He made allowance for passions, interests, and contingencies, 
computed things at their true value, and deduced conclusions 
which were rarely wrong. His despatches abound with 
opinions on the governments, politics, and men with whom 
he was brought into contact, and it would be difficult to 
point out one among them all which facts have not more or 
less confirmed.” 

It cannot, however, be denied that the “ old school” 
cautiousness had some considerable effect in restraining 


1852.] POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE DUKE. 269 

the Duke from, many measures which tended to the well¬ 
being of society. When his military career had ceased, old 
remembrances prevented his appreciating the mild and 
moralizing alterations which have conduced to the improve¬ 
ment and comfort of our standing army. As respected the 
organization and equipment of the army, no opinions could 
be more liberal than his own ; but it cannot he said that he 
was equally enlightened in his views of the service in 
general. In fact, he looked upon military reforms as he 
looked upon civil reforms—without absolute bigotry, but 
with no willing mind, and perhaps even in the light of 
unconservative intrusions. The successive improvements in 
the condition of the British soldier originated with others 
than the Commander-in-Chief, and were not unusually 
carried out in despite of his opposition. For all that could 
make the soldier “ efficient,” according to the old practical 
ideas of efficiency, a ready advocate was always to be found 
in the Duke; but the reforms of the recruiting and the 
relief systems, the amelioration of barrack life, and, above 
all, the abolition of military flogging—a measure which 
ought to have been carried much earlier—were not due to 
the Commander-in-Chief, though experience has now shown 
the perfect propriety of their introduction. His professional 
faculties never failed him to the last. His views respecting 
the exposure of our coasts to invasion, however their sound¬ 
ness might have been contested at the time, were indisputably 
correct according to the maxims of his own experience. If 
there were error, it was not in judgment, but in understand¬ 
ing. If Frenchmen and Englishmen were indeed such as 
the Duke had known them—if war were to be, as heretofore, 
the appeal of kings and cabinets at the first international 
disagreement — then there could be no doubt that our 
defences were inadequate for public security. These condi¬ 
tions we may hope have somewhat changed, but it can be as 
little reproach to the old Duke that he had not yet arrived 
at such conviction, as it is disgraceful to ourselves that our 
defences are in their present inadequate condition. On our 
famous 10th of April, his peculiar genius was exerted to the 
unspeakable advantage of peace and order. So effective 
were his preparations, that the most serious insurrection 
could have been successfully encountered, and yet every 
source of provocation and alarm was removed by the disposi¬ 
tions adopted. No military display was anywhere to be 
seen. The troops and the cannon were all at their posts, 
but neither shako nor bayonet was visible; and, for all that 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


270 

met the eye, one might have concluded that the peace of the 
metropolis was still intrusted to the keeping of its own 
citizens. As an instance, however, of his forecast against the 
worst on this memorable occasion, it may be observed that 
orders were given to the commissioned officers of artillery to 
take the discharge of their pieces on themselves. The Duke 
knew that a cannon shot too much or too little might change 
the aspect of the day, and he provided by these remarkable 
instructions both for imperturbable forbearance as long as 
forbearance was best, and for unshrinking action when the 
moment for action came. 

In the House of Lords the Duke was a regular attendant, 
and not unfrequently a speaker, but the journals of that 
body supply few testimonies of our hero’s excellence. His 
opinions and votes, excepting when his natural Conserva¬ 
tism had not yet been sufficiently influenced by pressure 
from without, were rarely otherwise than soundly given, 
but his motives were often imperfectly expressed. In ad¬ 
dressing the House, the Duke allowed himself to be carried 
away, not by the excitement of feeling, but by the impetus 
of a delivery which, without being either fluent or rapid, 
was singularly emphatic and vehement. Although exag¬ 
geration was no part of the Duke’s character, he warmed 
with his subject, especially if it was of a military character, 
and would sometimes, either designedly or from warmth 
of feeling, magnify his own opinions in order to impress 
them upon his hearers. If he recommended, as he did 
with great alacrity, a vote of. thanks to an Indian 
general, the campaign was always “ the most brilliant he 
had ever known;” if he wished to stigmatize a disturbance 
of the peace, it was something transcending “ anything he 
had ever seen in all his experience,” though such a quality 
could hardly be predicated of any disorder under the sun. 
One of the best chroniclers of his deeds has attributed this 
precipitate bestowal of praise and censure to a natural failure 
of character, but we suspect that in many cases the error 
of the opinion was due to the manner of its delivery alone. 
“ Few men,” it has been observed, “ have been intrusted 
with more delicate missions in the distribution of rewards, 
and none could have discharged such duties with more un¬ 
impeachable discrimination. The Duke could appreciate 
events with unfailing nicety, but he failed in the capacity to 
describe them, and of late years his speeches, whSre they 
were not tautology, were often contradictions. Nor could 
the failing be traceable to age alone, for it was observed. 


CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION. 


271 


1852.] 

though in a less degree, during the earlier stages of his 
career, and is the more remarkable from the contrast pre¬ 
sented by his despatches. No letters could ever be more 
temperately or perspicuously expressed than these famous 
documents. Even as specimens of literary composition they 
are exceedingly good—plain, forcible, fluent, and occasion¬ 
ally, like those of Napoleon, even humorous withal.” 

There is yet one matter on which we cannot be wholly 
silent, and that is the Catholic Emancipation Bill. Recent 
movements in the Church have given an invidious pro¬ 
minency to Catholicism, and more than one jealous eye has 
directed itself to Apsley House, as though the assent of the 
Duke to a measure which he had so earnestly repudiated, 
had endangered the safety of the English Church. It is 
even to be doubted whether the Duke—an obvious and per¬ 
severing opponent of what many have regarded only in the 
light of qualified Popery—Tractarianism—has not himself 
deeply regretted the part he had taken. He was a steady, 
practical churchman, and cared as little for a highly-deco¬ 
rated religion as for a luxurious dinner. Plain truths would 
readily satisfy a man with whom truth was the greatest 
virtue. His assent was dictated by expediency, and, we may 
almost say, necessity, not by any sympathy with the prin¬ 
ciples, or collusion with the insidious advances, of Papal 
Catholicism. 

On the whole, with the most distinct and definite opposi¬ 
tion to anything like Papal aggression, we are equally con¬ 
vinced of the impolicy of penal legislation against any reli¬ 
gious creed, provided it is deprived of all power of secular 
interference. Opposition often strengthens opposition, and 
it has ever been the policy of Roman Catholics to put them¬ 
selves in the light of the oppressed party. Sufferance often 
lets a thing die out, to which opposition would only act as 
sand-paper does to lucifers. Hoping, as we do, that the 
passing of the “ Jew Bill” will soon efface one of the re¬ 
maining acts of illiberality, which, while they rob us of the 
services of many efficient citizens, do not, in the least, con¬ 
duce to the preservation of the religion of the Church, 
unless, indeed, Church religion and bigotry must be 
identical. “ Soldiers,” as Corporal Trim observes, “can say 
their prayers;” but they are scarcely likely to sympathize 
with the "minute ramifications and delicately-drawn distinc¬ 
tions of a dogmatic system. Without any wish to depreciate 
the real and proper value of orthodoxy, we can well pardon 
the Duke having taken a political rather than a clerical view 


MEMOIR OF THE DUKE. 


272 

of the Catholic question. Those who remember the time in 
which that bill was passed will not be surprised at our want 
of sympathy with some of the popular indignation on the 
subject. 

It were easy to devote volumes to the praise of one who, 
like the Duke of Wellington, has earned every honour that 
humanity can bestow, and of whom, nevertheless, no one 
has ever spoken, or can ever speak of as “ over rewarded.” 
Monuments—not always most creditable to national (or 
rather Government) taste—will not transmit the name of 
Wellington to posterity with greater eclat than will the pens 
of ten thousand writers. 

The ancient warriors of the north, in their horror of 
lingering sickness, and with a barbarous preference for a 
death by arms, would gash themselves with wounds, or hurl 
themselves from a rock, and so go triumphing to the Hall 
of Odin. Fancy, even in recent times, has often associated 
a violent death and a glorious one as identical. As the 
warrior of the classic era prayed that no lingering sickness, 
no insidious disease, but the deadly point of the distant- 
sped arrow, or the deep wound received in front from the 
sharp sword of a renowned combatant, might be their 
medium of transit to the sunless shade of the grave—so 
the soldiers of the Peninsula have shunned a death-bed 
with horror, and have craved the ghastly plain of the 
battle-field for their last resting place. A kindlier fate was 
reserved for the Duke. He had valued life, and esteemed 
valour, just for what each was worth. A dignified and 
honoured old age, spent amidst the admiration of a grateful 
nation and the love of friends, whom a participation in 
danger and difficulty had endeared—such was the prelimi¬ 
nary to a tranquil and silent death. No languishing or 
painful sickness, no aberration of intellect, prostrated the 
energies of the noble old warrior. It was a curious acci¬ 
dent that he died in his arm-chair. The bed of death was 
no place for him who was only about to change immortal 
fame for a still grander immortality yet in store. Death 
saw him not recumbent: a few spasms agitated the frame 
that so many battles had left unshaken, and the soul fled 
from its earthly companion, leaving it seated perhaps in the 
dignity of the dead Charlemagne, and leaving a name as 
undying as history, to seek that glory which is treasured up 
for the good and the great of all time. 


London : Printed ).y Svea'/akt and Murray, Old Bailey. 










































































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